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Abstract 
This thesis is an analysis of liberal ideology and its role in South African 
industrial isation during the period 1886-1948. It looks at the growth of a 
specifically South African "liberal tradition" out of nineteenth century Cape 
colonial origins and focuses on the development of liberal welfare and reform 
orientated organisations and agencies. Using the private papers and corres- 
pondence of the individuals involved in establishing this reform tradition, the 
thesis argues that South African liberals were only partially successful in the years 
before 1948 in emulating their western counterparts in institutional ising themselves 
as political mediators between the state apparatus and the burgeoning black working 
class. Lacking a sound political base in the narrow electoral franchise, liberals 
were forced increasingly onto the defensive as the old paternalist basis of Cape 
liberalism became eroded. Though for the period between Uni-on and the second 
world war able use was made of local level politics, the increase in democratic 
radicalism by the mid 1940s forced liberals towards reformulating their ideology into 
one of administrative reform from above on the basis of a model of ethnic pluralism. 
This theory has remained the basis of South African liberal ideology substantially up 
to the present. 
.- J-: 
Con ten ts 
page 
Preface i 
Abbreviations 
Introduction 
A marginal phenomenon? 2 
The problem of social control 10 
Social control and South African liberalism 15 
The weaknesses of South African liberalism 23 
The scope of this work 25 
References 
Chapter One :. The decline of Cape liberalism 35 
The 1883 Native Laws and Customs Commission 41 
The Glen Grey Act 47 
References 
Chapter Two Ethiopian ism. and the extension of educational 61 
control 
The Ethiopian Challenge 63 
The Missionary Response: Fort Hare and African higher 70 
education 
The pattern of Cape liberalism after Union 82 
Re feren ces 
Chapter Three : The debate on segregation 92 
The context of imperial debate 95 
The widening of the debate 103 
Re feren ces 115 
page 
Chapter Four The ethnic challenge to assimilation 121 
The beginnings of an ethnic formulation 123 
The African challenge to ethnicity 129 
The beginnings of liberal consolidation in South Africa 135 
References 140 
Chapter Five Stallardism and the rise of Urban Segregation 146 
The limitations of the new urban liberalism 148 
The campaign for municipal reform 152 
The move back to the reserves 166 
References 167 
Chapter Six The Joint Councils and the extension of co- 173 
optation 
The Phelps Stokes Commission and the formation of the 183 
Joint Councils 
The Joint Councils and the "fight" to defend the Cape 193 
franchise 
The Non Racial Franchise Association 201 
The South African Institute of Race Relations 206 
The Joint Coun ci Is and the 1. C. U. 212 
References 219 
Chapter Seven Liberals and the drive to entrench territorial 234 
segregation 
Segregation and the reformulation of liberal ideology 
238 
Agricultural demonstration and the growth of African 243 
farmers associations 
Attempts at re-thinking segregation: Edgar 
Brookes and 250 
W. M. MacMillan 
Referen ces 
277 
page 
Chapter Eight : Renewed Liberal Debates 287 
The continuation of the debate in South Afr i ca 297 
Splits in the Institute 301 
The longer-term consequences 311 
Re feren ces 315 
Chapter Nine Trusteeship and the Crisis in Liberal Ideology 324 
The anthropological input 329 
The State's response: "Adaptation" and "Trusteeship" 333 
Growing Collaboration 343 
Towards the Politics of Hope 353 
References 355 
Chapter Ten : The growing democratic challenge 364 
The boycott issue 375 
References 385 
Chapter Eleven : The failure of reform 391 
Discussions on reform 392 
The African Response 403 
The beginnings of a party base 407 
References 413 
Conclusion 419 
Re feren ces 428 
Bib I iography 429 
Pre fa ce 
This study of South African liberalism is based on the. extensive archival 
sources left behind by both prominent liberals in South African politics and the 
organisations that they formed. During the period 1975-77,1 conducted research 
into some of these collections, many of which had hardly been used before as a 
basis for historical study. The archives of the South African Institute of Race 
Relations deposited at the University of the Witwatersrand in "B" boxes were 
especially voluminous as were the Rheinnalt-Jones and Margaret Ballinger collections. 
Further material came from the recently discovered Howard Pim papers, the Hofmeyr 
papers, the D. L. Smit papers and such better known collections as those of 
Walter Stanford, A. B. Xuma and George Heaton Nicholls. 
Historical research being such an on-going process, this study can in 
many ways be only a preliminary entry into a very large area where more detailed 
case studies will fill out our knowledge of the workings of contemporary South 
African political processes. In the writing of this thesis, I would like especially 
to thank my supervisor Professor John Rex and various individuals for helpful advice 
and discussion, including Stanley Trapido, Shula Marks, Martin Legassick, Richard 
Mendelson, Alan Jeeves, Tim Couzens, Brian Willan and Chris Saunders. Many. 
librarians have been of invaluable assistance and I would especially thank Marcelle 
Jacobson and Mrs. Anna Cunningham of the Church of the Province Archives, Wits 
University, and Mike Berning and Sandy Ford at Rhodes University Library. 
Paul Rich 
University of Warwick 
January 1980 
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Introduction 
In this study we propose to discuss the impact of liberal political theory on 
the development of South African industrial isation. Concentrating especially on 
the period between 1883, the date. of the politically significant Native Laws and 
Customs Commission in the Cape Colony, and 1948, the year of the election victory 
of Dr. D. F. Malan's National Party over Smuts's United Party, we will be looking 
at the shape and content of the liberal reform movement in South African history. 
Liberalism as such, it must first be acknowledged, has not usually been seen 
as having all that great an impact on either political consciousness or legislation in a 
society like South Africa. The conventional view of historians both of the right 
and the left has mainly been to emphasise the continual eclipse of those political 
figures and movements who sought even mildly I iberal -democratic reform. Instead., 
the central focus of attention has been on the growth of rival collective nationalisms 
especially Afrikaner and African nationalism - and the development of a labour 
repressive economy that has markedly diverged from the I iberal -democratic models of 
Western Europe and North Am. erica. South African industrialisation, indeed, has 
frequently been seen in terms of what the Simonses, in their study of class and colour 
in South African po lit ics between 1850 and 1950, have des cribe, d as "the impact of 
an advanced industrialism on an obsolete, degenerate colonial order". 
I 
Certa, inly, a general overview of South African history over the last century 
or so seems to confirm this general impression of the strong colonial and authoritarian 
legacy of the nineteenth, century squeezing out any pressures for political and economic 
I ibera I isa tion. Attention has therefore turned to the entrenchment of what the 
historical sociologist Barrington Moore, in an important comparative study of the 
different paths to modernisation, has termed a "revolution from above". 
2 
Certa in I y, 
judged even- by its own standards of a free market economy and the progressive 
destruction of state controlled regulations over industrial enterprise, the classical 
liberal model of laisser faire economic development stood little or no chance of 
0 
2 
entrenching itself in the political and economic order that grew up in South Africa 
after the discoveries of diamonds at Kimberley and gold on the Witwatersrand in the 
1 870s and 1880s. By the time that South Africa came to industrialise, the first 
main wave of -industrial transformation, represented by the British industrial revolution 
after 1850 and the wave of American expansion westwards in the nineteenth century, 
had already reached maturity. In effect, the real heyday of liberalism as a political 
creed and method of economic organisation centred around a capitalist free market 
economy had passed and the beginnings of industrial isation in South Africa, together 
with such countries as Japan and Germany, saw the beginnings of a new era of growing 
state control . Accordingly, what emerges as central to the study of the industrial 
transformation of South African society is the continuous and unhampered growth of 
central state power as the key means to foster and protect an industrial capitalism that 
rested only to a marginal degree on the disciplines of a competitive market economy as 
in the British or American case. This, therefore, leaves little scope for the classic 
form of political liberalisation in South Africa on the Western model. 
marginal phenomenon? 
Given this basic setting, it is not surprising that the basic historiographical 
interpretation of South African liberalism has rested on the view that it has been 
continually superceded and defeated by forces and organisations both more powerful 
and tightly organised than itself. Reflecting the far wider world wide trend of a 
general retreat of liberal political ideas in the twentieth century before rival state 
dominated philosophies of nationalism, fascism and communism, liberal analysts in 
particular have viewed liberalism in the South African context as a hopeless case of 
well intentioned individuals and organisations being swamped by the entrenched forces 
of Afrikaner nationalism, allied in many cases to the die hard English-speaking 
segregationists in areas like Natal. 
3 
This did not necessarily mean that the basic 
principles of political liberalism could not potentially be applied at some stage in South 
African economic and industrial development, for the forces that had led to widespread 
industrial isation and urbanisation were seen by these liberal analysts as also creating a 
3 
common social framework that transcended the boundaries of race and ethnic identity. 
But it was the central domination of the social framework by a polity characterised 
by a strongly ethnicically separatist philosophy that continued to prevent this from 
being real ised. 
However, this liberal view of South Africa's politically stalled industrial isation 
has come under growing attack in recent years by a newer school of revisionist , historians 
who have by no means been so certain of liberalism's basic marginality in South African 
history. Criticising, in particular, the second volume of The Oxford History of South 
Africa, which first appeared in 1970,4 the revisionists have argued that the liberal 
argument essentially rests on a false assumption, namely that it is possible to make a 
direct disjunction between a common social framework characterised, as The Oxford 
History maintained, by the "interaction" between "peoples of diverse origins, languages, 
technologies, ideologies and social systems, meeting on South African soil" 
5 
and a 
polity which is dominated by a racially exclusive ideology. This presupposes that 
there is a necessary contradiction between the rationality of a "common s ociety" and a 
state apparatus that continues to deny this in the interests. of maintaining a "dogmatic" 
racial ideology. 
In essence, this debate between the revisionists and liberals grew out of a 
debate in the early 1970s on the nature of possible political change in South Africa's 
contemporary social structure and on whether there was a possible force, in economic 
growth per se leading to some form of future political transformation. This debate, 
which has been extensively analysed in such volumes as those of Leftwich, Harrison 
6 
Wright and Schlemmer and Webster we do not propose to go into now in extensive 
depth beyond reviewing its implications for the reinterpretation of South African history. 
For, if the revisionist critique is to be accepted, it may be necessary to revise, many of 
the conventional assumptions about liberalism's place in the historical process. In 
particular, if the revisionist argument that there is no inherent contradiction between 
economic development and the. dominant racial ideology is correct, it may mean that 
liberalism may well have actively caused in many ways the dominant political order in 
South Africa today, instead of remaining in continued opposition to it. 
4 
The revisionist critique is important in South African historiography for 
bringing to bear new categories of analysis centred around concepts of social class 
and modes of production. This marxian framework shifts attention away from the 
previous liberal emphasis upon political ideas and ideologies for their own sake and 
instead seeks to incorporate them into a social framework governed by capital 
accumulation, class conflict and struggles for ideological legitimacy. The previous 
liberal argument that'there was a unilinear process endemic to South African industrial- 
isation whereby the progressive expansion of capitalism ensured a long run increase in 
general economic well-being can now by no means be automatically accepted. The 
revisionists have widened the framework of analysis in order to locate South Africa in 
the structures of global political economy and here it is not necessarily obvious that 
unhampered development follows tout cours. Unlike the first phase of industrial isation 
in Western Europe and North America, which was aided by the advantages of the surplus 
derived from imperial expansion overseas or America's expansion westwards, the South 
African phase of industrial expansion had to rely on the direct exploitation of peoples 
directly within her territorial confines or immediately contiguous to her. Thus, for 
the revisionists, the global relationships forged by the western powers of metropolitan 
development leading to peripheral underdevelopment, has taken place in the South 
African instance internally within her own borders. As a direct consequence of this, 
the racial ideologies of segregation and later apartheid did not develop, as some of 
the liberal conventional wisdom would have it, as a long term legacy of South African 
Frontier history but a direct consequence of capitalist industrial isation and the peri- 
: )heralisation of the African pre-capitalist reserve economies into labour reservoirs for 
7 
the white dominated capitalist core. 
Thus, as revisionist analysis has deepened in the 1970s, attention has 
increasingly turned towards seeing liberalism in South Africa as by no means such a 
-narginal and peripheral a phenomenon as has so often been argued. In particular, 
ýhe revisionists reflected the growing use of the concept of "social control" in the 
; omewhat alienated years of the 1 970s as their marxist methodology emphasised the 
)roblems of class differentiation and struggle for political power. In this newer 
5 
view, liberalism became less a simple tradition of political opposition based around 
such basic principles as the rights of man, freedom of speech, press and of assembly 
and the rule of law, but rather an ideology that had played a considerable role in 
the evolution of structures of social control in order to perpetuate a class society 
and capitalist relations of production. 
This was not a completely original view for attacks had been made on 
liberals and liberal ideology in the course of political struggle in South Africa in the 
1940s and 1950s. The Trotskyite Non European Unity Movement, especially, had 
been deeply critical of what they perceived to be the control exerted by white 
liberals in South Africa over black politics and its leading ideologist, I. B. Tabata 
had mounted an attack in his book The Awakening of a People in 1950 on the whole 
tradition of South African liberalism from the time of its development in the Cape 
Colony i, n the early nineteenth century. This liberalism, he argued, was specifically 
linked to English capitalism in its thrust to overcome "Dutch feudalism": 
the representatives of British imperialism appeared to the Africans in 
a progressive I ight and in so far as the I ibera Is brought them education 
they appeared as their friends and the champions -of their rights. 
Here again the Africans confused the objective demands of the 
capitalist system with a supposed will-to-good on the part of the 
I ibera Is. They translated the clash between two economic systems 
as evidence of an inherent difference in attitude towards the 
Africans, as an intrinsic difference in moral principles between 
Dutch and English. They failed to realise that the good things 
they associated with the I iberals had nothing whatever to do with 
moral principle or the humanitarian will-to-good. Actual Iy the 
liberals themselves were obeying the dictates of the objective forces 
of capitalism. 8 
A similar view to this by Nosipho Maieke in a work entitled The Role of the 
Missionaries in Conquest published by the Society of Young Africa in 1953 also 
emphasises the mystifying function of liberalism in South African history. Here , even 
the educational function of the missions and the philanthropic aims of the early Cape 
liberals like the Rev. John Philip are attacked as part of a deliberate colonial policy 
of "divide and rule". Emphasising the connections of the Evangelicals and A-nti 
"1' 
6 
Slavery Movement in Britain to the rising industrial bourgeoisie, Maieke argued that 
ýhe missionaries in South Africa were part of the historical expansion of capitalism 
: )nto a world scale: 
This is the womb of the so-called humanitarian movements of the 
early 19th Century. It is against this background of vast 
economic forces that the influx of missionaries to the colonies 
acquires meaning. The missionaries came from a capitalist 
christian civilisation that unblushingly found religious sanctions 
for inequality, as it does to this day, and whose ministers 
solemnly blessed its wars of aggression. Men like Wilberforce 
had visions of extending this civilisation to the ends of the earth. 
They saw themselves as the chosen race. 9 
Furthermore, "the achievement of the missionaries was the first achievement 
)f liberalism" 
10 
such that the foundations of liberal ideology in South Africa became 
rreparably joined to the intrusion of British mercantile imperialism and the control 
fructures it created. 
This earlier tradition of analysis of South African liberalism as an instrument 
)f bourgeois social control has, however, been elaborated in the more recent revisionist 
vork of Stanley Trapido and Martin Legassick. Trapido's area of focus has been 
: onfined to the Cape Colony between Responsible Government in 1853 and Union in 
910 where he has looked at the structures underpinning the hegemony of liberal, ideology 
it both the colonial and the local level. In particular, he shows how the maintenance 
ýf the "great tradition" of Cape liberalism depended upon the underlying backing of 
ngl, ish mercantile capital while the local tradition of liberalism related substantially to 
he establishment of marketing and trading links with the Eastern Cape peasantry. 
11 
)sing more recent categories of analysis from Immanual Wallerstein's general theory of 
he capitalist world economy, we can say that Cape liberalism reflected the emergence 
f the transitional category of African peasants between the pre-colonial tribal mode of 
roduction and the proletarianisation that ensued with the rise of mining capital after 
, )e diamond and gold discoveries at Kimberley and the Witwatersrand in the 1870s and 
880s. During this period a process of peripheral isation occurred as the Cape was 
7 
integrated into the world trade relationships forged by the expansion of the woollen 
indust ry, 
13 
and it was through the generation of a relatively well-off class of African 
peasants and small capitalist farmers 
14 
that the Cape liberal tradition flourished. 
Certainly, African voters came to play an important role in a number of Eastern Cape 
constituencies despite the successive raising of the franchise qualifications in 1887 
and 1894, while at the colonial level the tradition emphasised freedom of speech and 
the press and the rule of law through the growth of a significant liberal establishment 
centred around the missions, the press, the judiciary, the parliamentary opposition 
and mercantile interests. 
It was this establishment that was eclipsed at Union in 1910 as mining capital 
reached a hegemonic position in the united South African political system. From 
this time onwards, the great tradition of Cape liberalism was finished, though the 
small tradition continued to survive at the local level and the South African polity 
embarked on a course of territorial segregation. But what was I iberal isms' relationship 
to this new political phase? On this question a controversial thesis has been advanced 
by Martin Legassick in his work on South African liberalism in order to extend the area 
of analysis of Dr. Trapido. Liberalism, argues Dr. Legassick, did not remain a static 
force at the time of Union, linked only to a dying tradition in the Cape. Though 
this argument has been frequently mainted by a number of I iberals themselves, it over- 
looks an important process of ideological reformulation that was already beginning 
before Union and which continued after 191-0 and up through the inter-war years to the 
1948 election. During this period, liberal ideas and institutions were alive and 
active and werd being gradually accommodated to the hegemony of mining capital under 
the umbrella ideology of territorial segregation: 
The separate hegemonic classes within nineteenth century South Africa 
were linked only through the market, and only dominated with any 
effect at this level by the metropol i tan -orientated bourgeoisie of the 
Cape ports. The rapid emergence of the mining industry, generating 
capitalist forces and relations of production which impinged on every 
aspect of the Southern African economic system, created a new situation. 
The domination of the capitalist mode accelerated class differentiation 
8 
and forms of uneven development. The rise of a hegemonic 
fraction of capital based on production led to the creation of 
the South African state in which this fraction dominated the 
power bloc. Neither classical liberalism nor the hierarchi, cal 
racial ideologies of non capitalist social formations in the Boer 
Republics could serve to rationalise or reproduce bourgeois social 
relations in the new context. 15 
In consequence a new ideology of "segregation ism" emerged which located 
bourgeois social control on a geographical basis of separatad African and White land 
areas. As this segregation became entrenched by successive legislation in the years 
after Union, liberals, argues Legassick, did not for the most part step outside its bounds, 
but rather reacted to it in a defensive fashion, looking "in nostalgia for the comfortable 
assumptions of Cape liberalism rather than in a forward-looking search for reform. 
Most of their activities can be simply interpreted in terms of social control, and many 
of the reforms they advocated were intended to resolve the contradictions of segregation 
rather than to challenge its premises". 
16 On this methodological basis, it is possible 
to conclude that the opinion leaders of South African liberalism of the inter-war years 
such as Howard Pim, Edgar Brookes, J. D. Rheinnalt-Jones, W. M. Macmillan and 
C. T. Loram were for the most part concerned with elaborating social and welfare 
policies through bodies like the Joint Councils and the South African Institute of Race 
Relations which could be reconciled with territorial segregation and to smooth over 
lacunae that had been left by a generally weak state administrative apparatus. Further- 
more, on the basis of a hitherto unpublished paper, Legassick argues that once the state 
did start to develop a strongly interventionist capacity in the years after 1948, as 
Dr. Verwoerd began to systematise the apartheid doctrine, liberalism in South Afr-ica 
lost its essential moral basis and political purpose. The final demise of the Liberal 
Party in 1968 was not so much a result of simple political repression, the basic inter- 
pretation offered by liberals themselves, but a culmination of an inner withering through 
the loss of liberalism's basic effectiveness as an "agency of social control". 
17 
In its 
place there has emerged, Legassick concludes, the vulgar materialism of the 
O'Dowd, 
Horwitz and Hutt kind which has placed its central reliance upon economic growth to 
promote political change. This teleological belief articulates the post-war optimism 
9 
in economic progress as it has been articulated by Wait Rostow's "stages of growth" 
theory into the South African context and concludes that at some date. # 
O'Dowd has 
even named 1980 as the critical year, South Africa will begin to emerge onto some 
form of I ibera I -democratic state, albeit incorporating the features of a "plural 
society" due to the entrenchment of strongly diverse ethnic and cultural diversities. 
18 
Legassick's thesis is highly partisan and coloured by a desire, as he expresses 
it, to promote the interests of a "genuinely South African marxism within the democratic- 
19 African nationalist movement". How far should his analysis be taken as an accurate 
depiction of the true nature and intentions of South African liberalism as it has evolved 
from its nineteenth century Cape origins? One central objection is that the analysis 
has been typecast in terminology that defies exact definition. While the relationship 
of liberalism to structures of social control is an important one, there is the problem of 
what exactly does "social control" mean? At the same time, while Legassick has' 
been concerned, i. n studies on liberals such as Alfred Hoernle, C. T. Lorman and the 
missionaries of the American Board Mission, to analyse the ideas of varying South 
African "liberals'. ', 
20 
there is the important and basic question of "who or what is 
I ibera I? " By working within a shifting perspective of both "social control" and 
"I ibera I ism" there is the accordant danger of ideological reductionism and making 
whoever one I ikes I iberal and an "agent of social control". Indeed., in so far as 
anyone supports non revolutionary political change and some form of private enterprise 
economy, then he can be seen as liberal who acts to advance social control. The 
crudity of this approach is underlined by Legassick's concern to read back ex post 
facto the actual effects of liberal ideas of reform in the South African context and 
to then conclude that liberals both acted as "agents of social control" as well as 
21 
precursors of the apartheid state as it emerged after 1948. 
There is an important need, therefore, for a more exact definition of terms 
before assessing this critique of South African liberals and in this work we propose 
to look both at the uses of the social control concept in historical analysis and the 
definitions Offered of liberal ideology. On this basis, we conclude that while 
10 
Legassick's re-assessment makes an important contribution to our understanding of 
liberalism in South Africa, far sharper discrimination is needed between different types 
of I iberal isms, only the most conservative of which acted as conscious agents of social 
con tro I. A wider periodisation of liberalism" impact on South African history would 
suggest, furthermore, that the more thoroughly radical of liberals, acting in terms of 
its rationalist and Enlightenment origins in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. ' 
have acted as vital contributors to the tradition of resistance to political oppression. 
It is this wider periodisation that we seek to undertake in the latter part of this study 
as we move beyond the liberalism of the inter-war years to assess its impact on the 
I ibera I ism post 1948. 
The problem of social control: 
A crucial lacuna in Legassick's whole argument is an adequate definition of 
11 social control". This is important when it is realised that historians have radically 
disagreed on the value of the term. Gareth Stedman Jones, for example, has argued 
that the functionalist origins of the concept in America, with such pioneer sociologists 
as Edward A. Ross and Robert Ezra Park, makes it useless for the understanding of radical 
cleavages in history brought about the the rise of popular movements. In particular, 
the term as such divorces class relations from power relations such that there is a. danger 
of reducing the explanation for the failure of subordinate groups to manifest any 
collective consciousness of exploitation to narrowly psychologist terms. Stedman 
Jones has instanced as an example of this kind of social control explanation in historio- 
graphy the concentration camp analogy employed by Stanley Elkins in his classic work 
on American negro slavery - an essentially closed method of analysis that allows for 
little or no area of popular resistance to the structures of oppression which later 
historians have found on the Southern slave plantations. 
22 
This interpretation of the social control concept has not by any means won 
, iniversal approval 
from historians and a more recent counter attack has begun to mount. 
Dne recent volume on social control in nineteenth century Britain, for. example, has 
argued that Stedman Jones has misunderstood the essentially trans-ideological nature 
of the term social control. Though the term has been used by functionalists and 
conservative sociologists in both Britain and America, argues the volume's editor 
A. P. Donaigrodzki 
, nevertheless even radical scholars can be attracted to it on the 
basic grounds that all societies and social systems seek to devise various control 
mechanisms by which to perpetuate themselves. In this respect, the concept can 
be potentially attractive for it can illuminate some dark areas of history by showing 
up the processes of interaction between ruling classes and popular masses and the ways 
by which ruling gioups seek to maintain their dominance by the imposition of cultural 
controls. "Cultural forms of the different component parts of social systems" he 
concludes, "are formed in a process of interaction". 
23 
This conception of social control can certainly be said to give the term some 
sort of renewed lease of life, though it could be argued that many of the great works 
of popular historiography such as E. P. Thompson's study of the English working class or 
Eugene Genovese's study of negro resistance on the slave plantations were just as well 
documented without the direct empfoyment of the term. But if the meaning of "social 
control" in the final analysis amounts to a dynamic and not a static conception of social 
relationships, and the interaction between different class and power groups over time, 
then the 'term may well lead to an enrichment of historiography. However, can this 
be said to be the case so far in South African history? Here the term has come into 
frequent use in recent years and in some cases, such as Brian Wil Ian's recent analysis 
of De Beer's manipulation of Sol Piciatie's Brotherhood Movement at Kimberley during 
the first world war, 
24 
some meaning has been given to it in terms of changing class 
relationships. 
But in much of the more dogmatic, "revisionist" literature, "social control" 
has tended to be stated in much more rigidly sociological terms. The term has been 
too easily taken as representing an unquestionable truth which stands through its mere 
assertion and here "social control" seems to stand merely for some branch of an all- 
pervasive machiavellian capitalism. The full historical nature of "social control " as 
a product of changing class and social relationships thus tends to be played down in 
--t ,. 
12 
favour of a much more static conception whereby a capitalist ruling class has a 
permanently fixed and unchanging strategy of continually warding off class struggle 
and growing class consciousness through various strategies of "cooptation" and the buying 
off of a fickle African petty bourgeoisie. In this scenario the white liberals in South 
Africa have been the particular villains of the piece and, as Martin Legassick has 
rep, ý! atedly argued in a succession of papers, it has been through the agency of the 
liberals that the full mechanisms of "social control" by the class of ruling South African 
bourgeoisie has been maintained: beyond repeating týe continued links between the 
white liberals and both capitalism and "segregation ism" in South African history, for 
example, Legassick's most extreme argument is employed when he asserts that by its 
very nature of appealing to the less desirable alternative of bloodshed and revolution 
then it exerts its influence "as a force of social control". 
25 
Liberalism stands 
effectively condemned then 'by its very definition. 
But these are essentially anti-historical arguments and fail to locate liberalism 
effectively in South African historical development as a product of a particular con- 
catenation of events. The subsuming of liberalism into an a priori model of social 
control overlooks its historical peculiarities as an offshoot of a much wider movement 
of western bourgeois liberalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This 
movement had an autonomous set of political ideas that were linked to the rise of an 
assertive middle class and the ex post facto labelling of liberalism as an instrume nt of 
social control thus leads to the underplaying of the subjective belief held in the principles 
of-liberal political ideology for their own sake. The spreading of liberal ideals of 
humanitarianism, social reform and non violent political change was not a process of 
sheer political mystification as the more disillusioned and cynical generation of current 
social analysts have tended to maintain. These ideals were believed in for their own 
sake and they formed the principle bases of the whole language of political 
debate. 
In one long term sense, the protracted nature of liberalism's demise in a context 
like 
South Africa, where the political leadership of the African National Congress only 
reluctantly began to move towards a full scale campaign of violent revolution 
in the 
years after its banning in 1960,26 indicates the degree to which these 
ideals were held 
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amongst different ethnic and class groupings. While undoubtedly much was done to 
manipulate as far as possible the structures through which these ideals were inculcated 
and much of this emerges in later chapters of this essay - it simply is not adequate 
enough to assume that this was merely part of a process of imposing a grid of "false 
consciousness" upon the colonised subjected masses of the black South African population. 
Such a view manifests a failure to read. the whole tone and ethos of a different historical 
era to the present where, in the period of growing third world radicalism in the 1 960S 
and 1970s, much of the values of the forme*r Western liberal mode-I have gone into 
e cl ipse. As recently as a generation ago, many of the principle ideas of the western 
liberal tradition were still very much salient ones, and itwas only with the ostensible 
thaw in the cold war in the late 1 960s that a far more assertive marxism emerged in the 
West to present such a major challenge to the dominant mode of intellectual thinking. 
Thus what is needed in the analysis of South African liberalism is a basic 
empathy that stretches beyond seeing it as simply a functional instrument of capitalist 
domination. For this liberalism was also part of a much wider -international move- 
ment that occurred in the nineteenth century and was expressed in England in the mid 
century Victorian. liberal self confidence. In varying degrees this was the cultural 
and political core of the liberal political model (though additional inputs came from 
both German and American experiences) and around this revolved the increasingly 
less certain liberal colonial satellites. For South African liberals the Victorian 
model was the yardstick by which to judge much of their own actions and achievements, 
and the colonial dependency implicit within this continued to remain dominant long 
after the actual achievement of Union in 1910. The degree to which liberals became 
attuned to developing a more distinct South African-model of control based upon 
"segregation ism" and the manipulation of the structures of control located on the pre- 
capitalist reserve economies is, therefore, far more problematical than many revisionist 
analysts have been prepared to admit. The holistic nature of this model belies much 
of the liberals anti-theoretical empiricism, for South African liberalism continued 
to adopt the classic Victorian approach of avoiding central political questions 
in a society and political context that really demanded it. Indeed, 
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this was one of the central political weaknesses of South African liberalism - its 
failure to adopt a more coherent and politically orientated ideology of struggle 
and is an area that the revisionists have so far completely avoided. In one sense 
it is possible to beg the question with much of the analysis of Legassick on South 
African liberalism: if it was so effective as an agency of social control and in 
mystifying latent class differentiation why did it decline in the way that it did? 
Why did it cease to be the central instrument in dampening political conflict by such 
an astute and machiavellian ruling clqss? The very overstatement of the revisionists' 
case leads to a weakening of the argument through sheer overkill. 
The emergence of apartheid as the dominant political ideology in South 
African state politics in the 1 950s and I 960s lead us, accordingly, to a conclusion 
substantially at variance with much of the revisionists' conventional wisdom. It was 
the weakness and the inadequacy of liberal control structures and precisely their 
failure to act as effective agents of social control that led to the progressive state_ 
nationalisation of former ad hoc efforts practised unsystematically at the local level. 
White paternalist liberalism in fact failed to control the rise of democratic political 
consciousness amongst the mass of black workers and peasants in South African towns 
and villages and it was the continued indebtedness of white liberals to its English 
Victorian guideline that progressively weakened their overall political impact. 
Successive attempts were made, as we document in successive chapters, to modernise 
and upgrade this liberalism to cope with the changing exactitudes of an urbanising 
and industrialising society. But the efforts overall were piecemeal in the classic 
liberal tradition, and it was the generally unsystematic nature of the whole liberal 
effort in comparison to the far more cohesive and tightly controlled apartheid ideology 
under the umbrella of Afrikaner nationalist militancy which led to the latter's success. 
It was thus the paternal dimension of South African liberalism which had 
important ideological implications for later phases of political development. In 
England, social control structures had tended to develop on a generally unsystematic 
basis and without very strong state coordination. The effective dampening of class 
conflict by the middle years of the ninetenth century as England embarked on a period 
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of e conom ic growth aII owed a key breath ing spa ce whereby a de cen tra I ised mode I of 
political order could be developed that left considerable leeway to private initiative 
and middle class philanthropy. 
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Instead, therefore, of making a unilinear passage 
from a paternal system rooted in a pre-industrial agrarian order to one of centralised 
state controlled industrialism, England made a blurred compromise whereby much of 
the tenets of the earlier paternalism were preserved into the urban, secular, industrial 
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age. At the same time., unlike their German liberal counterparts, Victorian 
liberals and their intellectual defenders displayed a singular lack of interest in 
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"intellectuality" and for theories of social totality and wholeness. Until at 
least the emergence of the German educated philosopher Alfred Hoernle in the 1930s.. 
this tradition was to reign supreme in South African liberalism too. For the most 
part, white liberals in the colonial periphery continued to act under the guiding light 
of the Victorian decentralised model, despite the very different configuration of 
class and political cleavages that confronted them. 
Social control and South African liberalism: 
The origins of liberalism in South Africa therefore were very much bound up 
with the same forces that established the nineteenth century liberal culture in England. 
While a theory of liberal pluralism has been traced to the period before British inter- 
vention at the Cape in 1806,30 a distinct tradition of liberal thinking only occurred 
with the expansion of British colonisation and the intrusion of missions 
like the London 
Missionary Society. This was a classical liberalism influenced by the Eighteenth 
Century Enlightenment and Scottish missionaries I ike the Rev. John Philip revealed a 
famil. iarity with the works of Adam Smith, Samuel Johnson, Isaac 
Newton and Dean 
Swift. This liberalism sought initially at least to override racial differences and 
promote the extension of a free-market economy to the empire, and 
it was in many 
respects the ideological accompaniment of English mercantile capitalism and 
"free 
trade imperialism". 
In the same way as its nineteenth century English cou 
I 
nterpart, this South 
--t . 
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African liberalism was empirical, and resistant to any ideas of social totality or a 
coherent theory of the state. For the most part it relied upon subtle political 
pressure and the belief that ideas could be progressively transformed through education 
and "western ci vilisation". Philip's Researches in'South Africa was very much in 
this tradition and it can be seen as a pioneering form of the social survey and narrative 
report that was frequently to be employed by liberal commentators over the following 
century and a half. The immediate objective of the Researches, in fact, was to 
publicise the plight of the Hottentots in the Cape which Philip sought to free from 
ordinances binding them to unfree labour. As a result of this pressure the Government 
passed Ordinance 50 in 1829 removing the Cape Coloureds from their status of indentured 
servants and establishing formal legal equality. 
This action has been seen as the foundation of the Cape constitutional tradition 
in the nineteenth century and it became one of the key anchor points for the historical 
identification of the liberal tradition in South Africa. Its achievement, though, has 
often been emphasised at the expense of the pragmatic political circumstances that 
surrounded it. The Fiftieth Ordinance was an instrument of missionary propaganda 
for what Philip and the L. M. S. were seeking was really British governmental and public 
support for the expansion of their activities in Southern Africa. As Philip indicated 
in his Researches, this aim was not dictated by'any coherent political ambition, but as 
with the Anti-Slavery Clapham Sect in Britain, through moral pressure: 
We ask for nothing unreasonable, nothing illegal, nothing new. 
We have nothing to say to politics. The question under discussion 
is a mere question of civil rights. We have advanced no suggestions 
about the new character of justice. We are the advocates of no 
particular form of civil government in the colony. We have offered 
no particular directions about the machinery of government desirable 
in such a country. We have recommended no checks but such as 
are necessary to prevent one class of British subjects from oppressing 
and destroying another., In what we propose we suspend no weight 
upon the wheels of government. We ask nothing for the poor 
natives more than this., that they should have the protection the law 
affords the colonists. 31 
At the same time it was clear that this laisser faire approach, which eschewed 
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as far as possible direct political involvement beyond the subleties of informal 
pressure group politics, was part of a wider design to establish the legitimacy for the 
missions' own sphere of influence in the Cape Colony. The missions at this time 
were not viewed especially favourably by the white settler interest in the colony, 
which had grown up over the previous 150 years, and missionaries were- frequently 
termed "Hottentot predicants". The Governor, Lord Charles -Somerset, had already 
tried to have Philip removed, so Philip's tactic was mainly concerned to establish the 
basic equality for the Cape Coloureds in order to release resources for a wider 
proselytising mission: 
... if we can procure for the peopla their civil rights, we may 
gradually withdraw the funds now employed in supporting our 
missionary institutions and employ them in diffusing the gospel 
on a more extensive scale. Excepting a few missionaries at 
the principle drostyds or towns who may be employed among the 
coloured population of every class on the sabbath, and in 
preaching in the farm houses in the neighbourhood on week 
evenings, the natives may then be left to the provision made for 
the religious instruction of the colonists. 32 
Such a re-al location of missionary resources was a rational response, Philip 
argued, given the changed nature of Cape politics from the time in 1799 when the 
L. M. S. first moved into the Cape under the rule of the Dutch East India Company. 
Then the position of the missions had been a very defensive one given the very limited 
missionary activity over the period since the colony's' original foundation in 1652. 
Apart from the short-lived attempt by the Moravian Brethren to establish a mission 
amongst the Khoisan in 1737, lasting some five years, the L. M. S. itself represented 
the first real missionary movement in the colony. 
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By the end of the eighteenth 
century, however, the weak soci-al structures of the Khoi and the San had given way 
before the settler intrusions and :a high degree of acculturation had resulted in a class 
based society that in many respects transcended racial divisions. - Without the strong 
imperial links forged by the intrusion of British mercantile imperialism, it was by no 
means clear how Dutch-Coloured relations would have evolved since they were fairly 
evenly matched and, shorn of the imperial fie, might well have resulted in the white 
: 'I ... 
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settlers developing in a similar direction to the prazeros of Mozambique who 
amalgamated into the indigenous society through racial and cultural assimilation. 
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But the intrusion of British mercantile capital put paid to such a trend and 
the ensuing struggle and resistance of the Khoi Rebellion of 1799 to 1801 was an 
indication of the cleavages that had developed between white landowners and their 
Khoi labour tenants. The Rebel I ion came at the end of a period of growing economic 
exploitation of the Khoi as commercial links with the Cape boomed after the British 
entry in 1795 and revealed the limits of collaborative ties between the enculturated 
Khoi and their colonial masters. While it is probably true to say that the Rebellion 
did not mark an actual "independence movement" among the Khoi, since most of the 
drive towards independent state formation had been taken up by movements out of the 
colony by groups like the Griqua, nevertheless there were strong anti -colon isation 
features to it. 
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Desertions with guns and horses to the Xhosa in the 1790s, especially 
after the war of 1793, indicated the seriousness of the resistance involved and shaped the 
responses by the missions in the period following the restoration of order in 1801. For 
Philip, the essential lesson to be learnt from the Rebellion was the need for the imposition 
of missionary-control led order on the border as a means to avert the need for the continued 
resort to armed force. "Missionary stations are the most efficient agents which can be 
employed to promote the internal strengths of our colonies", he wrote, "and the cheapest 
a-nd best military posts that a wise government can employ to defend its frontier agaipst 
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the predatory incursions of savage tribes". The point about this missionary control 
was that it could become, Philip argued, the essential educative and cultural 
disseminator of a liberal, free market economy in South Africa. This was the key 
mechanism through which order might be maintained instead of force of arms. For on 
the basis of a free labour market and the ownership of private property it would be 
possible to insfil into the Khoi an economic motivation which would stimulate the 
internal trade in the colony: 
it is obvious that, while the Hottentots remain in their present 
degraded and wretched state, their condition must have a depressing 
influence on the industry'and morals of all the ranks of the inhabitants; 
. 11: 
19 
but by elevating them above the present level, the whole colony 
will be elevated along with them. 37 
The point about the free market system as a basis of order was that it was 
being introduced into a society which lacked any large scale peasantry as in the 
English case before the industrial revolution. Philip thus argued that intervention- 
ist measures were necessary to establish a free market economy in the Cape, implying 
in particular, a limited degree of "moral engineering" in order to ensure the legitimacy 
of a social order that rested upon class differentiation and the ownership of private 
property. The value of such a strategy lay in its de-emphasing any strong role by 
the state and any radical political transformation. There was, indeed, a strongly 
conservative emphasis in Philip's argument for he was careful to point out "no sudden 
alteration in the landed property of the country is to be apprehended from this source". 
Freedom of property ownership did not imply anything beyond the fact that: 
Under the most favourable circumstances the great body of the 
Hottentots cannot be in any other condition than that of labourers 
for centures to come. Individuals among the Hottentots, under 
a more genial system, may, in thirty or forty years, rise to possess 
little farms, and they may be able to leave the propety acquired 
by their industry to their children: but no one acquainted with 
the state of property in Europe can for a moment imagine, that 
any fears of this nature should paralyse the hand of the government, 
so as to make it withold from the Hottentots their natural rights. 38 
Thus, with the legacy of class differentiation produced by the industrial 
revolution in England, Philip's liberalism was lacking in much of the utopian optimism 
of much of the classical liberal political economy of the eighteenth century and was 
coloured by the additional input of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
evangelicalism stressing the need for the restructuring of social values to underpin 
the free market economy. Much of this was directed towards 
imposing a series of 
cultural controls over the nascent urban working class who were unlikely ever 
to 
become free property holders as the market model implied that they could. 
No 
doubt/ Philip's previous experience preaching in the workhouses of 
London and as a 
minister at Aberdeen between 1805 and 
1819 shaped his views on this question for he 
was already familiar with working class agitation and the use of 
the strike weapon. 
39 
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It was, therefore., the idea that the individual could rise by his own efforts to a 
propertied status which was essential since this was the competitive means through 
which class combination could be prevented: 
It would be sufficiently ridiculous for any one to propose to the 
British Parliament that it should pass an act disqualifyin. 9 the 
weavers of Manchester or Glasgow from holding land, lest they 
should dispossess the present landed proprietors and the nobility, 
and engross to themselves the wealth and honours of the country. 
In free countries you may see individuals rising from humble 
conditions to possess property; and you may find among our 
nobility individuals whose great grandfathers were mechanics: 
but such instances are extremely rare; and it will be allow ed 
that England owes much of its industry and its glory as a country 
to the laws which secure the poor against the oppressions of the 
rich, and which leave the immunities and honours of the state 
open to fair and honourable competition. 40 
This was the basis for the conservative liberalism of the Cape Colony in the 
nineteenth century. Philip's articulation of the liberal thinking behind it could be 
said to form the basis for a strategy whereby a free Coloured and African peasantry was 
brought into existence to act. as a barrier in frontier conflicts with African tribes as well 
as boosting the internal trade of the colony as it became progressively incorporated into 
British free trade imperialism. The point about it, though, was that it was strongly 
goaded by nineteenth century humanitarian and philantrhopic impulses and it was centred 
around the belief in continued economic progress, "upliftment" and the continued 
expansion of the essential values of "Western civilisation". These motives cannot 
be ignored when one assesses the first expansionist phase of liberalism in the nineteenth 
century and it is impossible to assume such a unilinear and direct connection between 
nineteenth century liberalism as social control and its twentieth century successors in 
South Africa rooted around segregation and apartheid. For the latter ideology, as 
we shown in chapter nine of this study, arose if anything through the general collapse of 
these liberal values in the twenti--th century. 
This point is further underlined 
, 
when Philip's liberalism is set within the wider 
context of missionary values as a whole in the early nineteenth century Cape. The 
view of individual missionaries as the simple purveyors of a "missionary imperialism" 
41 
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is a very simplistic one and the. closer analysis of different figures indicates that more 
than one ideological tradition can be unravelled in the complex interaction of mission- 
state relationships. Missionaries were not in control of the government at the Cape 
and the liberalism they articulated contained no coherent theory of political power for 
it was concerned with the selective and pragmatic use of moral influence in order to 
shape political decision-making. While the im. plicit end in view was some form of 
capitalist free market economy goaded by the disciplines of the work ethic, there were 
differing ideas on the way this should be achieved and these assumed considerable 
importance in the years after the promulgation of Ordinance 50 as Britain tried to 
establish a modern legal administrative polity, but lacked the resources fully to imple- 
ment it. For a missionary such as Philip, as Superintendent of the L. M. S. , the 
central issue up to 1828 was the need to restructure social relations in the Cape in order 
to incorporated the Khoi into a free legal system gover 
, 
ned by liberal ideas of civil 
liberty as opposed to the previously patriarchal system ruled by an archaic Roman-Dutch 
law. As the frontier in the Eastern Cape began to close in the 1830s, however, new 
considerations arose of what was to be the position of the missions vis a vis the African 
chiefdoms to the north and east of the Cape Colony. Philip's optimistic liberalism of 
the Researches had been mainly coloured by the expansion of mercantile commerce in the 
wake of the intrusion of the 1820 Settlers: in both the Coloured mission stations of 
Bethelsdorp and Theopolis, for instance, Philip had established trading stores of Cape 
Town merchants and the "improvement" of the 1820s in the living standards there had 
been due to the economic fillip provided by outlets such as transport riding for the 
surrounding white settlers. 
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But these conditions could not be automatically applied 
in all the contacts with the African communities and in the 1830s and 184Qs it became 
clear, in some instances, that missionary expansionism ran directly contrary to the 
interests of white settler agriculture. 
Philip's free-market liberalism did not really account for group conflicts between, 
missions, tribal chiefdoms and white settlers and a more radical tradition of direct 
championing of the Coloured or African cause has tended,, until recently, to have been 
overlooked in South African historiography. Philip's original appointment to the Cape 
in 1819 was in direct response to internal divisions in the L. M. S. at the time of a Cape 
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Town synod in 1817 and threats to close the missions in the Cape from the government. 
These divisions accrued from the emergence of a group of mechanic missionaries such 
as James Read who had worked their way up from artisan status to mission status and 
had actually been ordained in South Africa. Read reflected a much closer recog- 
nition in some missionary quarters of the difficulties confronting missionary expansion- 
ism in South Africa after a long period of working on the ground at the Bethelsdorp 
station from the time of its establishment in 1802 to his appointment as Superi 
, 
ntendent 
of the L. M. S. in succession to Johannes Vanderkemp on the latter's death. Through 
his marriage with a Khoisan woman and his championing of social equality, Read 
aggregated a lot of hostility to himself and many of the charges of the "backwardness" 
of the Bethelsdorp station and the "laziness" of its inhabitants accrued through political 
hostility to Read's radicalism. In his reply to these attacks, especially from the 
L. M. S. missionary Georg Thom who was eventually to get him suspended in 1817, Read 
revealed an awareness of the limitations to the simple free market model of economic 
expansionism. Bethelsdorp, he pointed out, was unsuitable to the intensive agri- 
culture that was essential if it was to be economically successful, while many of the 
able bodied men had to go on military service. Similarly, Read kept a record of the 
number of cattle held by the mission and was able to reply to the accusations that the 
number had fallen from an initial six thousand to a mere two thousand through Khoisan 
"idleness" by pointing out the incidence of disease in calves, cattle theft by neighbouring 
Africans and the preying of wild animals. In this respect, Read can be seen as an early 
forerunner of the many later observers of agricultural conditions amongst the Coloureds 
and, Africans and the structural limitations on their internal regeneration in response to 
market opportunities. 
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The importance of this radicalism, too, was that it extended into the area of 
mission-African relations in the years after 1830 when Read became minister at the Kat 
River Settlement. Having already some familiarity with the Griqua and Tswana 
missions in Transorangia, he began to recognise, unlike Philip, the tenacity of African 
tribal culture and to seek to defend it against what he now perceived to be the far 
greater danger from expanding, white land settlement. Much of this expansion in the 
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Eastern Cape by the I 840s was due to the growth in the woollen trade and many of the 
original defenders of the Kat Settlement., such as Robert Godlonton of the Grahamstown 
Journal , 
became an arch critic as it was seen to stand in the way of the further spread 
of white-owned farms. 
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Attacks on Read mounted as he was seen as a supporter of Maqoma and an 
intriguer in the 1834 War of the Axe., and he can in some ways be identified as an 
important forerunner of later white champions of African peasant agriculture in South 
Africa like William Macmillan and the Ballingers, and an early proponent of the idea 
of "Christian trusteeship" over independent African tribal cultures which were to be 
guided towards some form of progressive development and Christian enlightenment. 
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Read's s, ignificance for nineteenth century Cape liberalism, though, was lost 
with the destruction of the Kat River Settlement in 1851 .a year before 
his death, when 
progressive white land encroachment drove some 250 Khoi into an alliance with the 
surrounding Khosa against the whites. As a consequence, most interpretations have 
rested on the close association between liberals and the expansion of the Cape civil 
administrative machine and this has led in turn to the Maieke and contemporary 
revisionist thesis of seeing both the missions and Cape liberals as the ideological 
weapon of British imperial expansion. As we have sought to show this social control 
theory of the origins of South African liberalism overlooks its complexities and -is only 
partly true. The liberal ideology imported into South Africa was capable of being 
interpreted in a number of different ways and by the beginnings of industrial isation in 
the 1880s, which is the start of this study, it had already imprinted a legacy which was 
to lead to a number of substantially different interpretations of industrial change. 
The weaknesses of South African liberalism: 
The fundamental problem was, however, that the strongly empiricist tradition 
which colour'ed the thinking of South African liberals for so much of the period under 
study led them to overlook the essential question of how and in what way political 
power is both acquired and maintained in order to shape society according to these 
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principles. In a sense, the economic optimism of John Philip's free-market model 
avoided the key political questions being raised and the more sceptical thinking of 
James Read became overtaken in the headlong rush of nineteenth century mercantile 
imperialism and Victorian ideas of continuous progress. South African liberal 
economic optimism that tended to overlook basic problems of political power was not 
such a recent phenomenon,. as Legassick has maintained, and cannot be seen as simply 
a reflection of the loss of its function as an "agent of social control" in the post 1948 
years when the Nationalists entrenched apartheid. A fascination with the economic 
at the expense of the political was endemic to classical liberalism and became 
exaggerated in the colonial environment of South Africa. As Sheldon Wolin pointed 
out in a pentrating study of the political limitations of liberal theory: 
In its mature form liberalism expressed the same misgivings as 
conservatism about taking political theory seriously ... What 
determined the liberals' attitude was not merely a belief that the 
complexity of social relationships posed insurmountable difficulties 
to rational or purposive action, but the feeling that political 
activity had lost its charm and excitement. 46 
The transfer of this empiricist English disdain for the centrality of politics 
and a coherent theory of political power to the South African context owed a substantial 
amount to the ties of colonialism and cultural dependency. It indicates that there is 
more than a grain of truth in the famous thesis of Louis Hartz that: 
The processes Of colonization make no room for any doctrine 
beyond that of any immediate necessity. What has been their 
history, including the traditions that would have nourished their 
future, becomes only their pre-history - something irrelevant 
both to their present and to their development. They are, in 
truth, fragments which have lost the stimulus towards change 
which animates the unfolding or ripening of that greater whole 
they have quit ... They can 
be, at best, only a 'partial' 
embodiment of the European ideological complex. 47 
While clearly the cultural and ideological ties between South African 
liberalism and the mother country continued far beyond the early nineteenth century - 
and indeed act as a source of reinforcement right up to the present - Hartz's grasp of 
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the colonization process allows us to see that when it came to the question of building 
up a central ised nation state in the period before and after Un ion in 191 Of I ibera Is were 
hopelessly ill-equipped to understand the long term consequences of political centralisation 
in a country industrialising on the capitalist periphery. The entrenchment of Victorian 
optimism and its more systematic elaboration in the form'of social darwinism led to a 
unilinear belief in economic modernisation tending towards the West European and North 
American democratic model. This continuous belief in economic change producing 
political "development" led to an intellectual myopia when it came to considering non 
liberal forms of industrial isation. The model of development rooted in a paternalist 
class alliance between agrarian and industrial interests on the model of the Transvaal 
before Union was thus always seen by liberals as an anachronism that was doomed 
eventual Iy to give way before the irresistible pressures of free market forces. 
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The scope of this work: 
The main objectives of this work, therefore, are to look at certain key themes 
in the evolution of South African liberalism over the long period of 1886 to 1948. While 
it is clearly impossible to attempt an in-depth narrative history over such a space of time, 
the central emphasis will be on the relationship between changing liberal ideas and the 
economic and political context. Liberalism began by being heavily indebted both 
culturally and politically to the metropolitan core of Britain and in the nineteenth century 
the main liberal protagonists - apart from a small influential African acculturated 
elite - were white merchants, professionals and politicians. By the end of the period, 
liberalism had come to influence increasingly the thinking of a growing African petty 
bourgeoisie centred around the African National Congress and, in the Cape, the All 
African Convention. Liberalism had, therefore, to be redefined to fit the South African 
context, especially as the pressures from'a labour repressive path of industrial isation, 
centred around gold and diamond mining, indicated the divergence from the nineteenth 
century Victorian liberal ideal. 
In the first chapter, therefore, we look at the decline in the classical Cape 
liberalism rooted in the mid-nineteenth century alliance between a fairly prosperous 
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Eastern Cape peasantry and a white mer. cantile class integrated into mid-Victorian free 
trade imperialism. As diamond and, gold mining made headway with their increasing 
labour requirements, we look at the new structures of control cen. tred around Rhodes's 
experiment in individual African tenure in the 1894 Glen Grey A. ct. This change 
in Cape liberalism is also discussed in the second chapter when the African responses 
to white assimilation are viewed in the context of Ethiopian church separatism. The 
loss of control over many African followers by the white missions led to moves for 
extension of controls over African higher education, especially higher education, and 
in the second part of the chapter we look at the establishment of Fort Hare as an example 
of the reconsolidated Cape liberalism of the early twentieth century. 
These developments in the Cape towards growing links with the state indicate 
that, within the confines of Cape liberalism, there occurred many of the features of 
the social control debate that took place by the time of South African Union in 1910. 
However, the additional input from a growing white working class and petty bourgeoisie 
on the Witwatersrand added a new racist dimension which we analyse in chapter three 
when the debate on segregation is discussed. The new segregationist ideology 
crystallised many of the previous social control features debated in a less systematic 
manner in the Cape and marked the demise of Cape liberalism as a determining political 
influence at the centre of South African politics. As a consequence, liberals after 
1910 were progressively forced back onto the defensive by resorting to local level 
control via Native Affairs Reform Societies, such as the Transvaal Native Affairs Society 
in Johannesburg and the Native Affairs Reform Society in Durban founded by Maurice 
Evans. The latter we discuss in chapter four in terms of the evolution of a 
"philanthropic segregationi sm" evolved by conservative liberals like Evans to fit 
liberalism into a changing political situation. This idea received support, too, from 
the Aborigines Protection Society in England under the influence of its secretary John 
Harris and we look at the A. P. S. 's attempt to guide the thinking of the African National 
Congress in its opposition to the 1913 Natives Land Act. The collapse of these efforts 
by 1917, after the down fa II of the A. N. C. 's first president, John Dube, I ed to a 
temporary demise of this liberal segregationism such that the end of the first world war 
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saw a revival of liberal hopes f6'r-shaping reformist government legislation at the 
centre. 
In chapter five we co . ntinue by focussing the debate on social control in the 
critical period of 1918 -1923 and the even tua I dashing of I ibera I hopes to coopt an 
urban African petty bourgeoisie in the 'urban areas via the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 
of 1923. The rise of a white segregationist lobby in South African towns under the 
banner of Stallardism, as laid down in the crucial 1922 Report of the Transvaal Local 
Government Commission, forced liberals after 1923 back onto the local level through 
the new Joint Council movement, the Bantu Men's Social Centre and the press in the 
form of the Chamber of Mines financed Umteteli wa Bantu. These liberal responses 
are discussed in chapter six, leading eventually to the establishment in 1929 of the 
South African Institute of Race Relations. 
This liberalism of the inter-war years is further analysed in chapters seven 
and eight, where both the attempts to establish a class of African master farmers on the 
land was debated in liberal organisations such as the Joint Councils, and aided by 
missionaries such as the Reverend James Henderson of Lovedale and Father Bernard Huss 
of the Mariannhill Mission in Natal. Moves towards establishing African peasant 
cooperatives were begun under Huss's initiative in the Transkei in the I 920s and were 
further attempted by William Ballinger and the Friends of Africa in the early 1930s. - 
However, the 1936 legislation of the Hertzog and Smuts government represented another 
landmark in white liberal fortunes as, despite the removal of African voters in the Cape 
I from the common franchise, new platforms of representation were established via the 
Natives Representative Council and the white Natives Representatives in Parliament. 
Institutions like the Institute of Race Relations, under Rheinnalt-Jones's directorship, 
moved closer towards collaborating with the government's "trusteeship" policy and the 
attempts by the Friends of Africa to move South African liberalism in a social democratic 
direction became progressively eclipsed after 1937 as liberals such as Rheinnalt-Jones, 
Edgar Brookes and Margaret Ballinger were elected to parliament to represent African 
interests. 
ýI -I.. ' 
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However, the renewed development of African trade unionism in the late 
193 Os, throug h Max Gordon's Coun ci I for Non European Trade Un ions and the onset of 
the second world war, ushered in a new, phase which led to a growing ideological crisis 
in liberalism b-y the early 1940s. This i's 
, 
discussed in chapter nine, in terms especially 
of the rise of a renewed philanthropic segregationism via the cultural idealism of the 
academic study in anthropology and the International Institute for African Languages and 
Cultures. The most prominent I iberal to be influenced. by these new ideological directiom 
was Alfred Hoernle , the President of the S. A. 1. R. R. , and the author of the 1939 Phelps 
Stokes Lectures. This renewed lurch to segregationism in the early 1940s before 
Hoernle's death in 1944 had important long term consequences for liberal ideology in 
South Africa as it marked the turning towards what later became known as the concept of 
plural democracy based on ethnic separation. As a means of trying to meet the basic 
principles of the government's segregation progr, amme, liberalism denuded itself of the 
principles of the Westminster model of government via a parliament, and a universal 
franchise and this became confined to a small minority of democratic liberals in the 1940S 
centred around white trade unionists like Solly Sachs and the victor over Rheinnalt-Jones 
in the 1942 Natives Representative 6lection in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, 
Hymie Basner. This democratic liberalism is looked at in chapter ten, and its pro- 
gressive isolation explained in terms of the rise of African nationalist consciousness via 
the A. N. C. Youth League and the campaign to boycott Natives Representation. 
Deprived of a political base, the democratic liberals of the middle 1940s were increas- 
ingly outmanoeuvred by the conservative liberals centred around the Institute of Race 
Relations. Attempts, too, to reform the N. R. C. after the adjournment of the Council 
in 1946 at the time of the African mine strike., led to increased contacts between the 
Institute liberals, now led by Edgar Brookes, and the U. P. government of Smuts and 
H of me yr. These developments we discuss in the final chapter, as the last attempts 
by the white I ibera Is to consol idate their power base before the 1948 election are 
viewed in terms of various attempts to meet the A. N. C. 's boycott campaign. The 
long-term failure to establish such a base led, in the aftermath of the 1948 election 
defeat of the U. P. , to increasing efforts by the liberals to establish a party of their 
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own as it became increasingly clear that there was no other political avenue to pursue. 
The final establishment of the Liberal Party after the second U. P. defeat in 1953 was 
more an act of political despair than a confident attempt to enter into South African 
white party politics, as the previous political roots in both African political organisations 
and, to some extent, within the central echelons of government, became progressively 
narrowed. As the government's apartheid programme began to develop in the 1950s 
and external attacks by world opinion mounted, liberalism became squeezed out as the 
political framework became reshaped to accommodate both a rising white nationalist 
interest that transcended much of the previous Afrikaner-English speaking ethnic hostility, 
as well as reflecting a growing internal capital accumulation that marked the rise of a 
class of national capitalists free from the complete dependency to overseas control. In 
such a context a "revolution from above" that resembled many of the features of the 
Prussian path of industrial isation in the nineteenth century made the I ibera I -democratic 
model of industrial isation increasingly less plausible, and the final demise of the Liberal 
Party in 1968 after the Prohibition of Improper Interference Act made multi-racial 
political parties illegal represented more the culmination of previous political trends 
than some new attack on aI iberal tradition that had been so badly eroded by state 
action and white settler hostility. 
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Chapter One 
The decline of Cape liberalism 
Many of the essential dilemmas confronted by IiI berals in South Africa in 
the period of industrial isation were already present by the time the Cape Colony 
obtained its Constitution of 1853. This Constitution fulfilled many of the earlier 
aspirations of John Philip and the L. M. S. missionaries as it entrenched a franchise 
that included Coloured men on the basis of a E25 property qualification or a salary 
of E50 and extended the Whig ideal of representative government by establishing a 
parl-iament of two separate houses. 
I 
. 
But, at the same time, the Con stitution came 
during a period of increasing stabilisation in Cape policy towards the African tribes 
on its borders and presaged the growth in a central administrative apparatus guided 
by the tehets of Civil law. 
This longer term trend in state building afforded by Cape Responsible 
Government has frequently tended to be under -em phas ised in both liberal and radical 
South African historiography as attention has focused on the abstract categories of 
"Cape liberalism" and the "segregation ism" of Natal and the Boer Republics. Some 
have argued that the key area of interest is the rivalry between the liberally-in clined 
towns and the frontier "platteland" with the eventual domination of the latter ensuring 
the entrenchment of segregation by the time of Union. "in the towns the interaction 
was different from that on both reserves and farms", Francis Wilson has argued, and he 
continues: 
Not only were the relationships between the diverse groups more 
impersonal, but also the process of urbanisation came too late to 
influence the norms by which the politically dominant, white, 
group judged and to which it sought to mould social interaction 
as the country became institutionalized. 2 
Similarly, David Welsh has argued that, despite the fact that "urbanization 
undermined the master/servant relationship between white and non-white that had been 
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established in the pre-industrial era", nevertheless "industry was forced to defer to 
traditional white attitudes and, with the consolidation of segregation from the 1920s 
onwards, the traditional pattern was re-established, though, it is suggested, on a 
more insecure foundation". 
3 
This liberal view tends to by-pass the ideological and political impact of 
Cape liberalism on later South African developments after Union. The essential 
rationality of the liberal free-market economy has thus tended to be seen by the 
liberals as superseded by the entrenchment of a frontier racial ideology from the 
Northern Republics, as well as Natal under the system of segregation instituted by 
Theophilus Shepstone. 
The weaknesses of this frontier thesis, which goes back to some of the 
pioneering historiography of liberals such as Eric Walker, 1. D. MacCrone, C. W. de 
Kiewiet and W. M. Macmillan between the wars, 
4 
has long been the subject of attack 
by the revisionists. Using marxist categories centred around concepts of differing 
modes of production determining class relationships, the revisionist school has argued 
that Cape liberalism after 1853 can only be seen as the product of a certain historical 
momentwhen English, mercantile capital articulated with the pre-capitalist Eastern 
Cape peasantry in an era of free trade following Peel's abolition of the Corn Laws in 
1846. Thus, as Stanley Trapido has argued, the 1853 Constitution reflected a 
search for political consolidation in the wake of a decline in direct imperial control 
and the Cape could be more easily incorporated into the free-trade imperialism of the 
mid-nineteenth century through ruling itself rather than being a greater administrative 
and military burden on the British tax-payer through direct rule as in imperial India. 
5 
It was only when the rise of social imperialism in the 1880s and 1890s began to transform 
imperial attitudes into a racist and jingoist expansionism that attitudes towards Cape 
liberalism began to change; and the emergence of mining capital in the 1890s centred 
around Kimberley and the Witwatersrand began to shift the locus of imperial interest 
north towards the Transvaal. Cape liberalism by the end of the century became 
increasingly a political anachronism as its free-trade based economic and polifical 
individualism stood in the way of a wider state formation that could reflect the bureau- 
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cratic and monopoly status of mining. From at least the time of Rhode's 1894 Glen 
Grey Act onwards, it came under attack as wider structures of social control were 
sought over the nascent African proletariat and as the subsistence base of the reserve 
economies became the buttress for the extraction of a higher rate of economic surplus 
from African labour power. 
6 
This revisionist emphasis upon the historical specificity of Cape libera]ism 
and critique of the rather flabby frontier thesis of the liberal school clearly has a 
number of methodological advantages, especially when it is realised how, mid-Victorian 
Cape liberalism rested on a very narrow class base. 
7 
But, on the other hand, the 
emphasis upon the hiatus in South African economic development brought about by 
mining leads to a clouding over of the longer-term importance of Cape liberalism in 
the evolution of twentieth century social control. Even 
A for instancel, [: Xgass i ck , 
has seen nineteenth century Cape liberalism as very much in terms of a classical free 
market economy 
8 
and the longer-term continuities in terms of both the ideological 
conception of social control and the evolution of structures to underpin it has been 
rather ignored. This tendency in recent historical writing has been unfortunate for 
while, as we show in chapters three and four, many of the developments in segregationist 
ideology occurred before and after Union as mining capital was asserting its hegemonic 
position, it is also important to realise that many crucial features of this debate. had 
already taken place in the nineteenth century Cape. Indeed, the significance of 
Cape liberalism for later South African political developments becomes obvious when 
the focus of attention shifts to the administrative level for the Cape had had, by the 
time of Union in 1910, a century to develop its structure of law and administration 
while the Transvaal administrative structure for a long time remained weak and under- 
developed. The Cape court-centred administration became, as Albie Sachs 
has argued, "one of the main integrative forces in South African social history" along 
wit ha market economy, the English language and the belief in a single deity. 
9 
The Cape debate on social control is thus an important key to the understanding 
of the development of similar discussions at a later date. ý In particular, it is necessary 
to grasp the important ideological developments that occurred in the thinking of 
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politicians, administrators and independent observers on the relationship between the 
extension of Cape magisterial administration over Africans, and their consequential 
incorporation into a common legal system, and the systematic use and manipulation 
of tribal institutions and native law in order to buttress colonial control. Many of 
these developments can be seen to accrue from the dominance of a capitalist mode of 
production in the Cape Colony where, as Dr. Marks has recently suggested, "the 
forces of colonialism" were far stronger than in Natal under Shepstone and where "the 
disintegration of pre-colonial structures more thorough going" than in the Natal case 
where large tribal units'aided the establishmen, t of a segregationist system. 
10 
This 
materialist explanation certainly helps us to perceive the structural underpinning 
behind the "assimilationist ideology" of the Cape which was fostered by the dominant 
mercantile class in alliance with the African peasantry, but at the same time it can 
lead us into ignoring the processes of struggle endemic to Cape politics and the 
continuous challenge to colonial hegemony which grew progressively more concerted 
and organised as the century came to a close. 
In many respects the Cape administrative structure imposed upon the mass of 
the African population was a haphazard compromise of formal legal machinery under 
the Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate and ad hoc reliance on African tribal 
structures and customary law. Despite the formal attachment to "assimilation'. ' as 
part of the nineteenth century notion of a "civilising mission", British rule at the Cape 
was forced continuously to fall back upon tribal and "traditional" rule through sheer 
administrative weakness. The Cape civil- service and the public servants administering 
African affairs in no way developed the same kind of ethos and self confidence as its 
counterpart in India and remained continually hampered by a shortage of suitably 
qualified personnel. Many of its best administrators came from mission families 
where sons had been able to grow up amongst African communities and learn their 
languages and customs. But as the area of administrative. responsibilities widened 
as more and more African communities became annexed in the 1870s and 1880s 
culminating in the annexation of Pondoland in 1894., the shortage of suitable admini- 
strative staff grew worse. Many administrators were frankly unsuitable and frequently 
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adventurers, and opportunists were recruited of the ilk of William Charles Scully who, 
on becoming appointed a Resident Magistrate, had fingers that "were more at home 
with the trigger and the pick than with the pen" and who "did not know a single rule 
of English grammar". 
Thus, the Cape assimilationism in its peak years of the 1850s and 1860s during 
the period of the governorship of Sir George Grey (1854-61 ) can detract from a longer 
term crisis in Cape administrative ideology as the burdens of incorporating increasing 
numbers of non-westernised African groupings became immense. The heyday of Cape 
assimilation rested in substantial degree on the fortuitous circumstances of having a 
large group of Mfengu whose tribal structures were far weaker than those in the Transkei 
outside direct Cape control. In addition., with the cattle killing episode in the 
Transkei in 1857., many tribal identies became weakened for a period thus enhancing 
administrative optimism in the progressive extension of western values and the direct 
imposition of colonial control through assimilation. As Richard Hunt Davies has 
pointed out, this belief also coincided with the classical liberal model of individualism 
for "as national cohesion disintegrated ... Nguni attitudes towards missionary attitudes 
gradually shifted from a group to a personal reaction, which in turn produced a decline 
12 
in opposition to mission work". However, this period of optimism, when such 
directly assimilative institutions as the Zonnebloem College was opened in Cape Town 
in 1858 to educate chie I fs' sons on the English public school model, 
13 belied a longer 
term trend which threatened the stability of Cape colonial hegemony. 
The Mfengu were by no means a typical African community in the Eastern 
Cape since they had been resettled around King Williams Town in the aftermath of the 
1834-5 War and had long been subject to missionary influence via such institutions as 
Healdtown and Lovedale. Their rate of entry into urban locations before the close 
of the century was also significantly less than the other African groups - in 1894 only 
3.4% of the Mfengu were urbanised compared to 6.2% of other Africans, while many of 
these urbanised Mfengu were permanent town dwellers who had a far lesser rate of 
14 
mobility back to the rural locations than the other African groups. The admini- 
strative structure over the Mfengu was aided by two important features: a high rate 
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of rural residence by a group engaged in commercialised agriculture and an important 
buffer group of non tribal kholwa resident in the towns who formed a nascent petty 
bourgeoisie. As some studies have shown, this petty bourgeois class had been 
inculcated with the values of Victorian liberalism and British imperialism and the 
African leaders like Elijah Makiwane, Walter Rubusana and John Tengo Jabavu who 
formed the Native Educational Association in 1872 in many ways helped to stabilise 
administrative control through acting as vital political and ideological intermediaries 
between the administrators and the African peasants, though their longer term contri- 
bution to the development of African nationalism in the Eastern Cape should not be 
ignored. 
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While, therefore, some assimilation into the Cape administrative machine 
continued throughout the nineteenth century and this became aided by the development 
of such African newspaper organs as the Xhosa language Isigidimi in 1871 and later 
lmvo Zabantsundu edited by John Tengo Jabavu in 1884, at the same time growing 
African cultural resistance began to occur as the progressive annexation of the Transkei 
and Griqualand East took place in 1879, Gcalekaland and Thembuland in 1884 and 
finally Pondoland in 1894. The earlier model of Cape assimilationism became pro 
gressively difficult to apply in conditions where the patron-client relationships forged 
by colonial administrators with local headmen amongst the Mfengu could not be so 
easily adapted to tribal chiefdoms. With the Transkei Annexation Act of 1877, a 
pronounced shift occurred in the Cape administrative ethos as the governor was given 
power to legislate by proclamation and no Cape statute was to operate unless it was 
specifically extended. For the first time official recognition was given to African 
16 
customary law "as a system of law", and it began to become clear increasing use was 
likely to be made of tribal institutions in Cape administration as the Native Affairs 
Department was too weak to continue the earlier phase of assimilation. 
But-should the Cape develop a system of segregationist rule on a model 
similar to that of Shepstone in Natal? This question began to colour political debate 
in the Cape by the late 1870s and the Report of the Native Laws and Customs Commission 
in 1883 indicated that Cape liberal thinking was moving in favour of selective 
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incorporation and manipulation of African tribal institutions and customary laws in its 
administration, though in a far less restricted and inflexible manner than Natal. In 
this respect, the 1883 Commission is an important precursor of many of the later debates 
on social control at the time of the Inter Colonial Native Affairs Commission of 1903-05 
chaired by Sir Godfrey Lagden and which has so often been seen as laying down the key 
foundations of territorial segregation after Union in 1910. 
The 1883 Native Laws and Customs Commission: 
The Native Laws and Customs Commission that was appointed in 1881 came in 
the wake of a pronounced challenge to existing Cape native policy in the Basuto Gun 
War in 1880. While the Transkei Annexation Act of 1887 had sought to institutional ise 
some African customary and tribal law, in the Basuto case the Cape Government of 
Sir Godron Sprigg resolved on a policy of direct rule in order to enforce the Peace 
Preservation Act there of 1878 and the handing in of arms. This direct intervention 
into Basuto politics also presupposed the raising of the hut tax and white settlement in 
the south of the country in the district of Chief Moorosi and thus brought the various 
quarrelling factions of Chiefs Letsie, Lerotholi, Masopha and Joel into a united 
resistance against the Cape. In the ensuing guerrilla campaign, furthermore, out- 
breaks of revolt extended outside Basutoland into East Griqualand and the Transkei. 
With the British government failing to provide assistance to the Cape., the attempt to 
disarm the Basuto was consequently abandoned by 1881 and the incoming administration 
of Sir Thomas Scanlen decided to resort to the subtler tactics of divide and rule and 
exploit the jealousies between the different Basuto chiefs which had grown up in the 
power vacuum left by Moshoeshoe's death in 1870. John X. Merriman, particularly., 
hoped at this stage to "split the chiefs up" so as to "throw our friends over and work 
with the people as against the chiefs". 
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But this policy presumed that the Cape 
administration was sI ufficiently powerful to step in and take over many of the admin- 
istrative functions that were conducted by the chiefs themselves -a task that was 
clearly impossible as the Cape Government discovered when it appointed 
General 
"Chinese" Gordon to look after native affairs. Gordon sought to remove many of the 
administrative officials from both the Transkei and Basutoland, where the 
Peace 
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Preservation Act was repealed, and formal responsibility for the territory was abandoned 
to Britain who eventually took over the territory in 1884. The central issue was that 
the Cape simply did not have an effective enough administrative machinery to embark 
on colonisation of its own and it was faced, in an issue I ike that of Basutoland, of 
either seeking to over-run the territory by force of arms or else withdrawing completely 
and shifting the responsibility onto someone else. 
It was this somewhat crude paradox in Cape administrative policy that became 
the basis of political debate in the Cape and one of the most important contributions 
came from the Cape Governor's Agent in Basutoland, J. M. Orpen, who fel I out with 
General Gordon on the decision to hand back control of the territory to 6ritain and 
rest administrative co, ntrol on the Chiefs. In a pamphlet entitled Some Principles of 
Native Government II lustrated in 1880, Orpen sought to direct the principles of Cape 
liberalism to the question of administration over Africans and especially in so far as it 
affected the Sotho- in Basutoland whose interests he sought to champion. ' This meant 
in particular taking in effect a middle position between the two extremes that had 
become manifest in Cape policy of either seeking to rule through the chiefs - the 
line taken by General Gordon the following year - or else destroying the chiefs' 
power and working with "the people" - as suggested by Merriman. The point was, 
for Orpen, that Cape government had to be orderly without at the same time bei. ng 
arbitrary, and it was no use destroying the power of the chiefs to replace it with an 
administrative system based on the same principles: 
To substitute white arbitrary power for black arbitrary power makes 
no difference in the danger, for it is the thing itself not the person 
that is the danger. And if often results in making a black power 
more arbitrary and less controllable. It then adds crushing weight 
from above to an existing tyranny. Arbitrary power must be 
delegated downwards and never yet could be controlled from above. 18 
Orpen thus articulated a conservative middle course that frequently became 
the basis for much later liberal criticism of government segregationist policy in the 
twentieth century and can even be seen to form the core of criticism like that of the 
Ballingers' of British colonial policy in Basutoland and the other Southern African 
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Protectorates in the 1930s. 
19 
This course was to accept for the meantime the 
existing administrative and legal functions of the chiefs, but to argue for a pro- 
gressive policy of civilising liberalism that would in time lead to power being 
delegated downwards onto a popular basis. Analogies were frequently made with 
the English historical precedent and Orpen argued that there were many simillar 
features to English common law in African tribal life. Moshoeshoe, he argued, 
did not have an unchecked arbitrary power for in the high courts there were important 
'lama pakati" or middle men exercising judicial functions while at the popular level 
judicial decisions could occur through acclamation such that the law had its own moral 
force: 
The exercise of the intellect and moral mind of the people in 
discussing equality and public affairs was their greatest and most 
effective engagement. They knew well how to appeal to the 
higher feelings and reason. 
This was, therefore, an important attempt to reshape Cape liberalism, in the 
period before the rise of social imperialism and jingoist racism, towards accepting that 
its rationality and civilising attributes over African tribes were only relative and not 
absolute phenomena. African societies had "the same radical civilisation that we 
have" though it had "less concrete form" and was "less stable". It was essential 
therefore to embark on onl-y a very limited social engineering policy and "instead of 
forcing a fore ign growth on uncongenial soil, and instead of uprooting the growth of 
such a civilisation we have found as the natural African product., we should, develop 
and engraft it as part of our system, only pruning where necessary". 
20 
This. was a 
reformulation of the earlier ambitious civilising mission of the Cape missionaries wh'ich 
had been based on the unit of the individual and looked in many respects forward 
towards twentieth century conceptions of a more collectivist-orientated assimilationism 
that, as we can see by the time of the Native Economic Commission in 1932, represented 
a view of a multi-racial society centred around a growing access to the vote and 
progressive detribalisation and economic upliftment based on a free peasantry in the 
21 
reserves. 
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Orpen's assimilationism indicated several impor tant themes which became 
the basis for the last phase of nineteenth century Cape liberalism: the imposition 
of fewer laws and the recognition of African customary law as a common law, the 
establishment of native councils and the creation of municipal and district councils 
for the articulation of African opinion. Such a legal system together with the 
councils could -become an important means to check the power of the chiefs, 
especially if they were linked to a growing African peasantry with individual land 
titles that were registered. By such means could African society develop itself 
and it would be unnecessary to extend unnecessarily the Cape administrative structure 
which Orpen saw as "a great cold machine, worked by a distant government". 
22, 
This somewhat romantic view of African society was significant in that it occurred 
before the rise of mining capital and the bureaucracy that serviced it and reflected 
the great Victorian ideal of not extending government administration as far as possible. 
It is likely that Orpen's views had some influence on the thinking of the Native Laws 
and Customs Commission which has been seen as being sizeably impressed by the 
precedent of Theophilus Shepstone in Natal. 
23 Orpen's thinking crystallised much 
of the undercurrent of feeling of many of the Cape native administrators who were 
against too radical a change in policy towards African customs and law (since it was 
likely to result in an upsurge in fresh resistance) while at the same time emphasis. ing 
that the creation of an African "common law" meant that they could not be insti tution- 
alised in too "hard and fast" a manner. 
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It was undoubtedly the conceptual isation 
of an organic and evolutionary African customary law by opinion leaders like Orpen 
which led the Commission into recommending the selective acceptance of African 
customary law by means of a penal code modelled on the precedent of Macauley's 
code in India some fifty years previously. While missionary opinion was appeased 
by the Commission making circumcision by threats of force and without parental 
consent a punishable offence together with threats of witchcraft, at the same time 
African communal responsibility was recognised in cases like the spoor of lost cattle 
being traced to native kraals or communities. "The effect of it is, and will be", 
the Commission concluded, "to make every native living in his tribal state a detective, 
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and thus an inexpensive substitute for a-police force will be contained throughout 
the Territories. " 25 At the same time, the Commission clearly diverged somewhat 
from the more autocratic conception of Shepstone's segregationist system in Natal 
which rested, as he said in evidence t: ) the Commission, on the idea of African laws 
26 and customs being "based upon the theory of absolute power residing somewhere". 
Instead of relying solely upon tribal structures in the native administration of the 
Cape and the Transkei, the Commission looked to wards a more pragmatic harmon- 
isation of both triba, l rule by the chiefs with that of the administrators of the Native 
Affairs Department. It proposed the idea of a Council for the Transkeian 
Territories consisting of three chief magistrates and fifteen African members appointed 
for two years "in accordance with the method of co-optation which has recently and 
with so much approval been introduced into India for encouraging the people to take 
an intelligent interest in the management of native affairs". 
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Though the President 
of the Commission, Sir James Barry, opposed this through fear of the "tribal solidarity 
it would foster", 
28 
suggesting instead a continuation of a divide and rule policy by 
having three separate councils, the Commission report can be seen to contain the germ 
of the later United Transkeian Territories General Council or Bunga which was finally 
established through the merger of the Transkeian Territories General Council with the 
Pondoland General Council in 1931'. 
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The Commission contained, indeed, many 
of the aspirations of Cape liberalism in that it looked towards the continuation of 
government support for the missions and a policy of improving the general calibre of 
the civil servants employed in the Native Affairs Department by raising their pay and 
conditions of service. But, equally, it recognised that the Native Affairs officials 
could not take over the many legitimating functions held by the chiefs in the African 
tribal structure for it was useless to imagine that they could "take that place in 'the 
kaffir imagination which has from time immemorial been filled by their chiefs". 
30 
I 
The overall effect of the Commission's recommendations was limited, however, 
by the fact that it came on the brink of the mining revolution on the Witwatersrand in 
1886. Its recommendation regarding an African penal code led to the passing of the 
Penal Code Bill in 1886 which in turn aided the build-up over the following decades 
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of an important body of case law which would confirm the importance of the Transkeian 
system's flexibility at the time of the systematisation of native administration in the 
1927 Native Administration Act. 31 But its proposal for a native council was initially 
turned down by the Cape Parliament in 1885 and the proposal for the progressive 
i. ncorporation of non-tribal elements in native administration met a rebuff when the 
1887 Parliamentary Voters Registration Act restricted the number of African voters on 
the common franchise. The pace of economic change, indeed, was overtaking many 
of the ideas that lay behind the Commission's thinking and by the 1890s it began to 
become clear that the paternalist ideas of many of the Commission's members 
native administrators and Cape liberals like the Reverend James Stewart, John Ayliff, 
Richard Solomon, Walter Stanford., Thomas Upington and W. Bisset Berry - were 
being superseded by the rise of mining capital at Kimberley and the Witwatersrand. 
The emergence of Cecil Rhodes as prime minister of the Cape in 1890 personified 
these changes and with the passing of the Glen Grey Act in 1894 there began to 
emerge a clear tension between the paternalist idea of social control rooted in the 
classical Cape liberal alliance of missionary, resident magistrate and local headmen or 
tribal chief and a newer form of more bureaucratised social' control rooted in a stronger 
centralised state which was prepared to override local opinion in favour of a more 
standardised administrative structure. The "great cold machine, worked by a distant 
government" began to material ise as it became clear by the 1890s that the technological 
superiority of western arms over African tribes in cases like the Matabeleland Rebellion 
in 1893 was such that there need no longer be quite the same fear of resistance at had 
haunted many administrators' minds as recently as the Basutoland Gun War of 1880-81. 
As Cecil Rhodes stated, injecting a new brand of imperialist optimism into Cape 
politics., machine guns would make it a "perfectly easy thing to deal with the Pondos, 
and other native tribes". 
32 
In these newer circumstances, where social control in 
the Cape was being increasingly orientated towards ensuring an adequate supply of 
African labour for the Kimberley diamond mines as well as for the Witwatersrand, the 
older ideal of classical Cape liberalism began to give way towards a more segregationist 
conception and in this some, though by no means all, of the mainstream Cape liberals 
in positions of influence participated. 
47 
The Glen Grey Act: 
The passing of Cecil Rhodes's Glen Grey Act in 1894 in many respects 
crystalli. sed the growing contradiction between the paternalism of classical Cape 
liberalism and the newer centralised form of social control rooted in territorial 
segregation. The Act was conceived in an ideological context of growing class 
conflict which., in. South Africa as much as in Britain, was transforming the language 
of political debate from an individualistic plane underpinned by paternal deference 
to one of growing collective class solidarity with the ruling propertied bourgeoisie 
looking increasingly to state action to back up their interests. 
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In the debate 
on the Bil I before its passing, Rhodes appealed to the precedent of the "labour 
troubles" in England and the strike of the Pullman Car Company in Chicago engineered 
by the 'Black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car porters. The point of the Glen Grey Bill, 
explained Rhodes, was to avoid such strike action: 
This is what is going on in older countries on account of the masses 
as against the classes getting what they term their rights., or, to put 
it in plain English, those who have not trying to take from those who 
have. If they cannot get it by what might be termed Irish legis- 
lation , they mean to get it 
by physical force. 
And it was precisely to prevent such a possibility that Rhodes conceived the 
Glen Grey Bill in order to preserve a social order based on racial and not class - 
divisions: 
... if the whites maintain their position as the supreme race, 
the 
day may come when we shall all be thankful that we have the 
natives with us in their proper position. We shall be thankful 
that we have escaped those difficulties which are going on amongst 
the old nations of the world. 34 
The Act, therefore, can be seen as a crucial step in the development of a 
strategy of social control based upon terHtorial segregation. "What I would 
like 
in regard to a native area", Rhodes remarked, "is that there should 
be no white man 
in its midst. I hold that the natives should be apart from white men, and not mixed 
up with them. " 
35 
In particular, the Act sought to maintain the subsistence base of 
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African agriculture in the areas where it was proclaimed by perpetuating an Afr, ican 
"producer class" of freehold peasants who could in turn be buttressed politically by 
the establishment of local representative councils. The number of such peasants was 
to be governed by the number of the lots that were registered and the general principle 
was to be "one man, one lot".. though in practice that was to prove almost impossible 
to enforce. So far, the Act met with general support from the class of African 
peasants and small property owners in the Eastern Cape who were looking for legislative 
measures to entrench their rights of land ownership together with some means of local 
representation: the writer and clergyman John Knox Bokwe, who had been educated 
at Lovedale, wrote a pamphlet in the same year as the Act calling for the establish- 
ment of local village councils in order to extend African peasant agriculture and 
create a "public spirit in the village" free from the control of the "traditional" class 
of headmen who still farmed on a communal basis. 
36 
But at the same time the 
. Glen 
Grey Act sought to introduce a general labour tax of 1 Osh per annum as a means to 
force out more Africans to work on the mines and it'was in this respect that the Act 
led to a heightening of political consciousness amongst the African political and 
educational elite. Calling the labour tax provision, "at best a qualified slavery", 
lmvo articulated widespread African opposition which threatened to develop to the 
point of "passive resistance" and a collective refusal to pay the tax. 
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This threat of resistance by African taxpayers brought into the open a growing 
crisis in Cape administration as it became clear that the more paternalistic structure of 
control based on an alliance between local magistrates and chiefs and headmen was 
threatened with complete collapse. Mayor Henry Elliott, the Chief Magistrate of 
the Transkeian Territories, acted as the spokesman of the magistrates in the face of 
Rhodes's attempts at bureaucratic centralisation and, in an attempt to maintain the 
legitimacy of the old order, sought to get the labour tax reduced from 1 Osh to 5sh a 
yea r. This was essential, the magistrate W. T. Brownlee recalled, for it was "useless 
for us to tell the people that we were merely the mouthpieces of the Government and 
that it was the order of the Government that the new law was being introduced. The 
stereotyped reply was 'You are the only government that we see.. We cannot see the 
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Government that you say is in Cape Town. We look toyou tokill the law. ' " 
But Rhodes manifested little sign of understanding this system of face to face relation- 
ships base 
Id 
upon a sense of mutual trust within a paternalistic order of deference and, 
in meetings he held with African leaders and people at Nqamakwe (for the Mfengu) 
and Idutywa (for the Transkei) he threatened the use of force and the introduction of 
compulsory labour. 
38 
In such a situation, the magistrates were progressively forced to manipulate 
what was left of the old alliance with the chiefs and headmen in order to swing-it 
round behind Rhodes's policy. With the request for the tax to be reduced turned 
down, the magistrates were forced to tell the African chiefs to "obey the law" and this 
was eventually successful because of the complex relationships between different 
African 'ethnic' and kinship groups. While the Mfengu in the "Fingoland" reserve 
were most solidly in favour of passive resistance and had cried at the meeting with 
Rhodes "Hamba. Hamba. Hamba. asiii ku vola' (Go on. Go on'. we won 't pay 
it'. )", the success of their campaign depended upon wider support from the Gcaleka, 
Ndlambe and Mfengu groups in the Idutywc reserve. Here the Mfenqu were willing 
to cooperate readily enough but they needed the support of Chief Zenzile of the 
Ndlambe and Chief Sigidi of the Gcaleka. Zenzile only offered support if he was. 
backed up by the Lovedale educated Sigidi but, in the event, the latter refused after 
meeting the magistrate Brownlee. Without this collective solidarity, the threat of 
passive resistance was ineffective and the issue of writs for tax evasion in Tsomo in the 
course of 1895 soon led to its fizzling out. 
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Thus, the effect of the Glen Grey Act was substantially to nullify the older 
paternalistic system and to bring the Capeý magistrates increasingly into a segregation- 
ist system of control. With the rapid increase in labour mi . grancy in the latter part 
of the 1890s - 2000 African boys of 16 and 17 left Tsomo alone in 1895,40. _ 
the magisterial system became used to buttress a class alliance with local African, 
headmen'via the more institutional ised form of political cooptation in the Glen Grey 
councils. Within a year of the threatened passive resistance over the labour tax, 
many headmen turned towards the councils as they saw the political advantages in being 
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nominated to bodies which controlled such matters as land allocation and grazing 
rights. But as class differentiation in the African reserves became more salient as 
progressive ecological deterioration and disease such as the rinderpest epidemic of 
1897 drove out more African peasants as labour migrants, 
41 
the headmen risked 
alienating themselves from the groundswell of popular opinion in the locations. 
Thus magistrates by the turn of the century began to look towards instituting the 
councils on a firmer basis by paying the headmen a salary in order, as the Commissioner 
for Lady Frere argued in support of a E5 a year salary, "to make them independent of 
local influence". 42 This cooptation of headmen became essential, furthermore, as 
the councils became used to drive out allotment holders who broke the provisions of 
the Glen Grey Act or encroached on common land. 
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The effect of the Glen Grey Act, therefore, was to reverse many of the 
earlier assumptions of nineteenth century Cape liberalism and to backtrack on the 
assimilating ethos of earlier generations of magistrates. If the 1883 Native Laws 
and Customs Commission had marked a tentative step in the direction of recognising 
African customary law, the general administrative practice in the years after 1894 
marked the real decline of Cape liberalism and the progressive acceptance of many of 
the tenets of segregation. The small African intelligentsia and kholwa, who had 
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been earlier accepted as part of the Cape civil ising mission, became increasingly 
marginalised as it became clear that magistrates were working with the more "traditional" 
headmen on the Glen Grey councils. A vigi. lance Association formed in the Transkei 
in 1901 by the African intelligentsia led by Enoch Mamba remained unrecognised by the 
Cape Government 
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and the net effect of the Glen Grey Act was in many cases to 
reinforce the control of "Red" or "traditional" headmeh on the councils and their 
respective kinship lineages. In the Fingqutu location of Lady Frere, for instance, 
a number of "registered owners . of allotments" drew up a petition to protest against the 
activities of the acting headman Mqikela who: 
has been unusually very busy holding meetings and misleading the 
people by telling them'that if they have their building lots surveyed 
they would have no grazing rights in the commonage and the 
Government would at once take possession of it and let it to the 
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farmers and the natives would be required to graze their cattle 
within the limits of the lots surveyed as building sites for them 
and they would be further compelled by Government to push up 
strong substantial dwelling houses which they would not be able 
to pa y for. 46 
The petitioners clearly preferred to work through a leading kholwa Meschach 
Pelem, who drew up the petition, rather than the headmen and it was also clear that 
many of the forty signatures attached to it came from men forced out into migrancy 
since many were established to be "at work", "gone a long time" or were "dead". 
47 
The case illustrated the growth in class divisions between migrants and headmen and 
the use made by the Cape government of the Glen Grey Councils in order to buttress 
traditional lineages as the basis of local control. 
At the same time, the Cape government also recognised the value of not 
implementing the Glen Grey Act in a number of instances. With the risk of fostering 
growing divisions in the locations, many magistrates argued for only selective imple- 
mentation of the Act in cases where it would reinforce existing structures of control. 
While Idutywa, Nqamakwe and Tsomo were included along with Glen Grey in 1894 
and Kentani brought in in 1899., Xalanga was rejected as a suitable district in 1902 on 
account of "objections to the land tenure system". 
48 
The Chief Magistrate of 
Tembuland/ Transkei and Pondoland argued that it was "far better to wait until it is 
asked for, when it could be granted as a concession, than to force it upon them 
unwillingly" 
49 
and it began to become clear that many magistrates had lost the 
enthusiasm of the original act's ostensible intentions as it failed to lead to significant 
improvements in African peasant agriculture. Indeed, with growing failure to pay 
quit rent under the Act and the refusal of African peasants to build houses close together 
on the allotments provided, many magistrates began to bypass the original "one man, 
one lot" provisions of the Act and to allow the ownership of more than one allotment. 
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Furthermore, the, rules of seniority were often bent in order to allow allotments to be 
filled by aspiring African property owners: Julius Hlangwana was able to buy a plot 
in Macabeni location in Glen Grey, for instance, even though he was only twenty 
two years old and unmarried since he was the son of an existing allotment holder in the 
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location. The main objective in granting him the plot seemed to be that he was 
likely to pay hut tax. 
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This gradual emasculation of many of the tenets of the classical Cape liberal 
tradition as a result of the Glen Grey Act began to be reflected. in the thinking of 
some of the leading political figures in the Cape before the onset of Union in 1910. 
The Act was seen as a crucial means to thwart the political aspirations of the African 
petty bourgeoisie via the common franchise, especially after the 1898 election which 
saw for the first time the real emergence of what Trapido has termed a group of "semi 
professional politicians" and African election agents who broke through the barriers of 
race, language and culture. 
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Richard Rose-Innes, for instance, was angered by the 
support of lmvo Zabantsundu for Onze Jan Hofmeyr's Bond and began to favour a 
separate franchise to exclude African voters influencing white elections. In 1903, 
therefore., he argued in favour of the Glen Grey Act as a means for entrenching 
territorial segregation for the principles of the Act "necessarily involve the creation of 
purely Native Reserves or areas from which Europeans are excluded by purchase or 
otherw ise ". This principle "must be maintained against every species of opposition" 
for the "policy to aim at for the future" was "the segregation of the races within certain 
limits and u'nder safeguards". This segregation, in addition, had the advantage of 
establishing the reserves as " 'reservoirs of labour' and homes for these people into which 
the Native will be free I to come and go". 
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Thus, by the turn of the century, the conservative liberal tradition began to 
foresee much of the future debate on social control in. South Africa in the years after 
Union. The Glen Grey Act cannot be judged simply in terms of its objective of 
extending individual land tenure, 
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for the workings of the Act contributed substantially 
to the undermining of the Eastern Cape African peasantry which had grown up under the 
hegemony of mercantile capital in the mid-nineteenth century. By 1922, the Location 
Surveys Commission established that the Act had nothing like the effect of establishing a 
secure class of individual property owners for 40% of the Glen Grey allotments had 
passed into hands different from their original owners, 
55 
while in 1925 it e merged that 
f 
only 7 of the 27 Transkeian districts had been surveyed with a total of 50,000 land 
I 
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titles. 
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Increasingly, the objectives of the Act became compromised by the desire 
of the white government to work in alliance with the tribal chiefs; in an area I ike 
Pondoland, for example, chief Victor Poto adamantly resisted the extension of 
individual tenure on Glen Grey lines. 
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At the same time, however, it is not an accurate conclusion that the Glen 
Grey system simply led to a segregationist tendency within Cape liberalism. Despite 
the fact that the Cape became progressively subordinated to the hegemony of mining 
capital as 55,000 Africans from the Transkei worked on the Witwatersrand by 1909, a 
number of Cape liberals still held out for the older paternalistic style of control. 
This was less in the form of the Cape liberal F. S. Malan, as Peter Kallaway has argued, 
for it seems unlikely that he had much influence on the evolution of native policy back 
towards a more paternalistic form when he was running in addition the departments of 
Mines and Industries, Lands, Agriculture and Education. 
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It seems rather that the 
authentic voice for the older style of Cape liberalism after Union came through bodies 
like the Transkeian Territories General Council., and the Ciskeian General Council. 
It was probably with these bodies in mind that Walter Stanford, as a former Chief 
Magistrate of the Transkei, voiced his concern at the decline in the personal, face to 
face system of rule to which he attributed the reason for the outbreak of resistance at 
Matatiele in 1914 to the dipping regulations against East Coast Fever. Stanford 
perceived that labour migrancy was eroding one of the basic pillars, the African family 
unit, behind the old paternalistic system of Cape rule. Furthermore, both African 
women and headmen had taken part in the refusal to dip. cattle and Stanford urged a 
reassertion of magisterial control: 
In the Transkeian Territories we have a Native population of 
approximately a million souls. The large majority are stil I 
living under tribal conditions. With these, and to some extent 
even with the others, the personal influence and guidance of the 
Chief Magistrate and Magistrate are essential factors in their 
contentment. They regard these officers not merely as the 
judicial authority before whom their cases must be heard or the 
collectors of revenue to whom taxes must be paid; they are 
the representatives of that far away undefined power known to 
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them as the government, and the magistrates are their channel of 
communication, and sFould be their friends and protectors. Yet 
more and more these Territories are being administered as if they 
were European districts occupied by a highly civilised European 
race. The magistrate's power for good is constantly undermined. 
Officers of various departments abound, each responsible to some 
other officer stationed at Pretoria or elsewhere unknown to the 
people. 59 (emphasis added) 
But when Stanford's report came up for discussion at a conference of Native 
Administrators on 9th December 1914 only his proposals for amending the dipping 
regulations received any attention. 
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The Minister of Native Affairs, F. S. Malan, 
was unwi II ing to consider any increase in magisterial power and Stanford's voice was 
to a considerable degree a lone one crying in the wilderness. However, the logic 
of state policy becomes more explicable when it is realised that the growth in African 
political consciousness by this time made the notion of African conceptions of g-: >vern- 
ment as a "far away undefined power" a somewhat archaic one. Even if it was true 
at various stages in the nineteenth century the Cape paternalistic system had rested 
upon magistrates successfully legitimating themselves as the local wielders of political 
authority, by the start of the first world war a substantial expansion in scale of African 
political thinking had occurred. Much of this had been created by the same forces 
that had led to the erosion of the Cape paternalistic system from above - the 
extension of labour migrancy, population mobility and the bureau cratisation of native 
a dm in is tra ti on. At the same time, it was also transformed by the emergence of 
newer forces within African societies themselves and the establishment of pan-tribal 
political ideology. Even by the 1890s proletarian isation was beginning to make 
headway on the Witwatersrand and, despite the attempts by the mining magnates to 
resist this process as far as possible by seeking the enforced perpetuation of tribal 
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consciousness through the compound system, a process of detribalisation began to 
occur. Much of the expression of thi, s newer consciousness occurred through the 
development of breakaway African independent churches free from missionary control, 
for political radicalism in the form of socialist thinking did not begin to intrude into 
African thinking until the emergence of the International Socialist League on the 
55 
Witwatersrand during the first world war. 
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This independent church ideology of 
Ethiopianism became a crucial factor in altering the awareness of many African 
migrants in the 1890s and 1900s and did much to dissolve the individualist and 
paternalist liberalism of the Cape into the racial segregationism of the years before 
and after Union. It is thus towards these developments that we turn in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
Ethiopianism and the extension of educational control 
The developments in late nineteenth century Cape liberalism towards a more 
collectivist political ideology were not a simple response to the rise of mining capital. 
As the last chapter indicated, mining capital clearly was one important factor in 
eroding the Victorian individualism that lay behind the classical form of Cape liberalism, 
but it has also to be seen within a complex of other factors that were occurring at this 
time. The revisionist view of South African liberalism has tended to see the 
purveyors of Cape liberalism as somewhat passively responding to external events by 
the 1890s as they searched for some form of political accommodation with the move- 
ments from Kimberley and the Witwatersrand. Legassick has argued, for instance, 
that the centre for the newer South African liberalism only developed on the Witwaters- 
rand after the first world war as missionaries and 'friends of the native' extended their 
efforts at political cooptation towards the African petty bourgeoisie through bodies like 
the Joint Councils. In this context, the more traditional Cape liberals became 
increasingly anachronistic and looked back nostalgically to an idealised nineteenth 
century liberalism that increasingly failed to relate to the segregationist context of 
South Africa between the wars. 
1 
This view of Cape liberalism, however, fails to account fully for the develop- 
ments and initiatives pursued by Cape liberals themselves by the end of the nineteenth 
century as they, as much as the magnates and formulators of segregation in the north, 
realised the need for an increasing systematisation and professional isation in policy 
towards an African political and educational elite that was growing in size and 
inf I uence. Indeed, while the Glen Grey Act of 1894 signalled the growing inte- 
gration of the Cape economy into the octopus-like tentacles of the mines and its 
labour 
requirements, the 1890s were equally important for movements within the Cape Colony 
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itself for a strengthening of missionary control and the widening of African educational 
facilities in order to buttress white political hegemony. 
This movement among Cape liberals stemmed from developments in African 
independent churches and the rise of the phenomenon that became known as 
Ethiopianism. As a number of African religious leaders seceded with their followers 
from the white missionary controlled churches and established their own schools and 
methods of religious and educational instruction, a pronounced African challenge 
emerged to one of the main props of the Cape I iberal establishment. It was the 
missionary response to this by the start of the twentieth century in the form of moves 
to extend African higher education and plan for the creation of an African university 
college that marked one of the first major instances in cultural control over African 
political leadership. At the same time, with the actual establishment of the University 
of Fort Hare in 1915, some five years after Union and two years after the 1913 Natives 
Land Act, the real significance of Cape liberal efforts at both collaborating with and 
shaping the ideas of opinion formers on native policy in the other states of South Africa 
was established. As this chapter, therefore, seeks to show, Cape liberalism in the 
years before and after Union in 1910 was not a dying phenomenon but very much active 
in shaping the form and nature of social control in the years after Union and actually 
resisting the continued extension of state c6ntralisation. It was through, inde. ed, the 
perpetuation of private philanthropic and missionary efforts in the sphere of African 
higher education that state control in the form of Bantu education was resisted as long 
as it was and liberal influence exerted on the formulation of native policy through a 
"'liberal establishment". 
2 
Fort Hare undoubtedly formed a strong pillar in this 
continued liberal resistance to state centralisation of African higher education and its 
final demise with the state takeý-over in 1959, following the University College of Fort 
Hare Act, represented a major inroad into the ability of liberals in South Africa to 
resist the contin. ued aggregation of state power. In this respect, the origins and 
development of Fort Hare as an African university college, which we examine in the 
second part of this chapter after looking at the African challenge in the form of 
Ethiopianism, marked the active continuation of a liberal tradition in the Cape which 
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did not simply fall into demise at the time of Union in 1910, as Stanley Trapido has 
3 
tended to argue, nor been reformulated on the Witwatersrand in the inter-war years 
to rationalise the interests of mining capital and mediate the contradictions of the 
4 
government's segregation policy, as has been argued by Legassick. Fort Hare, 
rather, became the locus for aI iberal ism that was concerned to preserve non statist 
and informal modes of social control in an industrial ising society and it was thus not 
surprising that it aggregated to itself from the I 930s onwards continuous Afrikaner 
nationalist political hostility. As 'it was born to meet the'pan-tribal and Africanist 
consciousness expressed through Ethiopianism, so it came to be seen as a chief obstacle 
to the implementation of a policy of retribalisation based upon the ethnic separatism of 
Dr. Verwoerd and Dr. Eiselen's dream of apartheid. 
The Ethiopian challenge:. 
In its more classical form, the Cape liberalism of the nineteenth century sought 
the gradual inclusion of educated African leaders into the "European civilisation" of the 
southern tip of Africa. This was to be substantially on an individual basis for, despite 
the hopes of the ambitious f irstý generation of Cape missionaries represented by John 
Philip for the progressive transformation of African cultural values towards those of the 
dominant colonial culture, it became clear by Responsible Government in 1853 and the 
retreat of British expansionism that missionary optimism would have to be modified. 
The influence of the missions on African societies was very much an indirect one and, 
as J. B. Pe ires has recently shown in respect of the Xhosa, Christianity was implanted 
as an African religion brought by the convert Ntsikana as opposed to the breakaway 
nationalism of Nxele. 
5 
While, therefore, missionary proselytisation continued in the 
Eastern Cape, it depended very much on the vital cultural mediation of African converts 
themselves in the form of men like Tiyo Soga, the son of one of Ntsikana's converts. 
The magistrate William Charles Scully, reflecting on a meeting with Tiyo Soga in 1869, 
exemplified the classical Cape liberal view towards this group of acculturated inter- 
mediaries when he stated that Soga "had acquired culture both deep and wide, and then 
returned to try and civil ise his people ... He was not alone a deeply cultivated 
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scholar., but a Christian gentleman in the fu I lest sense of the term. "6 The 
acculturated African., in other words, was accepted on equal terms as the individual 
and bourgeois "Christian gentleman" in its full Victorian sense while at the same time 
being seen as having special additional and . separate responsibilities of "returning to 
his people" and disseminating the values of the colonial culture. 
This somewhat piecemeal form of cultural transformation did bring results in 
the form of a growing African intelligentsia; and in the years after the foundation of 
Lovedale in 1841 growing numbers of African children received elementary instruction 
- 11 / 000, for example, by 1856 and 63,000 by 1883 - and hopes began to turn 
towards some form of higher educational institution for African leaders. In 1872, 
the Reverend James Stewart of Lovedale looked forward to "something little short of 
an African university where a number of excellent things from agriculture to theology 
might be taught". 
7 Attempts at a systematic cultural transformation of African chiefs' 
sons in the isolated environment of Zonnebloem College in Cape Town, set up during the 
governorship of Sir George Grey in 1858, met with only mixed success and in the after- 
math of the annexation of the Transkei in 1877 following the Cape Xhosa war of that 
year and the rebellion of 1881, the Eastern Cape missions began to move towards a 
growing recognition of the distinctiveness of African customs and law. Even before 
the appointment of the Native Laws and Customs Commission the Christian Express 
considered that it was "surprising that (the Africans) have submitted., as patiently as they 
have done to laws and customs, ways and modes of life and forms of administration so 
foreign to them". For while "they have reaped certain benefits no doubt", they did 
SO: 
at the cost of the undermining of a large proportion of the foundations 
of their social life, and habits as a people. And the result has been 
that they are landed in what may be called the Transition State I in 
which many of them are neither completely civilised nor completely, 
savage, neither educated nor ignorant, neither extremely heathen nor 
Christian. 8 
This re-evaluation of civilising missionary assumptions received a boost with the 
1883 Native Laws and Customs Commission, but was even further reinforced by the 
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development of African religious secessionism in the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century. Beginning with the Thembu Church of Nehemiah Tile in the Eastern Cape 
following the War of 1877-78 and the influx of Trekboers of 1881-83,9 this movement 
reflected the increasing dispossession of the African peasantry as reserves became 
overcrowded and uneven development created a class of migrants and squatters., on the 
one hand, and a landed small farmer class on the other. 
10 
As labour migrancy in 
the Transkei advanced dramatically in the I 890s from some 27,511 in 1893 to 45,000 
by 1899, African independent churches sprang up to cater for a growing pan-tribal and 
Africanist consciousness that sought to be free from white missionary control - In 
addition, through the African Methodist Episcopal Church that was incorporated in 
South Africa in 1896, links were established with American blacks and the radical 
A. M. E. Bishop Henry M. Turner (known by the Africans as "Bishop Dunzi") visited 
South Africa in 1898 to ordain some sixty ministers into the church and raise its member- 
ship from some 2,800 in 1896 to 10,800 two years later. 
11 
The significance of this secessionism was that it amounted to virtually an 
"educational rebellion" by many former mission -educated Christian converts who, 
having accepted schooling from the colonial power, now wanted to bring it under their 
own contro . 
12 
One of the leaders of the A. M. E. in the Herschel district, for 
instance, was Isaiah Sishuba, a headman who had been educated at Lovedale and 
Zonnebloem College in Cape Town, 13 while in Pondoland Chief Sigcau appointed an 
A. M. E. minister Mtintso as "Royal Chaplain to the Great Place". 
14 The success of 
this challenge to missionary hegemony was com promised 'from the start, however, by a 
series of. economic and political weaknesses. Many of the adherents of the churches 
were poverty stricken having joined during a period of growing economic distress in 
the African reserves and there were few funds to establish any systematic educational 
and cultural programme. In addition, despite the growing pan-tribalism of the 
churches in the wake of the Thembu Church, many of the members of churches like the 
Ethiopian Church, established in 1892 out of the Thembu Church, and the A. M. E. were 
still motivated by ethnic and kinship considerations such that the followers of a 
particular local secessionist leader were frequently defined by-kinship attachments and 
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rivalry with another headman. 
15 
Thus, it was not surprising that the leaders of the 
independent churches looked elsewhere for assistance and the A. M. E. in this instance 
had the attraction of the connection with America where there were substantial 
educational facilities for blacks. African hopes grew by the late 1890s for an 
increasing number of students to be sent over to America for further education while 
in South Africa itself the visit of Henry Turner in 1898 led to the establishment by the 
A. M. E. of the Bethel Institute in Cape Town, under the principalship of the Reverend 
James Dwane., which was looked upon as a possible nascent African university in South 
Africa. 16 
This upsurge in A. M. E. opti. mism, centred around the connections with negroes 
in America, undoubtedly acted as a powerful influence on the thinking of white mission- 
aries and administrators by the turn of theýcentury. By 1905 it was claimed that some 
100 African st-uden ts from South Africa were enrolled in American universities 
17 
and 
missionary leaders started to warn of possible political implications accruing from 
education for Africans overseas. "The American connection should be watched", 
wrote the Reverend James Stewart in 1901. "We -don't want nor need American 
negroes in this country, and there is a party of these Negroes, evidently desirous of 
gaining a foothold in this country and exploiting as far as they are able for the benefit 
of the Negro in the South. " 
18 
Stewart's warning underlined the fears held by a 
number of white missionaries that the A. M. E. represented anew and po ten tia IIy more 
attractive source of missionary proselyisation. The Church did have considerable 
financial resources and the American negro missionary the Reverend Henry Attaway 
who helped found the A. M. E. 's Bethel Institute also organised a land syndicate that 
purchased a 10,000 acre farm at Croen River, 44 miles from Cape Town. 
19 
It thus 
seemed that the A. M. E. in time might become a leading missionary church in South 
Africa and so challenge the mission monopoly of the white-control led churches. 
These white missionary fears in the Cape were further underlined by an 
important secession from the Church of Scotland's mission at Lovedale by the Reverend 
p. j. Mzimba in 1898, leading to two damaging law suits in the Supreme Court in order 
67 
to recover property taken by Mzimba's followers. 
20 
This was seen by many leading 
Cape liberals as a direct challenge to the authority of one of the most important missions 
in the Colony and acted as a considerable reinforcement to the racial isation in much 
liberal thinking by the turn of the century. Richard Rose-Innes, for instance, as 
attorney for Stewart in the case, wrote to him advising that he "give no quarter and 
21 exercise every right and power we possess against them, and not yield a single in. ch". 
Coming on top of the election the previous year when lmvo transferred its support to the 
Bond, it is possible to see why Rose-Innes was in favour of territorial segregation by 
1903.22 Furthermore, support was also promised from the Cape Prime Minister 
W. P. Schreiner who stated that no matter what final judgment was g. iven in court on 
the Mzimba case " I will never give title to any but the Free Church of Scotland as 
long as I am Prime Minister. Dr. Stewart has nothing to fear. " 
23 
In such circumstances, the years after 1900 saw white missionary interests in 
the Cape being increasingly protected by the actions of the government in a growing 
mission-state alliance that had been somewhat weakened since the reduction of direct 
government financial support for the missions in 1863 and increased concentration of 
resources on white education. 
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Despite the fact that the period of A. M. E. radicalism 
in South Africa following Turner's v is it in 1898 was short -I ived and that by, 1900 a more 
moderate political course was being adopted, the Cape Government began to implement 
a tight policy of surveillance over the church as part of a wider aim to exercise control 
over -the activities of independent churches. In this respect it probably led the way 
in South Africa for other states had been far less discriminatory, either bending over 
backwards to meet A. M. E. leaders like Turner, as Paul Kruger had done on the 1898 
visit, or else forbidding the entry of their leaders altogether, which was the practice of 
the British administrators in both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State after the 
Anglo-Boer War. When, therefore., the A. M. E. sought the recognition of the church 
in the Cape and the right of its ordained ministers to initiate marriage ceremonies, it 
despatched the Reverend 1. N. Fitzpatrick, a leading moderate in the church, to gain 
an interview with the Prime Minister, William Schreiner. The Cape Government, 
however, instituted delaying tactics. By 1900, it was beginning to become clear 
68 
that by "playing a waiting game" it would be possible to neutralise the influence of 
independent churches like the A. M. E. by exp I oiting their interna I div is ions and lack 
of strong leadership. 
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From Resident Magistrates there came a number of reports 
of the failure of the independent churches at the local level to "inspire great confidence 
in the native mind" and predictions that "the movement will drag and not be a success" 
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and it seemed likely that by instituting a strict code of conduct in order to gain 
recognition, the leaders of the churches could be used as vital intermediaries in the 
implementation of social control. In the case of the A. M. E. the government requested 
that the church should be domiciled in South Africa "and have, on the spot, some fully 
competent authority, such authority being vouched for by the chief U. S. Government 
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official of the state he came from". Such an approach indicated a recognition by 
the Cape government of the value of using external vetting by the American state 
governments which, in the aftermath of the war with Spain in 1898, had an increasingly 
racist and segregationist attitude and were supportive of British imperial expansion in 
Southern Africa. 28 The policy bore fruit, too, for the A. M. E. duly complied by 
sending Bishop L. J. Coppin to the Cape in 1901 to secure governmental recognition 
and define the objectives of the church specifically to an apolitical "religious" sphere. 
A. M. E. Church organisation was thoroughly investigated by Coppin and the ministers 
ordained by Turner in 1898 were only selectively re-appointed from year to year. 
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As a consequence of these moves by the Cape government, control over African 
independent churches was put on a firmer footing in the years after the Ang"lo-Boer War 
when the question of a native policy for the whole of South Africa began to be discussed. 
Though the A. M. E. at the colonial level in the Cape was recognised in 1903, many of 
the radical elements in the church were progressively neutralised with the assistance of 
the A. M. E. church leadership. Even though, for instance, Isaiah Sishuba proclaimed 
that the objective of his church in Herschel was only "to christianise our people, to 
teach them to obey their magistrates, inspectors as well as their bodily masters to work 
and to be loyal to all the laws of the country", his activities were restricted by the 
government who backed the objections of the Wesleyan mission in the reserve to his 
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building another church in the location of headman Joel Mehlomakulu. Similarly, 
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the increased wi II ingness of Bishop Coppin's successor as head of the A. M. E. in South 
Africa, Bishop Charles Smith, to get rid of "undesirable elements" in the church led 
to the secession of the former radical faction led by James Dwane who complained of 
the refusal of the A. M. E. church in America to back up their former promises of 
assistance with any funds. 
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By the time of the Report of the South African Native 
Affa irs Comm iss ion , cha ired by Sir Godfrey Lagden, in 1905 recommended se lective 
recognition of African independent churches in South Africa, 
32 
the Cape policy of 
social control had made significant headway and by 1907 restrictions on the entry of 
A. M. E. ministers into the Transvaal were relaxed and white settler fears of a united 
African insurrection led by American educated black churchmen began to decline. 
Though the myth of Ethiopianism continued to live on in white popular consciousness 
- it was widely disseminated, for instance, through John Buchan's novel Prester 
John 
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_ it began to beC'ome plain to the various state governments of South Africa 
before Union that African independent church activity was capable of being controlled 
through various selective measures of partial recognition andcontinuous surveillance. 
As Louis Botha, the prime minister of the Transvaal after Responsible Government in 
1907, minuted in 1908., cooperation between the governments of South Africa was 
necessary "to arrest the growth of any racial or separatist movement among natives", 
nevertheless, "as far as the Transvaal is concerned, there is not sufficient information 
before the Government to show that the attitude and propaganda of the present 
Ethiopian organisations are such as to justify the assumption of special legislative 
powers for the purpose of suppressing their proceedings". 
34 This attitude character- 
ised the policy of successive South African governments after Union as well as social 
control through selective recognition and the establishment of guidelines for church 
conduct characterised the findings of the Report of the Native Churches Commission in 
1925.35 
On the other hand, the- refusal of central government to take a strongly inter- ' 
ventionist or repressionist line on independent churches meant that a large sphere of 
social control functions was left to private initiative, especially that of the white 
missions and their allies (frequently relatives) in native administration. In this 
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respect, much of the alarm felt in some missionary circles in the early years of the 
twentieth century at the growth of African independent churches and potential for 
Ethiopianism to radicalise mission-educated African religious and political leaders 
spilt over into a debate on extending controls over African educational facilities. 
The Ethiopian phenomenon, indeed, became an important base for white missionaries 
to justify the extension of their own sphere of influence by establishing an African 
university college under their own control in order to prevent the exodus of educated 
African leaders overseas, especially to the United States. The longer term conse- 
quences of Ethiopianism were thus to exacerbate the hitherto somewhat tardy moves 
to institutional ise African hi'gher education and to lead finally to the establishment 
of the University College of Fort Hare in 1915. 
The missionary response: Fort Hare and African higher education: 
As we have seen, one of the consequences of Phiopianism by the end of the i ii 
nineteenth century was to contribute to the growing racialisation in Cape liberal 
thinking. Even some of the most prominent Cape paternalists like Walter Stanford 
came to be influenced by this trend as Ethiopianism seemed to represent a significant 
threat to the stability of Cape native administration in the Eastern Cape and the 
Transkei. "Hitherto the influential chiefs and headmen in the Transkeian Terr. itories 
have not associated themselves with the teachings of the Ethiopians", Stanford wrote. 
in 1902. But: 
In some of the di, stricts it would appear that they are losing rather 
than gaining ground. Great ease should, I consider, be exercised 
in regard to applications from these people for permission to occupy 
land for church and school purposes, and in allowing any recognition 
of the validity of their claims to ecclesiastical orders. The intro- 
duction of the American negro as a missionary and the readiness of 
our Natives to send their sons to America for education and training 
are features likely to lead to political difficulties in the future. There 
will, however, be compensations. The cry of Africa for the black 
Africans if once established as the aspiration of the Natives, will more 
than ought else br 
' 
ing fraternally together the two dominant races in this 
country. 36 
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This attitude by a leading Cape native administrator was echoed too in 
missionary circles, especially The Christian Express which was printed at Lovedale. 
Sti II smarting from the Mzimba issue the paper in 1900 declared that the Ethiopian 
churches "tend to lower Christian life, and to produce a Christian heathenism, 
which is some ways is worse than the heathenism of 'reds' who do not pretend to be 
better than they are". 
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Such a view was not necessarily shared by all the leading 
figures in the Cape at the time for Merriman considered that the "intolerant articles" 
in the Express "must be to the natives a revelation of the insufficiency of the Christian 
profession to secure either tolerance or liberality in religious matters", 
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but this 
attitude was a reflection of the Bond's defeat of Rhodes's Progressives in the 1898 
election and the exclusion from direct political influence of Stewart and Lovedale. 
However, by the end of the Anglo-Boer War and the beginnings of the debate on native 
policy for a future united South Africa the warnings of Stewart and the Express began 
to be heeded. In 1903, for instance, Stewart pointed out in a paper On Native 
Education - South Africa that it would not be possible to rely on the continued 
funding of missionary education of Africans from overseas sources and)as things were, 
there was a major reliance on funds raised by Africans themselves. Pointing out that 
the annua I cost of Loveda le was some El 0,000 per ann um, Stewart argued that one 
quarter came from the mission committee in Scotland, one fifth from the education 
department of the Cape Colony and the rest from Afric an sources. Indeed, the fees 
for board and education paid by the Africans had risen from nothing in the 1870S to 
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nearly E5,000 a year or some E58,000 over the whole period. This meant that, 
as the African demand for education continued to grow, further reliance would be 
placed on African sources for funds. It was in this respect, therefore, that 
Ethiopianism represented such a major challenge to white missionary hegemony for, 
unless it was controlled, it had the potential for jeapordising the flow of funds from 
the African peasantry in the Eastern Cape and diverting it to alternative channels. 
Thus, the key'question was to get back control over the African independent church 
leadership before it became sufficiently radicalised to threaten the white missions. 
"The education question ... runs into the Ethiopian question", Stewart said in 
his 
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evidence to the South African Native Affairs Commission: 
... and I am afraid the Ethiopian question runs into another question 
wider still. It is to prevent and check al I this, to satisfy the 
native people and take away the excuses they have to go abroad for 
education that I would provide facilities and opporturiities for their 
getting better education in this country ... We cannot now avoid this advance in education. If it is not given they will secure it 
themselves by -and-by. One of the efforts of the Ethiopian Church 
was to found a New South African College, and possibly this Bethel 
Institution is a shadow of that idea. They wanted a large sum of 
money and got only a small portion of it. If they had got al I the 
money they wanted, and if they had not fallen out with Dwane, this 
new effort would have been existing today as the New South African 
College. 40 
Stewart's arguments undoubtedly influenced the thinking of the Commission 
for interest by the British administration in the Transvaal under Milner had been growing 
in the whole African education question and the colony's Adviser on Education., 
E. B. Sargant, had been associated with the Commission as educational adviser. 
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While visiting Lovedale himself in June of 1904, Sargant had been able to see for 
himself the significance of Lovedale as an educational institution, with assets valued 
at some E40,000, and its importance in the ideas of the educated African elite in the 
Eastern Cape. Even indeed the secessionist Mzimba manifested a high regard for it 
considering that higher education was the most important aspect of education for 
ri ca. Africans and that this should be provided at Lovedale in a united South, Af 1 
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Consequently, Sargant strongly recommended Lovedale as the centre for a future 
African college in his report to Milner since its symbolic significance in 
African eyes 
as a living educational institution lent itself readily enough as a catalyst 
for 
educational unification in a united South Africa: 
As the Bantu tribes receive different treatment at the hands of the 
various states and Christian churches in South Africa, there is, at 
present, great need f or some adjustment of the views of these States 
and Churches with regard to the native. I do not believe that 
this can be done by conferences and commissi-ons alone. What is 
wanted is the I iving energy of a single institution, in which the 
different opinions and modes of action of all governments and 
denominations can be brought together, costed and allowed to grow 
into a settled pol icy. 43 
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Further the strategic position of Lovedale in an area where many 
secessionist churches had grown up made it an important institution for neutral ising 
the influence of their leaders; for "even if they have lost their affection for their 
old school (a thing which is by no means certain), it still bulks largely in their 
eyes '. 
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In the years after 1905, therefore, the importance of Lovedale and the 
missionary tradition that motivated it, was impressed on the thinking of leaders from 
the northern states and the Witwatersrand. To educational specialists like Sargant, 
the commitment of Lovedale to an industrial training ideology on lines similar to the 
Tuskegee and Hamilton Institutes in the United States gave it a potential for significant 
development into a higher educational institution for a semi-skil led African petty 
bourgeoisie. Stewart, too, had long been defending the record of missions in the 
Cape against continuous attacks that missi on education for Africans was too bookish 
and was threatening the jobs of white artisans and in 1903 he complained of the 
inadequacy of grants from the Cape Government for the development of industrial 
training in the missions in order to train Africans in fields like carpentry, waggon 
making, printing, book-binding, post office and telegraph work. 
45 The whole ethos 
of Stewart's approach to African education reflected the racialisation in thinking 
regarding both African and negro education that was prevalent, in both South Africa 
and the American South by the early years of the twentieth century: 
The mind of the African is empty, and he has a great idea of what 
he cal Is "getting knowledge" , 
hence his anxiety about instruction 
merely apart from mental discipline and habit. To this must. be 
added little liking for manual labour, though that dislike is not 
peculiar to his colour in certain latitudes. He is not, however,, 
so unwilling to work as is generally stated. But there is the 
erroneous idea that manual work is servile toil, and mental work 
is supposed to elevate a man to a higher class. This is the odd 
native idea of social rank. 46 
At the same time, the more immediate reasons for this segregationist view of 
education, with Africans being directed as far as possible into manual as opposed to 
intellectual fields of instruction, related to Stewart's perception of the potential 
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threat to missionary hegemony from the growing educated African elite centred around 
the separatist churches. To enforce a racial separation in education with Africans 
being confined to industrial training was a means to reinstate internal social control 
inside the missions and thus neutralise the threat from mission-educated African 
leaders. A visit to Tuskegee in 1904 confirmed Stewart's beliefs in the value of the 
industrial training model developed by Booker T. Washington since, as in the case of 
Elijah Makiwane and the Native Educational Association founded in the Cape in the 
I 870s 
I it strengthened the values of conservative Cape I iberal ism in the African 
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educational and political elite. Instead., therefore, of seeking immediate 
political goals under the ideology of Ethiopian church separatism, Stewart saw the 
Tuskegee model instilling the Victorian values of hard work, educational progress and 
long term economic advancement: 
As Mackay of Uganda used to say, the African would need the Anglo- 
Saxon aI ongs ide of h im for the next 50 or 100 years. The pity is 
that it is just this help that the Native seems bent on throwing off at 
present. Although I have spent a lifetime in helping them, I am 
not blind to these defects or faults. Their imitative power is 
considerable, their spontaneousness not very great, and their 
administrative power a very great deal less than they take it to be. 
This sýeems the general rule, whatever rare exceptions may be found. 
Did you not find that they exhibited administrative abilities in 
America? Booker Washington's father is believed to have been-a 
white man, and the bulk of hi. s staff are not what we would call 
Natives. There are some very able men there, from architects 
to-. agriculturalists, and I was greatly struck by their loyalty to their 
work and to their leader personally. They have been also largely 
helped from the North. Mr. Washington spends often about a third 
of the year in the North. Mr. Carnegie gave him 600,000 dollars 
or E120,000 in one subscription towards his endowment fund. I 
spent several days going through the place, and found that where we 
had not a single steam engine at Lovedale, they had thirteen steam 
engines at Tuskegee, the largest being 60 horse power ... The work 
is very thorough and the teaching good, because the staff is large and 
everything is wel I organised. But there is no comparison between 
the two countries. The negro in Alabama has grown up under two 
totally different conditions, and has the English language, and he 
enters his work at Tuskegee under quite different conditions from what 
the Native from the kraal enters the institutions here, whatever the 
institution may be ... 
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... At Lovedale we attach quite as much importance to work as they do at Tuskegee, only this may be said: we have to give so 
much instruction now according to the present curriculum-and Department regulations that we have no time for education., which is a different process altogether. 48 
Stewart's statement was an admittance both of the importance of the more 
organised and professional system of negro education in America., aided as it was by 
large financial donations from- industrialists like Carnegie, and the inadequacy of the 
old Cape mission style of education still prevailing at Lovedale which allowed for 
"instruction,, but not for "education". Stewart's frank admiration for the technical 
success of Tuskegee indicated that Cape missions needed 'to buttress their educational 
facilities with greater equipment and more finan'ce if they were going to succeed in 
maintaining their ideological hegemony over the African educated elite which by 
49 this time was equally being impressed by the American negro example. It was 
thus both the recognition by Stewart of the inadequacy of the existing pattern of 
control inside the Cape missions and the realisation by Sargant, Milner and the Trans- 
vaal administration of the growing need for a more national system of African higher 
education in a united South Africa that led the South African Native Affairs 
Commission in 1905 to recommend the establishment of an African college of higher 
education. 
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The dominant pressure, however, to establish the college over the following 
decade 1905-1915 came from within the Cape itself, as the previous mission-state 
alliance forged at the turn of the century in response to the. rise of Ethiopianism was 
strengthened. Undoubtedly, a strong fil I ip to this was provided in 1905 by a further 
development in the breach between Lovedale and the secessionist church of P. J. Mzimba. 
In England the House of Lords made a controversial judgment at the end of 1904. awarding 
the Free Church of Scotland (the "WeeFrees") control over the property of the United 
Free Church of Scotland, which was the mission controlling Lovedale. As a resu It of 
this decision, Mzimba's church., which claimed in 1902 some 6,500 members and a 
further 20,000 adherents compared to the. Un ited Free Church's 16,044 members in 
South Africa and a further 8,182 adherents, 
51 laid claim to the property, and assets of 
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the Lovedale mission. The effect of this was for a period to drive Dr. Stewart 
further in the direction of Sargant and the Transvaal administration as he sought 
external political influence to resist Mzimba's move, 
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while the Cape government 
itself strengthened its resolve both to back Lovedale under Stewart and to support the 
idea of making the mission the nucleus of an African college of higher education as a 
means to strengthen resistance to Mzimba's claim. Stewart, the Cape Prime, Minister 
Jameson minuted in 1905, had "won the unresolved confidence of the Government" 
while Mzimba's movement was viewed with apprehension, the Government feeling that 
"should he secure a voice in the management of Lovedale an. d the subsidiary establish- 
ment of Blythswood, not only would the usefulness of these Institutions be gravely 
impaired, but having in regard the separatist views now so rife in the minds of a section 
of the Native people, the change might have a far reaching and harmful political 
tendency". 
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The Cape government, therefore, was strongly in favour of moves to initiate 
a campaign to mobilise support amongst sections of the African intelligentsia in both 
the Eastern Cape and elsewhere behind the African college scheme, since this was also 
a means to clamp down on any further spreading of Church separatism under Mzimba's 
con fro I. 
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The proposal was originally mooted in September of 1905 by the Education 
Board of the Cape 
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and, following the gathering of African chiefs and leaders at 
Lovedale in December to support the scheme, the campaign was further pushed by 
Sargant in the period of political vacuum left at Lovedale by Stewart's death the same 
month. With the possibility of resistance to the scheme growing from other Cape 
missions who feared a loss of students to the new college, Sargant saw the mobilisation 
of African opinion as a crucial buttress to the scheme's political effectiveness. III 
regard the natives as our first 'battle' ", he wrote to Hobart Houghton in February of 
1906, "but we must order our remaining forces so as to be in touch with the van. The 
advance should be made nqýpari passu but in co-ordination., At present the Cape 
Colony Government is well to the front, the natives close in support, the churches next 
and the Institutions in the raar. " 
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Sargant's fears regarding the "Institutions" were 
rnainJy directed at the Reverend R. H. Dyke, Principal of the Morija Institution in 
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Lesotho, who had suggested Queenstown as an alternative to Lovedale as the centre 
for the college, but the holding of a meeting of the major chiefs in Lesotho to back 
the Lovedale optioa the same month was a successful case of using African political 
opinion to block such missionary resistance. 
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This growing alliance between the original Lovedale supporters of the 
African college proposal and the African educational and political elite was further 
cemented when the Reverend James Henderson became the successor to Stewart as 
Principal of Lovedal-e in 1906. With the support of the now United Free Church of 
Scotland, Henderson was able to claim land adjacent to the Lovedale mission at Fort 
Hare as the site of the college and contacts were forged with the surrounding white 
commercial interests when an executive committee was formed to oversee the develop- 
m ent under the treasurership of J. W. Weir, a prominent King Williamstown businessman. 
Weir, as a representative in the Eastern Cape of what Stanley Trapido has termed "the 
little tradition" of Cape liberalism based on the class alliance at the local level 
between white commercial capital and the African peasantry, especially the Mfenqu, 
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was in a strong position to raise African interest in the scheme. Weir sought to 
convince the leaders of the African intel I igentsia in the Eastern Cape led by figures 
like Walter Rubusana, John Tengo Jabavu and Elijah Makiwane that the importance of 
an institution of higher education in South Africa was that they would not have to send 
their sons abroad for further education beyond the mission level. John Tengo Jabavu, 
for instance, had to send his son Davidson Don Tengo to'England for further education 
even as late as 1914 since the Fort Hare scheme was not yet established, and for Weir 
this was undoubtedly an important basis for forging an alliance that could override any 
remaining missionary opposition to the Fort Hare proposal since -it could lay claim to 
obvious "practical" advantages. 
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Over the following two years a series of meetings in the African reserves and 
locations to mobilise support had the effect of consolidating the traditional Cape liberal 
class alliance at the local level at a time when., at the colonial level in the Cape, 
liberalism was under attack. This can be seen as having important long term conse- 
quences since it meant that Fort Hare became the nucleus in the Eastern Cape for the 
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survival of Cape liberalism long after the establishment of Union and for its becoming 
one of the key bases behind the South African "liberal establishment". Much of 
the African support that was mobilised, for example, over-rode previous divisions 
that had grown up as a result of the implementation of the Glen Grey Act in the 
Eastern Cape after 1894. When a meeting was called at Idutywa on the 26th April 
1906 to gain I oca I support for the scheme, Enoch Mamba - the founder of the 
Vigilance Association in the Transkei that had protested against the exclusion of 
educated and " school" people from the Glen Grey Councils - was co-opted onto 
the local committee to supervise African support for Fort Hare along with Chief 
Dinizulu Sigidi, whose father had been instrumental in preventing the outbreak of 
"passive resistance" to the labour tax clause in the Glen Grey Act. - 
60 At the 
same time, Weir sought, along with his coterie of African supporters led by john 
Tengo Jabavu and lmvo, to keep open contacts with the Cape Government to ensure 
the scheme's success 
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and to use the Transkeian Territories General Council as one 
of the main bases for African fund raising. Such a wide alliance, involving the Cape 
government, Eastern Cape mercantile interests, the Scottish mission at Lovedale, the 
African peasantry in the Ciskei led by Jabavu and the Transkeian General Council was 
certainly an ambitious idea, though in 1906 it stil I seemed feasible when a leading 
Cape pol itician I ike Merriman could propose a scheme of E50,000 for the col lege on a 
half and half basis - the Africans pýoviding E25,000 and the Government and missions 
the rest. 
62 
However, in the period up to Union in 1910-, it became clear that 
fissures were developing as the Cape Government came under increasing segregationist 
pressure. The Superintendent of Education in the Cape, Dr. Muir, remained an 
inveterate opponent of the whole scheme and, despite Weir's initial success in raising 
funds, (which in 1907 amounted to some E4 to 5,000 of a promised E38,50 .0 including 
El 0,000 from the Transke ian General Council) 
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it began to become clear that support 
from the Cape Government was waning. In August 1907., the executive board under 
Weir supervising the scheme decided, after its campaign to involve African interest, to 
desist from further activity pending further national political decisions 
64 
while in 1908 
decided on no further approaches to the Cape Government for financial support due 
I 
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to I the economic depression which might, as Henderson gloomily wrote to Sargant, 
"prejudice the application -for a 
larger measure of assistance later on". 
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In 
such circumstances, the position of the college began to look desperate as AJrican 
interest in it declined and the. credibilityofwhite missionary and governmental 
financial support for it fell into doubt. "Our efforts have been in great measure 
rendered futile for lack of organization recognised by Government" stated an unnamed 
petition from African fund-raisers about this time: 
** the belief being widespread among our people that the Government 
is unsympathetic towards the scheme, and that efforts to raise money for it would be looked upon with disfavour by the au 
' 
thorities. Our aim is to raise E25,000 from among ourselves and we have reason to hope 
that, if we succeed in this a similar sum will be forthcoming from 
European sources. 66 
With such uncertainty, the organisers of the fund raising decided on a more 
coordinated effort to raise support outside the, Cape from mining and philanthropic 
sources in the Transvaal. Some tentative support had been forthcoming from these 
quarters in 1905, but the initial optimism in a completely Cape organised sch eme backed 
up by the Government in Cape Town put off further contacts until 1908. Now , 
however, in a period when unification of the South African states was becoming the 
main point on the political agenda, the Fort Hare org9nisers sent one of their number, 
Neil MacVicar, on a tour of Cape Town, Bloemfontein, Johannesburg and Pretoria. 
MacVicar reported extensive interest from mining, philanthropic and educational 
sources in the Transvaal as men like Howard Pim, a leading Quaker philanthropist in 
the Transvaal, Lionel Phillips, the mining magnate, and G. M. Hofmeyr, chairman of 
the School Board, expressed support for the scheme. Further support came from the 
Transvaal Native Affairs Society and the Transvaal Missionary Society while the 
Secretary of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association suggested providing bursaries 
for the college. Support from the Transvaal Government at this time, however, was 
only tentative with General Botha being "too busy" to see MacVicar and Smuts offering 
support only with the unification of South Africa out of the way first. 
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Thus, from 1908 onwards the original Cape organisers of the Fort Hare scheme 
began to 
Ilook 
increasingly towards the Witwatersrand'and mining interests as possible 
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future supporters of it and, this tendency increased as Union was finally accomplished 68 in 19.10. As econom'ic depression and agricultural decline continued in the 
African reserves, it began to become clear that African financial support would remain 
limited: apart from the t8., 000 contributed from the Tragskeian General Council., 
for instance, contributions from Africans remained tiny and only E300 of a promised 
El / 750 had been collected by 1910.69 Some efforts were made by the executive 
board of the African college to sustain African interest by seeking the appointment of 
an agricultural instructor since the farm manager at Lovedale could not conduct all the 
necessary classes in agriculture. Such an appo intment, James Henderson felt, 
would be crucial for the future of the college scheme since it would "give it a definite 
practical turn upon which its usefulness in the future so much depends". 
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The- 
Transkeian General Council duly complied by contributing towards the cost of an 
agriculturalist attached to Lovedale but connected to the College Department of the 
future "Inter State Native Coll6ge". 
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This development was important in a number 
of respects: it reflected the process of growing class differentiation in the reserves as 
growing numbers of African peasants were forced out as labour migrants while a smaller 
class of wealthier African peasant farmers sought to expand the scale and nature of 
their holdings and modernise their farming techniques. 
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Furthermore, it reflected., 
too, the increasing perception in dominant white political and. economic circles of the 
African reserves as labour reservoirs, with the economic base of African subsistence 
agriculture acting as a structural underpinning to the employment by the mining industry 
of extra cheap African labour power: 
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much of the debate on this revolved around 
the development of the concept of territorial segregation in the Rand before Union which 
we discuss in the next chapter. 
The educational function of the African college began, therefore, to change 
in the eyes of its organisers-by the time of Union and some of the more ambitious liberal 
aims expressed by James Weir in 1905-1907 
became tempered by a growing realisation , 
that increasing compromises would need to be made if the College was ever to get off the 
ground. Much of the original government contribution of E25,000 was clearly not 
going to be forthcoming and in 1912 the assets of the college amounted to a mere 
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E10,613, of which E8,000 came from the Transkeian General Council and a further 
El 1 000 from De Beers. Only E6,050 of this represented liquid assets in the bank 
and only E600 was promised from the Union Minister of Education, F. S. Malan, when 
the col lege board decided to open the col lege in 1915.74 With such a dilution of 
aims, it was clear that the college would only start off by being little more than a 
mere agricultural extension to the existing college at Lovedale, especially as the 
basis of the site donated by the United Free Church of Scotland consisted of farm 
land that could be used for the fostering of agricultural education and scientific 
farming. At the same time, the ethos of the college had clearly changed from 
before Union as the executive board supervising the college scheme became transformed 
into the Governing Council of Fort Hare under the chairmanship of James Henderson. 
The original alliance with African political leadership in the Eastern Cape centred 
around John Tengo Jabavu's lmvo Zabantsundu became weakened as African thinking 
became in creasingl y pol iticised in the wake of the 1913 Natives Land Act (which 
Jabavu originally supported) and resentment arose at what was seen as the perpetuation 
of an old fashioned missionary paternalism in the Governing Council's conduct of the 
college's affairs. "The College is the only institution of its kind the Natives have", 
Jabavu wrote despondently to Alexander Kerr, the new Principal of Fort Hare: 
both from the fact that it is undenominational and that they have 
been given a say in its management. For long we have noticed 
things in the management of the missionary institutions which we 
could not understand or been able (sic) to accounf for. But 
having no say in them we have resolved to bear and forbear. And 
now in respect of this college we have insisted on having a say in 
its conduct, and the bitterness of the discussions is due, I presume, 
to the impact of old missionary methods in the management of their 
institutions and ourselves who have discussed these matters outside 
their Boards and formed our own conclusions. 75 
Such bad feeling within the African educational elite in the Eastern Cape was 
on Iy partia IIyaI lev iated by the appointmen t in 1915 of Jabavu's son Dav idson Don 
Tengo as. lecturer at Fort Hare, for the paternalism endemic to the institution continued 
to breed continuing African hostility and charges of racial discrimination. 
76. 
Butthe 
0 
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structure of Fort Hare itself reflected substantially its changing function as a key means 
for the dissemination of improved agricultural methods as a means of maintaining the 
subsistence basis of the African reserves while larger numbers of African migrants went 
out to work in the white controlled cities and farms. James Henderson, indeed, 
acted. as one of the key spokesmen in the Eastern Cape for this brand of conservative 
liberalism, rooting many of his ideas on developing African peasant agriculture with 
his previous acquaintance with crofting in the Scottish Highlands. 
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His elaboration 
of this theme at the Johannesburg Y. M. C. A. in 1918 after arrangements with Howard 
Pim and the Society of Friends indicated the continuing trend in missionary thinking in 
the Eastern Cape centred around Lovedale and Fort Hare and their desire to strengthen 
ties with northern philanthropic interests on the Witwatersrand. 
78 
It was thus not 
altogether surprising that, in the wake of the post war African strike wave, 'that students 
at Lovedale went on strike in 1920, initiating a tradition of African resistance to white 
missionary and liberal control that has continued up to the present. 
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The pattern of Cape liberalism after Union: 
Despite, however, the emasculation of many of the original aims behind the 
African university college at Fort Hare as Ethiopianism itself declined as a key factor 
shaping African political consciousness after Union, the existence of the colle ge 
reflected an important continuation of the Cape liberal tradition. Fort Hare became 
a vital input into the widening of South African liberalism in the inter-war years and it 
served as an important example of missionary-state collaboration in the evolution of 
newer structures of social control. The institution itself became the centre for 
important I ibera I conferences such as the one in 1930 attended by Edgar Brookes and 
Alfred Xuma 
80 
and it became in turn an object of growing Afrikaner natio nal ist. 
political hostility. Describing Fort Hare as "the mecca of the native", Die Basuin 
in 1930 presaged much of the later organic and cultural idealist concepts of African 
society and education in Afrikaner natilona list circ I es in the 1 940s and 1950s 
by 
describing it as 
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managed and guided by a nation with an exotic culture, an anti Afrikaans culture that slowly but surely detribalizes the educated Native and makes him feel a stranger among members of his race. What a pity that the Native is crammed with everything that is 
alien in order to despise his race consciousness and race character. 
What a pity that a genuine Bantu atmosphere is not created there, 
an atmosphere in which the Native can develop on his own merits 
and can perpetuate a national pride. ... Why tolerate the 
wrong to the Native any longer, a wrong that the more alienates 
the Native from the Afrikaner nation? 81 
Before however the Report of the Native Educational Commission in 1953 
leading eventually to state expropriation of Fort Hare, the college acted as a basis 
to liberal resistance to continuing state centralisation of social control in the sphere 
of education. Under the umbrella of an ideology of social meliorism and gradual 
assimilationism, the liberal educational establishment at Fort Hare fought for the 
progressive development of African educational facilities and sought to resist as far as 
possible- the implementa tion of a rigid system of territorial segregation by the 
industrialising South African state. Contrary, indeed, to the revisionist thesis of 
the complete collaboration of the South African liberal establishment with the prevailing 
policy of segregation before 1948, we must conclude that Fort Hare was an important 
brake on it and that, as the next chapter discusses, even the original formulation of 
territorial segregation on the Witwatersrand before Union was tempered by the ability 
of more flexible segregationists to appeal to the decentralised forms of social control 
in the reserves. The capacity of missionary institutions to modernise themselves with 
growing South African industrial isation represented an important check on the more 
headstrong social engineers on the Rand advancing the case for increasing state 
centralisation of social control, especially in the sphere of education. As a con - 
sequence, - white liberals continued to find in the Fort Hare model of African higher 
education involving both white commercial interests and the African petty bourgeoisie 
an important mechanism for extending their political influence at the local level. 
Even though, for instance, liberal influences became increasingly nullified at the 
centre of South African politics after the 1922 Rand Strike and the 1923 Natives Urban 
Areas Act, -- compensations could often be found back in local politics. In Natal, 
84 
particularly, the Ohlange Institute of John Dube was seen as another institution of 
African higher education which could be developed on Fort Hare lines, with the 
funds this time coming from the Rhodes Trust. 
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Similarly, in the case of Adams 
College in Natal, a cooptation of local African leaders began under the Principalship 
of Edgar Brookes after 1934, when the control I ing American Board of Missions agreed 
to include African members on the board of governors. 
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The successful establish- 
ment of Fort Hare in 1915 represented an important means, in fact, for the reconsol idation 
of white liberalism and it served as a key institutional base for the fostering of a South 
African liberal establishment in the inter-war years and into the late 1940S before the 
advent of the Afrikaner nationalist reaction. 
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Chapter Three 
The debate on segregation 
The previous two chapters have sought to show the internal dynamics behind 
the transformation in liberalism at the Cape at the end of the nineteenth and the 
a 
beginning of the twentieth century. External factors played a part in this process - 
the rise of social imperialism after Britain's entry into Egypt in 1882, the development 
of social darwinism and jingoism onto a mass basis, the movement in church separatism 
and the American negro connection - butas we have shown in the case of both the 
Glen Grey Act and the extension of African higher education, a large part of the 
initiative in this transformation came from within the Cape itself. By the time of 
Union, the Cape evolved a defensive and conservative liberalism that survived into 
the inter-war period as part of a wider South African I ibera] ism on a national scale. 
Why this tenacity in Cape liberalism and why its ideological importance when 
so much of South African historiography has tended to play down its influence in 
comparison to movements in favour of territorial segregation? The answer in many 
respects related to the complex and sophisticated relationship forged between the Cape, 
rooted in a fairly long tradition of administrative consolidation since the 1870s a'nd 
1880s 1 and the Transvaal , where 
by the time of the start of the British administration 
under Lord Milner at the close of the Anglo-Boer War in 1902 there was still only a 
shaky and ill-coordinated pattern of government and "native policy". Though British 
imperial interests in South Africa between 1902 and 1910 were centred around the 
Transvaal and the Witwatersrand, this chapter will argue that the debate on the nature 
and form the future governmental structure in South Africa should take was heavily 
influenced by the Cape precedent. In turn, much of the character and ideological 
make-up of governmental legitimation in the period after Union was still dictated by the 
previous Cape legacy and it was not by any means fortuitous that when Afrikaner 
nationalism began to emerge onto a mass basis in the late I 930s the ideology accompanying 
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it should be a specifically anti-I iberal and organic theory that sought to depart from 
the whole ethos of post-Union government. 
2 
This longer-run importance of Cape liberalism in shaping governmental policy 
in South Africa after Union has tended to be ignored by historians who have dwelt either 
on the immediate political defeats suffered by Cape liberals at the time, particularly in 
the failure to extend the common franchise northwards 
3 
or else on the contribution of 
the Natal system of segregation evolved in the nineteenth under Theophilus Shepstone. 
When the contribution of liberalism as a political iedology has come to be considered 
in post-Union South Africa, it has been assessed either in terms of a narrow party 
political mode I, making I ibera I ism an extreme Iy ephemera I phen omen on that on Iy 
achieved its fullest expression during the period of the Liberal Party between 1953 and 
1968 5 or else 'as in the more recent revisionist critique of Legqssick, a broadly defined 11 1 
"liberalism" that superceded the nineteenth century Cape liberal tradition and which 
rationalised the segregationist ideology of the emerging South African state. 
6 
The South African I iberal ism that began to emerge after 1910 was, in fact, a 
less precise phenomenon than this. It was an eclectic ideology that was interpreted 
in differing ways to suit differing class and group interests and, pace the revisionist 
argument equating liberalism as an important contributory strand behind segregationism, 
. 
it was frequently more the case of the state selectively making use of liberal political 
expertise than the other way round. For what is striking about the S outh African 
debate over the nature and form "native policy" should take is its imbalanced and dis- 
jointed nature. On the one hand, there was a state coming into existence as a British 
dominion on the periphery of the world capitalist system as it then functioned before the 
second world war; a state that was heavily dominated by the interests of gold and 
7 
diamond'mining and its links with international finance capital. On the other hand, 
a state that was centred on the Transvaal where African chiefdoms had only been finally 
subjudicated as recently as 1898, a year before the Anglo-Boer-War, and where 
administrative expertise was signally lacking and governmental structures had to be built 
8 
up more or less from the ground. On the one hand, a state where most of the wealth 
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and managerial expertise was centred around the Transvaal, but on the other hand, 
where most of the best in educational traditions, native administration, and a 
nascent white intelligentsia was centred around the Cape. 
To resolve these -imbalances was not easy. Even the small number of Oxford 
men that Milner brought out to reshape the administration in the Transvaal after the war 
be-came known pejoratively as the "Milner kindergarten", 6nd it was unlikely that 
Britain could on any long-term basis restructure South African administration completely 
as she would have liked in order to incorporate it as a fully mature dominion in the 
emerging Commonwealth 'of English-speaking nations. EvenIn the period before 
Responsible Government in Transvaal in 1906, the main aim of Milnerism in the Trans- 
vaal had been more a cautious attempt at restoring the old system of government of the 
Boer Republics, but under different political direction, than the massive attempt at 
social engineering it has often been taken to be. 
9 
However the victory of Het Volk 
under Botha and Smuts put paid even to this and -the creation of Union in 1910 was more 
the result of a succesful exercise in careful political manipulation by Britain to create 
a new alliance of English mining capital and Boer collaborationists than the fulfilment 
of a Liberal "Magn. animous gesture". 
10 
It is thus an historical fallacy to conceive 
of Milnerism as the intrusion of some new form of liberalism into South African Politics 
and then, by means of argument by association, to link this to the emergence of territorial 
segregation by the time of the 1913 Natives Land Act. In its ideological 
formulation, Milnerism under the influence of its mentor owed more to Bismatckian 
state centralisation and to socialist theory than it did to the main thrust of nineteenth 
century Victorian I iberal ism. "Where the Liberal saw politics as essentially a 
second-order, arbitral function", Eric Stokes has written, "Milner shared the-Germanic 
conviction in the creative role of political power 
12 
This worshipping of state 
power in turn cut it off even from the developments in liberal hegelianism in late 
nineteenth century England where thinkers I ike T. H. Green and Bosanquet saw the 
positive use of governmental power more to fulfil ethical ends and idealist notions of 
"the good" than they did to fulfil the ambitions of inter-state politics extended onto 
an imperial plane. 
13 
But furthermore., the application of Milnerism in practice in 
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South Africa led, via the Boer War and Campbel I -Bannerman's accusations of "methods 
of barbarism" in regard to Boer concentration camps, to the revival' of liberalism in 
England in a specifically anti-Milnerite political direction. The victory of the 
Liberal Party over the Conservatives in the 1906 election represented an important 
resurgence of I iberal thinking in England that began slowly to challenge many of the 
racial assumptions that had accompanied social imperialism since the 1880s. Even 
in its heyday, this social imperialism and the social d. arwinism that accompanied was 
probably not as widespread as it has often been taken *to be, 
14 but certainly in the 
years after 1906 there began a movement amongst the English liberal intelligentsia to 
challenge the cruder forms of the Kiplingesque white man's burden and to advance a 
theme that, by the end of the first world war, would come to be known as internation- 
aI ism. Originally, this liberalism looked more to Asia and to China than to Africa 
as a source of political change, but the longer-term challenge to the racial assumptions 
of imperialism were already present by, say, 1911 with the publication of L. T. Hobhouse's 
Libera I ism: 
Nothing has been more encour , 
aging to the Liberalism of Western 
Europe in recent years than the signs of political awakening in 
the East. Until yesterday it seemed as though it would in the 
end be impossible to resist the ultimate "destiny" of the white 
races to be masters of the rest of the world. The result would 
have been that, however far democracy might develop within any 
Western State, it would always, be confronted with a contrary 
principle in the relation of that state to dependencies, and this 
contradiction, as may easily be seen by the attentive student of 
our own domestic political constitutions, is a standing menace to 
domestic freedom. 15 
This emergence of a newer and-more democratically inclined liberalism in 
England in the years after 1906, frequently in alliance with the nascent Labour Party, 
must lead to a questioning of the ostensibly "liberal" context in which segregation was 
formulated before and after Union in South Africa in 1910. 
The context of imperial debate: 
Indeed, the ideological context in which the discussion on territorial segregation 
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was conducted within the white political elite in the Transvaal at the time of Union 
was less specifically a "liberal" one, but rather a product of the earlier defeat of 
Milnerism and an attempt to consolidate British imperial hegemony on a more decentral- 
ised basis. Even in its most classic form, the doctrines of Milner and his acolytes 
manifested a realisation that British imperial interests needed to be shaped by a 
strategic caution and a limitation on territorial aggrandisement. 
16 
- The share of 
Milner in escalating hostilities against the Transvaal Republic leading to the Anglo- 
Boer War in 1899 has tended to detract attention away from this more conservative 
political aim in stabilising British imperial influence in a fashion reminiscent almost'of 
Metternich; 
17 
and to base explanations for the eventual establishment of South 
African Union more in terms of party political accommodation in the wake of successive 
electoral defeats by Oranie Unie in The Orange River Colony, Het Volk in the Transvaal 
and the Bond in the Cape. 
18 
While clearly these elections were significant in altering 
the perception by British imperial decision-makers and their allies in South Africa of the 
more fragile nature of British imperial hegemony, at the same time they only brought to 
the fore trends that had been going on in British imperial policy making since the end of 
the nineteenth century. 
By the 1890s it was becoming increasingly obvious that British "splendid 
isolation" could not continue for ever with growing competition from Germany,. Japan 
and the United States. With the growing armaments race with imperial Germany, the 
British political elite looked increasingly towards the consolidation of empire as a means 
to meet the growing German naval "threat". In India, the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon 
between the years 1898 and 1905 marked the intrusion of this new imperial strategic 
thinking and the ethos of British rule began to shift from the mid-Victorian conception of 
direct rule and mission civilisatrice towards a pattern of government that became known 
by the 1920s as "indirect rule" and which worked, as Eric Stokes has pointed out, 
"indirectly and unobtrusively through indigenous institutions and ruling classes". 
19 
This idea of defusing power onto a wider basis had been formative in the upbringing of 
Milner who had serve'd under Lord Cromer in Egypt after the British colonisation of the 
country in 1882 and it had been largely conducted in spatial terms and the diffusion of 
97 
power on to Local bodies. It was now recognised that British imperial hegemony 
was becoming increasingly incompatible with a utilitarian free market economy, which 
had formed the basis behind mid-Victorian direct rule, since this meant the, steady 
erosion of precisely these indigenous institutions and traditional ruling classes on which 
consolidation depended. With 6 growing monetisation of colonial economies and the 
creation of an important commercial sector, there was an increasing likelihood of 
political influence shifting towards a nascent nationalist petty bourgeoisie acting as 
commercial middlemen between peasant agriculture in the rural areas and the colonial 
economy in the towns and cities. 
The locus of this imperial debate by the end of the nineteenth century was 
undoubtedly India, the jewel of the Empire, since here the growing class contradictions 
as a result of British rule became starkest and where a sophisticated administrative 
service was able to conceptual ise and seek to act on the issues in a far more compre- 
hensive manner than areas like the Cape Colony. Thinking, in particular, centred 
around the Punjab where the traditional prop-of British rule, the class of large landowners 
known as Zamindars, was having its hold on land eroded by the emergence of an urban 
commercial petty bourgeoisie of moneylenders. Consequently the 1900 Punjab 
Alienation of Land Act sought to prevent this by prokibiting the Zamindars' right to 
sell or mortgage land except with the prior consent of the district officer. The Act., 
described by one historian as "the greatest single piece of social engineering ever 
attempted in India" 
20 
was undoubtedly important in signalling the end of the utilitarian 
conception of a free market in land and heralding a newer era of state intervention and 
manipulation of the land system in order to sustain British imperial hegemony. The 
basis of British imperialism became rooted now in the creation of communal village 
settlements as opposed to individual land holdings, hence excluding the Hindu 
commercial class. The 1900 Act was, however, directly instrumental in fomenting 
rioting in the Punjab in 1907 and growing nationalist agitation led by the urban petty 
bourgeoisie. 
21 
For South Africa., these events in India did not go completely unnoticed 
since in some ways they resembled the loss of faith in the Cape in the Glen Grey system 
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of individual tenure by the start of the twentieth century and the bolstering of rural 
headmen. In the Transvaal they were of some influence on the thinking of one of 
the foremost segregationist writers in the period before Union, Howard Pim, who later 
became one of the leading liberal spokesmen in the 1920s. Pim's brother, Alan, 
who was later to write an influential report on the Protectorates in Southern Africa, 
22 
was an administrator in the Punjab in the early years of the century and gave Pim a 
glowing account in 1905 of the workings of the 1900 Punjab Alienation of Land Act. 
"New rights of transfer should not be given to backward peoples", Alan Pim wrote., 
reflecting the wide prevalence of social darwinist thought., "it is better to wait until, 
such practice grows up in the course of years and then to recognise and control them 
in the light of experience". 
23 
Furthermore, it was the duty of the state, Alan Pim 
argued, of manipulating the cultural traditions of the colonised to bolster up this early 
form of indirect rule: 
... it is only when we 
have built up on the customs of the country, 
adapting it from time to time to changing conditions, that we have 
been fairly successful. 
This, however, meant a policy of direct intervention for a period through 
local administrators in order to ensure the success of such social engineering: 
In starting an agrarian system it is necessary to concentrate for a 
time all power in the hands of selected officers, i. e. those who 
... should also 
define and record the rights of the state and of 
individuals (as against the state and amongst themselves). No 
other courts should have juris&ction. 24 
These ideas developed in the Indian context almost certainly had some 
influence on Howard Pim's thinking on the development of "native policy" in South 
Africa. The Indian precedent provided an effective model of administration that, 
in 1905, was still seen to be capable of being worked out and was, moreover, "British" 
in its nature. It was very likely, therefore, to have helped shift Pim's thinking from 
a more extreme position rooted in "residential segregation" to one of "possessory 
segregation" by the time of the South African Native Affairs Commission Report in 1905. 
Pim, as a chartered accountant., reflected to some extent the thinking of the emerging 
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white professional bourgeoisie in Johannesburg after the war and he derived a 
considerable proport! on of his work from the gold mining industry (though he opposed 
the idea of recruiting Chinese labour and was ultimately to lose his contracts with 
H. Eckstein and the Chamber of Mines). In 1903., in a paper to the Transvaal 
Philosophical Society, Pim argued for racial separation and the recruitment of white 
labour as opposed to either importation of Asiatic labour or reliance on Africans, for 
he saw reliance upon black labour as similar to the use of slave labour in the South 
in that both brought about "degradation" of poor whites who were rendered economically 
superfluous. Pim's thinking at this stage was somewhat static for the chief objective 
of policy, as he then saw it, was to bring about a position of "stable equilibrium, a 
condition economically sound, to maintain which all natural laws will assist". 
25 
By 1905, however, Pim's thinking developed in the direction of ensuring a 
growing supply of black labour and a policy that, as in the Punjab instance, rooted 
African communities on the land and established labour reserves for the mines and farms. 
As a result of a request by Lagden for a paper to be given at the meeting of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science, which held its annual conference in 
Johannesburg in 1905, Pim went on a visit to Basutoland in order to observe at first 
hand the tribal system so favoured as a basis of administration by Sir Godfrey Lagden 
and his fellow member -of SANAC, Sir Herbert Sloley. Pim's tour was assisted by 
Sloley as the Resident Commissioner in Maseru and it very probably confirmed the 
Punjab arguments of his brother Alan. Certainly in his 1905 paper Some Aspects of 
the Native Problem, Pim favoured the establishment of tribal councils on the Basutoland 
pattern and the fostering of redistributive economies based on the power of chiefs and 
local headmen. 26 This, furthermore, led to his opposition to the extension of the 
Glen Grey system of individual tenure which he saw as failing anyway with plot- 
owners encroaching on commonage and the district councils being generally ineffective. 
27 
He therefore concluded that administration should be rooted more in the Transkeian 
system of magisterial rule under the Native Affairs Department for: 
It is clear that we should go cautiously elsewhere and not assume 
that in individual tenure any panacea for the difficulties of the 
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Native land question has been discovered. Perhaps South 
Africa may derive benefit from the ... gen. eral rules which have 
emerged from a large experience of Indian land tenure and land 
administration (note this system is a valuable one but not one of 
individual application). 
Pim then spelt out the principles espoused by his brother Alan based on the 
idea of enlightened direct rule of the local district officer in order to reconstruct 
local systems of land tenure. 
28 
This administrative strategy, however, he linked 
to a further idea born out of the then current campaign against Ethiopianism in the 
Tra nsvaa I. Pim saw industrial training strategies modelled on the Tuskegee pattern 
as being essential for the fostering of rural African land settlement and preventing 
the emigration of African leaders to colleges in the United States. It was also in 
the development of African agriculture in the reserves that a subsistence base for 
African wages could be found and competition with the stil I shaky white agriculture 
be avoided: 
... the white man pays in wages, that is in cash, to the Location Native the equivalent of the time that the same Natives under 
other conditions spends in growing his crops. But if the Native 
does not grow these crops somebody else must, either inside or 
outside South Africa. The white man has not yet shown that in 
South Africa his cultivation of the single crops, which the Native 
requires can compete with Native cultivation. Consequently 
if these crops are grown in South Africa so far from the white man 
gaining from the change, he will probably lose. If they are 
grown outside South Africa the funds used to purchase them leave 
the country, which has therefore so much less capital available 
for its extension and development. But this is not all. In 
a Reserve ... the 
Native I ives under natural conditions which he 
understands and has created for himself. 29 
Such was the basis for Pim's espousal of a strategy of "segregation" for, 
while he argued that there was "little reason to extend (the reserves) as they became 
over-populated" since "there can be nothing unhealthy or wrong in requiring the 
Native himself to cope with the increase in his own number or the increasing stress 
of outside competition", 
30 
at the same time the American experience of segregation 
11 
suggested an historical tendency for "the two races" to "steadily drift apart". 
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These arguements of Pim were significant in the debate after 1906 on closer 
union in South Africa. Pim gave a further paper at the Fortnightly Club 
32 
where 
the Closer Union campaign was launched by the Kindergarten member Richard Feetham 
and the concept of segregation was linked by Lionel Curtis in a paper entitled The 
Place of Subject Peoples in the Empire to the reformulation of the British imperial ideal 
away from the enlightened despotism of direct rule - as espoused, for instance, by 
Sir James Fitziames Stephen in the 1870s and T880s - towards the diffusion of power 
and consolidation of empire on a federal basis. This ideal, which was later 
championed by the Round Table in the years after Union by both Curtis and Philip Kerr, 
later Lord Lothian, and the Rhodes Trust, was reflected in Curtis's argument that "South 
African should be taught not to think of failing back on British troops for the suppression 
of native disorders even as the last resort" for "by this means it is possible to engender 
in the minds of every South African a sense of responsibility even greater than that which 
is followed by the Indian beaucracy (sic)". 
33 
This however led to the question of 
internal social control mechanisms in South Africa and here Curtis - probably with the 
1907 Punjab Rebel lion in mind - perceived the advantages of the possessory segregation 
concept as a means of severing relations between reserve Africans and the emergent 
African petty bourgeoisie in the towns which was likely, as in the Indian case, to foment 
an incipient nationalism. "We are still faced with the other difficulty", Curtis 
observed, "that, as with the commercial community in India, the interests of the white 
population of South Africa are too closely entangled with those of the native population. 
This however is a difficulty which may be increased or diminished by the policy 
adopted. " 
34 
(emphasis added) 
Curtis accordingly ruled out the Cape "policy of washing (sic) the Eithiopian 
(sic)" which "tends in exactly the oppcýite direction" since it encourages him to seek 
to incorporate himself with the white communities". In contradiction to this was the 
policy suggested by Pim which, though Curtis had initially been "at issue " with it, was 
now seen as workable based on the areas like Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland and 
the Transkei and Zululand which were "more or less perfectly reserved for their (i. e. 
Africans') exclusive occupation". This strategy was seen by Curtis as much more 
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effective as a control mechanism than raising the rents on African squatting as had been 
the dominant tendency in policy in the Transvaal after the Anglo-Boer War. This had 
had the effect of "crowd(ing) the native off the land" and "encumber(ing) (the Africans) 
with debts to the white and Indian populations", creating a situation, observed Curtis, 
similar to one "which would exist if the commercial Europeans in India controlled the 
natives". In contrast, the "conditions of Basutoland and Bechuanaland are 
incomparably more wholesome". 
35 
The policy, therefore, suggested by Curtis was one of possessory segregation 
in a united South Africa- mixed with a strong element of benevolent paternalism born 
of the Indian precedent. "I am picturing a state of affairs", he wrote: 
in which the native is free to move about South Africa but has been 
led to fix his home in native territory and to find himself in the 
position of an uitlander when he goes outside it. These territories 
could then be administered by the South African government by means 
of a highly organised Civil Service, very much as India is administered 
by the Imperial Gov't. 36 
This policy of segregation espoused by Curtis in 1907 can be seen to have been 
of some ideological significance coming as it did in the wake of the Selborne memorandum 
of December 1906. This memorandum, which was substantially written by Curtis, 
sought to guide opinion in South Africa in the direction of federation while at the same 
time seeking uniformity in "native policy" between the different South African states. 
"Two or more native policies, inconsistent with each other", the memorandum stated, 
"cannot end otherwise than in confusion and miscarriage". 
37 
Curtis, therefore, very 
probably saw possessory segregation as being the unifying ideological means by which 
such uniformity might be achieved in a federated South Africa. 
On the other hand, before 1908 the discussion on closer union and segregation 
was for the most part confined to narrow political and intellectual circles-, while the 
Fortnightly Club, for instance, had as members a considerable number of individuals 
who were later to play significant roles in the evolution of "native policy" after Union 
Colonel Stallard, for instance, Archdeacon Mi6ael Furse, later Bishop of Pretoria at the 
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time. of the 1920 Natives Affairs Act, Herbert Creswell and F. Petty of the Chamber 
of Mines - it still reproduced the somewhat * narrow elitism of the 
Milner kindergarten. 
As such, it still had to sell the idea of possessory segregation to wider sections of white 
political opinion: in particular the white petty bourgeoisie on the Rand and the white 
working class who were in the throes of a "Black Peril" scare. The remainder of this 
chapter will thus focus on the widening of the debate on segregation after the attain- 
ment of Responsible Government in the Transvaal and the moves between 1907 and 1910 
to establish a wider South African Union. 
The widening of the debate: 
By 1908, in the aftermath of Responsible Government, a number of interests 
in the Transvaal began to favour the idea of possessory segregation. The Transvaal 
Landowners Association favoured it as a means to ward off more radical demands for 
government controls on African squatting; similarly the representatives of Milnerism, 
in the wake of Het Volk's victory with the assistance of white labour, saw possessory 
segregation as a means of re inforcing internal structures of social control over the 
African population in South Africa as Britain delegated power to a federated South 
African state. This, however, still left the white petty bourgeoisie and working 
class who had been mobilised on a racist basis following the importation of Chinese 
labour. In April 1903, for instance, the White League, an organisation described 
38 by the Simonses as consisting of "shopkeepers and racists" and based on a campaign 
stretching back to before the Anglo-Boer War to exclude Indians from citizenship in 
the Transvaa I, organ ised a mee ting in the Wanderer's Ha II of 5000 to condemn the 
importation of Chinese labo. 
. 
ur. 
39 
Prominent among the League's members was 
Councillor J. W. Quinn, a Johannesburg bakery and cafe owner, who later became 
mayor of the city, and active in seeking to exclude by legislative means economic 
competition from either African or Asian shop-owners. 
The white petty bourgeoisie on the Witwatersrand was at this time an insecure 
group since its trade, in the era before industrial diversification in the 1920s, was 
heavily dependent on a single industry, the mines. As its fortunes fluctuated with 
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that of mining capital, its ideological outlook was overwhelmingly shaped by what 
it perceived as the all-powerful political dominance of the mine-owner. The petty 
bourgeoisie was thus very given to conspiratorial theories-of politics and another of 
its prominent spokesmen, Fred Bell, an insurance salesman,, wrote a book in 1900 
entitled The South African Conspiracy that accused the mining capitalists of "backstair 
i-nfluence with the corrupt Government of Pretoria from the time of the discovery of the 
Witwatersrand fields". 40 Bell called in 1904 for the granting of immediate 
Responsible Government in the Transvaal to prevent both the domination of Transvaal 
politics by the perceived party of mining capital, the Progressives, or, for Bell, the 
equally unacceptable alternative of "Labour and the Dutch Party together with 
capital in a hopeless minority". 
41 
This political uncertainty of the white petty bourgeoisie reflected a basic 
political dilemma it confronted after the Anglo-Boer War in that while it did not wish 
to be dependent upon a single class interest, white labour or mining capital, it was 
itself really too weak to control the state alone. Thus, Bell's call for South Africa 
to be ruled after Responsible Government "by the good sense of the great majority, 
which will comprise men of all parties who desire the welfare of the land in which they 
live and wil I die, but ... which they are not exploiting for the purpose of I iving away 
from " 
42 
was a simple statement of a racist settler nationalism in which the petty. 
bourgeoisie would have a dominating political say. 
Such a nationalism, however, depended to a considerable degree on continued 
white immigration into South Africa so that the white petty bourgeoisie was very much 
a prey to contemporarily fashionable arguments of racial determ-inism and eugenics that 
stresse-d the need for increasing the stock of the Anglo-Saxon race. These racial 
theories were dominant at the time in the American South in the era of Jim Crow and 
had been given a boost by the victory of the United States in the war against Spain in 
1898.43 Thus it is interesting to note that they were picked up b. y Bell in an indirect 
form when a platform was provided for him to attack the possessory segregation view by 
the formation of the Transvaal Native Affairs Society in 1908. 
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The Transvaal Society was not the first of its kind in South Africa for it came 
in the wake of the Native Affa, irs Reform Society in Durban. An additional feature 
in the Transvaal case was that it was formed at the same time as the Closer Union 
movement initiated discussion on South African federation. Thus, while J. W. Quinn 
was the society's first chairman, the objectives of promoting "the study and discussion 
of the South African native question, with a view to enunciating and advocating a 
liberal, consistent and practical Native policy through South Africa" together with 
"native opinion being consulted in matters affecting their own government" indicated 
that the objectives were similar to those of the Fortnightly Club. Indeed, many 
Club members were on the Society's first committee: Howard Pim, W. Perry and 
Michael Furse while Sir George Farrar and Walter Webber of the Chamber of Mines 
soon joined. From the very beginning, therefore, the Society met opposition from 
sections of the white petty bourgeoisie. The Transvaal Leader noted that few "born 
South Africans" were on the committee and hoped that "an embryonic Exeter Hall" 
44 , 45 
was not being fostered while Fred Bell accused the committee of being "negrophilists". 
Politically, these arguments came at an opportune time for the white petty bourgeoisie. 
The 1906 election in the Transvaal had demonstrated that some businessmen on the 
Rand were prepared to side with Het Volk for reasons of economic nationalism and a 
fear of reproducing a similar situation to Kimberley where economic diversification 
was thwarted by the monopoly domination of De Beers. 
46 
In addition, by 1908, in 
the aftermath of the strike by white mine workers the previous year, there was a 
renewed upsurge in white working class consciousness and a campaign for industrial 
segregation on lines similar to the unsuccessful experiment in 1903 by the white Labour 
leader, Herbert Creswell, to replace unskilled African workers with poor whites. 
These latter interests on the Rand became expressed in the debates of the 
Transvaal Native Affairs Society which, though it only had 109 members by the end 
of 1908,49 focused and crystallised the differing class and. economic interests behind 
the debate on South African "native policy" in a manner far beyond its actual 
numerical size. The differences in fact became expressed at an early stage in the 
Society's proceedings: The "repression ists " led by Bell and Quinn gained an early 
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victory over the "accommo0ationists" when it was decided that Africans could not 
48 be admitted as members to the Society, while the committee accepted Quinn's 
49 invitation to meet in a building he owned. Furthermore, in March of 1908 
another repressionist member, Geo Max King, attacked the Society's constitutional 
provision that those who favoured a "purely repressive policy towards the natives 
would not, of course, be in sympathy with the Society " 
50 
for "creating a feeling 
of moral resentment in the minds of the majority which will intensify their prejudices, 
excite their passions and tend to defeat the object for which we hope the Society has 
been formed ". 
51 
King's proposal, however, for the Society to adopt an extreme 
segregationist policy ensuring "a line of demarcation between the white and black 
communities, socially, industrially and politically" did not gain majority support. 
The convening of the National Convention in October 1908 for the purpose 
of unifying the component states of South Africa injected a new dimension into the 
political debate on the Rand. The repressionists had consistently seen the franchise 
as a key political issue and linked the incorporation of a sma 11 class of African petty 
bourgeois voters with the eventual collapse of white hegemony in South Africa. 
Following the elections in the Cape in 1904, for instance, the repressionists' voice 
on the Rand, the Transvaal Leader, voiced its anxiety about the franchise in terms of 
the crude racism then current in the American South on the negro's inherent inferiorify. 
The elections, it wrote, led to the "disgraceful scenes" where "statesmen of the 
dominant race" went "begging and manoeuvring foe the votes of the black men, who 
see in the process none of the 'brotherhood of man', but only the weakness of those 
whose weakness they should not be allowed to seell. The African franchise, therefore, 
was to be opposed on the grounds that there was no "mental or moral equality between 
the black races and the white". 
52 
This biological racism formed'the basis of the repress ion ists' arguments against 
extending the African franchise from the end of 1908, and strengthened the hand of 
those in favour of the racial partitioning of Southern Africa and complete residential 
segregation. H. J. Crocker, for example, suggested such geographical partitioning 
in the course of 1908 with the "occupation and final settlement of the Europeans in the 
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temperate -zone, and the negro in the temperate zone of the African continent". 
53 
However, it is clear that most of the repressionists did not go so far as to advocate 
such extreme racial partitioning and the complete denial of African labour power. 
For Fred Bell the biological argument became a means to rationalise a segregationist 
scheme which differed from the possessory segregationists in the sphere allowed to 
protected white labour and white petty bourgeois trading interests. In a paper 
read to the Transvaal Native Affairs Society in December 1908, Bell developed the 
biological racist argument on the basis of the writings of Robert Bennet Bean, a 
Professor of Anatomy at the Uni versity of Virginia, who argued that negro brains were 
"inferior" to Caucasian ones. 
54 
However Bell retained some of the nineteenth 
century imperial arguments regarding the white "civilising mission" for while it was 
essential to "regard the native as a lower race" it was also necessary to "recognise 
our responsibilities and obligations towards him to the fullest extent ... recognising 
thdt each race should, and must, follow its natural lines of development". 
55 
The differences revolved essentially around the mechanism of social control 
to be employed over the African population, for, with the possibility of the franchise 
being extended in a South African Union, there was the chance of a future'Sou. th 
African state resting social control through an incorporated African petty bourgeoisie 
possessing both landed and political rights. This, indeed was the substance of the 
case presented by the Earl of Selborne in an address at the University of Cape in 
February 1909. While conceding the same general principle as Bell and the Transvaal 
racists that "so far as we can foreseen, the Bantu will never catch up the European 
either in intellect or in strength of characte I r1l. 
56 
Selborne nevertheless pleaded for 
an extension of t-he Cape franchise to other parts of South Africa on the basis of a 
"civil isation " test. This position was substantially that of mid-Victorian liberalism 
in the Cape, which by the twentieth century was most prominently espoused by Theo 
Schreiner 
57 
and interpreted the nineteenth century "civilising mission" in terms of 
incorporating the African petty bourgeois elite via the franchise. Opposing, 'the 
idea that "the native should be left to work out his salvation unaided", Selborne 
argued: 
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If the black man had neverseen or heard the white man, he 
might possibly in the course of ages have evolved a satisfactory 
civilisation on lines of his own; but, having' been brought. 
into contact with the white man, he must surely go astray unless 
the white man gives him all the help he can in his evolution. 
The question is not whether the black man is going to. evolve or 
whether he is going to be educated. It is out of the power 
of the white man to settle that question, for the Bantu race wil I 
slowly evolve, and the mor .e progressive of its members will 
acquire education, whatever he thinks or does. The rea I 
question is whether the white man is going sympathetically to 
influence that evolution, and, out of his more abundant 
experience, to direct that education? In self defence for the 
sake of his children, and in fulfilment of his own moral responsibility, he cannot shirk the task. 58 
Selborne was urging the need for a. social control strategy that took account 
of Ethiopianism and was picking up some of the ideas that had been expressed by 
James Stewart and others in the Cape at the time of the South African Native Affairs 
Commission for increased control over African higher education in order to neutralise 
the impact of Ethiopian ideology. The operative word here was control for a 
voluntarist policy that left "the Bantu" to "imitate the civilisation and religion of 
the Europeans, after his own fashion" would lead to a situation where the whites 
effectively abandoned their imperial civilising mission so that they would have 
"forfeited the right to be surprised at the appearance of a foolish and seditious press, 
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or at the spread of the spirit of what is called 'Ethiopianism'". 
For the white petty bourgeoisie the crucial issues were not the provision of 
"higher education" for African political and religious leaders. The main area of 
contention was what degree of political incorporation should be adopted for these 
leaders once educated? Here the question of the franchise was seen to lead 
inextricably to the question of growing economic power, in direct competition with 
the white petty bourgeoisie, in the urban areas. For, while Selborne effectively 
advocated a policy of territorial segregation with respect to rural Africans, calling 
for the maintenance of the Protectorates and Reserves as "safety valves" in a manner 
similar to Howard Pim, in the case of "civilised Africans" things were seen to be 
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d if ferent. With the latter group, the "civilising mission" of the white man 
necessitated the removal, as far as possible, of the tribal structures which were likely 
to endure for a good while longer in the rural reserves. 11 ... so long as individual 
natives are subjected to the effects of tribal rule and kept from the path of escape 
from it", Selborne argued, "they are hindered in their efforts towards attaining a 
higher state of civilisation". 
60 - It was therefore essential that "no legal impediment 
should be put in the way of the individual civilised native to prevent h. im from becoming 
an owner of land". 
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Without such an alternative mechanism of control, in the 
nineteenth century manner of the individual holding of property, then the danger of 
"assimilation" arose through the "uncivilised" African threatening European cultural 
standards: 
If the Bantu imitates the European, does the European never 
assimilate anything from the Bantu? The more the Bantu is 
civilised, the fewer objectionable and unnatural traits there 
will be for the European to assimilate. 62 
Bell attacked this idea in a paper on The Black Vote read at the Native 
Affairs Society in April 1909 maintaining that Selborne's proposal for outlets for 
individual African land-holding contradicted the basic principle "that each race should 
develop along its own separate and natural lines". 
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But his criticism at this stage 
did not extend beyond asserting merely a possessory segregationist principle that white 
and black land-holding should be in specifically designated areas. 
64 
It was in the course of 1909 that the debate on segregation took a new turn 
as Bell came under the influence of American eugenicist arguments. In April 1909 
he had casually referred to writings by A. H. Keane and Meredith Townsend i. n support 
of the determinist contention inherent in the racist argument that negroes were inferior 
to whites. This had lacked the "scientific" appeal of Selborne's ev. olutionist argument 
which appealed back to nineteenth centur 'social darwinism. As a resu It of corres- y 
pondence between Bell and Keane, the ideas of the eugenicists in America began to 
seep into South Africa, especially Robert W. Schufeldt's 
A rý 
The Negro, A Menace to 
American Civil isation which was written in 1907. " As an anthropologist, 
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Professor Keane took up the Nordic cult of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority and used 
it against the "philanthropists and sham sentimentalists" who proclaimed racial 
equality and racial miscegenation. This furthermore, was essential for the 
preservation of the Anglo-Saxon stock who were threatened by miscegenation on the - 
Latin American pattern and the possibility, in Robert Schufeldt's words, of being 
"robbed by heroic injections into their veins of all the savagery and criminality there 
is in the negro" . 
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Keane and Schufeldt's influence on Bell became clear by 
October of 1909 when, in a paper entitled The South African Native Problem, he 
backed his previous arguments for racial separation with the warning that current 
policies in South Africa threatened both the "industrial extinction of the whites" and 
"the possibility of the dominance of the black race over the white". Foreseeing a 
future "struggle by force of arms for supremacy" between the races,, Bell developed 
the theme that the reserves should be developed economically to ensure a greater 
carrying capacity for the African population and as outlets for the emergent African 
petty bourgeoisie. This, he argued, should be ensured by a mixture of triba. 1 rule 
and Glen Grey individual tenure, the latter being adopted in areas like Zululand to 
buttress the power of minor chiefs and headmen in the absence of the paramountcy 
after the Bambata Rebellion. The essence of the policy was similar to the formulation 
of SANAC, Pim and Curtis in its recognition of future contingencies: 
... if the white. and 
black people in South Africa are to follow 
their natural development, separately and apart, provision in 
the way of land will have to be made for the native by the white 
man, to allow for the future expansion of the black race. 67 
This policy could not be carried out "without effort and sacrifice, nor without 
inconvenience to classes" and it would be necessary to carry out a scheme of population 
remova Is: 
... I would make the individual 
black man in white areas as much- 
a "fish out of water" as the white man would be in black territories. 
The native should have no locus standi in white territories and the 
inconvenience of his position -would act, automatically, as a stimulus- 
to separation. The white man must be protected from the bl-ack man, 
and the black from the white. In opposition blacks and whites 
are each antagonists, industrially, socially and politically. But 
separately and apart each may follow his own line of progress 
without detriment to the other. 68 
This was the racial nationalism of the white petty bourgeoisie, defined though 
very much in an English cultural idiom. But its formulation almost exactly paralleled 
the apartheid conception of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie in the 1940s which merely 
took the essence of the scheme and subordinated it to Afrikaner nationalism. 
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In 
addition, the scheme propounded by Bell involved the shunting of the African petty 
bourgeoisie into the reserves in the same way as their successors were provided platforms 
in the ''Homelands" in the period after the Bantu Authorities Act and Promotion of Bantu 
Self Government Act in the 1950s: 
... this breaking up of tribal rule, and our enticing the native ,I 
away from his natural state and env 
* 
ironment, that has so enormously 
increased our difficulties. This it is that has made the problem 
so'perplexing. It is the so-called "Civilised" and "educated" 
native who gives us most concern. By what I believe to be our 
wrong methods we have created an unnatural product, and at the 
same time, it must be admitted, a class for which we are the more 
directly responsible. Such natives cannot with justice be forced 
back to the environment from which we have drawn them, nor can 
they be allowed to become part of. either our social systems or our 
body politic. But they must be discouraged from remaining amongst 
the white men, and encouraged to return to their own kind. And 
under the scheme I suggest a fruitful field would be afforded for the 
talent of such natives in the settlement under communal tenure where 
they would have opportunity of aiding and teaching their own people. 70 
Politically the ideas of Bell and the repressionists gained some headway after 
1909 as the white petty bourgeoisie began to mobi I ise. Herbert Creswell called at a 
meeting in July 1909 "for all friends of the white man to bestir themselves" 
71 
and by 
the time of týe General Election in September 1910 the White League on the Rand, 
together with the newly-formed South African Labour Party, rallied behind calls for 
industrial as well as political and social segregation. Some of this appeal was based 
on a renewed black peril scare with the'focus of attack being the Unionists led by 
Jameson who was associated with the Cape liberal hope to extend the African franchise. 
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"Beware'. ", said a White League election leaflet, "Sixty One votes in the Union 
Parliament for Dr. Jameson's desire, and you have the nigger vote all over South 72 Africa 
By'this time, the Transvaal Native Affairs Society had become effectively 
defunct as the white petty bourgeoisie's political objectives were pursued through 
other channels like the S. A. L. P. , while the advocates of Closer Union centred 
around Richard Feetham's The State that managed to bring ou It two issues before Union. 
But in March 1910 Bel I had significantly been elected to succeed Howard Pim as the 
Society's President as the latter's political credibility had declined in the wake of 
successively fruitless bids to be elected Mayor of Johannesburg and a member of the 
Transvaal Legislative Assembly. Pim's response to the repressionist campaign on 
the Rand for industrial segregation had been to asset a politically colourless positivism 
that was much in keeping with the contemporary tendency in British colonial circles 
to assert the need for "ethnology as an important factor in any scientific system of 
tropical administration 11 . 
73 Thus, in his presidential address to the Society in 1909, 
Pim had spoken of the need for a "rational policy" founded on the principles of society, 
and a more "piecemeal" approach that distinguished between facts and values: 
If we find that our influences in effecting permanent scientific 
change in the Bantu races that work will be of value, for it will 
enable us upon clear and re ' asonable grounds 
to remodel our own 
social system to meet the altered conditions. If., on the other 
hand, we find that the changes are merely periodic, that they 
effect the individual but not the race, that what we caff -the 
civilised native Ras less vitality, for instance, than his uncivilised 
brother., or is being a less desirable member of the population, then 
also the work will bear fruit for we shall know the direction in 
which our energies have been misplaced. 74 
This positivistic scientism was of significance though in that it reflected a 
-considerable shift in 
liberal thinking from Lord Selborne's evolutionist arguments. The 
historical optimism of Selborne based on notions of a civilising mission to incorporate 
Africans as individuals into western "civil isation", now became replaced by a static 
social engineering policy that looked at races. In its formulation, this thinking of 
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Vim's probably owed a lot to the shift in the political balance between "accommodatibnist" 
and "repressive" segregationists inside the Native Affairs Society as the white petty 
bourgeoisie and working class mobilised politically to fight the 1910 election. Faced 
with political defeat by a white racism that had been strengthened by the input from 
eugenics, Pim's scientism set a precedent for future white South African liberalism: 
it was wise for I iberals as far as possible to avoid direct political confrontations with 
the numerically stronger white electorate and instead to seek to defuse situations as far 
as possible by concentrating on ostensibly neutral "facts" backed up by empirical 
evidence. The lessons of the first experiment on the Rand in the organised discussion 
of "native affairs" through the Transvaal Native Affairs Society were not lost on the 
nascent white intel I igentsia, led by figures I ike Pim, and in later developments after 
the first world war via the Joint Councils and eventually the Institute of Race Relations, 
white South African liberals saw a thoroughly empirical presentation of their case as a 
crucial means to avoid damaging political infrays. 
At the same time, as the ideas of repressionists like Bell began to become 
translated into legislation by the time of the 1913 Natives Land Act, 
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a number of 
South African I iberals turned back towards the Local level as a means to avoid, as they 
saw, increasing state centralisation of native policy under a northern and racist direction. 
While it was recognised that liberals might have lift. le chance to influence the direction 
of policy at the centre, at the level of informal social control at the local level they 
stil I had a significant chance to modify or redirect what might often be seen as hastily 
conceived or ill-thought out legislation. Writing in a memorandum in 1914 on the 
Natives Land Act, for example, Pim argued that "the value of the Act must altogether 
depend upon the wisdom with which it will be administered, and both races have doubts 
on, this point. This practi-cal question (in the form of the Beaumont Commission 
established by the Act) is now before the country, and obviously it can only be worked 
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out in detail and on the spot wherever native and white lands are intermingled". 
In this case, the liberals at the centre in South African politics had the opportunity of 
appealing to the variety of local differences in the handling of native administration in 
the four provinces of the -Union, together with the Proctorates and Rhodesia, and this 
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diversity could be used to resist as far as possible an immediate synthesis of policy. 
It was out of the discussion on the merits of the differing local precedents that South 
African liberalism began to emerge by the inter-war years and its eclectic nature 
was emphasised by the crystallisation of debate around essentially two major schools 
of thought. On the one hand., there was the precedent of the Cape and its 
as I similationist ideal of the mid-ni-neteenth century. On the other hand, there was 
the precedent of Natal and tribal states like Lesotho based on the ideal of maintaining 
separate African ethnic identity as part of a theory of cultural idealism. These two 
strands of thinking interacted within South African liberalism in the post-Union 
period - though both sought significantlyto resist as far as possible state central- 
isation and total unification of native policy in South Africa. It is the development 
of these two strands of liberal thinking in South Africa after Union towards which we 
turn in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
The ethnic challenge to assimilationism 
The es tab I is hment of Union in 1910 and the pass in g of the 1913 Natives 
Land Act were, as we have seen, significant political defeats for the tradition of 
liberal assimilationism rooted on the Cape precedent. At the level of national 
politics, white liberals had to come to terms with territorial segregation and the 
entrenched legislative demarcation on racial lines of the rights to land ownership. 
In the Transvaal, the centre of gold mining and now of the new Union government, 
it became clear that the pattern of class alliance that had ch. aracterised nineteenth 
century Cape politics -a wbite-mercantile bourgeoisie in trading and political 
relations with an African peasantry - would not be carried northwards. Instead 
the interests of the mines and the white working class and petty bourgeoisie on the 
Witwatersrand were best served by a segregationist ideology that reduced the African 
reserves to labour reservoirs, restricted the competition from the Afýican peasantry in 
favour of white settler agriculture and hindered as far as possible the permanent 
urbanisation of an African working class in the cities by a process of rustication and 
influx control. 
1 
Liberals as such had little role in the i-mmediate mechanics of this process as 
Union was established for, as the last chapter showed, the main political thrust behind 
this had come from the successors of the Milner administration in the Transvaal in 
alliance with their former Boer opponents centred around Botha and Smuts's Het Volk. 
Out of this new alliance there emerged the South African Party government of Louis 
Botha in 1910 with the remnant of the old Cape liberals I-ed by Leander Starr Jameson 
in the Unionist Party opposition (but backed, though, by a section of mining capital 
led by Patrick Duncan and Richard Feetbam). The objectives of this party line-up 
were less the fulfilment of a new "liberal" ideology based upon segregationism but 
the consolidation of the "incomplete dominion" of the South African state and there 
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was as yet no dominant over-arching blueprint of native policy as came to be character- 
istic of "segregation" or "trusteeship" in the 1930s and "apartheid" by the late 1940s. 
In this respect the role and significance of liberalism in South African politics 
returned, once the process of political unification had been initially completed in 
1910, to the local and provincial level where issues of "native policy" were disc6ssed 
and debated through a number of Native Affairs Reform Societies interspersed by 
periodic meetings of the new South African Association for the Advancement of 
Science., modelled on its British predecessor that had met in Johannesburg in 1905. 
These reform societies were often under the influence of the more racist sections of 
the white petty bourgeoisie, as we have seen in the case of the Transvaal Native 
Affairs Society before Union. For in so far as white settler attention did fix on 
the "native question" in the period before the first world war it was heavily influenced 
by myths of "black peril" which, as Charles Van Onselen has shown in the case of 
Johannesburg, reflected the close domestic encounters in white households with a 
growing black servant class and the periodic bouts of structural unemployment within 
the white working class as the gold mines went through rounds of boom and depression 
in the 1890s and I 900s. 
2 
Thus, even in bodies most likely to advance the liberal 
cause in .a settler society, assimilationism was very much a minority view. In the 
case of the Natal Native Affairs Reform League which was ýestabl ished to deal with 
black peril agitation in Durban and other Natal towns, it was clear that the dominant 
objective was to assist in the "control" of the small emergent African political and- 
intellectual elite 
3 
and one of its more liberally inclined members, the American 
missionary Frederick Bridgman, gloomily confessed that it would take "dynamite" to 
shift the government on the basic tenets of its native policy. 
4 
In such inauspici ous circumstances, it became plain to a number of liberals 
and "native experts" that a gradual modification of assimilationism was needed in 
order to exert I iberal influence over the workings of native policy at the local and 
provincial level. This was especially crucial once Union was achieved for the 
establishment of a national Department of Native Affairs failed to extend the Cape- 
based N. A. D. on any significant scale since most local appointments were made 
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through the less sympathetic Department of Justice. 
5 
The consequences, therefore, 
of British indirect rule policy which had been behind the establishment of Union began 
to seep through into liberal thinking and a number of writers and spokesmen began to 
look for alternative channels of influence via the selective use and manipulation of 
African ethnic institutions. 
The beginnings of an ethnic formulation: 
One of the key turning points on the discussion on native administration in 
South Africa in the first decade of the twentieth century was undoubtedly the Bambata 
Rebellion in Natal of 1906-7. Hitherto, the idea of employing African tribal 
institutions as part of an administrative policy of ethnic divide and rule had been 
hampered by the awareness of strongly different regional traditions in the Cape and 
Natal. While the former had developed a flexible system since the 1883 Native 
Laws and Customs Commission based on selective use of native law, 
6 
the Shepstone 
system of segregation in Natal was seen as too rigid for any large scale application to 
the African reserves in a future united South Africa. 
7 
In this context, the Report of 
the Native Affairs Commission in Natal in 1907 in response to the Bambata Rebellion 
the previous year represented an important landmark in the discussion on incorporating 
African ethnic and cultural institutions into the system of administrative control Jn 
South Africa. The Report., chaired by H. C. Campbell, was noteworthy for having 
the "expert" Maurice Evans among its members and its ideas on African "tribalism" 
were important in the development of Evans's ideas through the discussions in the Native 
Affairs Reform Society in Durban, which he helped to found, and in his books Black and 
White*in South East Africa (1911) and Black and White in the Southern States (1913). 
In particular, the Commission sought, through the application of "the principles 
of political science", to modernise and, update the system of tribally-based segregation 
bequeathed it by Sir Theophilus Shepstone. While recognising the value of the personal 
face to face relationships, engrained in Shepstone's nineteenth century system of patern- 
alism, the Commission also realised that the advance of bureau cra tisa tion in an 
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industrialising economy had to be faced. The "over administration" of Africans 
was regretted, in a manner reminiscent of J. M. Orpen in the Cape, but at the same 
time it was real ised that a more systematic administrative structure was necessary. 
9 
Thus, the Commission went on to suggest removing native administration from 
parliamentary control and empowering a separate body with the powers and respons- 
ibilities to modernise continuously a basically patriarchal system of government. 
The analogy here was with a municipality which had special powers granted it by the 
central government., 
10 
though there was the added specification that the separate 
system of native administration was headed by the Governor as Supreme Chief who 
"should be free from the review or interference of any court or person". 
II 
Within 
this system of administration, it was envisaged that the Native Commissioners would 
work through gatherings of the chiefs and their followers who would continue to act 
for a considerable time into the future as vital legitimating agents: 
To control the growing lawlessness of young men and women, 
Chiefs and kraal heads should be entrusted with more authority 
in the direction of securing social order and the maintenance 
of discipline amongst their people. The loosening of the family 
tie fills husbands -and 
fathers with alarm, and the fabric of their 
social system is disappearing before the inroads of misapplied and 
misabused personal liberty. 
At the same time, how'ever, the Commission manifested a continued belief in 
the late Victorian conception of social darwinism for: 
Social evolution in relation to these people is a question that 
demands much more encouragement by Government than it has 
received in the past, because, apart from its manifest advantage 
to the individual., it is a political engine of the highest importance 
in reducing the power of the chief, and consequently achieving the 
disintegration of the tribal system. As they become fitted by 
character, education and intelligence, they should be encouraged 
to dissociate themselves from tribalism by every agency and means 
that can be devised for their welfare, so that the system will 
gradually disappear, more by internal force than external law. 12 
(emphasis ýýd`de-d-ý 
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This social darwinism essentially rationalised a strongly state-dominated 
. system of social control over the 
Africans for the whole point'about this Victorian 
view of "evolution" was that it should be allowed to run its "natural course" free I 
from the external intervention of either "philanthropy" on the one hand or "selfishness" 
(extreme repressive segregation) on the other. 
13 
Such state paternalism potentially 
threatened any local liberal influence over the workings of policy, and it was the 
suggestion by the Commission of the establishment of a "Council for Native Affairs" 
including four official and three non official members which seemed to some liberals 
in Natal the one avenue they might have for the exercise of influence over the 
direction. 
14 
Maurice Evans tooks up this idea in his Black and White in South East 
Africa and suggested that it should be allowed to review legislation before it was 
debated in parliament and that two of its six members should be allowed to address 
the House when it was sitting. Furthermore, one of the Council's tasks would be 
to earmark the land set aside as African reserves. 
15 
The significance of this Natal contribution to political debate on native 
policy was that it made South African liberals far more aware in the years after Union 
of the issue of maintaining a coherent form of 
, 
political order as African societies 
underwent profound social and economic change. The Cape conception of liberalism 
was more laisser faire in its approach to this question, maintaining. that the continued 
inculcation of the values of Christian religious teaching would in itself be a means to 
ensure a guided "progress" in African society. The Report of the Commission of the 
Assaults on White Women reflecte-d this view in 1913 under the chairmanship of the 
Reverend James Henderson. While arguing for firmer social segregation in urban 
areas in order to prevent a renewed occurrence of black peril agitations, the Commission 
manifested a continued faith in the value of missionary education free from central state 
control. "The evidence of the effect of Christian teaching and education on the 
character of natives is very strong", the Report concluded. "These unquestionably 
exercise an enormous influence for good. Administrative action can go but a short 
way in that direction. " 
16 
0 
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In contrast, the input from Natal after Union stressed the need to maintain 
in addition political structures of social control so as to avoid social breakdown on 
lines similar to that before the Bambata Rebellion in 1906. "The substitution of the 
I 
impersonal force of law and regulation for the highly personal rule of past days", 
Maurice Evans wrote, "was largely responsible for the rebellion". 
17 
The question 
remained, though, of what kind of political structure to evolve in order to cope with 
seemingly intractable "problems" for which a governmental system modelled on West 
European lines was not designed. Evans approached this- issue in a manner that 
typified much liberal thinking in South Afr i ca in the years. a head and Ai ch. even tua IIy 
came to be characterised as the model of political pluralism. Attending in 1912 at 
Tuskegee an International Conference on the Negro, Evans was, like James Stewart 
before him, able to see the workings of industrial training in the South at first hand 
and its capacity for systematic and continuous modernisation in accordance with the 
needs of an industrialising economy. 
18 
Thus, Evans's book Black and White in the 
Southeirn States moved some way beyond the more personal ised system of native govern- 
ment envisaged for South Africa on the old Shepstonian lines of Nineteenth Century 
Natal and began to develop a more comprehensive system of territorial segregation 
based on African ethnic as opposed to tribal differentiation. The American negro 
parallel indicated to Evans that the selective incorporation of African franchise holders 
on the Cape model was potentially disastrous since it risked the same cleavages as had 
happened after the American Civil War during radical reconstruction. 
19 
The point 
about Southern segregation and the industrial training provided by Tuskegee was that 
it was able to act as a buttress to negro peasant agriculture, thus resisting the tendency 
of blacks to emigrate to the northern cities. Writing in a period just before the 
massive negro exodus north during the industrial isation before and after the first world 
war, Evans concluded that "the city is a veritable sewer and death trap for the negro" 
for "his home I ife should be in the country, and it is as peasant farmers that the majority 
wi IIf ind the sphere for whi ch they are best f itted. I think the same may be said of 
the Bantu people of South Africa. " 
20 The point was/ therefore, to devise a system of 
i 
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government rooted in racial separation, but under "white guidance" and here Evans 
began to move towards an early pluralistic model: 
At present we are like voyagers without chart or compass on an 
unknown sea. As questions affecting the native people arise 
we deal with them on the spur of the moment, governed by the 
exigencies of a system of representative party government which 
we have imported ready made from overseas, and in which the huge native people is unrepresented. We follow no plan, we 
have no principle to guide us. We have adopted as final a 
system of government gradually evolved by homogenous peoples 
of Western Europe so suit their needs, and fatuously hope this 
will meet the totally different conditions of South Africa. .. 
The urgent need was, therefore, to establish "machinery, within and subject 
to the parliamentary system, which shall provide for the steady, continuous study of the 
ever changing relations of the races". 
21 
It was by this means that the emergent 
problems of "race relations" in South Africa could be continuously tackled since it was 
to this sphere, as opposed to the older civilising mission of the Cape, that Evans 
perceived the future role of South African liberals and "friends of the native". An 
idea, it seems, that began to make an impact on liberals in South Africa by the first 
world war, for in 1915 Michael Furse, the Anglican Bishop of Pretoria and one of the 
members of the Fortnightly Club before Union, argued at the Anglican Synod in Cape 
Town for a "more uniform and sympathetic native policy" which should be "above party 
politics" and handled by three "able bodied experts" who could also be linked to 
native councils that were extended on Glen Grey lines to the rest of the Union. 
22 
These views effectively amounted to a philanthropic form of segregation23 and 
they began to characterise liberal thinking increasingly in the years after- Union as it 
appeared that the Cape assimilationist ideal was going into decline. Cape liberalism 
seemed to represent a political model that failed to accord with the centralising 
tendencies of the South African state and the perceived need of liberals to establish 
new platforms through which to impress their views. Furthermore, there was the 
additional factor that many of the philosophical assumptions behind this liberal 
assimilationism were beginning to come under attack in some humanitarian circles by 
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the early years of the twentieth century. In its classical form, as we saw in the 
introduction, assimilationism in the nineteenth century was linked to liberal 
individualism and utilitarian ethical philosophy. This rationalism and belief in 
both continual economic and moral social progress began to be doubted in its effects 
on colonial economies even before the first world war and the more general European 
crise de conscience. Humanitarians pointed to the effects of colonialism on African 
society in the Congo under Belgian rule and early ethnologists began to study African 
customs and social structures more systematically and to argue for their right to self 
preservation. In South Africa, one of the foremost writers of the latter kind was 
Benjamin Kidd who, in books like The Essential K. affir and Kaffir Socialism, argued 
that African tribal society was marked by a strong communistic-type communalism and 
a rejection of the Western materialistic norms of enlightened self-interest and that this 
should be both recognised and preserved. 
24 
This. was an early version of what later became a cultural idealism heavily 
influenced, by the 1930s, by German ethnology through the International Institute for 
African Languages and Culture. 
25 
In its early phases in South Africa it was only a 
minority view even in the circle of liberals and "native experts", for it challenged 
the assumptions not only of the Cape assimilationists, but even the pseudo-scientific 
eugenicists on the Witwatersrand and the industrial -training school of segregationists 
led by such figures as James Henderson, Maurice Evans and the missions at Lovedale 
and Fort Hare. For the most part the cultural idealists rejected the use of western 
science altogether in the question of developing African societies and, in rejecting 
western materialistic values, there was a strong tendency to romanticise the cultural, 
traits of "traditional" African societies as heroic examples of the primitive. 1.1so 
long as we rely on scientific theories built on a material bas, is"., wrote one early 
cultural idealist Trevor Fletcher in 1908, "we are but tinkering with symptoms and 
ignoring the cause". 
26 
The point was not necessarily that no "development" would 
take place in African society as a result of white colonisation., but rather that it should 
occur outside the context of "material means" and "mechanical theories". Presag i ng , 
therefore, much of the later discussion in anthropological circles in the 1930s of 
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"culture contact", Fletcher wrote: 
Much will ultimately depend upon the good will between the two 
races, and so long as we rely solely on force we shall but create 
ill-will and rebellion. It is through society and contact with 
the whites that the greatest good will come, and the whole question 
calls for patience and self restraint on our part. 27 
This was a radical reconceptualisation of western humanitarianism., though 
its effect in philanthropic and missionary circles in Britain at least was fairly marked 
by the 1920s,. as figures I ike Arthur Shearley Cripps and J. H. Oldham compaigned for 
the preservation of African cultures, and in effect brought a large section of British 
humanitarian and liberal opinion behind the policy of indirect rule. 
28 
In South 
Africa, the redirection of ideas had an impact on I. iberal thinking as well, though in 
the event not in quite such a pronounced manner as had seemed likely at first. For 
the ethnic formulations of writers like Maurice Evans, Dudley Kidd and Trevor Fletcher 
in their varying degrees, all assumed a certain African political passivity. In its 
purest form of cultural idealism it assumed almost a static tribal state, while even the 
industrial training views of Evans shaped by the precedent of Tuskegee implied a 
political collaborationism of the kind Booker T. Washington had espoused after his 
1895 Atlanta Address. 29 But by the first world war in both America and in African 
colonies black political militancy was beginning to grow - in the former through 
W. E. B. Du Bois's N. A. A. C. P. 
30 
and in the South African case through the Sou th 
African Native National Congress, formed in 1912. A year later, with the passing 
of the 1913 Natives Land Act, the Congress began to mobilise African political opposition 
that both challenged the ethnic formulations of the philanthropic segregationists and 
forced a reappraisal of it by South African liberals. 
The African challenge to ethnicity: 
In its most direct form., the philanthropic segregationism of the humanitarians 
after 1910 amounted to a systematic attempt to exert white con tro lover African po I itica I 
organisation. The older assimilationism of the nineteenth century had implied a 
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continuous process of African economic and political growth on the classis bourgeois 
lines of an ever widening franchise and in Britain this had continued to be held in 
bodies like the Native Races Committee, a humanitarian descendant of the Clapham 
Sect and the campaign against slavery. In its two reports on South Africa in 1899 
and 1909., the Native Races Committee continued to praise Cape assimilationism and 
the Glen Grey system of individual African land tenure which it saw as likely "to 
educate the natives for self government, and encourage their sense of civic 
responsibility". 
31 
The main thrust of social control I therefore., should, the 
Committee argued, be exerted in an indirect form via education under the control of 
the missions and far more of a common purpose was required in order for Africans "to 
take some predetermined place in the body politic or even in the industrial ranks of 
the community". Arguing the case for greater systematisation of African education, 
the Committee saw this was essential since "evecywhere guidance and control are 
required rather than repression. In all the provision for education there is need for 
adaptation to the life and future requirements of the native. " 
32 
Developing a theme 
that was substantially that of the defensive liberalism of the Cape by the early years of 
the twentieth century, the Committee maintained some belief in the continued "uplift- 
ment" of African society through industrial training and warned that "the future of the 
colonies must be seriously imperilled if there is much further delay in substituting a 
33 
real scheme of progress for the present destruction of native tribal institutions". 
This expression - if somewhat guarded - of the more classical form of the 
British humanitarian tradition began, however., to be substantially modified in the years 
after South African Union by the rise of a more segregationist theme via the ranks of 
the Aborigines Protection Society. While the Native Races Committee had acted as 
a mouthpiece for Cape liberalism before 1910, its position in that year in British 
philanthropic circles began to be checked by a revitalised A. P. S. which merged with 
its rival/ the Anti Slavery Society, and appointed J. H. Harris as Organising Secretary. 
Harris boosted the pol itical influence of the A. P. S. and enhanced its stand on the basis 
of segregationist philanthropy which it had been increasingly taking since the 1890S as 
he injected a reformist zeal for safeguarding the autonomy of African societies born of 
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, 34 his previous experiences as Secretary of the Congo Reform Association . The 
objective now became one of resisting as far as possible the continued erosion of 
African tribal structures which Harris saw as essential if Afri 'can societies were to 
resist the economic and cultural onslaught of white land settlement; and the 
A. P. S. focused its attention not on segregation per se but on ensuring some form 
of "just" segregation via large allotments of land reserved for African use in the 
working out of colonial governments' land settlement policies. These arguments, 
for instance, were used extensively in Rhodesia, which Harris v-isited in 1914'. at the 
time of the sittings of the Native Reserves Commission. 
35 
However, in South Africa, such a view of lust" segregation was by no 
means unanimously held by the leadership of the Native National Congress as it 
decided to embark on a mission to England to protest to the British government against 
the passing of the Natives Land Act. 
36 
Certainly some tribal chiefs in Nata I and 
parts of the Transvaal were by no means in automatic objection to territorial segregation, 
provided it became a means through which they could extend the areas under their 
con tro 1 
37 
and some of the educate 
.d 
political elite too were prepared to consider it as 
some form of "political solution" by which they could extend their sphere of influence. 
Sol -Plaatie, for instance, wrote that General Hertzog had promised, while still 
Minister of Native Affairs in 1912, to create "a vast dependency of the Union in which 
the energies and aspirations of black professional men would find their outlet, with no 
danger of competition with Europeans; where a new educational and representative 
system could be evolved for Natives to live their own lives, and work out their 
salvation in a separate sphere". 
38 
But the actual passing of the Land Act in 1913 
dashed these hopes for there was no provision left for any "mixed" areas where white 
and African farms could exist side by side and any opportunities for separate African 
administrative ambitions were nullified by a rigid racial demarcation of land that left 
African reserves as some 9% of the total South African land area and a provision for 
further "scheduled areas" which would be specified by a commission at a later date. 
39 
The effect. of the Act., therefore, was to dent considerably the hopes of the 
more segregation is t of the S. A. N. N. C. 's leadership, especia IIy as the basis of 
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political influence exerted at the local levpl became considerably eroded duri-ng, the 
course of a campaign in the latter part of 1913 and early, 1914 to raise funds for the 
deputati 
I 
on to England. John Dube, for instanýce, as the first President of the 
Congress had initially seen it as little more than a political alliance of different 
African ethnic "nations" in Southern Africa and his own political power base had 
been substantia) ly confined to his native Natal, I where. his control of the Natal Congress 
came through an alliance of Christian Kholwa and chiefs and hereditary headmen or 
abenumzane. 
40 - Thus, he was'not necessarily opposed to the idea of ethnic compart- 
mentalisation of African societies since if this could lead to the eventual restoration of 
own political intluence might well increase, in Natal at any rate. '' For Dube , 
the Zulu Paramountcy of King Solomon, removed after the Bambata Rebellion, then his 
I ... I. ýI 41 
ethnicity in 1912 denoted still a means of mobilising political opposition to government 
policy and with fears of "black peril" and independent church leaders mobilising a 
Black pan-tribal revolt in South Africa (which were perpetuated by the Natalian George 
Heaton Nicholls's novel Bayete, written some time after 1913), 
42 
it was not surprising 
that the Natal Native Affairs Department continued to resist the restoration of the Zulu 
Paramountcy in the years after Union. 
43 
These ethnic considerations became eclipsed by the time of the 1914 
deputation as it began to emerge that ethnic compartmental isation might well be used to 
divide up African political consciousness at the grass roots level. The fund raising 
I campaign had been quite successful as African chiefs and their followers gave generously: 
Saul Msane, for instance., collected MOO 9s in one afternoon in Bethel in the Eastern 
Transvaal , 
44 
while Selby Msimang collected funds from East Griqualand and the Trans- 
kei. 
45 
As a consequence, the tone of the Congress's opposition to government policy 
began to change as younger and Jess constrained leaders like Selby Msimang came to the 
fore . 
"Our agitation is for the restitution of our legal rights", Msimang wrote 
46 
and 
it became clear that no matter how slim the chances were for successfully persuading 
the British government to step in and prevent the Union government implementing the 
Land Act, the Congress leadership would have to bow to popular pressure and use the 
funds collected to send a deputation to London. "We are between the other thing (sic) 
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and the deep sea - between two fires", - said Dube at the Congress's conference in 
K imberley in May of 1914 when the deputation was chosen. "On the one hand we 
have thousands of people who gave us their money on the express condition that we 
send a deputation to England, and to obey the government is to break faith with 
them. " 
47 
In such circumstances, some white politicians began to view the Congress's 
activity with alarm and John X. Merriman, as always an acute observer of political 
trends, wrote to Botha the Prime Minister that he should both try and dissuade Dube 
from allowing the deputation to go overseas and to consider some policy of divide and 
rule. "These poor fools", he argued, "will do themselves nothing but harm, but 
indirectly they may give us a great deal of trouble both here and over the water. I 
do not think that it would be difficult to anyone I ike yourself to detach the Zulu from 
the Bechuana. At least., Dube's demeanour gives one that impression. " 
48 (emphasis 
added) Coming from a former Cape Prime Minister, Merriman's comment indicated 
the current trend of thinking in some Cape quarters, though the advice was lost on 
Botha who, probably reflecting the widespread hostility still. in some sections of the 
N. A. D. to retribalisation, urged Walter Rubusana at his meeting with the deputation 
that "it was surely the duty of educated and enlightened leaders like him to disabuse 
the minds of the people of false ideas and to persuade them that no good purpose could 
be served by such talk". 
49 
There was still hope, in Botha's mind at least, t hatthe 
educated elite could be used as the key instruments of social control over the Africans 
at a mass level. 
But the decision to embark on the tour of England introduced a new dimension 
as the Congress leaders came up against the A. P. S. and its secretary, John Harris. 
By deciding to resort to a direct appeal to the British government, the Congress had 
unwittingly challenged the Society's own perceived prerogative of acting as mediator 
in such issues, while its stand in opposition to the Land Act contradicted Harris's own 
support for segregation as a philanthropic measure. 
50 
Thus, in the months before 
August 191.4, when the outbreak of the first world war prevented any further stay in 
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England, Harris sought to defuse as far as possible the Deputation's political effective- 
ness and to force it into agreeing to a document that would signify the British govern- 
ment's approval of the Union government's policy of segregation. Though this was 
only partially successful , since the Deputation did get a chance to give their full 
views at a meeting with the Colonial Secretary, Harris's action signified an increasing 
determination on his and the A. P. S. 's part to actively intervene in and control 
Congress pol icy. His hand in this respect was strengthened when it came to the 
question of finding further funds for the Deputation members to return to South Africa 
in August 1914 and Dube, Saul Msane and Thomas Mapikela became indebted to 
Harris when he secured a loan for them via the Wesleyan Missionary Society, the 
London Missionary Society and the A. P. S. 
51 
With these financial strings, Harris 
sought to continue influencing Congress policy back in South Africa and in 1916 a 
meeting of the Congress in Pietermaritzburg, passed a resolution that stated that the 
"Bantu people will gladly welcome the policy of territorial segregation of the races 
if carried out on fair and equitable lines". 
52 
The wording betrayed the influence 
of Harris and philanthropic segregationism. 
However, both the ineffectiveness of the 1914 deputation which had left the 
Congress in serious debt, and the rise of a more radical Congress faction centred 
around the newspaper Abantu Batho in Johannesburg, led to a showdown over Dube's 
I inks 'with the A. P. S. in 1917. With the publication of the Native Administration 
Bill, the hand of the militants was strengthened, especially as links had been established 
by this time with the syndicalist International Socialist League on the Rand, and at a 
meeting organised by the 1. S. L. in the Johannesburg Trades Hall the Transvaal African 
Congress President S. M. Makgatho, together with Saul Msane and Horatio Mbel le, 
threatened strike action to resist the Bil 1.53 Thus Dube's control over Congress 
became seriously threatened and his fate was sealed at a conference of the Congress in 
June of 1917 when a letter was road out of John Harris's supporting the 1916 Pieter- 
maritzburg resolution. There was an "outburst of indignation" among the delegates, 
according to Sol Plaatle 
54 
and Dube, along with the Secretary of Congress, Victor 
Selope Thema, was forced to resign. 
55 
As a consequence the more, radical faction 
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led by Makgatho came to dominate Congress and in the period immediately following 
the end of the'first world war the Congress moved towards more radical resistance to 
government policy, culminating in a campaign of passive resistance against the pass 
laws in 1919.56 The A. P. S. I ine of segregation and attempting to intervene in African 
politics had not paid off. 
The beginnings of I iberal consolidation in South Africa: 
The weakness of external intervention into African politics by the A. P. S. from 
as far away as London led to a reappraisal of the liberal position in South Africa itself in 
the years after 1917 and it was as a result of this that the liberals were eventually 
strengthened organ isational Iy vis a vis African political movements by the establishment 
of the Joint Council movement after 1921. At the same time the growth of radical 
African hostility towards workin'g in collaboration with any white liberal organisation at 
all as a result of the Harris affair indicated that a far more flexible ideology would be 
needed than the somewhat domatic line of philanthropic segregationism. As African 
strike action grew after 1918 and pol itica I ideology started to move in the direction of 
an early . Africanist radicalism 
57 
this began to be recognised by some South African 
liberals themselves. Maurice Evans for instance by 1919 began to advocate not only 
a Council of Native Affairs and a system of local government in South Africa on Glen 
Grey lines, but even parliamentary representation as a means to appease growing African 
political demands. 
58 
There began to occur indeed a swing back to the Cape model of 
local government and limited parliamentary representation with the additional Natal 
feature of a specialised Council or Commission on Native Affairs to provide "experts" 
a platform to "study" the "native question" in greater detail. Following a strike of 
African sanitary workers in Johannesburg in 1918,. for instance, a Government Commission 
of Enquiry chaired by the Cape Magistrate John Moffat urged that the parliamentary 
franchise was essential if the political radicalism of organisations like the I. S. L. , which 
it blamed for causing the strike, was not to spread amongst the African political elite. 
"So long as natives are denied the rights of citizenship as parliamentary voters", it 
11 
59 
concluded, "there can be no real contentment in the country . This was 
linked, 
-ýx -, .- 
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too, to proposals to remove gradually the job colour bar secured under the 1911 Mines 
and Works Act and secure a class of semi-skilled African workers on the Rand as an 
agent of internal social control on the mines. 
60 
Furthermore, the Commission's 
proposal for a Council of Native Affairs was taken up by the Witwatersrand Church 
Council under the Reverend F. B. Bridgman which, as we discuss in the fol lowing 
chapter, had been deeply involved at the local level in reform of municipal admini- 
stration. 
61 
Organising a deputation to the Minister of Native Affairs, F. S. Malan, 
at the end of 1918 the Church Council urged an Industrial Board of three or four 
persons "acquainted with the natives" who could "advise in the event of another 
industrial conflict arising". 
62 
South African liberals., in fact, began to recognise that a more broadly-based 
liberalism was needed to cope with an increasingly complex political scene where' 
there, were a number of different openings and opportunities. A simple accommodation 
to territorial segregation, as had tended to occur in the years before and after the 1913 
Natives Land Act with some philanthropic segregationists under the influence of external 
bodies like the A. P. S. , was too narrow a conception and risked cutting off liberals 
completely from urban African political movements centred around a burgeoning working 
class. It was clear by the first world war that a rural conception of segregation failed 
to relate to the growing trend of permanent African urbanisation and chiefs and headmen 
were declining figures of social control in an urbanising society. This became clear, 
for example, after the Chamber of Mines refused to meet the S. A. N. N. C. in March 
1919 to discuss African wages on the mines and decided instead on working through the 
chiefs. At a meeting with the Native Recruiting Corporation the following month, a 
deputation of chiefs confessed to being powerless to control the African workforce and 
Chief Isang Pilane expressed his surprise that there was not More "commotion" in 
Johannesburg. 
63 
In such circumstances, it began to become clear that more admini- 
strative machinery was required to control African workers, negotiate their wage rates 
and exercise social control by means of "studying" their problems and grievances, which 
could no longer be interpreted in a tribal or simple ethnic fashion. Some leaders in 
the mining industry, like H. M. Taberer and the head of the Native Recruiting Corporation 
't .- 
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N S. N. Pritchard (who had administered the Native Labour Contingent in France) were 
even in advance of government or liberal thinking on this issue and argued that the 
government should take a greater role in handling African wage rates while the 
Native Affairs Department should seek to restore "native confidence" in itself. 
64 
Furthermore, with the suspension of the Native Administration Bill in 1917 
and the reporting of the five regional select committees on land demarcation in South 
Africa in 1918,65 it was by no means certain by-the end of the first world war what 
exactly would be the direction of territorial segregation. In 1913, the conception 
of segregation had been more simply defined as the Natives Land Act had been passed 
to appease white farming interests in-the removal of African squatters and Naffir 
66 farmers" from the Orange Free State and parts of the Transvaal. But as the question 
arose of implementing a more comprehensive conception of territorial segregation, the 
Beaumont Commission and later the local land committees found extensive opposition 
from white farmers who were-threatened with a loss of land values as they were put 
adjacent to African owned areas. 
67 
In such ci*rcumstances, there seemed to be 
increasing scope for white liberals and "native experts" to exert influence at the local 
level in order to modify some of the consequences of segregation and to champion the 
interests of African farmers in their search for larger grants of land. 
In the years after the Armistice of 1918, therefore, there was a considerable 
revival of liberal hopes at the level of both national and local politics. With the 
death of Edward Dower, the Secretary of Native Affairs in late 1918, Merriman looked 
forward to a Cape liberal like Moffat "or one of his type" succeeding to the post68 
while government native policy as a whole seemed increasingly amenable to liberal 
political influence. Despite calls, for instance, by the Chief Magistrate of 
Johannesburg, T. G. Macfie for a coordinated campaign to remove al I Africans without 
passes from the Rand in the wake of the 1919 Passiv 
Ie Resistance Campaign, 
69 
an Inter- 
departmental Committee chaired by the former Cape magistrate G. A. Godley recommended 
in 1920 only selective action and, indeed, urged that passes should be changed into 
"registration certificates". 
70 
Keep-ing in accord with the thinking of the Moffat 
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Commission of 1918, the Committee sought the permanent urbanisation of a section 
of the African workforce in towns like Johannesburg and argued that the most satis- 
factory way to exert control over African residential patterns would be in the form of 
"attractive and property controlled native townships or locations for the more 
permanent section of the native population, supplemented by efficiently conducted 
hostels and rest houses for natives temporarily sojourning in these areas". 
71 A Bill 
on these I ines had indeed been drafted in 1918 by the Native Affairs Department and 
it appeared that liberal welfare and missionary work in the urban areas would be put 
on a firmer basis by legislative backing for permanent African urban townships where 
there would be provision for freehold property ownership. 
72 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Smuts government in 1920 Passed 
a Native Affairs Act that extended the Glen Grey system of local councils and provided, 
73 
after repeated requests by figures like Maurice Evans and the Bishop of Pretoria, for a 
Native Affairs Commission as a platform for expert "study" of native affairs. Echoing 
many-of the Cape assimilationist assumptions on the break-up of African tribal and - 
communal structures, Smuts argued, while introducing the measure in parliament, that 
"the most complicated factor" in the whole native affairs issue, was "the break-up of - 
the old tribal life and the engagement more and more of the native in the industrial life 
of South Africa". The "economic life of the country" had been "deepening t. he 
antagonism" and there was accordingly a need "to arrest this feeling of estrangement" 
and "to re-establish good relations and to recover the lost faith of the natives of South 
Africa". 74 This conciliatory tone won the praises of The Christian Express while The 
Star saw Smuts's speech as "one of the most important utterances ... since Rhodes 
introduced his Glen Grey Act in 1894". 
75 
Thus, by 1920, with the Native Affairs Act moving some way towards appeasing 
liberal demands, it seemed likely that a significant change in direction away from the 
more rigid territorial segregation of 1913 would occur, and that liberal political influence 
could be exerted at the centre of South African politics in a way which had not been seen 
since before Union. But a chain of events initiated by the African mine strike the 
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same year and esca I at ing through the 1922 Rand Revo It and the 1923 Urban Areas Act 
dashed the more ambitious of these hopes. Within three years of the 1920 Native 
Affairs Act, liberals and their allies now organised through the Joint Councils, were 
back again in the position of seeking only piecemeal modification of policy and 
working at the local level. 
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Chapter Five 
Stallardism and the rise of urban segregation 
Despite the hopes of some liberals in Sovth Africa after the first world war that 
they would be able to extend their political influence, the rising clamour of white 
commercial and propertied interests in favour of extending urban segregation nullified 
this. Instead, there occurred., through the passing of the 1923 Natives (Urban 
Areas) Act, the entrenchment of a rigidly segregationist doctrine that has remained the 
cardinal principle behind South African urban areas legislation to the present day, 
namely that Africans should only be in ostensibly "white" towns and cities in so far as 
they minister to white economic needs. This doctrine, associated with the report of 
the Transvaal Local Povernment Commission of 1921 chaired by Colonel Stallard, 
1 
represented a severe limitation on the political and economic potential of I iberal 
welfare and philanthropic work in urban areassince it nipped in the bud any expectations 
they may have had for stabilising a propertied African middle class as a means of 
extending their mediating role with the growing mass of urban Africans. , As a 
consequence, when liberal political influence did begin to extend itself in the 1920s 
amongýt the growing African educational and political elite through the Joint Councils 
and later the Institute of Race Relations, it was qualified by a growing realisation on 
the Africans' part that its potential as a mediator and a lobbyer for the interests of urban 
Africans was severely limited. Similarly, as chapters six to nine of this study point 
out., the organisers of, the Joint Councils and the Institute became increasingly aware 
as the years passed by that any influence they might have with the government of the 
day would be sizeabI y determined by the degree to which they. were prepared to work 
within the basic tenets of territorial segregation and base the'ir appeal on the enhance- 
ment of African interests in the reserves as opposed to the urban areas. 
So, the modelling of urban segregation around the Stallard doctrine in the years 
after 1923 represented a crucial hiatus in liberal fortunes, though it is interesting to 
note how little this was really perceived or truly understood at the time. In effect, 
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the growing turn of events in the post first world war period was either misread by the I 
I iberals or else simply accommodated to in a somewhat bland and short-sighted manner. 
By turning back towards local welfare work and the factual analysis of government 
policy, the liberals sought to ignore the underlying trend of urban segregation and 
assume that in some way the automatic logic of growing urbanisation, and its con- 
comitant economic and social changes, would in themselves represent a powerful motor 
towards a different pattern of "race relations". This, for example, tended to be the 
assumption of the pioneering school of u rban anthropologists in the 19jOs led by Ellen 
Hellman and Eileen Krige, rooted as it was in the theories of "culture contact" 
associated with the International African Institute and its journal Africa. 
2 
Similarly, 
the work of the Joint Councils and welfare workers on the Witwatersrand tended. to be 
heavily influenced by the North American pattern of urbanisation, as the writings of 
the American missionary Ray Phillips in such books as The Bantu are Coming and The 
3 
Bantu in the City indicate. 
Thus, throughout the inter-war period and until at least the time of the 
sittings of the Fagan Commission of 1946-48, liberals in South Africa tended to avoid 
posing any central questions about the essential trajectory of urban segregation and to 
assume that it must at, some stage become modified to fit what was seen as the more 
"normal" model of North. America or Western Europe. This dependence on external 
models has tended furthermore, to characterise most liberal historical readings of 
South African urbanisation, until at least quite recently, and in the Oxford History of 
South Africa there is the implicit assumption in a number of chapters that urban policy 
is still dominated by an economically irrational ideology derived from the frontier 
past. 
4 
This tradition of historiography, in turn, has been read back into the'past, 
to explain the failure of liberalism to influence more widely the workings of government 
segregationist policy. In the writings of Rodney Davenport, for instance, there is a 
strong emphasis upon the strong domination of policy by such doctrinaire figures as 
Stallard and George Heaton Nicholls while liberals are left helpless, but righteous, 
in the political wings, continually outmanouevredb. ya rigged political system that 
always favours the most racial of political ideo ogies. 
5 
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There is something deeply unsatisfactory about such explanations. The 
logic and, trend of government segregation policy cannot be explained in terms only 
of the machinations of individual men, divorced from the structural constraints and 
class pressures of urban politics. Similarly, the increasing "severity" of urban 
areas legislation over the period from 1923 to 1945 and beyond cannot be. judged in 
terms of a eurocentric archetype derived from a different historical and social 
situation. 
6 
The logic of urban segregation, indeed, needs to be located in terms 
of the complexity of class relationships, and their resulting ideological rational isations, 
that were forged in the expanding urban milieux. By such means, it is possible to 
get behind the seeming "passivity" of th e liberals in South African urban politics and 
to explain their failure through a combination of cultural and class limitations. In 
this way, therefore, we seek in this chapter to explain the long-term failure of liberals 
to influence Policy at the political centre over the crucial years 1918-1923. 
The limitations of the new urban liberalism: 
One of the main problems that confronted the first generation of post-Union 
liberals was the speed and pace with which urbanisation overtook them. Between 
1904 and 1921 urban isati on increased in the ratio of 100: 155, of which the ratio for 
whites was 100: 151 and Africans 100: 185. The number of urban Africans rose, by 
87,622 between 1911 and 1921 . while in the nine principal towns of the Union, the 7 
African population was estimated to have risen by an average of 61%. Many of 
the social "problems" that accompanied this urbanisation began to change too as more 
and more African women followed their menfolk to establish permanent families in the 
towns: in Cape Town, for example, African women increased by 110% between 1911 
and 1921,184% in Durban and 211 % in Johannesburg. 
8 
The consequences of this 
change, wrote the American missionary Frederick Bridgman in 1924 shortly before his 
death were "revolutionary" since it meant that Africans had "almost at a bound made 
the leap from communistic tribalism to individualism. They have come within the 
pale of industrialism. " 
9 
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But how could the existing liberal conceptions, derived as they so often 
were from missionary work in a predominantly rural environment in areas like the 
Eastern Cape, be reformulated to fit the changing urban situation? 'This was a 
question that continually dogged liberal opinion formers in the years after Union and 
was never indeed really reso'lved before the Nationalist victory of 1948. The 
missionaries and welfare workers in South Africa's expanding towns and cities carried 
with them many of the optimistic assumptions of the nineteenth century civilising 
mission and did not fully real ise the break-up that was occurring in Victorian liberal- 
ism. Frequently, missionaries had little ex'perience of the changing nature of urban 
politics in late Victorian and Edwardian England, as an increasingly jingoistic lower 
middle class began to make itself felt on the political scene, 
10 
and still based their 
activities on an unhampered extension of missionary activity in Southern Africa in 
the twentieth century. In the General Missionary Conferences in South Africa 
between 1904 and 1912, for instance, there was a growing move to rational ise and 
coordinate missionary work in order to meet the perceived "threat" from Ethiopianism, 
but the underlying assumption remained that a mere extension of the previous pattern 
of proselytising activity would in itself lead. to the goal of complete Christian isa t ion 
of the African population. Thus, in 1912 a conference survey noted that on the 
basis of the present rate of missionary expansion, whereby some 43 missionary societies 
manned 813 mission stations that covered 7 million Africans in South Africa, "another 
half century may see the complete Christian isation of the heathen population of South 
Africa south of the Limpopo River". 
II 
This general missionary myopia regarding the specific features of urbanisation 
was . compounded, furthermore, by a further cultural legacy that limited the perceptions 
of those missionaries who were more acquainted with urban conditions. In South 
Africa the American Board Mission was probably one of the most urban -orien ta ted of 
missions, given the strong influences back in the United States of the Social Gospel 
movemen .f since the latter part of the nineteenth century. 
12 
This movement, however, 
which particularly influenced such missionaries as Frederick Bridgman and Ray Phillips, 
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was rooted in a collectivist and organic view of industrial societies that, like liberal 
hegelianism in England, failed to provide any specific class analysis of the urban 
social system. 
13 
Thus, like the equivalent development of urban sociology in the 
United States around the Chicago School of Robert Ezra Park and Louis Wirth, 
14 
there 
was an implicit assumption that modern urban social control could be constructed out 
of a synthesising of nineteenth century liberal optimism with twentieth century 
collectivism as part of a "search for order" out of the chaos of laisser faire economics. 
15 
Within this process of a renewed harmony of economic and social interests on group 
rather than individualistic terms, it was assumed that the moral influences from 
missionaries and philanthropists would p-lay a guiding lead. In this way a renewed 
pattern of "cooperation" between different racial and class interests could be ensured 
through the essential mediating role of urban missionaries, who could prevent the 
recurrence of Black peril agitations as had occbrred on the Witwatersrand as late as 
1912. This, for example, was the guiding assumption behind Bridgman's work in 
Durban between 1897 and 1912, before he moved up to the Rand, and it was a cardinal 
article of faith that schemes of social settlement which entrenched the status of lay 
preachers and created "healthful surroundings physical and moral ... with evening 
school and bible class privileges" could ensure "a little Christian community which 
will be as gospel salt in this corrupt city". 
16 
But this view of the mediating role Of the urban missionary was flawed by a 
basic failure to account for the rise of a new propertied white lower middle class in 
the years after Union. Rooted as it so frequently was in North American and 
English parallels, the missionary view in South Afr-ica was taken unawares by a more 
militant white petty bourgeoisie which was far less constrained by the consensual 
apparatus of Victorian liberal ideology. If the rise of petty bourgeois jingoism in 
England in the 1890s, culminating in the collective frenzy of Mafeking night, was a 
conservative and defensive move to consolidate the English liberal order around an 
17 
essentially patriotic appeal, its equivalent form in South Africa knew no such 
limitations. With liberalism on the Witwatersrand being little more than a thin 
veneer, the South African white petty bourgeoisie resembled more the German 
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Mittelstand in its desire to create its own forms of political and ideological self 
expression. This had been true, for instance, of the issues of territorial and 
industrial segregation before Union, as we saw in chapter three, where the white 
petty bourgeoisie of the Transvaal before Union had been unwilling to accept auto- 
matically the dictates of the mining magnates and land companies grouped around the 
18 Transvaal Native Affairs Society. It became true, too, of the period after the 
1913 Natives Land Act when the petty bourgeoisie, fortified by the patriotism 
engendered by the first world war, sought to consolidate itself as a respectable suburban 
middle class protected by a rigid pattern of urban segregation and health and sanitary 
reform. 
For Bridgman and other welfare workers and missionaries on the Rand, these 
were only partially understood social trends, and the belief in the essential mediating 
role of urban missions continued to be a guiding principle, even in the middle of the 
1912 Black Peril agitation. the lines of cleavage are being sharply drawn; ", 
Bridgman noted in April of that year: 
on both sides the forces are being organised. Evidently conflict 
must wax hotter before permanent improvement in racial relations 
can be expected. In, the meantime it looks as though the 
missionary would have to act the part of buffer and get many hard 
knocks from his friends, white and black. 
Though at the same time, the renewed appearance of the White League on the 
Witwatersrand did not seem to disturb him, for it did not seem to oppose any "reasonable 
demands". 
19 
Thus, Bridgman's essentially nineteenth century optimisim became only 
tempered by a realisation of the need for timing and political astuteness in working on 
central government in the wake of racial or industrial conflict that hit South Africa 
between 1912-14 as the Black Peril agitation was followed by white and African mine 
strikes. As the Economic Commission of 1914 pressed for outlets for semi-skilled 
20 - African workers on the mines, and the management of the mine recruiting bodies Rf 
W. N. L. A. and the N. R. C. favoured the creation of "open compounds" where Afri cans 
could live in locations with their families, 
21 
the possibilities seemed to open up for the 
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liberals and their missionary and welfare worker allies to extend their mediating and 
"buffer" influences through a coopted African petty bourgeoisie. So a campaign 
began to mount in the years after 1915 for municipal reform and these ideas began to 
be pressed despite the fact that the likely white lower middle class response was only 
half understood. 
The campaign for municipal reform: 
Indeed, as liberal opinion formers, missionaries and welfare workers began 
to mobilise a campaign for the reform of municipal locations in the years after 1915, 
it was dimly perceived that the actual "reform" of these both strengthened the power 
of the central state as well as entrenching the structures in the urban areas of 
territorial and spatial segregation. The elaboration by the reformers of previous 
patterns of municipal reform such as that of Durban through the Native Locations Act 
of 1904 and the Native Beer Act of 1909 or the Native Reserve Locations Act of 1905 
in Cape Town, gave municipalities the power to extend the racial division of property 
ownership. The liberals in other words either failed to perceive, or else actively 
connived in, a reformulation of the Victorian pattern of municipal reform on to racial 
I ines. In England, the motivation behind much of this reform had been a class 
conscious attempt by the new middle class in the nineteenth century to impose a, 
11 sanitation syndrome" on the thinking of local government. As a consequence, 
disease and epidemics were seen to be endemic to, and caused by, the poor housing 
and living conditions of the working classes, who were in consequence to be treated 
as a separate category of public reform. In South Africa this Victorian class based 
conception of sanitation became progressively reformulated, in the aftermath of such 
outbreaks of bubonic plague as in Cape Town in 1902 and in Johannesburg in 1904, 
onto racial lines and the separate category of public housing for the working class 
became a racially separate category of urban locations. 
22 
Thus, following Donald 
Olsen's analysis of Victorian London, we can see this in terms of a "tehsion between 
two coexistent, but incompatible Victorian ideals: individual privacy and public 
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accountability" which followed class lines: 
The middle classes desired privacy for themselves, but wished the lives of the lower orders to be I ived in the ful I blaze of 
publicity. Street improvements and slum clearance schemes 
were designed to bring the poor into the open, where they 
could be observed, reproved and instructed by their superiors. 23 
In South Africa, such a distinction became racially defined 
, 
with the central cause of 
slums and urban squalor being perceived in terms Of "the native problem" and the 
growth of an urbanised African population. The "solution" to this "problem", 
furthermore, was to be seen as pulling whites who lived in multi-racial slums out into 
privatised, middle class residential situations on the lines of the growing suburban 
mode . 
24 
On the other hand, Africans 
., 
together with Coloureds and Asians, were 
to be kept under constant "public" (i. e. white) attention in the form of municipally- 
controlled urban locations. 
In Johannesburg, these influences can be seen as critically shaping the 
campaign for reform after 1915. The Johannesburg Council had made a pre- 
liminary effort at establishing African locations in 1904 when, following an outbreak 
of bubonic plague, it established a location at KI ipspruit near a sewage farm. 
25 
But multi-racial urban slums continued to grow in the years up to the first world war. 
In March of 1915. matters came to a head when a judgment in the Supreme Court 
meant that it became illegal for landlords to let rooms to Africans within the confines 
of the Johannesburg municipality. The effect of this judgment was to leave 
thousands of Africans under threat of eviction. "It seems", wrote The Star, "that 
a very stiff task faces the municipality" and the need to estab, lish locations became 
pressing: 
What seems to be necessary is either the establishment of 
locations conveniently situated and provided with decent 
housing at rentals as low as possible, or that areas which 
are already largely "black" should be defined as native 
areas and brought under a special set of bye-laws. 26 
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Pressure for such locations came especially from the temperance reformers on the Rand 
who linked the abolition of "illicit liquor" with the provision of adequate housing 
which would remove the pressures on African households to make up rents of often 
27 E3-E4 per month for a slum tenement through liquor dealing. These reformers 
often came from a non-conformist background Ue Pim who was a Quaker. "Some 
of us who have not been able to get other work", Pim wrote to Lord Selbourne in 
June 1915, "are trying to obtain more control of the illicit liquor traffic, and to 
improve the scandalous conditions under which natives are 
. bound in this town". 
28 
The pressure the temperance reformers placed on white opinion in the years 
after 1915 was for a radical reform in the whole "system" of African housing. Despite 
the appeal to a "public conscience", much of the influence on their thinking seems to 
have stemmed from the previous "Black Peril " agitation of 1912-1914 which had 
so shocked missionaries and liberals at the time. 
29 
In a report to the executive 
committee of the Citizens Alliance for Liquor Reform, for instance, Raymond 
Schumacher, F. B. Bridgman and R. Raine argued that African housing areas were 
too small and, like municipal locations, "should not be allowed to be extended 
on the present lines". 
30 
Policy in fact should be much more far reaching: 
The present type of room or house is generally speaking 
unsatisfactory and the amount of space, both inside and 
outside the building, is insufficient. Provision should 
be made in the future for properly -laid out native townships 
under the most sanitary conditions. 31 
The basis of this recommendation lay in the growth of overcrowded slum conditions 
in many working class areas of Johannesburg where black and white lived cheek by 
jowl in appalling conditions of proverty and degradation. In the Vrededorp and 
Siemert Road district, for instance, a group of ricksha "boys" were 'reported as 
. 
having "a little colony" close to houses occupied by whites; while in Jeppestown 
and districts of Doornfontein reformers pointed to the "problem" of "yards" at the 
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back of ostensibly respectable residential property where slum conditions persisted. 
At the back of one such cottage built of wood and iron there was: 
a yard containing between 30 and 40 of the worst kind of 
slum rooms and every one of the rooms is occupied. 
Considerable ingenuity has been shown in the squeezing 
in of the greatest number of these, and not a foot of the 
walled-in yard space has been wasted. The plan with 
all these places is to use the yard wall for the outer wall 
of the living room, so that only three sides need be added. 
Walking round the cottage you come, Straight upon four or 
five rooms that have not been thus treated. They have 
been built separately, quite near the back of the house, 
but the occupants may consider themselves the aristocrats 
of this yard, for they have windows in their rooms and 
some I ight. 32 
In one of the "rooms" in this yard, measuring 7 feet by 7 feet,, two people. 
lived at a monthly rent of EI 5s a month: the husband of the African couple 
occupying it earned E3 a month. This yard was "one of the worst". in Jeppe for 
Round the yard, in the corner, you may notice here and 
there a hole that once contained a bottle, until the police 
came along and found the hiding place. 
For the white slum owner in the cottage, however, the yard was a profitable 
venture for she received 30 lots of rent ranging from El 5s to El I Os. In all some 
one hundred "coloureds" lived in the yard. 
33 
Since, however, it was estimated 
that 80% of Africans in Johannesburg earned less than E3 a month, short of a planned 
township, there was nowhere else to live. The reformers tended studiously to avoid 
the question of wa-ges as such, for to them the "problem" was posed in terms of "bad" 
housing leading to illicit liquor dealing and a consequential increase in crime, 
34 
especially on an organised basis like the "amaleita . But seen 
in these terms, 
the reformers' arguments carried considerable weight. The Rooth Committee on the 
working of the Transvaal Liquor laws found that between 1903 and 1917 there were 
168 521 convictions for contravention of the I iquor laws in Pretoria and on the 
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Witwatersrand: this included 8,214 wh-ites for the sale of liquor and 22,160 for 
drunkenness while there were a further 123,237 convictions of Africans. Without 
further locations the number of slums was likely to grow: in 1915 it was estimated 
that of the African population in Johannesburg, some 2,500 adult males lived at 
KI ipspruit and in the Wemmer and Jubilee compounds set up under municipal control, 
while a further estimated 8,800 lived in "yards". 
35 
The proposed locations were to be at rents which an average African family, 
at the existing wage levels, could afford to pay. The "solution". therefore, proposed 
by the reformers was to build the locations on land at a low market price outside the 
city confines and ensure an effective system of transport into the. city. Howard Pim., 
for instance, proposed a site about 3 to 4 miles from the business district for "given 
good transport., employers would be willing to allow their native servants to live away 
from their stores". The Star agreed and proposed a tram system and "worker trains" 
which would ensure that the whole enterpr, ise of establishing locations on the- city 
perimeter would be worthwhile. In the language of mining recruitment it argued: 
... a serious economic wastage could 
be cured by a proper 
housing scheme the natives in all probability finding no 
difficulty at all in paying such sums for their municipal 
accommodation as would cover interest and redemption 
on the capital sum invested by the town. 
36 
By the end of 1915 this pressure from the reformers was felt in the muni- 
cipal elections when seven candidates fielded 
by the reformist Rand Social - 
Serv 
.i ces 
League were elected to the Johannesburg council. 
The tone of the candidates' 
appeal indicated the racial basis of the reformist programme: 
Have you ever visited the pestilential yards where, the 
dregs of the white, toloured and native population are 
herded together in indescribable filth and squalor? If 
so you will appreciate the pressing need for native 
townships and better housing conditions. 37 
One candidate in the election, J. A. Smit, who was Chairman, of the 
Parks and 
Estates Committee, was more explicit: 
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Destruction of slums and municipal housing- 
This matter is bound up with the qu'js-tion of natives residing in town. The indiscriminate manner in which natives at 
present reside and live within the town cannot be other than 
a menace to the lives and health of the population. The 
council's power to deal with the matter is somewhat circum- 
scribed. 38 
With descriptions such as these, the campaign continued through the 1917' 
municipal elections when five reform candidates were elected on a growing white 
franchise on the Rand that for the first time included white women. 
39 Only by 1920 
did the reform campaign appear to die down, as the issues increasingly came to be 
defined on a national level and legislation began to be drawn up. 
40 
The basis behind the municipal reform campaign stemmed, in part, from 
the revival of an economic potential for slum clearance schemes. The actual social 
engineering process involved in expropriating and compensating slum owners who 
rack-rented properties to Africans, Coloureds and "poor whites" was a costly business, 
as the Johannesburg city council had discovered in 1903 following an outbreak of. 
bubonic plague. The Transvaal Government - then under British colonial control - 
was influenced by similar schemes in Britain under the Housing of the Working Classes 
Act of 1890 and had compensated the slum owners of the "insanitary area" by 
considerably excessive amounts: in all some EI 145,046 was paid for land which 
was on Iy worth E393,000 in 1912 when it came to be assessed by the Transvaa I 
Leasehold Townships Commission. 
41 
Thus the establishment of the Klipspruit 
Location in 1904 left memories of excessive compensation and charges of corruption, 
compounded by the fact that the city council itself became dogged by declining 
rateable values of property in the years after 1906. Compared to 1906-7 when 
the income from rates was E421 066, in 1907-8 income fell to E340,376 and did 
not begin to pick up again until 1911.42 Furthermore, Union in 1910 added 
confusion in fýat it remained unclear what exactly the responsibilities of the 
council were in relation to those of the central government and many interests on 
the city council continued to deny their responsibility for urban reform and charged 
it to the Union government in Pretoria. 
43 
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In 1917, however, the relationship between the city council and the central 
government became more closely defined when the Union government refused to allow 
the extension of the Durban system of municipal beer brewing as a means of raising 
money for the upkeep of African locations until the council first provided better 
municipal locations in the first place. 
44 While the Durban system led to repeated 
opposition from the Witwatersrand Church Council, who saw it as likely to erode the 
basis behind the migrant labour system since African male wage earners would be 
spending their income on municipal beer and not put it into "more productive 
channels" or allow it "to be sent home to the families of the natives"I 
45 
the potential 
for further municipal locations aided the reformers' attacks on those sections of the 
white petty bourgeoisie who were seen to profit from the perpetuation of multi-racial 
slums. One reform candidate in the 1917 election, John Taylor of Norwood, for 
example, singled ou-t the slum landowner, the illicit liquor seller and the "kaffir 
eating house owner" as those "v3sted interests" who "ministered to the vices of the 
native.. -. 
46 Similarly, the Secretary of the Transvaal Municipal *Employees 
Federation wrote in The Municipal Magazine in the Transvaal that "it should be 
possible for the Council to make it a punishable offence for certain premises in 
specific locations to be let to others than native or coloured people and in other 
specific parts of the town to be 'let' to other than whites. In this way the 
I iving together, cheek by jowl, of whites and blacks could be prevented and slums, 
. "47 
such as now exist, would be done away with. The influenza epiJemic of 1918 
at the end of the first world war undoubtedly contributed to these segregationist 
sentiments as it did, for instance., in the case of Cape Town and the decision to 
remove- the inhabitants of Ndabeni to the new location at Langa. 
48 
In 
Johannesburg, the council's housing and health committee instigated a Public 
Health and Social Welfare Survey and concluded that "the abolition of slum 
property is one of the first steps on the road to civic health" and recommended the 
establishment of cottages at 1, ow rents on lines similar to the Bloemfontein Town 
Council. 
49 
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This manipulation of the sanitation syndrome ensured that by 1918 the 
Johannesburg city council proposals should closely coincide with those developed by 
the municipal reformers. As ea rIy as Ma y 1917 the Coun ciI adopted re comme ndations 
for a site to be selected for an African I ocation and tenders were given out for the 
erection of houses at Newlands, with a tramway connection beihg established to 
Brixton. Some of Howard Pim's and the reformers' ideas on moving the African 
location away from Klipspruit and closer to the centre of the city were taken up, at 
the same time as transport connections were established in order to ensure an adequate 
model of urban segregation. At first only E44,35Q was allocated for the buildings 
50 and roads with provisions for If 200 Africans in 75 two-room houses. However in 
1918 the Parks and Estates Committee submitted two further estimates for African 
rehousing in locations (E125,000) and E250,000 for "poor whites": though the 
proposal was watered down by the finance committee to a mere E65,000 for the African 
housing scheme and none at all for Africans. it is wel I to remember", commented 
The Star after initial opposition to the scheme, "that these are times of stringency and 
that to perpetuate what may be termed the "Town Hall Standard" of somptuousness is, or 
should be, inappropriate to prevailing conditions. Health before the splendours of 
landscape gardening should be the watchword. " 
51 Emulation of the British pattern of 
municipal reform seemed, indeed, to be on the way out. 
This increasingly segregationist tendency at the local level was compounded by 
the growing mobilisation of political opposition by the municipalities at the national 
level to proposals for state control over municipal administration and the entrenchment 
of many of the ideas of the I iberal municipal reformers. A 1918 draft Bill prepared 
by the Native Affairs Department to provide for the "establishment and the better 
management and control of locations and other places of residence for natives in urban 
areas and generally for the administration of native affairs in urban area S1152 incorporated 
many of these I iberal ideas as it sought, in a manner similar to the state -or ien tated 
British Housing of the Working Classes Act of 1890., to provide for state powers to compel 
recalcitrant local authorities to comply with general provisions for sanitary reform. 
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Furthermore, the segregationi'st provisions under this Bill were generally weak in so 
far as it followed the Cape model by giving sections of the African petty bourgeoisie 
in urban areas the right to be exempted from living in municipal locations or hostels, 
while restrictions on African trading were removed outside urban locations. 
53 
The 
Bill too was generally favoured by white liberals. James Henderson saw it as a measure 
which would extend the opportunities open to the semi-skilled trainees from Lovedale 
who were often prevented in towns in the Orange Free State and elsewhere from 
conducting trading activities, though he hoped for further provisions whereby Africans 
could make their own "representations" so as "to secure that their interests are properly 
considered by the central authority" for "local authorities are apt to take a narrow 
view even of their own interests in having a strong supply of Native Labour at hand, 
not to say of the opportunities of utilising the abundance of Native labour for industrial 
developments in the interests of both races". 
54 
But lobbying from local authorities in the period after 1918 ensured that the 
reformist provisions contained in the 1918 Bill were con'Siderably modified by the time 
of the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act. Pressure on local authorities from white 
ratepayers began to build up when the cost of schemes such a's Johannesburg's location 
at Newlands began to rise beyond the original estimates. The original E44,350, set 
aside in June 1918 for the erection of the location proved inadequate by 1922, despite 
the fact that the cost of the buildings was kept to a basic minimum through constructing 
two-roomed huts with roofs of ga*lvanised iron together with a small verandah and 
latrine. The cost led to a deficit in the council's expenditure and in 1922 alone 
this amounted to some E7,251, while the cost of providing trams to and from the 
55 
location between 1919 and 1922 added a further E3,419. It was thus not surprising 
that local authority representatives echoed the complaints of their ratepayers to the 
1922'Select Committee on Native Affairs, especially as some Labour councillors like 
Morris Kentridge objected to the location being in the vicinity of white working class 
suburbs and thus jeopardising white property values. 
56 
"Personally I should not like 
to encourage a native to build his own house". said Councillor H. Kroomer to the 
Select Committee. on the suggestion that Africans be allowed to take up 33 year leases, 
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"we only want the natives in the locations as long as they work in Johannesburg. 
We have no desire that they should go and stay there permanently ... we want to 
expel from our locations a number of loafers who are really doing no work at all. 
These people are at present living in the slums, and we do not want to be burdened 
by these people. Some place must be provided for them. " 
57 
The tone of these remarks indicated an alternative formulation to that of co- 
optation of the African petty bourgeoisie and strong state control suggested by the 
municipal reform campaign and the 1918 draft bill. The entrenchment of an urban 
African petty bourgeoisie would mark a split in the otherwise united racial unity of 
white property owners and thus represent the possibility of South African cities developing 
into a distinctly multi-racial direction such as New York where the negro population rose 
by 66% between 1910 and 1920 and 115% between 1920 and 1930, and 87,417 negroes 
moved into Harlem and 118,972 whites left for the suburbs of the Bronx, Brooklyn and 
Queens. 58 This ghettoization in New York, especially in Harlem, was a consequence 
of the inability of white property owners to maintain a united front of racial segregation 
in resistance to the negro urban influx. For many white landlords and land speculators 
the entrance of the negroes proved very profitable, while for the rest the choice was 
either maintaining white tenants at very reduced rents or acceding to the general trend 
59 
and letting to negroes; thus ensuring that Harlem quickly became a , negro" area. 
This was precisely what many of the municipal reformers in South Africa feared: hence 
the attacks on the slum landlords on the Rand who let to Africans as well as low income 
whites. In contrast to the New York situation, however, the municipal reformers were 
able, via a direct access to the white controlled state, to enforce state interventi-on in 
order to prevent the logic of market forces and property values dictating this American 
I 
style trend in the urban areas. In the years after 1918 the channels of communication 
between local auth orities and the state increased such that by the time of the 1922 Select 
Committee on the Urban Areas Bill, government policy was forced to accede to the demands 
of the rn. unicipalities. 
One of the reasons for this enhancement in the municipalities' political, effective- 
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ness was that, compared to the weak and diversified nature of the liberals, they 
reflected the coherent class interest of the white petty bourgeoisie. Under s uch 
leaders as Colonel Stallard in the S. A. P. , the white petty bourgeoisie had been able 
to take advantage of the splits in the South African Labour Party over the issue of 
entering the first world war, and to widen its appeal on the basis of a jingoistic 
patriotism. 
60 
As a high tory patriot with populist leanings, Stallard used some of 
the arguments of the philanthropic segregationists in order to emphasise the differences 
between African and White cultures in South Africa and to rationalise complete urban 
segregation. Arguing for a white labour policy, for instance, Stallard told the 
Dominions Royal Commission in 1914 that "the native in South Africa is essentially a 
socialist" while "we are more individualistic" and there was a danger of the African 
system being "broken down' through migrant labour. Accordingly, there was a need 
for the creation of "native territories ... of considerable size., where they (the Africans) 
will be able to lead their own life under their own social conditions, according to their 
own . ideas 11 . 
61 
These arguments he was able to project with great effectiveness 
through the Report of the Transvaal Local Government Commission of which he was 
chairman., in 1921 and to outweigh the competing liberal influences organised around 
the Native Affairs Commission, establish ed under the Native Affairs Act. At a 
conference between the Commission and the N. A. C. in August 1921 , it was clear that 
the Stallard position was likely to prevail as the two groups agreed that "the existence 
of a redundant black population in municipal areas is a source of the gravest peril, and 
responsible in a great measure for the unsatisfactory condition prevailing". 
62 
In the 
aftermath of the 1919 Passive Resistance Campaign and the 1920 African mine strike, the 
Stallard Commission had the backing of the municipalities and white property interests in 
their attack on African residence in urban areas, and though liberals on the N. A. C. like 
Alex Roberts, a former teacher at Lovedale, hoped for modifications in the pass laws on 
linessuggested by the Godley Committee's Report of 1920,63 it seemed ever more likely 
that state policy would bend to municipal and Stallardist pressure. 
Th is was ev iden ced in a new Urban Areas BiII pub I is hed by the N. A. D,. in 
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February of 1922 which, while still containing some of the ideas on co-optation of 
an African petty bourgeoisie by providing for the creation of "native villages" where 
municipal authorities could "advance moneys to approved natives for the construction 
of dwellings for them" and the right of Africans to acquire "for residential purposes 
the ownership or lease of lots", 
64 
at the same time moved clearly in the municipalities' 
favour by providing them with greater powers to expel Africans "habitually unemployed", 
"not possessed of the means of livelihood" or "leading an idle, dissolute or disorderly 
I ife ". 65 Though some of the African leaders on the Johannesburg Joint Council like 
Selby Msimang looked still to the cooptive provisions of the Bill and the "great 
possibilities" it held out to would-be African property holders, 
66 
even these limited 
rights came under growing Stallardist attack in the months after its publication. 
One of the members of the Stallard Commission, M. G. Nicholson - who was 
town clerk of Pretoria - voiced his opposition to the Bill's provision for Afri-cans to 
own property freehold on the grounds that it conflicted with the Stallard Commission 
report that "natives ... should only be permitted within municipal areas in so far and 
for so long as their presence is demanded by the wants of the white population". In 
the case of the draft Bill, Nicholson pointed out the dangers of creating a permanently 
urbanised class of Africans who would be likely to compete with the white petty 
bourgeoisie in trade and business activities: 
One can easily imagine such a native village being established 
on the outskirts of a town and ostensibly at the commencement 
for workers in that town only, but in the course of time the 
inhabitants far outnumbering those of the town itself and 
demanding an outlet for their activity, thereby competing with 
the town's inhabitants in every sort of business, trade and 
occupation. 
What was needed, Nicholson went on, was for a "definite policy" re'garding 
Africans in urban areas. While willing to accept the need for villages - with 
their rural connotation - Nicholson suggested a scheme that had been previously 
outlined by the Stubbs Committee in 1918. Such villages were to be "for the 
exclusive residence of natives so long as they are in the employment' of European 
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masters or have definite work to do for the good of their own community" and were at 
the same time "separate from the European areas-, but with ready means of transport- 
ation" where "dwellings there could be erected either by the municipality or by 
employers of labour or by the natives themselves". 
67 
This was a scheme that 
reflected the growth of more modern means of transportation, but at the same time 
sought to use it to maintain the cheap labour basis of the reserves in the form of urban 
locations contiguous to "white" urban areas. The reformists' willingness to entrench 
a freeholder class who could also develop distinct trading interests, threatened the 
whole wage labour basis of this model of urban locations and also raised the spectre 
of a large black township that would destroy the whole ideal of urban areas being 
specifically "white". 
Nicholson's arguments indicated the white lower middle class opposition to 
those parts of the bill which accepted the idea of permanent African urbanisation. 
In January of 1923, one month before thebil I began to be debated in the House of 
Assembly, a conference in Johannesburg between the Executive Committee of the 
Transvaal Municipal Association and members of the Assembly for Reef and Pretoria 
constituencies indicated the extent of this disapproval among the municipalities. 
"So far as the Transvaal is concerned", the conference recordedl "it (the Bill) 
introduces novel and far reaching principles, the result of which may be very 
different from w. hat the framers of the Bill ever intended 11 . 
68 
In the debate on 
the Bill itself., there were si-milar expressions of opposition. While Smuts argued 
that the Bill provided for urban segregation on the principles of the 1913 
Land Act 
and the fact that they "could not mix up natives indiscriminately 
in one location. 
They had to give the educated and progressive native a better position in the 
location than the native who was just rising from barbarism", 
69 
Creswe II went 
on to warn of the prospect of "great black cities around our industrial centres". 
The "policy of drift", he argued, that was contained in the Bill was one "which 
was tending to wither the roots of our white civilisation 
in South Africa ". 70 
This opposition reached fruition during the committee stages of the Bill 
when the Select Committee under Richard Feetham moved a number of amendments 
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to reduce African rights of residence in urban areas. In particular, clause I (b) 
was amended such that the rights of "natives ... to acquire for residential purposes 71 the ownership or lease of lots" was changed to mere leasehold. "it would have 
been no use", Feetham wrote to Pim, "trying to satisfy native sentiment in favour of 
ownership at the cost of exacting antagonism of municipal authorities and making 
the bill unworkable 
72 
The effect of the change, howeverý, on African opinion 
was profound. Selby Msimang saw the Bill as a "most shameful compromise" which 
"deliberately seeks to arrest Bantu progress and to perpetuate a dangerous policy of 
keeping the Natives dispossessed of landed property". 
73 Msimang, in fact, was 
in favour of organising a stoppage of work in Johannesburg and the sending of a 
deputation to Pretoria to protest against the failure of the Act" to allow Africans 
freehold property in urban areas; the idea was dropped, though, since he was 
unable to obtain support from his fellow African members of the Johannesburg Joint 
Council. 74 The inclination of the co-opted elements, of the African petty 
bourgeoisie was to continue to work through segregationist structures, and to hope 
that some pressure for change could be exerted through the Joint Councils. 
In June 1923, therefore, when the Joint Council in Johannesburg discussed 
the Urban Areas Act, the pre-ssure for some sort of "liberalisation" of the freehold 
tenure measures focused on the leasehold regulations that were to be published-under 
the Act. Howard Pim, as chairman of the Council., urged that leases should be 
standardised and stated that he had pressed this point in discussions with both Alex 
Roberts and General Smuts. The African members of the Council proceeded to 
recognise the effective withdrawal of the ownership clauses from the Act but hoped 
75 
that leasehold standardisation would be such as "to make them as good as freehold". 
This standardisation was, the Joint Council was able to report at the end of the year, 
effected so that to all intents and purposes the distinction between leasehold and free- 
hold had been nullified. 
76 
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The move back to the reserves: 
However, the political efficacy of urban segregation in the years after 
1923 ensured that, even while opposing the more rigid applications of the job colour 
bar and the exclusion of Africans even from semi-skilled positions - liberals in 
South Africa after 1924 were forced even more to confront the issue of the rural 
reserves as the basis of social control. "All thinking natives must admit", Selby 
Msimang wrote, "that we cannot any longer adopt the I ine of campaign in 1914 
because segregation is no longer a theory but a fact. We must therefore find a 
means of adapting ourselves to it and get our people to make fresh resolutions about 
1177 accepting the inevitable in a spirit that will make segregation a blessing in disguise. 
Over the following decade the process of adaptation to government, pol icy on these 
lines by the African political and educational elite was ably assisted by white liberal 
organisations and the process of incorporating the fundamentals of the Stallardism 
within liberal ideology ensured that a review of urban segregation would be put off. 
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Chapter Six 
The Joint Councils and the extension of co-optation 
The failure of white liberals to take up a sustained interest in the issue of 
urbanisation in the 1920s did not preclude a widening of the avenues of social 
advancement to sections of the African petty bourgeoisie and the development of 
an effective strategy of social control through political co-optation. In so far 
as the industrial militancy shown in the aftermath of the first world war had failed 
to prevent the emergence of a policy of urban segregation, African political leader- 
ship had by 1924 become isolated from the groundswell of African popular opinion. 
Deprived of a popular base, which - if it got involved in any mass activity at all 
by the mid-1 920s - tended to drift towards the 1. C. U. of Clements Kadal ie, 
some key African spokesmen became the effective articulators of a white liberal 
ideology. Most prominent of these were Victor Selope Thema, who wrote regularly 
for the Chamber of Mines newspaper Umtefeli wa Bantu and later became editor of 
The Bantu World in the 1930s, and Selby Msimang, one of the founder members of 
the A.. N. C. in 1912 and who, after a period spent establishing branches of the 
1. C. U. in the Orange Free State in the early 1920s and imprisonment in Port 
EI izabeth ,2 become another regular columnist for Umteteli and a prominent African 
member of the Johannesburg Joint Council. In addition, a considerable number 
of other African political leaders got drawn in to political channels controlled by 
the white liberals, though a prominent minority, led by the former editorial group 
of the Garveyist paper Abantu Batho, and including such figures as D. S. Letanka 
3 
and T. D. Mwe Ii Skota , refused an y su ch col 
labora ti on , 
The basis for the white liberals' success rested to a considerable degree on 
the transformed nature of the class conflict in the South African social formation in 
the wake of the 1920 and 1922 mine strikes. Some measure of political acquiescence 
by the defeated African political intelligentsia would probably have accrued in any 
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case by the middle-1920s since the A. N. C. suffered a sharp decline in support 
following its dismal failure in the 1919 pass campaign. The A. N. C. leadership's 
fright during the course of that campaign, as we saw in Chapter Five, especially 
as its inability to keep control over it, ensured that some form of collaboration 
with, reform-orientated institutions was more or less inevitable. The strong 
influences of mission education which was supplemented in some cases by attendance 
at Lovedale under the Reverend James Henderson 
4 
aided this general predisposition 
to seek "solutions through the proper channels" so that it was not especially difficult 
to win over some individuals even without any formal organisation such as the Joint 
Coun ci1. Saul Msane, for instance, had come out in support of the Chamber of 
Mines during the 1918 African sanitary workers strike and issued a pamphlet in 
SeSotho calling on the workers to go back. 
5 But, this partial and eclectic form 
of co-optation remained diffuse until it was crystallised through more formal systems 
of organisation and it was precisely this need which the Joint Council movement in 
the 1920s was founded to serve. The actual size of the African petty bourgeoisie 
by the early 1920s indicated that merely local welfare organisations would be inade- 
quate to cope with the growing mobility of African political, religious and cultural 
leaders: there were an estimated 9,756 African teachers, ministers, chiefs and 
headmen in 1921 and a further 1 634 interpreters and clerks 
6 
and the national scope 
of their work - aided by the growing nationalist ideology of the A. N. C. itself - 
meant that a concomitant national co-optive network had to be created if the 
competing ideological influences from both Garveyism and marxism from the 
emergent South African Communist Party, were to be neutralised. 
Furthermore, South African welfare organisations in the period before 
1918-20sti II tended overwhe I ming Iy to reflect the missionary tradition of Christian 
proselytisation and saving heathen souls with only a minimal emphasis upon active 
material assistance to the emerging working class in South Africa's towns and cities. 
While there was some selective welfare work on the Rand such as that of the Community 
of the Resurrection, which organised a hostel for African women * 
on the Rand as early 
as 1908 in Doornfontein district, 
7 for the most part church activity in the period before 
the first world war tended to steer clear of any comprehensive programme of economic 
17 S" 
and social reform. Deprived, therefore, of any wider systematic ideology of 
reform which recognised that political co-optation of African political leadership 
depended to some extent upon reform in the living conditions in the communities 
from which they sprang, white welfare organisations left themselves open to the 
continuous charge of pursuing "rescue work" that merely shut the ga te after the 
horse has bolted. 
This inadequacy in missionary work tended to become exposed and debated 
during the course of the municipal reform campaign which was discussed in the last 
chapter. Frederick Bridgman, especially, acted as a significant catalyst for a 
new-approach that imbibed some of the ideas previously developed in America among 
reform groups during the Progressive era. Reflecting, in particular, the growing 
urban orientation of this radicalism when America was still dominated by the agrarian 
myth of an individualistic yeomanry, Bridgman urged social reform in South Africa in 
language reminiscent of such contemporaries as Jana Addams. Johannesburg, he 
recognised soon after coming to the Rand was, in 1913, "the very pivot upon which 
the future of the native in South Africa swings". 
8 
But it was "useless" to expand 
missionary work on the Rand "unless the missionary can in some way or other find the 
means with which to multiply himself" 
9 
and this involved confronting the diversity of 
different "problems" that existed there. This meant moving the Christian mission 
effort in the direction of seeking out those, such as the slum-dwellers in Doornfontein 
. or the domestic servants in the white suburbs, who had been hitherto untouched by 
the missions based on the mines. Indeed, faced with diminishing returns from 
missionary attempts at proselytisation on the mines where a significant number of 
ethnically-based black independent churches (frequently Zionist as the earlier 
Ethiopian phase declined) challenged conventional missionary hegemony, Bridgman 
looked increasingly towards the suburbs for new Christian converts. 
10 
Here ., he 
recognised that the more conventional mechanisms of social control through the 
compound or location system did not so easily apply, and that a strong welfare 
component was necessary, possibly on lines similar to the American YMCA. 
II 
This 
idea developed during the course of the first world war such that Bridgman found 
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himself in opposition to most of the conventional assumptions behind missionary work 
up to that time. "How far", he asked in report for 1917, "are our churches 
meeting. the criterion of the judgment by extending the helping hand to the hungry, 
the thirsty, the strange, the naked, the sick and the imprisoned? " What was the 
church to do, he asked, to offset the "snares" of the "gleaming allurements -of novel 
city life" for the young African men with "superabundent animal energy" who were 
separated from the traditional restraints of "home" and "tribe",? 
12 
Thus, in the 
manner of Jane Addams's emphasis upon the role of recreational pursuits in growing 
urban settlements, 
13 
Bridgman emphasised the need for the church to "provide 
healthful, uplifting recreation" through such activities as Sunday dances for the "raw 
native", together with sports such as football, cricket and tennis and concerts. 
"Africa is moving", he concluded, "while the church apparently clings to the ancient 
heresy of destiny working between the sacred and secular, a survival of the medieval 
14 
fallacy of saving souls while ignoring the body in which the soul lives". 
By the end of the first world war, Bridgman had moved the missionary ideal 
in urban centres like the Witwatersrand from the more conventional and piecemeal 
approach based on "rescue work" to a more integrated perspective that recognised the 
need for an educational and cultural programme to wean away the rising class of 
militant African'leaders on the Rand from radical political ideologies. The real- 
isation for this, in great part, can be seen as probably stemming from the secession 
by a group of Natal Africans in Doornfontein from the American Board Mission who 
had been radical ised by the impact of the 1913 Natives Land Act and the debate on 
socialism on the Rand through such organisations as the International Workers of 
Africa. 15 Bridgman noted in particular from this issue that it was the "more 
educated, sophisticated" of the Natal Africans who led the secession while "the 
unsophisticated 'mine- boys' have been loyal to us almost to the last man". 
16 This 
observation was further compounded by the 1919 passive resistance campaign against 
posses instigated by the A. N. C. when Bridgman anxiously recorded that "the temper 
of the- native radicals is fast becoming more and more violent ano the number of 
radicals is increas. ing rapidly". With the outbreak of strikes and demonstrations 
by 
/77 
the African mass in Johannesburg "the feeling towards the ruling class", Bridgman 
wrote, "is more hostile and more widely bitter than before". Furthermore: 
Everything pertaining to the white man, everything foreign, 
is now being derided and held up to scorn and hatred by the 
native radicals. Christianity is being decreed as an 
importation, an instrument for keeping the blacks in subjection 
by appealing to, religion. Within the past few weeks a move- 
ment is afoot to launch a boycott of matters religious. No 
church, no membership card, no marriage certificate, which has 
anything to do with a white missionary is to be recognised or 
countenanced in any way. So far as I can see we are I iving 
in days in Johannesburg at least analogous to the days preceding 
the Boxer uprising in China. If matters keep on with the 
present trend and at the present rate, there are bound to come 
terrible days in South Africa. 17 
The short-lived nature of the pass campaign, however, and some renewed 
attempts at welfare work in the post-war period, tempered Bridgman's pessimism with 
some long-run hopes for a more co-ordinated approach by religious and welfare bodies 
on the Rand. Already, in 1918, he had been joined by a fellow ABM missionary 
Ray Phillips who soon proved ambitious to make use of newer mechanisms by which to 
win over at least part of the radical African intelligentsia: in the following years 
Phillips's use of film shows over a wide area of the Witwatersrand at both mine 
compounds as well as missionary and welfare societies evidenced a possible new path 
18 by which to modernise the channels of influence by white liberals. In addition, 
the Community of the Resurrection's work in helping to "save" single African women 
on the Rand became supplemented by a Helping Hand Club for Native Girls organised 
by Bridgman and his wife in 1919 in Hans Street, Fairview and which sought to "rescue" 
female African domestic servants who "as a class" were "bold, impudent and of loose 
I character". 
19 
By this time, Bridgman was aware that individual missionary work 
alone was insufficient in scope to cover the activities and interests of the African 
intelligentsia who- were "leading a life so largely estranged from church interests" and 
20 
who showed suspicion and aloofness" towards missionary endeavours. , The 
establishment by Ray Phillips and his wife of playgrounds that formed key links between 
schools and the church was one possible path, indicating that "t he natives will respond 
1711 
in large numbers to social endeavour when applied in an intelligent,, tactful., 
brotherly way". But the missionaries could not cover the whole sphere of human 
activities on the Witwatersrand and could only demonstrate the value of such 
selective effort. What was needed, Bridgman concluded, were efforts "to 
stimulate others to enter the social service field". 
21 
The activities ofthe Bridgmans, Ray Phillips and the American Board 
Mission on the Rand before 1920, therefore, formed a crucial backdrop to the 
pressure for a more co-ordinated approach via the Joint Councils. 
22 
Further 
bodies were in the process of expansion as the new University of the Witwatersrand 
got off the ground in 1919. J. D. Rheinnalt-Jones., who at this time was editor of 
the journal The South African Quarterly and an official of the Witwatersrand Council 
23 
of Education got drawn into inter-racial activities through the founding of the 
Eclectic Club to replace the defunct Johannesburg Native Welfare Society. This 
stimulated Ray Phillips, who was already influenced by the Native Affairs Reform 
Association in Durban, to found a literary and debating society, though its title 
The Gamma Sigma Club after the Greek dictum "know thyself" suggested a parallel 
with similarly-named bodies in the United States. 
24 
Contact in bodies such as 
these with "keen-witted native leaders at their wits' end in Johannesburg, ready to 
1125 try anything convinced many white liberals of the value of political discussion 
groups where figures such as R. V. Selope Thema, Selby Msimang, Horatio Mbelle 
and Benjamin Phooko cou'ld involve themselves in discussions with white missionaries, 
educationalists, welfare workers and advocates. Though the discussions were described 
as "often hea ted " 
26 
the ideological complexion of the debate indicated that the grounds- 
well for "interracial cooperation" was laid through the dissemination of a liberal 
positivism that emphasised the role of individual rights and liberties at the expense of 
nationalist and group identities. The advocate 0. D. Schreiner, for instance, as 
a typical example of a newer generation of white liberals who grew out of the emerging 
lega-I requirements of the post-war mining and industrial boom, acted as a powerful 
influence on Selby Msimang's thinking: 
Mr. Justice 0. D. Schreiner gave us a lecture (at the Eclectic 
I I&I 
Club) I have never been able to forget. This was the time 
when we were all developing real hatred for a white person. 
In other words, Black Nationalism. We were already 
accusing ministers of religion of hypocrisy of holding the 
bible in one hand while on the other they helped to confiscate 
the land. Mr. Schreiner disillusioned me completely. I 
learnt of one that might not visit the wrongs of one person to 
the whole race of natives to which he belongs. 27 
This pattern was not followed completely throughout the African political 
class at this time, for a' radical group of nationalists continued to campaign on 
Garveyist lines through the A. N. C. paper Abantu Batho, and Victor Selope Thema, 
until at least February 1920, was in the vanguard of this group. During his stay 
in Britain before his return to South Africa in 1919, Selope Thema reported that he 
had "come in contact with men and women of all nationalities and colours who are 
pledged to free the world from the clutches of the economic vultures of capitalism". 
28 
Presaging, therefore, a very different model of "inter-racial contact" to what the 
white liberals in South Africa had in mind, Selope Thema pointed out, on the basis 
of a post-war railway strike in Britain, that "the popular cry of the working classes 
is 'direct action' " and that "the waters of international revolution are rising and the 
flood of proletarism (sic) is threatening to sweep away capitalism and militarism and 
establish the real permanent peace of the world". 
29 
But in the wake of the 1920 mine strike by African workers a series of 
developments ensued designed to neutralise the faction centred around jAbantu Batho 
and strengthen structures of co-optation. The African press as a whole had tended 
to be treated with a certain amount of disdain by the white liberals and only. a year 
previously the Reverend James Henderson, in a talk at the Johannesburg YMCA, had 
criticised the failure of the black press in South Africa to attain the some degree of 
freedom and knowledge as overseas. 
30 The precedent of the mine strike made the 
establishment of a white controlled paper directed at the African intelligentsia even 
more pressing and the same year the Native Recruiting Corporation established 
31 
Umteteli wa Bantu in order "to voice sound native opinion in the country". The 
key figures instrumental in this were H. M. Taberer of the N. R. C. and Ray Phillips, 
who earned the long lasting dislike of the African radicals for his attempts to control 
Ito 
African thought. 
32 
Theeffect of Umteteli's establishment was to hasten the 
demise of the shaky Abantu Botha which continued to be printed on the outmoded 
and worn printing presses that had first been used when the paper was first established 
in 1912 with assistance from the Swazi Queen Regent. The printing workers on the 
paper were enticed away by higher wages on Umteteli and, though the paper struggled 
on through the 1920s to finally die during the depression, it had lost the original 
influence it had enjoyed in shaping African political thinking on the Rand and else- 
where in South Africa. 
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The establishment of Umteteli in 1920 was further complemented by moves 
to create the Bantu Men's Social Centre as a means of fulfilling Bridgman's ideal of 
establishing recreational facilities for the growing African population on the Rand. 
The scope of the Centre was for the mo . st part confined to the African petty bourgeoisie 
with the overall control over policy retained by a sub-committee that included a number 
of prominent white liberals. Howard Pim, for instance,, was Secretary, while Ray 
Phillips was Organising Secretary; other committee members included Walter Webber 
of the Chamber of Mines and Frederick Bridgman. The African role on the committee 
was confined to electing seven of the total of fifteen members and of the seven three 
had to be white. This relatively peripheral influence on the actual decision making 
in the Centre produced an initial wave of African hostility and Bridgman described the 
attitudes of some African leaders as "suspicious, jealous and offish". 
34 
Furthermore ,I 
the Centre was clearly dictated by the interests of the chief donors: the Chamber of 
Mines gave E3,000 for the establishment of the Centre which was estimated to total 
some E15,000 in all, while the Chamber of Commerce in Johannesburg also gave a 
35 donation. However, Bridgman's aim of making the Centre into a place where 
African men could find, "wholesome companionship, entertaining amusements and 
healthful recreation" 
36 began to achieve some fruit despite attempts at obstruction in 
1920 by the "reactionary element" who attempted to "discredit" the whole idea. 
37 
With the "more reasonable element" in African political leadership coming out in 
38 
support of the scheme, the Centre began to establish itself from the end of 1920 
and to play a significant role in the evolution of a western -educated urban black elite 
Is( 
during the 1 920s. While the exact influence that the BMSC's products played 
in African politics on the Witwatersrand and elsewhere in the inter-war period 
remains an area for more detailed historical analysis, it is possible to conclude 
that the Centre acted as one of the more crucial institutional underpinnings behind 
the move towards educational, cultural and political co-optation of the African 
petty bourgeoisie in the aftermath of the industrial struggles of 1918-20. By 1927, 
the Centre was reported as having a total membership of 365, though the actual 
numbers of Africans coming in contact with it was far larger because of the high 
rate of resignations and new memberships. In addition to such sporting facilities 
as volleyball, tennis, cricket and boxing, the Centre provided a series of educational 
classes for junior clerical work such as book-keeping, typewriting, English, arith- 
metic and elementary science. 
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The Gamma Sigma debating club was also con- 
tinued in the Centre and this may well'have been an important educational -forming 
experience for a future president of the A. N. C. as Dr. A. B. Xuma who came into 
contact,, through the Club, with such prominent white liberals as C. T. Loram, 
J. D. Rheinnalt-Jones and James Dexter Taylor. 
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The exact role of the Bantu Men's Social Centre in white liberal activities 
in the 1920s can be seen to change, however, as the objectives for "healthful 
recreation" in the urban context by Frederick Bridgman began to be transformed into 
a wider objective of territorial segregation as the decade advanced. This transition 
had, in some respects, been accomplished even before Bridgman's death in 1926 for 
in bringing other bodies into the welfare arena after 1920, other individuals began 
to play an important role in evolving liberal ideology. Apart from such figures as 
J. D. Rheinnalt-Jones and 0. D. Schreiner, undoubtedly Charles T. Loram from Natal 
was crucial in shifting the emphasis away from reform per se in the urban context 
towards defining welfare activities in the context of a policy of confining as far as 
possible the educational, social and political aspirations of the African petty 
bourgeoisie to the reserves. The Report of the Native Churches Commission in 1925 
was a landmark'in this respect for, with Loram as one of its members, the spectre of 
Ethiopianism was finally exorcised from official thinking at least in South Africa. 
African Church separatism was now seen as a process that was likely to continue and 
192 
should, the Commission argued, be given government recognition. Furthermore, 
the fissiparious tendencies within this separatism no longer represented the potential 
for a united Ethiopian ideology of "Africa for the Africans" as such writers as George 
Heaton Nicholls imagined, but rather the continuation of tribal ties into the 
industrial setting. "A feature in the separatist movement- which is disconcerting 
to the parent churches", Loram wrote on the Commission's findings, is the 
friendly and even cordial relationship which exists between the seceeding Natives 
and those who remain loyal to the parent Church. It shows clearly how racial or 
at least tribal considerations rank higher in the Native mind than church divisions, 
and how likely it is that the separatist movement will spread". 
41 
If Loram can be seen as taking over, in many respects, the role of one of 
chief ideologist of white liberalism in the 1920s from such figures as Bridgman and 
Howard Pim, this carried Bridgman's argument for co-optation of the African 
intelligentsia in 1904 a stage further. Initially, as we saw in Chapter Two, Bridgman 
had argued for a cautious policy towards Ethiopian church separatism in order to 
neutralise the possibility of a united Black movement rising in self defence against 
white-inspired "Black Peril" campaigns. 
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Now, however, in the aftermath of 
the 1920-1922 strike wave and the decline in the-political significance of independent 
church movements, the focus of attention for the South African state had clearly 
shifted to the educated African intelligentsia in the towns. Loram , as a member of 
the Native Affairs Commission at the time of his sitting on the Native Churches 
43 
Commission., was in a good position to understand governmental thinking on this, 
while his previous work for the Phelps-Stokes Commission on education in Africa 
gave him a good insight into contemporary colonial ideas on updating education in the 
African setting to fulfil the objectives of rural development. It was, indeed, as a 
consequence of the tour by the Phelps-Stokes Commission of South Africa in 1921 that 
the Joint Council movement was finally got off the ground and in the years ahead a 
more integrated approach to white welfare and philanthropic work in South Africa 
came to emphasise its coordination with the government's segregation policy and the 
defusing of African political aspirations through the control of tribal and local 
councils. 
191 
The Phelps-Stokes Commission and the formation of the Joint Councils: 
The internal trend in South Africa towards co-optation of African political 
leadership remained fragmentary by the start of 1921. The establishment of Umteteli., 
the founding of the Eclectic and Gamma Sigma Clubs and the development of the Bantu 
Men's Social Centre all remained partial solutions, each hindered by a good deal of 
African suspicion and political hostility. It was probably true that no white liberal 
in South Africa had sufficient personal charisma to rally African political leadership 
behind the idea of "inter-racial co-operation" and the possibility of demonstrating 
concrete examples of its success remained tenuous. There was the precedent of 
similar attempts in the American South, but apart from the small number of Africans 
who had been to America'for education.. this remained a very distant ideal to most 
Africans in South Africa at this time. Furthermore, despite the continuing general 
popularity of the Tuskegee ideal of Booker T. Washington and his successor after 1915, 
Robert R. Moton , it was no 
longer the case by 1920 that al I African opinion formers in 
South Africa accepted Washingtonism without question. Breaking to some extent with 
the previous adulation of Tuskegee by leaders like John Dube and Pixley Seme, 
S. M. Molema wrote in his book The Bantu Past and Present in 1920 of the ideas of 
W. E. B. Dubois. Taking up the ideal in Smuts's 1917 Savoy Speech of "independent 
self-governing institutions", Molema reflected the thinking of a section of the African 
intelligentsia in South Africa after the first world war in demanding that the process be 
taken to its logical conclusion and that "separation must be equal". 
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In addition, 
Molema articulated the more widely-felt despair in Europe in the values of Victorian 
liberalism after spending a period at the University of Edinburgh (together with the 
future A. N. C. president James Moroka) studying medicine. "British 
liberalism is 
offering nothing to the Bantu of South Africa", Molema wrote, "except such morbid 
creations and fancies as 'the Native problem"'. 
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In this context, it was probably essential for some new external influence to 
show itself in South Africa for any wider movement towards "inter-racial cooperation" 
to be a success. This influen, ce was duly provided by the Phelps-Stokes Commission 
s V& 
in the course of 1921 as the Director of The PhelPs7Stokes Fund, the Welshman 
Thomas Jesse Jones, and the Commission's African member, Dr. J. E. K. Aggrey 
from the British colony of the Gold Coast (Ghana), toured South Africa collecting 
information on African education. The tour was significant for the marrying of 
ideas on educational segregation developed by C. T. Loram, who helped to arrange 
the tour, in his book The Education of the South African Native published in 1917 
with those of Jesse Jones who was Director of the Research Department at the 
Hampton Institute in Virginia and lecturer in Sociology there. For Lora m, 
education for Africans should be directed towards the objective of resisting cultural 
assimilation with whites and - on the basis of his experience in such areas as 
reforming the curriculum at Amanzimtoti 
46 
_ should be geared towards industrial 
training in the reserves. For Jesse Jones, too, education for American negroes 
should be based on the principles of industrial training similar to those of Tuskegee 
which, in the Southern case, could be demonstrated to be economically successful 
by the use of comparative statistical analysis. 
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Both, therefore, defended an 
educational ideology based upon assumptions of racial differentiation and both 
essentially saw the value of education for blacks in the context of rural social control, 
despite the considerable growth in the United States during the first world war of 
extensive negro urbanisation. 
The especial significance of the Phelps-Stokes Commission, however, was 
its linking of the ideas on industrial training developed in such centres as Tuskegee 
and Hampton in America and Lovedale in South Africa with missionary and admini- 
strative concern in African colonies with problems of rural education. 
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This 
linkage was reflected by the inclusion of Aggrey on the Commission, for here was a 
shining propaganda example of the relevance, as far as the Phelps-Stokes Commission 
was concerned, of the Tuskegee ideology to colonial conditions. Aggrey had 
graduated from Livingstone College in North Carolina in 19.04 and had long been 
acquainted with Jesse Jones. After becoming Vice Principal in 1919 of the newly- 
established college at Achimota in the Gold Coast by the progressive British 
administration of Sir Gordan Guggisberg, Aggrey was a key political figure to use in 
Iss, 
demonstrating the possibilities of the Tuskegee. Furthermore, Aggrey's anglophilia 
served as an important means to dispel any doubts, as reflected for instance by writers 
like S. M. Molema, in the values of British liberalism, which could now be shown to 
be shown to be the essential basis behind the objectives of African self-help and self- 
reliance. In the course of the South African tour, Aggrey went out of his way to 
inf I uen cp the thinking of the African intelligentsia and participated in no less than 
120 meetings with African students and religious and political leaders. Appea I ing 
to "British justice" which was "being felt now more than ever before because of the 
war and because of the restlessness", Aggrey was able to exploit politically the 
divisions that had emerged by 1921 in Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement 
Association through corruption and the disaster of the Black Star Shipping Line. 
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This proved especially effective in such student centres as Lovedale and Aggrey was able 
to appeal to his African origins in his objective of weakening Garveyit6 sympathies in a 
manner that white missionaries, such as Father Huss of Marriannhill engaged in a 
50 
similar task, were unable to do. "What we need is some great messiah of the 
Anglo-Saxon race to rise up and give fair play and reciprocity", Aggrey declared at 
one meeting. "I have dedicated my life to see that we work for cooperation. I 
pray that before long South Africa will be the best place on earth for white and black; 
so that Great Britain will lead the whole world". 
51 At the same time, reflecting 
the gradualist basis of this approach, Aggrey argued that "We Africans must, like 
infants, learn to stand before we can walk and walk before we can run". 
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Aggrey's appeal clearly lay in his ability to demonstrate to sections of the 
African intelligentsia the political advantages of working through institutions that 
afforded direct contact with white liberals and governmental, academic and commission 
representatives.. There was an air of glamour about his own career that probably 
appealed to even radical African political leaders and the possibilities of being able 
to influence government and "white" thinking. R. V. Selope Thema, for instance, 
was especially impressed by Aggrey's description of the inter-racial bodies in the 
American South which demonstrated the possibility, so Aggrey argued, of altering 
ingrained political attitudes. 
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Furthermore, Aggrey's stress 
. on Africans having 
11(o 
the right to join the proposed Joint Councils as opposed to the previous system of 
selective invitation to the old Native Welfare Associations gave the Joint Council 
idea a seemingly radical potential for many African leaders, the political possi- 
bilities by 1921 had already become somewhat narrowed as the decline in popular 
upsurges left the scope of "agitator" politics considerably diminished. The 
success of political agitation, as Michael Twaddle has pointed out, depends upon 
a continual threshold of political credibility 
54 
_ this had been the case in the 
wake of rising prices, the decline of the reserve economies and the dissemination 
of radical ideologies in the course of the first world war. On the other hand, 
short of the creation of a fully fledged political movement, "agitationol per se does 
not offer the basis for a political career for such aspirant politicians who engage in 
it, and there is the consequential risk of becoming a specialist in a narrowly defined 
political field. Thus political co-optation occurs when institutions open up the 
opportunity for upward career mobility, introducing what Morris-Jones describes as 
"nodal points or moments of crucial choice in the course of a career" when the less 
adaptab le pol iti cians tend to get eI im inated. 
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In this respect, the establishment 
of the Johannesburg Joint Council did offer some such avenues of mobility, though 
on a considerably reduced scale to what many African leaders had hoped. Professor 
D. D. T. Jabavu had hoped for African membership on the Native Affairs Commission 
in 1920 and there had been hopes for the local councils established under the Native 
Affairs Act considerably revamping the powers of the Glen Grey councils and extending 
them to the rest of the Un ion. In the initial stages of optimism in 1921, the Joint 
Councils were probably seen by many African leaders to complement this process of 
"representation", though in later years they be. came the last bastions in a general 
process of declining political influence by the time of the legislation of 1936. In 
terms of information and factual discussion, the Joint Councils clearly provided 
invaluable assistance to many African leaders whose education had often ill-equipped 
them to scrutinise complex government legislation. It was precisely in this sense 
of growing political adaptability that Selby Msimang later recorded that the Joint 
Council provided much needed help on such measures as the 1923 Natives (Urban 
Areas) Bil 1. "For the first few months", Msimang recalled, "the whole thing was 
Is? 
in the form of a test. Africans felt that they could not put all their confidence 
in the whites, they had got to show in 
, 
some way their sincerity". With the 
introduction of the Urban Areas Bill the white members of the Joint Council were 
provided with an opportunity of demonstrating their interest in providing concrete 
assistance and "they took the trouble to explain the provisions of the Bill and went 
through it clause by clause". 
56 As a consequence, when the Native Affairs 
Commission visited Bloemfontein to discuss the Bill, Msimang said that "the notes 
we had made through our discussions in the Joint Council assisted us greatly. I 
was able to put across the various ideas that came across in our discussions in the 
Joint Council". 
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But the other side of this process was a strong decline in 
political radicalism for, even though Msimang wanted to organise a large demon- 
stration "of all the people from Randfontein to Springs" to protest against the Urban 
Areas Bill and march to Pretoria, he was unable to carry his fellow African members 
of the Joint Council on it. 
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By this time, the Joint Council had been able to 
institutional ise, itself sufficiently to ensure that its African members eschewed for the 
most part popularly-based politics. 
The political co-optation centred in the Joint Council in Johannesburg, 
however, was not all-embracing. After an initial attendance by the Native Mine 
Clerks Association and the Native National Congress, who were each able to elect 
representatives onto the committee of thirty members, external pressures soon enforced 
their withdrawal. In the case of the Mine Clerks, the Chamber of Mines sought its 
separation from Joint Council activities through fear of its possible radicalisation. 
As in the case of Kimberley, where De Beers established its own structures of internal 
co-optation with the local African petty bourgeoisie through its support for the 
Brotherhood Movement and the Lyndhurst Road Native Institute., 
59 
the Chamber on 
the Witwatersrand feared outside participation in its own system of rewards and 
favours that buttressed socia I control. In the aftermath of the 1920 African mine 
strike, this attitude was probably well reflected in one memorandum of the Native 
Recruiting Corporation which argued that: 
The native has an inbred respect for his superiors and will 
quickly recognise and appreciate the justice granted to the 
/it 
more skilled of his class and will look to these men to guide 
him rather than the highly educated native who is fast 
becoming more and more under the influence of undesirable 
Whites who will only use the natives as a means to attain 
their own mischievous ends. 60 
This distinction between the "more skilled" Africans on the mines and the 
"highly educated native" probably guided the Chamber's policy. In the case of 
the former group, the selective avenues which the Chamber proposed to open up on 
the mines after the 1920 African mine strike could effectively act as a dampener on 
any latent political radicalism. In the case of the latter group,, the issue was 
seen as essentially a non-mining one and in the province of such institutions as the 
Bantu Men's Social Centre, the Joint Councils and literary and debating societies. 
The proneness of this group to radical political ideologies, as represented by the 
Abantu Batho faction in the Native National Congress, made it an object of 
continual Chamber mistrust and it was partly for this reason that the N. R. C. had 
been instrumental in establishing Umteteli in 1920. Thus, it was not surprising 
that when the Native Mine Clerks under their leader Allison Champion sought to 
introduce a discussion on African wages at thqý second meeting of the Joint Council 
in June 1921 that the Chamber soughtto bring the association to an end. The 
following year the Chamber withdrew recognition from the Association in the light 
of the 1922 Rand strike by white mine workers and the Association had, as a con- 
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sequence,, to withdraw from the Council in October 1922. 
This withdrawal by the most prominent association of clerical and white 
collar workers on the Witwatersrand, whom Charles van Onselen has designated 
"collaborators" in the mining industry, 
62 left the Joint Council's African component 
very much dominated by the more conservative sections of the African petty bourgeoisie 
who had to some extent no real alternative avenues of political advancement once they 
had been deprived of a mass. following. It was not surprising therefore that the Mine 
Clerks withdrawal was followed by the formal disassociation by the radical A. N. C. 
leadership centred around Abantu Batho. Always distrustful Qf the Council, th .e 
radical group led by D. S. Letanka, C. S. Mabaso, L. J. Mvabaza and 
T. D. Mweli 
1fq 
Skota attacked what they alleged was Joint Council interference in A. N. C. 
politics and forced Victor Selope Thema to give up his post as Provincial 
Secretary of the A. N. C. in the Transvaal. 
63 Aided by the development of 
Kadal ie's 1. C. U. on the Witwatersrand, the A. N. C. refused throughout the 
early 1920s any collaboration with the Joint Council and boycotted such 
campaigns as that opposing the introduction of night passes for African women 
in 1925. The isolation that produced for the African ' 
followers of the Joint 
Council was evidenced in 1924 when Selby Msimang got the Council to establish 
a special sub-committee to organise publicity for the Council which he said was 
only vaguely known about by the Africans living on the Rand. 
64 Umteteli 
as a Chamber of Mines-backed paper continued to give the Joint Council unstinting 
support throughout the 1902s claiming that "the chief hope of the Native People 
lies in such inter-racial cooperation as that which has been begun by the Johannes- 
burg Joint Council". Its protestation, however,, that it was "certain that the 
movement will spread" and that "the government will sooner or later be compelled 
to give it recognition" 
65 began to look increasingly implausible as the 1920s 
progressed. 
The Joint Council, however, did act as an important channel by which 
some African organisations on the Rand were able to obtain white liberal support 
on specific issues. A good example of this was the "night passes" issue when 
the Council was significantly pressured by Mrs. Charlotte Maxeke and the Bantu 
Women's League. By the 1920s, Mrs. Maxeke had ended her association With 
the A. M. E. School in the Northern Transvaal which she had established with the 
assistance of Chief Dalindyebo 
66 
and had moved to Johannesburg where she had 
become involved in -church work, and as chaplain to four women's prisons. 
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As a prominent African member of the Joint Council she had significantly opposed 
Champion's attempt to get the wages issue discussed in June 1921 and was clearly 
anxious to maintain the support of such, prominent white liberals on the Council as 
Ray Phillips and Howard Pim. These connections proved useful in 1925, when 
lqo 
the Pact Government proposed to introduce night posses for African women. 
Ray Phillips took the lead in the lobbying of the government on the matter, care- 
fully pointing out in a letter to General Hertzog on January 18th that "we would 
deplore any action on the part of the Natives which would lead to any increase of 
anti-wh 
. 
ite feeling on their part". 
68 
The response from Hertzog indicated the 
government's willingness to accede to the Joint Council Is request for the holding 
in abeyance of the issue, provided that the Joint Council itself agreed to act as 
an informal policeman for the government by placing before it "any effective and 
acceptable alternative scheme of solution of the problem". 
69 
Ray Phillips then 
sought to mobil ise a campaign to change the government's policy and reported on 
February 9th that "energetic efforts" had been made to secure the cooperation of 
70 the African National Congress in the calling of a Joint Conference on the issue. 
In the event, the A. N. C. refused any such collaboration and, though individual 
members of the A. N. C. attended the conference which was held on the two separate 
days of February 14th and March 7th, no formal support from the A. N. C. was 
obtained by the Joint Council on the issue. Instead, the Joint Council had to be 
content with the support of the essentially conservative Africans organisations on 
the Rand such as the Native Ministers Association, the Native Mine Clerks Association., 
the Native Teachers Association and the Bantu Women's League. Even so, the 
meetings failed to reach agreement on the issue of whether African women should be 
made to secure parental or magisterial, assent before travelling to an urban area, 
with both Selby Msimang and Allison Champion opposed to the whole idea. 
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Though the Joint Council won the admiration of some leaders of African opinion 
such as Sol Plaatie for "its definite stand and active protest" over women's night 
passes, 
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the ambiguity of the Joi-nt Council's strategy and its failure to obtain 
A. N. C. support indicated its only partial political support from the African petty 
bourgeoisie. 
Indeed, by the middle 1920s the Joint Council's somewhat unreliable 
support from the African political and educational elite reflected in many ways the 
contradictions engendered by the Government's segregation policy. As the 1923 
/11 
Natives (Urban Areas) Act had indicated, the main place of abode for Africans 
was -in the rural areas and the restrictions on African property holding in urban 
areas indicated the problem an urban petty bourgeois class faced in getting 
itself established. 
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Even the two most prominent African members of the 
Joint Council in Johannesburg, Selby Msimang and Victor Selope Thema, were 
unable to overcome these hindrances for both had only flimsy economic roots 
in the city in the 1920s. 
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Though they both wrote regular articles for 
Umtetel ir attempts at forming businesses were haphazard and when Msimang 
eventually gave up the Secretaryship of the Joint Council and formed a general 
agency business with Selope Thema to collect rents for the property owners in 
Alexandriaand Sophiatown, the effort proved unsuccessful. After working as 
a clerk to pay off debts of some E80, Msimang found a much more promising 
offer in the management of three farms owned by a land syndicate at Driefontein, 
near Ladysmith, in his native Natal. 
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The problems confronting Msimang and 
Selope Thema in establishing urban businesses almost personify the position of the 
African petty bourgeoisie at. this time and indicated why so many members of the 
African political elite were willing, in the final analysis, to accommodate them- 
selves to governmental policy, and take advantage of territorial segregation to 
acquire rural landholdings. "It seems to me", Msimang wrote, "that if we 
allow things to drift as they do we shall not only delay the final settlement of 
the Native areas for another ten or twenty years but we may afford an opportunity 
to those whose ambition it is to oust us out of the land altogether and to convert 
the existing recommended areas into white settlements or cotton growing farms for 
11 76 poor whites under state or company patronage . There was a tendency, 
therefore, for. Africcn members to fall in with the general trend of segregationist 
thinking in the Joint Councils in the 1920s, belying the idea that they acted as 
significant forces on liberal opinion in the direction of assimilation. 
77 W. M. 
Macmillan in 1923, for instance., suggested that African leaders accept the 
proposal for land allocations in the bushveld areas, since there was the potential 
for growing cotton there 
78 
and later the same year Msimang echoed this by arguing 
III 
that "we should try to make a good job out of a bad one in the hope that if the 
recommended land be not enough after they have been occupied we shall have 
the excuse of asking for more land. Let us take that which is given to us and 
then ask for more". 
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Faced, therefore, with this general structural weakness in the urban 
African petty bourgeoisie, the Joint Council was forced to turn increasingly to 
rural areas for African political support. This policy was shaped too to a 
considerable degree by the increasingly segregationist turn of "liberal" thinking 
in the wake of the 1923 Urban Areas Act, the victory of the Pact in 1924 and 
the publication of the four bills in 1926. As an editorial in The South African 
Outlook in February 1924 summarised the position: 
So far as we can see the safe course is along the line of 
dual.. or parallel development, where thatis still 
practicable at the stage we have already reached. 
Save and except on the Rand, the large concentrations 
of Natives are still in the reserves and locations. But 
only a voluntary segregation is now possible, and to 
attain that, it must be made attractive. If white 
employers would make up their minds to employ whites, 
and set for their employees a high standard of efficiency, 
the hope would dawn for a white South Africa. 80 
Within this context, the pressure was exerted on the Joirit Councils until 
the end of the I 920s to focus on rural African leadership. This was aided after 
1926 by the growing influence of C. T. Loram on Joint Council policy as the 
Native 
Affairs Commission declined in its ability to influence government th, inking. 
Loram, together with Rheinnalt-Jones had been one of the driving forces behind 
the establishment of the Joint Council in Johannesburg in 1921, though 
his views 
were in a markedly more segregationist direction than many of 
his liberal colleagues. 
As chairman of a Commission of Enquiry into the Training of 
Natives in Medicine 
and Public Health, Loram championed the idea of welfare worlý and the training of 
African doctors being primarily focused in rural areas. Thus, it was not surprising 
03 
that., when A. B. Xuma returned in 1927 from America as a qualified medical 
practitioner, Loram., together with H. M. Taberer, advised the wife of the late 
F. B. Bridgman not to appoint Xuma as superintendent of the newly-opened 
Bridgman Memorial Hospital for Africans on the grounds that he would be better 
employed among "his own people" in the reserves. 
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Xuma did join the 
Johannesburg Joint Council the following year, 1928, but it is clear that his 
interest together with a number of other African political leaders based in urban 
areas, to collaborate with white liberal bodies did not substantially develop until 
after the formation of the South African Institute of Race Relations in 1929.82 
By this time, the general direction of liberal ideology in South Africa had been 
to move to an "apolitical" basis with welfare work by the Joint Councils and 
other welfare bodies serving as the social and economic underpinning of co- 
optation of the African petty bourgeoisie, while separate political accommodation 
occurred with the state on segregation to remove African voters in the Cape from 
the common roll. This strategy was to develop in the years after the publication 
of the four native bills in 1926. 
The Joint Councils and the "fight" to defend the Cape franchise 
The publication of Hertzog's four native bills in 1926, with the implicit 
threat behind them of the eventual destruction of the common franchise in the 
Cape, led to a debate in liberal circles on the exact "political" role the Joint 
Councils should take. It was clear that the imprint on the Joint Councils since 
their inception had been that of Loram, who had developed an approach model. led 
on the precedent of inter-racial bodies in the American South. The Tuskegee 
ideal of avoiding "political" involvement as far as possible and concentrating on 
relatively peripheral issues and welfare work was enhanced in Loram's mind by the 
relatively delicate position held by the Joint Councils in South African politics. 
With funds from the Carnegie Corporation in the United States, the Councils 
needed to keep a "respectable" image if they were to continue to be supported by 
their American benefactors, whilst at the same time avoid rousing political hostility 
/94 
inside South Africa due to their overseas connections. 
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Furthermore, from 
at least 1923 onwards, Loram became increasingly influenced by what he saw as 
the more significant political potential of the Dutch Reformed Churches, which 
he considered could do the job of political lobbying far more effectively than 
the English-speaking liberal bodies. This conception was originally stimulated 
by a conference in 1923 held under the auspices of the Federal Council of the 
Dutch Reformed Churches in Johannesburg, where as number of papers, including 
one by Edgar Brookes, had been given on the need to develop welfare politices 
with in an overall policy of territorial segregation. The conference impressed 
Loram as "the largest and most important unofficial conference on Native Affairs 
ever held in South Africa" 
84 
and it was undoubtedly the legacy of this which led 
Loram, after the victory of the Pact in the 1924 election, to advocate a low 
profile strategy to the Joint Councils, leaving the Dutch Reformed Churches in 
the vanguard of actual political pressuring on a government that now had a 
distinctly Afrikaner complexion. ' 
By 1926, therefore, Loram came out distinctly in opposition to any schemes 
for a tightening up of the national organisation of the Joint Councils and the creation 
for a federal contro-Iling body since this would be likely to lead to pressures for more 
direct political involvement. As he wrote to Rheinnalt-Jones: 
American experience would keep the joint Councils aloof 
from national issues. If the JC is bound to a votes for 
Blacks policy for example it will find it harder to get the 
Blacks in Pretoria a swimming bath. Without achieving 
practical local reform the JCs will fade away. Keep your 
big political organization separate tho the personnel may be 
the same in both cases ... You will see that I 
have 
departed from my view of a National Joint Council. I see 
that the JCs; to be effective must be local and non political. 
Let the Dutch Reformed call the political meetings ... 
In addition, he added a sting in the tail by threatening Jones's own position 
if he did not conform to this idea: "don't you get associated with the political 
issues", he wrote, "otherwise we shall not be able to use you as you deserved. to 
/Is- 
be 11 , 
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Thus, hiding behind the ostensibly "delicate" position of the Joint 
Councils, 86 Loram from 1926 onwards sought to steer the Joint Councils as far 
away as possible from any direct political involvement, especially on such issues 
as the Cape African franchise, which he himself only came out and openly 
championed after he had reached the safe vantage point of Yale in 1930.87 But 
this effective emasculation of much of the original liberal thinking which had been 
carried into the Joint Councils by a number of their supporters at their inception 
led to growing threats of a political wrangle. 
While Loram was able to maintain a certain body of support behind his 
apolitical conception from the Joint Councils in the Transvaal., where the Cape 
franchise issue especially had less immediate political impact, it was clear that 
a number of Cape members came increasingly to object to what they perceived as 
the abandonment of the principles of the Cape liberal tradition. Loram himself 
made some attempts to offset this influence in the Cape by himself forming 
"Bantu Study Circles" at the University of Cape Town, 
88 but this failed to stop 
a Cape liberal like Saul Solomon from arguing in 1926 that "analys. is proves that 
the substitute for the Cape franchise is a sham and a farce" and putting pressure 
on the Joint Council to openly state in its memorandum In Defence of the Cape 
Franchise the essential Cape liberal ideal of "equal rights for everybody irre- 
spective of race or colour". 
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Such a clear difference proved significant 
in the case of the Johannesburg Joint Council for a number of members were by 
no means so vocal in their opposition to the Government's segregation policy. 
In the case of Howard Pim, for instance, it was clear that the victory of the 
Pact in 1924 had led to a desire to press the welfare and philanthropic claims of 
the Joint Council within the confines of the segregationist framework laid down 
by General Hertzog's Smithfield Speech on native policy in December 1925. 
While arguing that he had "no hard and fast segregation in his mind", Pim never- 
theless wrote that "the only section of the native population iln the Union which 
is asked to give up anything is the Cape Native voters. For the other provinces 
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the Prime Minister's proposals if carried out will be a definite gain". 
90 
was a clear difference between the liberal members from the Cape and the 
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Transvaalers who were more concerned to use the Pact's segregationist scheme 
for whatever political advantages could be derived from it. 
The debate in the Joint Council. however, led to temporary victory of 
the Cape liberals and this was to determine increasingly the course of policy 
unti I the defeat of the South African Party in 1929. The memorandum published 
by the Joint Council on the Smithfield proposals and the four bills of 1926 came 
out in favour of preserving the Cape franchise on the grounds that "the steadying 
influence of the Cape vote will be lost" such that "European interests will more 
and more dominate Parliament": 
It will be fatal if European interests and Native interests 
are separately represented. Every member of Parliament 
should have the interests of all South Africa as his province, 
and these can only be protected by representatives elected 
on a franchise that knows neither colour or race. 91 
For the moment considerations of unity within the liberal campaign had 
led to Loram's apolitical strategy being defeated for a number of Transvaal members, 
including Howard Pim, were prepared to concede to the Cape liberals. "if we 
start shedding members on account of differences", Pim wrote to Rheinnalt-Jones, 
11* .. we shall 
break up altogether, and this I think would be a setback". 
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The logic of the course taken, by the joint Council, however, dictated 
that some form of political lobbying would become increasingly necessary if every 
member of the South African parliament was to "have the interests of all South 
Africa as his province". The 1927 pamphlet General Hertzog's Solution of the 
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Native Question still followed the Loram course of presenting only a factual 
analysis of the four bills, declining any overt political analysis. But With the 
conference the same year of the Federal Council of the Dutch Reformed Churches 
refusing to come out in opposition to the Pact's segregation poticy, 
94 
it was 
becoming progressively clearer that Loram's hope of relying on the Dutch Reformed 
III ý 
Churches to bring effective political pressure on the government was failing to 
wor . 
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At the same time, a number of Joint Council liberals, including 
both Alex Roberts from the Native Affairs Commission as well as Pim, were 
beginning to oppose what they perceived as the illiberal and corporatist ideology 
being espoused by Loram as he sought to gather funds from American sources for 
an inter-racial boost to supplement the work of the Joint Councils. 
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In 1928, 
Loram initiated contacts with the Carnegie Foundation as well as the Phelps-Stokes 
Fund in America for funds to establish an Institute of Race Relations. These 
sources were closely linked to the corporatist and managerial ideological thinking 
behind American Progressivism which stretched back to before the first world war 
but had hitherto only indirectly affected liberal thinking. in South Africa via the 
welfare and philanthropic ideas of Frederick Bridgman and the American Board 
Mission. Now, however, it became clearer that Loram's initial insistance upon 
distinguishing welfare work in the Joint Councils from direct political involvement 
was becoming expanded into a far wider pragmatist and managerialist 
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ideology 
of liberal philanthropy that threatened completely to eclipse the older liberal 
paternalism of Roberts, Solomon and Pim. - 
This positivism of Loram - which he 
shared with a number of "friends of the natives" such as Brookes and Rheinnalt-Jones - 
was not simply a colonial fascination with "scientific" methods in the metropolis, but 
also related in considerable degree to the work he did for American educational 
foundations. Thoroughly acquainted with methods of Negro education in the 
United States, Loram by 1928 was the South African representative of the Phelps- 
Stokes Fund as well as acting as unofficial adviser to the Carnegie Corporation on 
its programmes for black education in both Africa and the United States. 
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It 
was as a result of these connections that the Phelps-Stokes Fund had provided a 
grant of E500 per annum for three years and E200 for the salary of Rheinnalt-Jones 
as the "Executive Secretary of the Joint European and Native Councils in South 
Afr i ca "; while the Carnegie Corporation in 1928 authorised E750 per annum for 
five years to the "Associated Joint Councils". 
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This Ameri`can money was 
M 
welcome for Joint Council activity had before then been frequently financed by 
money from the pockets of individual members, 
100 but on the other hand it 
threatened any political work the Joint Councils might do. Pim, therefore, 
argued for an Organiser and a Board of Trustees to handle the funds which, while 
observing the conditions laid down by "our American friends", as he termed 
them, would also avoid the other threat which Loram's ideas seemed to imply of 
actual government control. The proposal was motivated in part by Pim's 
suspicions regarding Loram's background in the Native Affairs Commission and his 
governmental connections and a determination to keep Joint Council work auton- 
omous to state in terferen ce ata time when govern men t pol i cy seemed to be veer ing 
increasingly towards an "illiberal" direction. "We are glad you recognise", he 
remarked sarcastically in a letter to Loram, "the difficulty of distinguishing between 
what is "politica]" and what is "social betterment in native affairs". Under the 
conditions existing in the Union it seems to us impossible to draw any definite line, 
and to attempt to draw one would nullify the efforts of the Organiser". 
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Pim's growing political involvement by 1928 was also backed, at a 
convenient distance by Rheinnalt-iones. In Jones's case, freedom of manoeuvre 
was more difficult since his salary at this time depended on Phelps-Stokes sources; 
but on the other hand, Jones too began to recognise after 1927 that the Joint Councils' 
success depended to a considerable degree on a political involvement. In part, this 
was a recognition by Jones that the Loram strategy had cut off the Joint Councils from 
an important section of African political thinking. In 1926 Jones went on a visit to 
the Eastern Cape, the Transkei and Natal where he was able to see conditions for 
himself at a time when the 1. C. U. was picking up support in the rural areas. In 
Durban he attended an I.. C. U. meeting chaired by the former Joint Council member 
Allison Champion, 
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whose application to join the Joint Council in Durban had 
been refused, and was made aware of the growing potential of African trade unionism 
at a time when the reserve economy was entering a catastrophic decline 
during the 
long drought in the 1920s. Such influences began to tell on his thinking which by 
1 qct 
1927 was moving in the direction of accepting greater numbers of permanently 
urbanised Africans, with social control being exercised through legally recognised 
trade unions. At the European-Bantu Conference in 1927, Rheinnalt-Jones 
argued against the Hertzog land proposals in a similar vein to W. M. Macmillan. 
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Labour conditions on the land, he argued, were "favourable to neither the 
European nor the Native farm labourer; both suffer from the fact that their 
conditions are survivals of patriarchal and slave-owning days". 
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While 
accepting the reality of the African reserves and segregation as "a temporary 
expedient" (though "as a permanent principle" it "was bound to fail") 
11 05 he 
argued for common "National Land Policy" as opposed to a racial ly-defined "Native 
Land Policy" as was esconsced in the Hertzog Bills. The logic of this lay in the 
determination of a policy that accepted the proletarian isation of farm labour, both 
black and white, and the elimination of what was perceived as pre-capitalist 
restrictions on the mobility of labour. "Experience in Europe and elsewhere", 
Jones's memorandum continued, "shows that only a small proportion of any agrarian 
population is fitted to be independent on the land" so that "our rural population 
will have to consist mostly of farm labourers - working under direction. This 
wi II be true of both Europeans and Natives". The strategy that was needed was 
two-pronged in nature, which, while seeking to maintain industrial segregation at 
one level in so far as Africans were kept on the land,, at the same time accepted 
the growing requirement for African labour in industry: 
The acutness of the racial problem in South Africa today is 
due to the fact that rural conditions are driving White and 
Black into fierce competition for the same jobs in urban 
areas. There are only two ways of dealing with a situation 
of this kind. The first and most essential is to ease off the 
flow of Black and White migrants into the towns by creating 
better conditions on the land. The other is by enabling 
Industry to absorb the available labour in the towns. 106 
The industrial aspect of this questj on, Rheinnalt-Jones approached some 
two years later, in 1929, in the wake of the fissures in the 1. C. U. and the growth 
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in control over the union through the importation of William Ballinger in 1928 
to act as consultant to Clements Kadalie. As author of the Joint Council 
memorandum The Native in Industry, Rheinnalt-Jones argued against industrial 
searegation and the colour bar. Taking as his standpoint, the position of 
neo-classical economics and the laws of supply and demand in a capitalist 
economy, Jones argued for "the abrogation in course of time of laws which 
prevent the adoption of the urbanised native into Industry,, under the ordinary 
laws applying to Europeans. Natural economic laws know no colour bar, 
whether protective or repressive. The only protection we ask for the Native 
in Industry is protection against measures which would not be taken were he a 
white man". Favouring the formation of African trade unions, he saw this 
as a newer form of social control, necessary in a situation where "it needs no 
prophet to foretell that they will organise more and more in the near future, and 
it is important that they should early learn to organise on trade union lines and 
to act constitutionally and lawfully". 
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This toleration of black trade unions 
came in the wake of the 1. C. U. split and was indicative of the change in approach 
amongst white liberals as the 1. C. U. began the move away from industrial militancy 
in the middle I 920s - including attempts at organisation among farm workers and 
pea san ts 
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_ which it described as "the worst features of a ra cialist organisation" 
to Joint Coun ci I controlled moderation where "it ... endeavoured to function as a 
general workers union, following legitimate trade union methods". 
109 
This development in Joint Council ideology as articulated by Rheinnalt- 
Jones shaped the outlook of the Council towards political involvement on the Cape 
franchise issue. Older forms of social control, based on the rural reserves and 
philanthropic efforts at giving a "helping hand" in urban areas, became increasingly 
outmoded as African urbanisation and the growing labour requirements of industry 
necessitated newer forms of collaboration with Africans in the urban locations. 
In this context, the Cape franchise took on a new meaning. For the liberals in 
the Joint Council., the issues of principle involved in the defence of the campaign 
IDI 
related in substantial measure to their concern to maintain and modernise 
structures of social control in urban areas through the increasing co-optation 
of an urban African political class rooted in the franchise. With the failure 
by and large to sustain this in the early 1920s, though important ground work 
had been laid in the form of welfare work and the Bantu Men's Social Centre, 
the Cape franchise issue became all the more pressing. In addition it 
presented an important opportunity to extend influence among African political 
organisation which, in the Cape, was too weak to present an effective opposition 
to the Pact government's franchise proposals. By 1928 it was clear that despite 
attempts such as those by Sol Plaatie to mobilise African voters together with 
Col'oureds and Indians in the Cape Flats to "squash the attitude of the most over- 
bearing Europeans by working up a strong man who would stand up between the 
Natives and repressive legislation", 
110 little or no grass roots supports backed 
the Cape voters in the fight to defend the franchise. In such a context, the 
Joint Council was in a strong position to take the initiative in shaping the 
campaign to oppose the franchise proposals. 
The Non Racial Franchise Association 
The Joint Council in Johannesburg resolved on political action on the 
Cape franchise early in 1928, following the Select Committee on the Native Bills 
the previous year. Support for this had come from other Joint Councils, such 
as Pretoria, which allowed the Johannesburg Council to act on their behalf. 
ill 
At the same time, the actual organisational dimension of a Franchise Defence 
Organisation, as it was preliminarily called, was delegated by the Johannesburg 
executive to Howard Pim, as the Chairman, and Rheinnalt-Jones as Secretary. 
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The basic principle was accepted to be a common franchise, though the executive 
was "prepared (to) accept high personal native qualifications". 
1,13 The reasoning 
for this political involvement was explained by Rheinnalt-Jones to Archbishop Owen 
in Kenya in February of the same year. "There is one thing we have to work for 
24)2 
in Africa", he wrote, "and that is STATUS - legal, political and economic 
status for all the members of the state. Without status all efforts at uplift- 
ment will take many more generations to be effective". In addition, while 
willing to accept a Council system "as a means of cultivating public opinion 
among the Africans and of providing a sounding board for this opinion" the Joint 
Council was at the same time "nervous". explained Rheinnalt-Jones, "of proposals 
to invest them with legislative powers independent of the legislature of the 
country" for "this would prove an easy way of ridding the country as a whole of 
the responsibility for development of the Africans". 
114 
The problem that confronted the Joint Council at this stage was the 
question of mobilising support from white liberals in the Cape. Rheinnalt-Jones 
complained to Morris Alexander that he had tried on frequent occasions to persuade 
the Joint Council in Cape Town to act as a parliamentary committee to lobby for 
support d irectl y in the House of Assembl y, but to no ava i 1.115 Apart from 
Alexander himself, few members of the South African Party in the Cape seemed 
willing to take up the issue, especially as many of the old Unionist bloc inside the 
party seemed more interested up to 1927 of fighting the government on the Flag 
controversy. 
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In addition, with the unlikelihood of the government proceeding 
with actual legislation on the franchise until after an election, many S. A. P. 
members in the Cape urged the joint Council members to desist from immediate 
action. Henry Burton, for instance, wrote to Pim in April of 1928 arguing. that 
"it would not do for us to take a line - in our ignorance of the final plan and the 
views of the natives themselves upon it - only to find that these views do not 
agree with our own. We had much better await the modified scheme, so that we 
know what to fight about and also what the natives say about it 11 - 
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These were 
tactical arguments based upon the interests of the South African Party in white party 
politics and the Joint Council was hampered in its attempts to gather "liberal" 
support in the run up to an election which was to play upon racial fears. C. P. Crewe, 
another former Unionist in the S. A. P. even went so far as to argue against any formal 
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political organisation in the Cape before the June election in 1929, on the 
grounds that "our people are pretty well al I agreed to stand by the present Cape 
franchise for Natives" while in the S. A. P. "it would be difficult in most parts 
of the Cape to get the best men on to a committee or organisation to deal alone 
with Native franchise matters". 
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Despite this resistance to formal organisation in the Cape, by February 
of 1929 matters came to a head with the National European-Bantu Conference 
organised by the Joint Councils in Cape Town between February 6 and 9. Here 
the arguments which had been rehearsed by Rheinnalt-Jones in the memorandum 
The Native in Industry were spelled out with greater political effect on the thinking 
amongst white liberals in the Cape by the Conference chairman, Howard Pim 
(Rheinnalt-Jones was convenor of the Conference). Pim's forthrightness probably 
accrued from the fact that he had been in Cape Town the year previously in order 
to canvass support on the franchise issue and was aware of just how few members of 
the parliamentary opposition were willing to make a stan . d. 
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But aside from 
the immediate political considerations, Pim's opening speech established the whole 
tone of the conference and guided it towards a growing recognition, which was 
later to be reflected in the report in 1932 of the Native Economic Commission I, 
that the subsistence base of the reserves was declining and permanent African pro- 
letarianisation made a reconsideration of the level of African wages essential. 
While African wage earners had to buy in "European markets", the prices they 
paid were "based upon European wages and these in turn upon European costs of 
living". These prices, therefore, were not based upon what Pim saw as African 
"costs of living" and the actual level of wages paid were "arbitrary and do not 
rest upon any definable foundation". There was thus a need for "having a 
definite scheme of correlation of Native and European revenue and expenditure, 
and for the co-operation of both these races to bring this about". 
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Pim 
accepted, however, the idea of a continued increase in African proletarian isation 
and "the most persistent efforts are called for to remove all barriers to Native 
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advancement and to encourage Natives in every possible way to increase their 
knowledge and improve their position", necessitati ng the removal of the Colour 
Bar Act, as well as increased exemption under the pass laws. 
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Pim's arguments were reflected in the resolutions of the conference 
which sought the amendment of the Industrial Conciliation Act to include "pass- 
bearing Natives" and the organisation of African workers into trade unions. 
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In addition the Cape franchise issue was discussed and a resolution passed 
defending it, despite Loram's objections. 
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The debate on this acted as a 
catalyst for developments in formal organisation for the franchise's defence, with 
Pim in particular -expressing open objections to Loram's attitude. " If Loram 
has nothing good to say of the Franchise Bill", Pim wrote to Rheinnalt-Jones, 
"why did he take up the attitude he did in the conference and object to any 
resolution being taken of the principle. Frankly I do not trust him and in this 
I am not alone. He is the Government servant every time with the merits and 
defects of his class". 
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Pim, therefore, instigated moves to start an organ- 
isation in the Cape, especially as a committee had already been formed by 
Rheinnalt-Jones, before he returned to Johannesburg after the Conference, of a 
number of prominent Cape liberals such as the Archbishop of Cape Town, Sir James 
Rose-Innes, Henry Burton, Jagger and Morris Alexander. 
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The assumption 
behind this was that such a group would contribute to a widening debate on the 
franchise issue which Pim saw as occurring as a result of the election campaign 
and which was not tied to the strings of the S. A. P. 
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The organisation that was formed, however, quickly got caught up in the 
maelstrom of party politics in the run up to the June election. Following the 
issue of a manifesto which condemned the Franchise Bill for having the effect "as 
surely as night follows days to drive all the Bantu, civilised or uncivilised, 
educated or uneducated, into one group by giving them a com mon grievance", 
127 
early in April an association was formed with a committee that 
includes Rose-Innes, 
10.5 
J. W. Jagger and Professor Fremantle. Some 55 to 60 names were included 
in the Association membership and the general tone was to some extent dictated 
by the dominating personality of James Rose-Innes who had retired from the bench 
in 1927 and had desisted from the idea of entering active party politics. 
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On 
the 25th April, the society was firmly established as the Non-Racial Franchise 
Association, despite objections from two senators, F. S. Malan and Street, who 
sought more general objectives. 
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With E140 collected from the foundation 
meeting., the ostensibly "non party" basis of the association soon became confused 
by the decision taken in early May to canvass all the election candidates in the 
Cape Province on their attitudes to the franchise issue., with the further tactic of 
"warning" the Native Voters Association of individual replies that were "unsatis- 
factory". 130 As Henry Burton wrote to Pim, there were clearly doubts about 
the value of this for the S. A. P. 's election fortunes but "our object is of an import- 
ance so overwhelming that we dare not be guided simply by Party considerations". 
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By this time General Smuts had already been careful to dissociate the 
S. A. P. from the Non Racial Franchise Association's activities. The initial 
manifesto of Rose-Innes issued at the end of March he depicted as championing 
equal franchise rights which was not the policy of the S. A. p. 
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The response 
of the Association, as represented by its dominating spirit, Rose-Innes, was the 
re-affirmation of its non-party status; 
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but the value of this was soon nullified 
by the actual defeat of the S. A. P. in the June election with concomitant tendencies 
amongst some S. A. P. Assembly members to blame this on the N. R. F. Association 
activities. 
134 
The effect of the election was to send the Non Racial Franchise Association 
into decline and, though it continued in truncatory form in the early 1930s, the 
main driving force in Cape Town after 1930 appears to have been from Julius Lewin 
and a small Fabian Society. 
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By this time, though, the In*stitute of Race 
Relations had been formed and white liberal opinion tended to be increasingly 
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controlled, as it had before 1929., from the Witwatersrand. "I do not know", 
Rheinnalt-Jones wrote to Lewin "whether the country is ready for another 
organisation on the political side"136 and to this extent independent liberal 
organisation outside the S. A. 1. R. R. tended to fade. 
But with the Institute formed in 1929, there tended to fade as well the 
political hopes of liberals such as Howard Pim., who had been so closely associated 
with the attempt at formal political organisation in the Cape. Instead of 
widening discussion on the franchise issue., as Pim had hoped, the election had the 
effect of strengthening the S. A. P. 's role in the f ight to defend the franchise, thus 
reinforcing tenden'cies towards an "apolitical" standpoint in white liberal organ- 
isations. While the Pact could not alone command a two-thirds majority in the 
combined Senate and House of Assembly to remove the African voters from the 
common roll, the standpoint of the S. A. P. became increasingly critical. " Our 
future., therefore", Pim wrote to John Harris, "depends upon the party tie to an 
extent that we never expected and it can be expected to hold for some time, but 
not indefinitely unless we succeed in changing northern opinion". 
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It was 
this increased dependence on the S. A. P. , however, which renewed the division 
in white liberal thinking between "political" activity, which Loram had at first 
been content to leave to the Dutch Reformed Churches and was now the role of 
the S. A. P. , and welfare activities and "consultation" with 
African elite opinion, 
which after 1929 became increasingly centred around the Institute of Race Relations. 
In this new definition, Loram played a final decisive role, before finally leaving 
South Africa for good to take up a professorship at Yale. 
The South African Institute of Race Relations 
The intervention of the Joint Councils on the franchise issue, and the 
formation of the Non Racial Franchise Association, in the election year of 1929, 
provided the context in which the Institute of Race Relations was formed. The 
exact form it was to take remained unclear until that year for as late as January 
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of 1928 Loram was still interested in the idea,, now that the Carnegie Corporation 
had promised E3,750 over a five year period, of reviving the old idea of a, 
federation of Joint Councils. 
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But this idea was proposed for discussion along 
with other issues, including the proposed legislation on the franchise; and 
Pim's objections to Loram's attempts to divide "political" from welfare issues in 
the course of 1928 can be seen as an important motive for Loram to propose by* 
the end of the year a "more Catholic" committae for inter-racial co-operation 
than was possible under the aegis of the Joint Councils". 
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As Rheinnalt-Jones 
wrote to Jesse Jones of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, "Loram feels so nervous regarding 
the political side of the present situation that he fears lest the Joint Council should 
become too political. For myself I feel that a great deal will depend upon the 
organiser who must use considerable judgment in these difficult times. I have 
told Loram that I am ready to throw myself into the work even at considerable 
financial risk". 
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Rheinnalt-Jones's effective willingness to fall in with Loram's scheme 
I for liberal organisation in South Africa was a decisive factor on the shaping of the 
Institute in 1929. On 9th May, a committee established by Rheinnalt-Jones 
with the consent of the Carnegie and Phelps-Stokes Funds met at Ray Phillips's 
house in Johannesburg where Loram was elected Chairman, Pim as Treasurer and 
Rheinnalt-Jones as Secretary. This committee became the effective foundation 
of the Institute and Rheinnalt-Jones, who was in favour with the American bodies 
' 141 (especially Jesse Jones since his 1927 memorandum on Land ) was appointed 
"Adviser" to the Institute from the Ist January 1930. The guiding ideology 
of the committee was that of Loram and the American foundations' policy of 
desisting from political involvement. The establishment of the foundation 
committee on 9th May, for instance, had extracts from a report of the Carnegie 
Corporation for 1924 distributed to the participating members *Which defined 
Corporation policy on political involvement. "The deliberate and conscious 
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propagation of opinion is a perfectly legitimate function for the individual". the 
report stated, "but it is becoming greatly recognised' that it is not the wisest use 
to which trust funds can be put". 
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With the money involved (though Rheinnalt- 
Jones stated his commitment to the idea even if it meant financial risk to himself), 
there was little the South African liberals could do: even Pim was forced into 
proposing Loram as Chairman of the foundation committee because of his foundation 
connections, feeling that he was "entitled to the position". 
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The only crumb 
of comfort that could be gained was the knowledge that the Institute was formed 
separately and autonomously to the Joint Councils, whose work Loram had promised 
not to interfere with; but the effective centre for I iberal activity after 1930 
clearly rested on the Institute,, whose "Adviser" tried increasingly to intervene in 
Joint Council work to make it conform to Institute policy. 
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Despite the overtly "apolitical" ideological basis of the Institute, Rheinnalt- 
Jones did seek from the beginning various low-keyed contacts with representatives of 
state institutions and politic, ians in the Senate and House of Assembly. He was 
aided in this by Loram's decision in 1931, following a refusal by the Natal Admini- 
stration to allow him to serve on the Native Economic Commission and an order by 
the Government to return to Natal as Superintendent of Education,, to take up an 
offer of a Professorship at Yale. 
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With Loram's controlling influence thus 
removed, some freedom of manoeuvre was allowed to Jones. Until 1936 with the 
appointment of Douglas Smit (a member of the Institute) as Secretary of Native 
Affairs, contacts with the state tended to be limited, despite attempts to make the 
Institute a channel for communication between the Native Affairs Department and 
wider public opinion. 
146 Thus for the first few years, various feelers were put 
out to establish selective personal contacts and an avoidance of organised publicity, 
which Rheinnalt-Jones felt would damage the image of the Institute. (which was 
widely distrusted in government circles) and jeopardise a strategy based on the idea 
that "when the time came for the special campaign we could rely upon groups of 
men both inside and outside Joint Councils who would respond to the appeal for helpii. 
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Much more overt political activity by the -Institute, however, was 
initiated with respect to African politics. By 1930, African support in the 
Joint Councils was tailing off to a marked degree, while there were reports 
that standards in the Bantu Men's Social Centre were slipping- 
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Furthermore , 
there were significant indications of resistance by African members of the Joint 
Council to imparting information on African living conditions. In 1930, for 
instance, an attempt was made by the Johannesburg Joint Council to secure what 
Pim described as "social information" on the means of African workers. The 
attempt, however, soon ran to ground. "Preliminary meetings were held when 
a number (of Africans) expressed their willingness to help", Pim wrote to Rheinnalt- 
Jones, who was in London at the time, "but as soon as results were asked for they 
faded. All questions of this kind emanate from the Europeans. Natives are 
suspicious of the occasion for which their statements are required and I fancy 
that the enquiries are not too well received". 
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Pim was inclined to ascribe 
this distrust to the general image of the Joint Councils, blaming in particular the 
traditional African bete noire Ray Phillips. "The natives say", he continued, 
"that he is now only a messenger boy of the Chamber of Mines"; 
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an idea 
based presumably on the fact that Phillips had been granted a F-2,000 donation by 
the Chamber to spend as he saw fit, in the wake of his successful work for them on 
fiIm shows during the 1922 stri ke. The "suspicions", by the Africans continued, 
however, 151 aided by the growth of newspaper articles by an anonymous writer 
"Enquirer" in the Umteteli to the effect that the Joint Councils were seeking to 
control all African political organisation. As "Enquirer" (widely believed, in 
fact, to be Harold Mbelle, Sol Plaatie's brother in law) wrote in July 1933: 
The Joint Council movement ... is one intended to be 
established as the only agency or medium through which 
the, Natives could air their grievances or make their 
representations to the Government or local authorities 
concerned. In working towards this objective (though 
V cp 
as has been seen, it was turned down by the government in 
1932 - P. R. ) this movement has, direct Iy or ind ire ctly 
destroyed or rendered ineffective all'purely African organ- 
isations, and has arrogated to itself the right to control and 
direct all matters Bantu. 152 
The persistence of "Enquirer's" charges against the Joint Councils in the 
early I 930s underl ined the renewal of distrust in col laboration with white I iberal 
bodies by significant sections of African political leadership. Certainly, there 
were still prominent African figures still arguing for a renewal of contacts, though 
in a somewhat less subservient form. Xuma, for instance, argued in a paper read 
at the Conference of European and Bantu Christian Associations at Fort Hare in 1930 
that "The European must more work with and less for the African. The Africans, 
on the other hand, must not only co-operate with the European in European -controlled 
activities but must more and more organise, themselves and do things themselves. 
They must not always wait for someone to do things for them". 
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But, on the 
other hand, it was also clear that "Enquirer's" diatribes underpinned a widely felt 
resistance to "co-operation" of any kind. Rheinnalt-Jones privately confessed 
that "Enquirer's" accusation that the Joint Councils had destroyed African leadership 
contained "just enough truth to make it a dangerous statement" 
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and in 1933 the 
Institute commissioned Edgar Brookes to tour the Union to sound out whether "Enquirer" 
had any significant African support (Brookes reported that he had very little). 
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The significance of "Enquirer's" attacks, in fact, lay beyond the immediate 
issue of the control of African political leadership. In an important sense, 
"Enquirer" gave vent to the grievances of a section of the African petty bourgeoisie 
that felt itself to be increasingly squeezed out of economic activities by the end of 
the 1 920s and the onset of the depression. Numbers of Africans owned small 
shops on the Witwatersrand, which were estimated to number some 500 in 1934, with 
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40 in Nancefield alone. Likewise, individual Africans managed to take 
advantage of certain sectors for which was no significant ethnic domination such as 
the haulage of bricks: Johannes Tumahole, for instance, built up a brick cartage 
: Z1 I 
business from Sophiatown to Parrtown in the years after the Anglo-Boer War, 
for which he was paid up to 15sh a load and on which he was able, as T. M. 
Mapikela had been in Bloemfontein, to start a building business of his own. 
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But the mobilisation of capital by African businessmen was extremely limited, 
especially as ethnic domination of various service sectors, such as laundering, 
had successfully squeezed out African competition by this time. 
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For mission-educated kholwa in the African petty bourgeoisie running 
shops, carting bricks or laundering was not the most obvious way in which to 
employ their talents. The long tradition of African journalism which stretched 
back to the mission papers such as Isigidimi and Imvo in the nineteenth century 
suggested another obvious way through the ownership of newspapers and the 
Congress paper Abantu Batho survived as late as 1931 as an example of successful 
independent African newspaper ownership, though in the final years it was propped 
up by the Congress President Josiah Gumede. But with Gumede's defeat in 
1930 the paper collapsed and was succeeded for a brief period by a paper of 
Gumede's conservative successor in Congress, Pixley Seme, entitled The African 
Leader. The Leader was edited by a former writer for Abantu Batho and 
opponent of Ray Phillips, T. D. Mweli Skota and the paper maintained a clear 
Africanist philosophy, reflecting a desire for independent African business activity 
by its owners. But soon after its formation early in 1932 it met a challenge from 
white commercial capital in the form of The Bantu World, which ensured its 
eventual demise. In this instance, "Enquirer's" accusations of Joint Council 
and Institute intervention into African politics proved well-founded, for in the 
crucial area of African opinion formation, especially at the level of the educated 
elite, the white liberals played a decisive role in the early 1930s. W 
The actual initiative for the founding of the Bantu Press (Pty) Ltd. did 
not a ctua IIy come from the, Institute directly, but a Be the I farmer stuck on hard 
times, B. G. Paver. Conceiving the idea of a central organisation to take over 
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African newspapers and co-ordinate their advertising, Paver approached 
Rheinnalt-Jones who responded favourably. 
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It seems, in fact, that Jones 
formulated the idea of a central syndicate which actually controlled the 
advertisement contracts in the various African papers, which were in due course 
to be incorporated into the one central organisation. Disclaiming any personal 
financial involvement in the scheme, Jones stated his support for the idea on the 
grounds that "the level of native newspapers would be raised considerably", 
especially as the number of literate Afri-can readers had risen significantly, thus 
making it "imperative that it (the African readership) should be supplied with 
better reading matter". 
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In actual practice the Institute of Race Relations 
was tied in to the-project to the extent that, as William Ballinger, an opponent 
of the whole scheme., claimed, a wealthy Pretoria businessman Charles Maggs 
supported The Bantu World while at the same time championing the efforts of 
Edgar Brookes in raising funds for the Institute. 
161 
It was Maggs's company, 
together with the Chamber of Mines' Umteteli, which was reported by Ballinger 
to have approached the Printing Machinery Company, which printed The African 
Leader, in order to get that newspaper into its possession "lock, stock and barrel" 
11 - 
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and pul it into cold storage". It was not surprising, in this context, that 
Brookes sought, after the death of The Leader, actual affiliation of The Bantu 
Press (Pty) Ltd. to the Institute of Race Relations in order that "we could keep 
some measure of regular influence over the Bantu Press". 
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An idea, though, 
that does not seem to have been taken up, especially as Brookes soon left direct 
Institute of Race Relations work to take up an appointment as Principal of Adams 
College in Natal. 
The Joint Councils and the 1. C. U. 
In comparison to the limited success of the Institute in establishing a 
certain degree of iedological control over the black press, the role of the liberals 
in the joint Councils in exacerbating splits in the 1. C. U. was of for more long 
term significance. As we have seen., the 1. C. U. in the early part of the 1920s 
2/3 
remained a focal point of African 'opposition to efforts at political co-optation. 
While the A. N. 
' 
C. remained weak and divided, Kadalie's efforts at extending 
the 1. C. U. amongst unorganised black workers remained a thorn in the govern- 
ment's flesh. The "hostility clause" in the 1927 Native Administration Act 
was a result of a series of resolutions passed by white farmers associations that 
called for action to be taken against African workers who joined the Union and 
it was clear that pressures began to grow by that year for an active state response 
to the Union to curb its activities. In the case of the liberals in the Joint 
Councils, the 1. C. U. was seen as for the most part marginal to their activities 
following the failure to gain their support for such issues as Women's night passes 
in 1925 and until 1926 no initiatives were taken to wean over any sections of the 
1. C. U. leadership, despite indications that some of the more moderate leaders 
were increasingly hostile to links with the Communist Party. 
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In such circumstances, it is interesting that the first real initiative for 
the Joint Councils to establish some form of political alliance with the moderate 
1. C. U. leaders came from outside the mainstream of the white liberal intelligentsia. 
Up until the middle 1920s, white liberal activities had been almost exclusively 
male dominated. White women had for the most part confined their activities 
to welfare work, typified, for instance, by the wives of Ray Phillips and Frederick 
Bridgman, while additional support had come from women involved in church work 
and the looking after of hostels for African women. In the period after the first 
world war, however, the expansion of university education began to break down 
some of the more traditional mores in white society and the first of the women 
graduates began to make their mark on South African political life: Mabel 
Palmer in the middle 1920s (who probably formed the basis of William Plomer's 
character Mabel van der Horst in his novel Turbott Wolfe), then Margaret Hodgson 
(later Ballinger), Ellen Hellman, Eileen Krige and others in the 1930s. The 
exact ideological influences exerted on South African liberalism from this incipient 
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conservative feminist source remains a rýatter for detailed investigation, but in 
the case of Mabel Palmer wider overseas contacts as a result of a stay in England 
led to the emergence of a female triumvirate of herself, the novelist Winfred 
Holtby and the South African writer Ethelreda Lewis that exerted a decisive 
impact on white liberal opinion in the direction of co-opting 1. C. U. leadership. 
Of the three, Ethelreda Lewis was the most vocal in her unflagging efforts to try 
and rouse support from South African business and political figures in a campaign, 
as she saw it, to save the Africans in the 1. C. U. from Communism. As a minor 
novelist who wrote stories such as those about "Trader Horn", she was probably in 
a far better position to reflect populist sympathies amongst the lower middle class 
in both Britain and South Africa in a period when, following the "Zinoviev . 
Letter" of 1924, communism was a considerable bogy term. At the same time, 
following the failure of efforts in 1926and 1927 to rally support for her cause in 
South Africa since, as she put it to the Bishop of Zululand, "no one of all the 
professional or businessmen in Johannesburg has come forward with definite help. 
They have no wish to jeopardise a practice or a business by being associated with 
natives "1 
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it became clear that the on Iy source to turn to was overseas 
assistance. In effect, the probes of Ethelreda Lewis and her coterie were 
sufficient to expose all the political limitations of the Joint Council/Bantu Men's 
Social Centre structure that had been erected in the early 1920S through the 
efforts of Loram, Bridgman, Phillips and Rheinnalt-Jones. Selective help had 
been offered from these quarters only in the form of lectures from such people as 
Edgar Brookes and F. S. Livy Noble of the Pretoria Joint Council and from the 
anthropologist J. D. Krige. This form of activity was politically innocuous 
since., as Krige wrote to Ethelreda Lewis, "it would not stigmatise us as being 
implicated in a movement which we do not wholly sympathise with% 
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But 
any more direct involvement that included reshaping the administration and 
control of the Union in order, as Ethelreda Lewis saw it, to neutralise the 
Communist influence, was at this stage beyond the capacity of the white liberal 
11jr 
hierarchy in the Joint Councils. But it was precisely this limited extent of 
Joint Council activities, covering mostly only the smal I African petty bourgeoisie, 
which Ethelreda Lewis objected to. "They fail to see", she wrote, "that where 
help and a faithful presence is most vitally needed is not in the nursery but in the 
street with those of no reputation, natives who are constantly being walked over 
by the well-organised Communists here". What was thus needed was not a 
continuation of the old missionary approach which had already been criticised 
for al I its limitations by Frederick Bridgman before the first world war, but which 
still survived in the general ethos impressed after Bridgman's death on the Bantu 
Men's Social Centre by his successor Ray Phillips. On the contrary, Ethelreda 
Lewis argued, there should be a "mission" which was "unsectarian" in order to 
neutralise the "anti-Christian doctrines" inculcated by the Communists: 
And that is the only way they may eventually get clear of 
bad doctrine - by the constant presence and friendship 
of men who are not out to steal their legitimate trade union 
ambitions from them (which is what they fear from the Joint 
Council type of organiser), but to establish those ambitions 
more safely than would any self-seeking communist. 
And, in a manner that echoed the earlier ideas of Frederick Bridgman: 
Especially could they be approached by young men good at 
footba II and cri cket and box ing, who are wiII ing to coa ch 
the native and not to laugh at his little vanities. 167 
Despite this paternalism, Ethelreda Lewis's approach was still seen by 
Clements Kadal ie as offering up a better opportunity for integrating the 1. C. U. 
into the mainstream of the South African labour movement than working with the 
Joint Councils. 
168 In particular, the overseas connections that had been 
forged by the Lewis, Holtby, Palmer triumvirate opened up possibilities for help 
from the British labour movement. Following the expulsion of the Communists 
from the 1. C. U. in December 1926, which led Ethelreda Lewis to boast to the 
Prime Minister, General Hertzog, that Kadalie was "leader of a law abiding 
labour organisation of natives" who was "likely to be of far more use in South 
V6 
Africa than if he were a docile nonentity amongst a small group of natives who 
are content to be influenced by the Joint Council', great as their pioneer work, 
has been", 169 the plans for a more elaborate structure of co-optation began to 
get into gear when Kadalie visited Europe in May 1927. The success of 
Kadalie's appearance at the In-ternational Labour Conference in Geneva and the 
contacts forged in Britain, via Winfred Holtby, with the Labour Party, Trade 
Union Congress and the Co-Operative Movement led to the beginnings of a re- 
evaluation in the South African administrative hierarchy of the nature and role 
of African trade unions. The Department of Labour in particular seems to have 
been favourable to the idea of bringing African workers inside the Wage Act and 
even recpgnising African labour organisations under the 1924 Industrial Concil- 
iation Act, though at a conference with the Native Affairs Department and 
Native Affairs Commission, no definite conclusion was arrived at on this. 
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But at least it seemed, in the political climate of 1927-28, that certain moves 
in the direction of shifting social control away from purely racial criteria towards 
one of class and the entrenchment of a unionised black work force were a distinct 
poss ib iIi ty. In these circumstances, the fruition of the first stage of Ethelreda 
Lewis's plan came about when, following the acceptance by Walter Citrine of 
the British Trades Union Congress of the credentials of the trade unionist William 
Ba II inger, an adviser was sent out to ass is tin the reorganisati on of the 1. C. U. in 
June 1928. 
Right from an early stage, however, it became clear that the hopes 
placed behind Ballinger's appointment in South Africa were misconceived for 
his appearance in South Africa ultimately only represented the extension of 
existing Joint Council activities into the spheres of African trade union organisation. 
The reasons for this are multiple. The divisions, corruption and jealousies inside 
the 1. C. U. which had grown rapidly into a nation-wide movement of some 57,760 
members by January 1927 hampered Ballinger's work right from the beginning. it 
was also clear, as was later to emerge during the period of African trade union 
217 0 
expansion in the second world war, that the British model of union organisation 
was completely misconceived in an environment of semi-peripheral capitalist 
171 industrial isation such as South Africa. No nation-wide social democratic 
political movement existed across racial lines to champion the interests of 
African and White workers on the ostensibly colour-blind liberal democratic 
model of North America and Western Europe. The entrenchment of racial 
prejudice in white workers' political consciousness together with the institution- 
alisation of the colour bar militated against any effective co-operation with the 
white trade union movement. Thus the options open to Ballinger were extremely 
I imited. Even if he had wanted to, the option of seeking a more militant line 
was hampered by the prospects both of his expulsion from South Africa and the 
isolation of the 1. C. U. from any radical influences stemming from the Communist 
Party. The most that could be hoped for would be some of radical political - 
cum - industrial black organisation that would be able to pick up earlier traditions 
of resistance to white rule such as -Ethiopianism and Garveyism. But in such 
an instance, Kadalie would have been wiser politically to have taken up the 
already well-trodden American trail and seek assistance from a Black American 
trade union organiser: the cultural and political background of Ballinger were 
completely alien to the idea that Kadalie seems to have had in mind by the time 
he arrived to assist in the task of reorganising the union. 
In such circumstances, it was not surprising that Ballinger's entry into 
South Africa served to extend Joint Council control over African political 
activities. With the 1. C. U. itself becoming increasingly racked by internal 
divisions, a chance existed for white liberals to involve themselves in spheres 
of labour organisation and African trade unionism. In the following years, 
therefore., a debate began on the methods by which capitalist economic values 
could be instilled into the African working class. An industrial committee was 
formed by the joint Council in Johannesburg in 1930 under Ballinger's influence 
in order to gather statistical data on African living patterns on the Witwatersrand. 
Though African participation in this newer "developmental" approach was initially 
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limited through earlier hostility to the links forged by such leading figures as 
172 Ray Phillips with the Chamber of Mines, this development heralded an 
increasing interest in research into the conditions of urban Africans in the 1930S 
by such liberals as Ellen Hellman and Eileen Krige. Though one of the 
dominant emphases of such work in the 1930s was on juvenile delinquency and 
the need to reproduce family-based structures of social control in the urban 
areas as well as maintaining links as far as possible with the kinship links in the 
reserves, 
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nevertheless the fresh approach engendered by Ballinger in the late 
1920s served to keep liberal interest in working-class organisations alive through- 
out a decade that was signally barren of a notion-wide black trade union organ- 
isation. Such an interest served to influence liberal thinking by the time of 
the second world war when the renewed expansion of black trade unions led to 
a resurfacing of the debate on the exact role liberals should play in relation to 
the activities of African political and industrial organisations. 
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Chapter Seven 
Liberals and the drive to entrench territorial segregation 
The political context in which liberal bodies developed in South Africa in 
the years after the first world war indicates that a reassessment is needed of the role 
and function of liberal ideology inside the South African body politic. On the 
surface, the creation of the Joint Councils, the Bantu Men's Social Centre, the 
Institute of Race Relations and other similar bodies acted as an important catalyst 
for debate on the nature of racial prejudice. Acting as channels through which ideas 
that were being discussed on the international plane could be disseminated in South 
Africa, the liberal bodies of the inter-war years acted as key educational and cultural 
institutions through which an educated African elite could be socialised into con- 
temporary political life. As the example of the 1. C. U. and the importation of 
William Ballinger shows, this process was not always an easy one and often overlay 
African aspirations to political autonomy and the free development of their own 
institutions. But in addition, there is the important further question of how far the 
political involvement of the liberal bodies compromised their own ideology. 
Some analysts have taken the liberals' own claims towards racial assimilation 
in the inter-war years at face value and seen the ideological content of South African 
liberalism in somewhat of a political vacuum. John Shingler, for example, in a 
recent doctoral study of education and its relationship to political order in South Africa, 
has argued, from an analysis of various liberal writings of the period,, that the content 
of South African liberalism by the 1920s verged towards assimilationism: 
Wherever earlier to be aI ibera I, a negrophi I is t and a 
humanitarian meant to be a segregationist, by the 1920s 
the reverse was true. I 
This view tends to accord with the dominant theme of South African liberal 
historiography which, as was shown in Chapter Three, rests on the view that the Union 
in 1910 was apolitical hiatus from which the influence of the Cape liberal tradition 
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successively declined. Libera. 1s, therefore, remained for the most part excluded 
from power, except for a few important individuals such as Hofmeyr, the subject of 
Alan Paton's dramatic biography, 
2 
and remained effectively in a state of near 
internal exile, cooped up in their isolated universities, Joint Councils or Institute 
of Race Relations, though occasionally receiving important moral support from some 
liberal churchmen. 
3 
This isolationist view of South African liberalism, seeing the 
purveyors of the liberal message as in touch with the ideas being developed outside 
South Africa but incapable'of disseminating these ideas into the formation of actual 
policies, has been challenged by the revisionist school of South African historiography. 
Using for the most part a marxist paradigm, the revisionists have sought to locate the 
liberal bodies of the inter-war years in the context of a class struggle, indicating that 
the objective function of the liberals, as opposed to any subjective intentions,, was to 
both sustain the South African social formation and reproduce capitalist relations of 
production. In this context, as Martin Legassick has argued in an unpublished 
seminar paper, the actual differences between the ideas on "native policy" by the 
liberals and "friends of the native" and that of the government itself were only marginal. 
Focusing, in particular, on the transformation in I iberal ism as a whole by the end of the 
second world war from an individualist-based laissez faire model of society to that of a 
collectivist and interventionist one., Legassick has argued that the traditional view of 
an unbroken "liberal tradition" surviving in isolation in South Africa after Union 
becomes somewhat static and unhistorical. While certain general ideas in individual 
liberty, human rights, freedom of speech could be said to remain the basis of South 
African liberalism, at the same time an important reformulation of liberal ideology took 
place to reflect the social and class changes engendered by South African industrial- 
isation. The liberals of the 1920s such as Rheinnalt-Jones, Hoernle and W. M. Macmillan 
represented a newer generation of liberal ideologists based no longer in the Cape, though 
some had had their origins there, but in the Transvaal and on the Witwatersrand. 
4 
Here 
liberals proceeded to formulate an ideology that closely coincided with the segregation 
policies of both the Smuts government up to 1924 and the Pact government thereafter. 
In 1923, especially, a "liberal consensus" could be said to have emerged with the calling 
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of a European Bantu Conference by the Dutch Reformed Church., where prominent 
white liberals such as W. M. MacMillan and Edgar Brookes mixed with represent- 
atives from welfare societies and the Protestant churches in addition to those of 
the D. R. C. 
5 
This high-water mark of "liberal" influences on official thinking - which 
was reinforced by the appointment of Roberts and Loram to the Native Affairs 
Commission - was, to a considerable extent, minimised in the years after 1924, 
though liberals continued to score individual victories, such as that of the night 
passes case of 1925. For the most part, white liberal organisations felt themselves 
to be under growing threats of isolation as the 1 920s progressed and this was aided 
after 1929 by the beginnings of a reformulation of "native policy" by Afrikaner 
nationalist ideologists such as W. W. M. Eiselen in his pamphlet Die Naturelle 
Vraagstuk. 
6 This period of comparative isolation, however, did not indicat ea 
static liberalism for the development of liberal discussion, especially on such issues 
as the reserves in the 1920s and the position of urban Africans in the 1930s, indicates 
that the position of liberals in the overall South African social formation was one of 
both periodic isolation and inclusion. The argument of this chapter and the ones 
following is based upon a partial synthesis of the isolationist thesis of Shingler and 
liberal historiography, on the one hand, and the revisioniýt critique of Legassick on 
the other. Liberalism was of use as an ideology of social control, but only on 
selective occasions. The key occasions were in periods of ideological uncertainty 
in the governing apparatus such as in the early 1920s covering the last years of the 
Smuts government and the first two years or so of the Pact; as well as the period 
after 1933-34 when Hertzog and Smuts joined together to form the United Party 
government and eventual I y. pass the Native Bil Is of 1936. In the latter instance 
liberal commitment to the Cape African franchise was outweighed by considerations 
of direct inclusion into the state apparatus via the Natives Representatives and the 
Natives Representatives Council. 
The periodic isolation and inclusion of South African liberal ideology makes 
any assessment of its formulation considerably more problematic than a simple analysis 
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of its objectives will imply. The weakness with the analyses of both Shingler 
and Legassick is that they have taken liberal statements at face value, though 
coming to somewhat different conclusions. Behind such statements there was 
a machiavellian pragmatism which is revealed in the private correspondence of such 
figures as C. T. Loram, Edgar Brookes and J. D. Rheinnalt-Jones who were al I 
politically ambitious men intent on manipulating the systems of communication and 
influence with the government to their advantage. How far were these individuals 
and the institutions they represented the expression of a distinct class interest? 
While it is possible to observe that most South African liberals had a "petty bourgeois" 
background, some of the cruder marxist analyses imply that white liberalism was 
simply a covert mask for capitalist interests and that the content of liberal ideology 
was effectively the same as that of segregation and, later apartheid. 
7 
The thrust of 
this argument is similar to that of the Frankfurt theorists in Germany after the rise of 
Hitler when Herbert Marcuse, especially, charged liberalism with being a direct 
ideological source of fascism. 
8 
But this probably overlooks to a very high degree 
the fundamental political weakness of the South African liberals and implies to them 
an effectiveness in ideological influence they simply did not have: it was only in journals 
Trek and later The Democrat that anything like a "mass" impact of liberal ideology 
like 
could be said to be felt in South Africa, and even then on a relatively limited scale. 
The true picture, indeed, was considerably different. The very isolation of the 
liberals for most of the period under review necessitated their taking up a pragmatist 
and realist approach in order to exploit whatever political opportunities were 
available - but the very necessity of doing this involved a considerable compromise 
of pri-nciple such that the objective consequence of I iberal toenadering was that they 
became the instruments of social control. It was a dilemma which was never fully 
resolved before 1948 and only began to be debated in the early 1950s with the 
emergence of a more radical liberalism articulated by a younger generation who 
became instrumental in the formation of the Liberal Party. This'we examine in 
the last chapter; for the moment, however, we turn to the de! velopment of liberal 
ideological discussion in the 1920s once the victory of the Pact in 1924 ensured the 
state's determination. to proceed with a policy of territorial segregation. 
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Segregation and the reformulation of liberal ideology 
Even before the arrival of the Pact, liberal thinkers in South Africa had 
been continually aware of resting their "solutions" to "the native problem" on the 
basis of the development of the reserves. This had been the basis, to a consider- 
able extent, of the ideas of Maurice Evans in his Black and White in South East 
Africa in 1911 , when the industrial training of Tuskegee was recommended as the 
basis of African education in South Africa in order to ensure the continuation of the 
African's attachment to the soil: "Back to the land is the inarticulate cry of the 
Abantu, and no relief of the situation is likely to be brought about by those who 
will accept entirely new conditions of life which would connote abandonment of all 
they value". 
9 
This was the basis of a cultural idealism which progressively 
infiltrated liberal thought in the colonial context in the first few decades of the 
twentieth century and which later spilled over into more scientific analyses in 
anthropology by the I 930s. Beyond shaping an educational debate on the nature 
and control of African education in South Africa, the formulation of rural industrial 
training also determined the politico-economic basis of South African liberal ideology 
in the inter-war period. The concept of agricultural and rural training in the 
reserves implied the fostering of a class of master African farmers who would form 
strong social and economic attachments to mission stations and educational institutions 
like Lovedale and Fort Hare in the Eastern Cape. In a sense, there was the notion 
of a class alliance implied in this with Christian liberals such as James Henderson and 
Edgar Brookes, secular intellectuals such as C. T. Loram and W. M. MacMillan and 
philanthropists such as Howard Pim uniting in the collective mission of fomenting an 
African petty bourgeois class rooted in the rural areas and having the limited 
political check of the Cape African franchise, which most liberals still hoped in the 
1920s would still be extended to the provinces. Such an alliance played a vital 
role in protecting liberal interests by steering African political consciousness away 
from the dangerous urban radicalism represented by Abantu Batho on the Rand, and 
the small numbers of African radicals being recruited into the Communist Party night 
schools after 1921 , while at the same time meeting the repressionist counterattack 
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from the white working class and the S. A. L. P. who sought complete industrial 
segregation as a means of removing the competition from semi-skilled Africans in 
the urban areas. 
There was an implicit paternalism in this vision which was only gradually 
modified as the 1920s progressed and the African political class became more vocal. 
, Principal One of its earliest advocates was the Scot., the Reverend James Henderson. 
of Lovedale, who, as a highlander born in Caithness, was eager to apply the Scottish 
crofting model to the African reserves. The advantage of such a model was its 
implicit paternalism which ruled out the possibility of independent class action 
through the growth of trade unions: 
:** tenant farming, it may 
be said, is uneconomic because it 
imposes on the ground the burden of carrying two sets of people 
apart from the servants, but in Scotland, I take it, the ground 
requires to carry two sets of citizens. In Scotland, we had 
the autocratic class, the descendants of the old feudal lords, 
and these were born by the land, and it was up to them (and 
they did i t) to carry on the pub Iic work. They were the 
members of Parliament, the Lieutenants of the County,, the 
Off i cers of the Court. They bore the great burden of public 
service. The farmers bore the burden of local public service, 
meaning by local that confined to parishes, perhaps to Counties. 
It would seem that for the wider class of public services we (in 
South Africa - P. R. ) are largely dependent on men who have 
achieved success in business and are in a position to retire from 
i t. We are not maintaining a class in the same way, who, in 
the prime of life, are free to carry on the broader public service. 
With White farmers thus playing this role of "public servants" carrying on 
the wider functions of political and legal office., Henderson went on to suggest that 
more local issues could be taken up, as in the Scottish model, by smaller businessmen 
and farmers, who in the South African instance, could be African: 
''' it seems to me as* clear as 
daylight that by and by we shal I 
be faced with great labour unions opposing the Masters Unions, 
and that we are paving the way for that by making no differ- 
enti-ation between the most capable Native. We are throwing 
back the most capable Native amongst the least capable, and the 
result will be combination amongst them, and strikes and labour 
troubles. 10 
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This suggestion for providing aspirant African rural entrepreneurs with 
outlets in the reserves took a form similar to that outlined by the 1925 Morris- 
Carter Commission in Rhodesia of Native Purchase Areas which were attached to 
the African reserves and were areas where African farmers could buy land freehold. 
I 
In the South African instance, however, the 1913 Land Act of Sauer had eliminated 
the proposal in Hertzog's draft bill for a series of "neutral" areas where bo-th white 
and black farmers could buy land and had instead introduced a rigid definition of 
territorial segregation that defined land as either White or African owned. 
12 
But 
Henderson's ideas carried considerable influence among a number of opinion formers 
on land policy at this time and the idea of "neutral" areas was a crucial element in 
the debate on segregation. For C. T. Loram I for instance, Henderson was seen as 
one of the most crucial influences on his book The Education of the South African 
Native which also appeared in 1917.13 Here Loram suggested that communal 
African land tenure would eventually break upand' "individualism must ultimately 
pre va iI": 
The influence of the white man's example and the work of the 
missionaries both lead in that direction. It is unreasonable 
to expect a trained and educated Christian Native to subject 
himself willingly to the capricious rule of the heathen and 
barbarian hereditary chief, nor is it possible to expect any 
great interest in education unless such education will bring 
natural as well as spiritual advantage. 14 
On the other hand, Loram was careful to point out that this recognition of 
the need for increased outlet for the educated African kholwa and rural petty 
bourgeoisie did not negate the basic need to keep the mass of the African population 
on the land though "for this to be carried into effect with the limited amount of 
land 
available, better methods of agriculture must be taught in the schools. 
Along with 
the primitive methods of agriculture the primitive methods of tribalism must die" 
15 
(emphasis added). Loram pointed out that such developments in -the rural context 
should be made to fit in with the increasing pressures towards 
industrial segregation 
in the urban context where there were little or no opportunities for the 
development 
1 
of African industrial skills. "The educated native", wrote Loram, "is beginning 
to see that his work is to be largely a preserve for the white youth, and that he 
must take up some manual occupation if he wishes to make a good living. At 
present such forms of manual labour as carpentry, blacksmithing and bootmaking 
are the most popular; but when the natives real ise, as they soon must, that these 
callings can only take a limited few, they will turn to farming, which is the field 
that offers the greatest scope for them, and which is the hereditary occupation of 
their race". 
16 Arguments such as these were a distinct shift from the position 
Pim had taken at the 1914 Dominions Royal Commission, when he championed the 
increase in industrial training in an urban context for Africans and Loram's case 
underpinned the pressures towards Stallardism that were to gather momentum in the 
period after the first world war. 
Henderson's and Loram's arguments for economic outlets for a rural African 
petty bourgeoisie were championed by some of the leaders of African opinion. 
D. D. T. Jabavu, for instance, supported the idea of "neutral" areas in evidence to 
the 1917 Select Committee and it appeared, from the development of African farming 
in the Eastern Cape, that certain areas of mixed white and African farming would win 
support from the Union government. 
17 
This was certainly the opinion of the Local 
Natives Land Committee under the chairmanship of W. C. Scully, which was set up 
after the report of the Beaumont Commission, to investigate conditions in the Cape 
Prov in ce. 
18 
Before the Committee reported on the 24th January 1918, Scully 
issued a communication which defended the individual ownership of land by Africans 
in the Eastern Cape and pointed out that "in districts wherein European and native 
farmers are most intermingled, representations of both races expressed themselves as 
strongly opposed to the principle of segregation and stated most emphatically that 
they desired no interference with the existing conditions". Furthermore, Scully 
went on, "whilst regarding territorial segregation as advisable within the greater 
portion of the Cape Province, I am strongly of opinion that any 
law which would 
have the effect of forcing large numbers of civilised native landowners back into 
locations would be unfair and in every respect inexpedient". 
19 
But Scully's 
IIAZ 
ideas met opposition when it came to trying to put them into effect. White 
farmers, despite Scully's claims, were increasingly segregationist in outlook in the 
Cape after the first world war and eventually succeeded, at the sixth annual 
congress of the Cape Provincial Agricultural Association in November 1919, in 
passing a motion that opposed the sale of land to Africans in "European" areas. 
20 
When , therefore , the Scul 
Iy committee proposed at Victoria East to schedule a 
narrow line of farms owned by whites that projected into African-owned territory, 
opposition from white farmers proved, in Henderson's words, "irresistible" and, 
after communications between Scully and General Botha, the Prime Minister, the 
21 
proposal was dropped. The failure in Victoria East did not prevent Scully keeping 
to his original ideas in the final report of the committee when land in the Cape was 
proposed as being divided into three different classifications. Classes "A" and "C" 
were proposed as white and African respectively while Class "B" was proposed as a 
mixed area, including King Williams Town, East London, Komgha, Peddie, Stutterheim, 
Victoria East, Fort Beuafort, Stockenstrom, Cathcart, Queenstown, Wodehouse, Elliot, 
Maclear, Matatiele, Mount Currie and Umzimkulu. 
22 
Within these districts was 
some 104,000 morgen owned by African farmers and the committee warned of the 
consequences of rigid territorial segregation which would lead to the eviction of 
large numbers of African farmers and the further overcrowding of the reserves as well 
as the town locations. Such evictions, the committee suggested, would "subject a 
multitude of people accustomed to a healthy country life, to moral and physical 
conditions which it is no exaggeration to describe as hideous, and under which the 
death rate is often a disgrace to civilisation". 
23 
The Committee, therefore, reflected to a considerable degree the thinking 
on African reserves and the need to create outlets for the rural, African petty 
bourgeoisie 
among liberals of the time. In particular, the Committee warned against the creation 
of large African farms which it felt often led African farmers to get into 
debt and 
suggested instead expropriation and sub-division into smaller 
blocks which might be 
designated as locations under the Glen Grey Act. Such sub-division would help 
rel. ieve the pressure on land and reinforce the trend towards settling 
Africans on the 
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land and maintaining social control through individual land-holding. "The 
evidence is overwhelming", the Committee concluded, "to the effect that the 
land-owning Native in spite of his occasional improvidence - is a useful member 
of society. The ownership of land tends to endow him with a sense of responsibility: 
he and his tenants are usually regarded by unprejudiced Europeans as an insurance 
against stock-thieving in the vicinity". 
24 
In order to make a large number of small 
individual holdings viable, though, the Committee went on to suggest some form of 
cooperation which would ensure the fencing of arable lands, the purchase of agri- 
cultural implements, the more systematic use of grazing areas and the breeding of 
stock. Such cooperation could, in addition, be assisted by "Native General 
Councils" which "should be encouraged to interest themselves in these matters", 
while "the same financial aid should be given by the Government as is at present 
given towards general education in the Native Territories". 
25 
The emphasis upon cooperation in the rural context was a theme that was 
increasingly championed by liberals in the 1920s as efforts at encouraging more 
efficient African farming took effect at both the informal level of encouragement 
through private institutions such as Lovedale and Fort Hare and the formal level of 
instruction through agricultural demonstrators appointed by the Native Affairs 
Department and the establishment by the government of the training schools for 
African demonstrators such as Fort Cox and Tsolo. It provided the immediate 
context for the elaboration of territorial segregation after the election of the Pact 
in 1924. 
Agricultural demonstration and the growth of African farmers associations 
For Henderson, rural co-operation among Africans was a problem that 
would "apparently have to be re-created under European guidance". 
26 
1t was 
a question that influenced policy at both Lovedale and Fort Hare in the period 
after the Armistice in 1918. The general aim was a Native Training Institute 
in South Africa which could broaden the selective focus on industrial training that 
already went on in places like Lovedale, which had only just completed the 
instd1lation of electric plant in 1918 to power its workshops. 
27 At Fort Hare 
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in the same year the Agricultural Department was inaugurated with the son of 
Swiss missionaries, P. Germond, appointed as both Lecturer in Agriculture and 
Farm Manager. In this Germond was assisted by an American Negro mission- 
ary from Qanda, near Middledrift! Reverend East, who was paid as a part-time 
agricultural demonstrator by the Department of Native Affairs to take over the 
task of organising students' vegetable gardens at Fort Hare. 
28 
This early 
instance of cooperation between informal efforts at Fort Hare and formal interest 
by the Union government reflected the growth in ideas of separate, community- 
based African education that had a strong rural orientation. In East and Central 
Africa such ideas reached fruition in the Jeanes schools organised by Thomas 
Jesse Jones, that were modelled on the system of itinerant teachers in the American 
South who travelled to backward Negro schools to instruct negro pupils in industrial 
and agricultural education. 
29 
A similar pattern in South Africa began to 
emerge even before the Report of the Phelps-Stokes Commission in 1921 and the 
American Negro connection -(which contrasted strikingly with the attitudes to 
"Ethiopian" influences and the A. M. E. Church that were to be repeated as late 
as 1923 in Heaton Nicholls's novel evidenced also a concern to import 
techniques and methods from the South. 
30 
In this respect, the official recognition 
of the value of the American model was not an isolated incident in Southern Africa 
at this time for in 1926 the government of Southern Rhodesia appointed an American 
missionary, E. D. Alvord, as "Agriculturalist for the Instruction of Natives", with a 
staff_of 4 Whites and 87 Africans, though work on "development" of reserves was 
severely hampered by lack of adequate staff and funds and opposition by Native 
Commissioners to Alvord's American background. 
31 
East's influence among many small African farmers in the Eastern Cape 
appears, however, to have been significant at this time. As a child, East had 
worked on the cotton fields in the South, where his grandfather had been a slave 
and "dedicated to improving the agricultural practices of his congregation, he 
made his pastoral rounds in an open cape-cart which carried a plough, a harrow 
I #. f 
a, nd other basic implements. He needed no invitation from workers in the fields 
to unhitch his team of two draught horses,, transfer'them to the plough and demon- 
strate better methods and skills to the conservative African peasants". 
32 This 
advice and demonstration came at a time of growing rural unrest in the Eastern 
Cape, with radical influences from'the 1. C. U. as it sought to organise farm 
wor ers 
33 
together with the millenarian tendencies of the Wellington Movement 
in the Transkei which awaited the liberation from white colonialism through the 
arrival of American Negroes in aeroplanes. 
34 
For such 
. leaders as D. D. T. Jabavu, 
who had been teaching at Fort Hare since 1915 and who had visited Tuskegee and 
championed its ideas, East's presence acted as "a source of inspiration to many 
African husbandmen", 35 especially in the way that he emphasised that acreages 
of 4 to 6 acres were too small for effective farming and the need for dams, sanitary 
arrangements in the locations and the importation of foreign bulls and stallions to 
improve the quality of African stock. 
36 
In addition it is very likely that Jabavu 
saw the political value of East's agricultural demonstrations in that they acted as 
important ideological counter-weight to the 1. C. U. 's radicalism. Warning in 
1920 that "socialism of the worst calibre is claiming our people", 
37 
Jabavu 
increasingly sought a power-base of his own in the Native Farmers Associations 
that were formed in the Eastern Cape after the War and which closely identified 
with the agricultural methods and Tuskegee-based ideology promulgated by East. 
Most of the African Farmers Associations were formed in the Keiskamma 
River basin where they were in easy access to the agricultural demonstrations of 
Fort Hare, combined with the fact that some of the smal I farms in the area were 
felt to have a considerable potential economically in the agricultural development 
following the War. The first such association was formed in Middledrift in 1918 
and had East as its Vice-Chairman, Jabavu as Secretary, Chief Shadrach Zibi as 
Vice-Chairman (he was later to re-settle with some of his followers in the Rustenburg 38 
district of the Transvaal) and Stan Ford Sojica, a self-made farmer, as Treasurer. 
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Some 60 African farmers attended the second meeting and over 100 the third, 
held at Qanda, where a talk was given by Reverend C. Kunene of his exper- 
iences of "scientific agriculture" at Tuskegee. 
39 
The Association met with 
some support from the government: the Secretary of Native Affairs agreed by 
the end of 1918 to arrange for agricultural bulletins to be translated into Xhosa, 
while in July 1919 the then Secretary, M. C. Vos, addressed the Association at 
Burnshill, and stressed the need for better agricultural methods, especially 
adequate fencing which "would release thousands of boys for school and other 
purposes whose time is now wholly and deplorably consumed in herding stock", 
local afforestation "so as to obviate the present primitive method to which 
(African) women folk are compelled to resort in order to gain firewood" and the 
creation of adequate markets for African produce and local village industries. 
40 
By the end of 1919, the Native Affairs Department agreed to discuss proposals for 
cooperation and the establishment of local councils on Glen Grey lines which 
empowered locations, on a majority vote of tax-payers, to tax themselves for 
41 
agricultural schemes such as dipping tanks, commonage fencing and waterfurrows. 
This attitude does not appear to have been maintained for very long for the assistant 
Secretary of Native Affairs, E. R. Garthorne, reflected the government's decline in 
support for Glen Grey principles when he wrote to the Association that the govern- 
ment had had "no indications of any general desire on the part of Native communities 
in Ciskeian districts for the establishment of councils or committees such as are 
contemplated by the association". 
42 Government policy reflected the growing 
trend to enforce territorial segregation and it thus appears that the Farmers 
Association was only accepted in so far as it reinforced ideas of separate African 
communal occupation and not necessarily individual tenure per se. This policy, 
in fact, emerged in the course of discussion by the Smuts government in the early 
I 920s and, on the 5th December 1921 , Smuts stated at a meeting cal 
led to discuss 
a Native Affairs Department memorandum on the "native land 'question" that while 
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he "felt that ... it would be unwise to adopt any measure which was equivalent 
to segregation out of hand" (a policy he had outlined in the debate on the 1920 
Native Affairs Bill) nevertheless he "was impressed with the importance of 
providing for community occupation, which seemed to be better adapted than 
individual tenure to the needs of the native at his present stage of developrnent". 
43 
From the end of 1921 . therefore, state policy towards fostering African 
farmers associations and encouraging individual tenure began to change as 
communal tenure became increasingly emphasised. The Native Affairs Depart- 
ment declined to appoint an additional agricultural demonstrator 
44 
while., three 
years later, it declined to assist Chief Zibi in his scheme to move his Hlubi 
followers from the overcrowded Rhenosterboom location to Rustenburg on the 
grounds that it was "doubtful as to the ability of the tribe to carry the financial 
burden they wish to undertake": 
45 
though in the event some E4,000 was raised 
and 1,200 morgen of land purchased. 
46 
Until the start of a series of disastrous 
droughts after 1924, this policy did not have too debi I itating an effect on the 
growth of the Associations which were able to accumulate considerable sums of 
money on the basis of individual members' prosperity. Stephen F. Sonjica of 
Qanda, for instance, had become prosperous on the basis of savings earned as a 
policeman in King Williams Town and with E80 invested in farming he had 
gradually accumulated sufficient funds after five years to be able to buy a farm 
for EI/ 000.47 Success stories such as these were held up as within the realms 
of possibility for any of the Associations' members and enthusiasm tended to grow 
for their objectives. By March of 1920 285 members were reported by a meeting 
of the Association at Victoria East 
48 
and numbers of non-kholwa "lady heathens 
and peasant women" 
49 began to take an interest, walking up to 16 miles on foot 
to attend the meeting of the Association at Ncwazi in June 1921. Un the 
basis of this increased interest, Jabavu announced a scheme to establish a "Native 
Endearmont Company" which could purchase agricultural equipment and E73 was 
collected for this by June 1922 
51 
while in the same year a threshing machine was 
50 
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purchased by a syndicate of the Association. 
52 
But at the same time there 
were indications that the Associations were increasingly distrusting government 
policy as they sought to encourage African agriculture on I ines similar to those 
of white settlers. lmvo complained of the policy of sub , sidising 
European 
farmers associations on a pound for pound principle "some of wh'ich have hardly 
a dozen members present at their so-called meetings" while "nothing is granted 
to the Middledrift or Kentani or Butterworth Associations which are attended by 
anything from fifty to a hundred at an average gathering". 
53 
The election of the Pact government in 1924 had the effect of accentuating 
these political tendencies as both the government's drive towards territorial segre- 
gation and the progressive ecological deterioration of the reserves hampered even 
further the Tuskegee ideal of establishing a class of African master farmers centred 
around the detribalised kholwa. In the same year as the election drought hit the 
reserves and continued throughout the 1920s to hinder the efforts of the farmers 
associations to accumulate sufficient resources from whatever agricultural surpluses 
were available. "Were it not that natives practically live on dead meat", Paul 
Germond wrote despondently to Alexander Kerr, "there would be starvation. In 
some locations dead cattle are numbered in hundreds". 
54 This natural disaster 
was not assisted by the Government's passing in 1925 of the segregationist Native 
Land and Taxation Act which continued to exclude African farmers from state 
assistance in the form of the government land bank, available to only white farmers, 
whilst at the same time consolidating the various provincial taxes on Africans into 
one standard poll tax of 20sh per annum on all adult males together with a local tax 
of 1 Osh per annum on aII huts and dwel I ings in the reserves. This tax, was a penal 
one for African land holders,, especially in the Cape, where previously Africans 
holding land on individual tenure had paid quit rent instead of the I, Osh. hut tax and 
caused a considerable amount of resentment. In particular, the centralised 
nature of the tax'., which was designed to provide finances for African services 
such as education, was seen as a direct attack on the entrenched position of African 
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land holders in the Cape under the 1910 Act of Union. These fears were con- 
firmed even further the following year when the government published its long 
awaited four native bills, which proposed, amongst other things, to remove 
African voters in the Cape from the common roll and place them on a separate 
franchise in return for seven white representatives in the House of Assembly with 
the power to vote on African issues only. 
In such circumstances, the African political elite, especially in the 
Cape, was drawn increasingly into the orbit of the white liberal institutions 
centred around the Joint Councils as the Afrikaner nationalist complexion of the 
Pact and its resistance to proposals for increasing state spending on reserve develop- 
ment nullified much of the discussions in the early 1920s at the time of the Native 
Affairs Act. This does not mean that the change of government in 1924 necessarily 
represented a political hiatus since many of the ideas of Hertzogian segregation were 
implicitly rooted in the earlier discussion under the Smuts administration of 1919 to 
1924. But what did become clear as the 1 920s progressed was that South African 
native policy was falling further behind British colonial policies of indirect rule in 
other parts of Africa as the government, under pressure from settler farming and 
mining interests, proved increasingly reluctant to provide the resources for African 
tribal institutions to develop or for increased spending on African education. 
While the E340,000 spent on African education in 1921-22 nearly doubled to over 
E600/000 by 1931-2, the Native Taxation and Development Act acted as a rigid 
form of taxation that provided a fund incapable of sustained development 
55 
and by 
the time of the 1932 Report of the Native Economic Commission it became increasingly 
recognised that the state would have to provide a growing capital contribution to 
provide the resources and infrastructure for the reserves to function effectively under 
a modernising African political elite. But until such thinking becam'e clarified 
by this Report, acting as it did under the legacy of growing African militancy in 
rural areas as a consequence of 1. C. U. influences, the Official policy at govern- 
mental remained obfuscated. Thus, the only alternative centre for develop- 
ITO 
mentalist ideas in the reserves (apart, of course, from the more revolutionary 
proposals of the Communists) were the white liberals in the Jo-int Councils. 
By the latter part of the 1920s, thinking in these quarters began to move towards 
a coherent strategy of educational mobilisation, taking off from the earlier and 
piecemeal Tuskegee approaches of the early 1920s, geared towards the systematic 
inculcation of western economic values and the cash nexus into the African 
peasantry in the reserves. Such thinking received a considerable fillip after 
the arrival of William Ballinger in 1928 and the split in the 1. C. U. leading to 
its effective demise as a separate and autonomous African institution capable of 
resisting white liberal control of African political activities. But it reflected 
too a conscious liberal attack on government policy as successive efforts to work 
in collaboration with the Pact proved unsuccessful. This was especially the 
case with such I iberals as Edgar Brookes and W. M. Macmillan who, by the end 
of the decade, found themselves effectively rebutted in their efforts to instil into 
govern ment segregationist thinking a recognition of the need for a strategy of 
educational and economic development. It was, in fact, only as a consequence 
of the more circumambient route of the Native Economic Commission that these 
ideas had a significant impact on government thinking by the middle 1930s, in the 
more optimistic climate of the United Party government of Hertzog and Smuts. 
But by then, the South African economy had come out of the more depressed state 
it was in during most of the I 920s. For the meantime white liberals were forced 
to look to their own individual efforts as the attempts by Brookes and Macmillan 
proved so inauspicious. 
Attempts at re-thinking segregation: Edgar Brookes and W. M. Macmillan 
The previous sections of this chapter have indicated that many of the 
crucial elements in the ideological reformulation of segregation had already 
occurred before the triumph of the Pact in 1924. Pressures towards industrial 
segregation made themselves felt under the South African Partý government of Smuts, 
which passed early in 1924 an Industrial Conciliation Act that confined collective 
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bargaining machinery to only whites and coloureds. After 1924, the Pact 
Government elaborated this policy by passing the Wage Act in 1925 and the 
"Colour Bar" Act of 1926, the former protecting unskilled white workers and the 
latter the skilled and semi-skilled. Linked to this was the espousal of a pro- 
gramme of "segregation" which, while initially formulated by Hertzog in terms of 
strict white-black territorial demarcation, 
56 
came increasingly after 1924 to be 
seen in terms of the "liberal" model of providing a third "neutral" area for a black 
rural petty bourgeoisie. One of the initial influences for this change in Hertzog's 
thinking, or at least a return to the position of his 1912 Land Bill was that of Edgar 
Brookes who was at the time teaching at the Transvaal University College in 
Pretoria. Despite coming from a Natal English background, Brookes developed 
strongly pro-Nationalist sympathies and in an influential monograph accepted as a 
Ph. D. thesis, The History of Native Policy i-n South Africa from 1830 to the Present 
Day, argued on the basis of a positivist view of history developed from the then 
influential Introduction to Political Science by J. R. Seeley that territorial segre- 
gqtion was the fulfilment of South African historical processes. 
57 
The Nationalist 
sympathies revealed in the book led to English publishers refusing to publish it, 
unless certain passages were excised, so Brookes accordingly sent a copy to Hertzog 
in February of 1924 for his opinion on possible publication. 
58 
This request came 
at a delicate time politically: Hertzog had no clear "policy" on the "native 
question" and even admitted as much after the Pact Victory in 1924, while at the 
same time there was an ideological vacuum within the Nationalist Party. Basing 
most of his political appeal on the industrial segregation and Republican issues, 
Hertzog had not yet begun to come under systematic pressure from within his own 
party to define Afrikaner Nationalism on a more strongly ethnic basis. The 
Broederbond/ founded in 1918, had gone under ground in 1922 and, though its 
ideological leadership in the mid-1920s shifted from Johannesburg to Potchefstroom 
under the chairmanship of Professor J. C. van Rooy who was a strong advocate of 
"Kuyperianism" and the exclusiveness of ethnic identities, 
59 
this did not have any 
a5z 
immediate Political consequences. Indeed .it was on 
Iy after 1927 that the 
Bond began to undertake a programme of mass propaganda, aided after 1929 by 
the foundation of the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kul 
. 
turvereen ig ings. 
60 
Thus 
Brookes's appeal for assistance on publication of his manuscript came at a time 
when Hertzog. needed more systematic ideological backing for his policies. 
To this extent, the semi-historicist justification for segregation contained i. n 
Brookes's History was timely,, together with the fact that Hertzog found the work 
a valuable apologia pro vita sua in so far as it justified his stance in 1912 on the 
break with the Botha cabinet and his later claim to be the "true" author of the 
1913 Land Act. "If they had followed the draft bill of 1912 with its provisions 
for reserved areas - suggested by you as neutral areas", Hertzog wrote to Brookes 
on March 23 "your indictment of the Act of 1913 would never have been necessary. 1161 
In the event Hertzog gave his support to Brookes's efforts at publication 
and the History was eventually published by Die Nasionale Pers in Cape Town. 
it was clear, too, that Hertzog's thinking moved in the direction suggested by 
Brookes and the policy that was then dominant in the Native Affairs Commission 
and the thinking of the Smuts government. "I wish to assure you of my almost 
unqualified approval of your solution of this most difficult problem of native 
policy", Hertzog continued to Brookes: 
In fact, ever since 1912 1 have been a constant advocate 
of this policy of differentiation - political, territorial 
and economical. Unfortunately, for lack of a more 
appropriate term at the time, and under the circumstances, 
I spoke of it as a policy of segregation, and thereby opened 
the field for a variety of misconceptions, not the least of 
these being what you call residential segregation the folly 
of which I have all along felt no less deeply than you do. 62 
For the following three years, therefore, Brookes campaigned for Hertzog 
and the Nationalists and sought to exercise political influence on their segregation 
programme. 
63 Such ideas revealed., though, some contin, uity with the thinking 
of I ibera Is under the S. A. P. government of Smuts. Interpreting Hertzog's scheme 
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to the Rand Daily Mail, for instance, Brookes argued that it "had been very 
largely misunderstood" for it was "not a scheme for the immediate division of 
the country into sets of areas in one of which only white and in the other only 
black people will be permitted to live". Furthermore, "as regards land, 
(the scheme) simply means the addition of neutral areas to the existing "black" 
and "white" areas of the Natives Land Act. In these neutral areas natives 
would be permitted to buy land as freely as Europeans. In effect it means 
legislation finding greater land facilities for the deserving and progressive 
native". This re-emphasis on rural development and creating agricultural 
opportunities for the African petty bourgeoisie also, of course, coincided with 
Hertzog's policies for industrial segregation: 
In existing native areas the plan is to develop native 
agriculture and native kraal handicrafts with suitable 
marketing arrangements, in order, by a gradual process, 
to withdraw natives from mines and factories, making 
room for the surplus of unemployed whites ... The 
whole object of this so-called 'economic segregation' is 
to reduce to a minimum economic competition between 
white and black and subsequent race friction and race 
ha tred. 64 
The similarity of these ideas with those of the liberals on the Joint 
Councils and the Phelps-Stokes Commission in the early 1920s was evidenced in 
June of 1924 when Brookes arranged for Jesse Jones to interview Hertzog as part 
of the Phelps-Stokes Commission's tour of the Transvaal. Brookes was anxious 
for the Commission to understand the Nationalist Party's "native policy" which, 
as he had previously explained in the Rand Daily Mail, he felt to be "mis- 
understood". This was especially important, Brookes felt., in the light of the 
Commission's standing in both America and Britain where the Commission was in 
"close touch" with the recently appointed British Imperial Commission on Natives 
Affairs in Tropical Africa after its 1921 report on education in Africa that was 
considered "authoritative and final". In these circumstances, the recently- 
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elected Pact government could not afford to ignore the Commission, Brookes 
argued, especially if it was to present a better image in native affairs: 
Part of the propaganda used against the National Party in 
the past - and largely accepted overseas - is that our 
Native Policy is illiberal, reactionary and unjust. No 
better opportunity of dispelling this slander could be ob- 
tained than by convincing the Phelps-Stokes Commission of 
the Party's good intentions in the sphere of Native Affairs. 65 
This public relations role of Brookes continued throughout 1924 and 1925 
when Hertzog effectively made Brookes's History appear as the definitive ideological 
base for the Nationalist programme on segregation. In response to a request from 
the Secretary of the Party in the Cape, copies were despatched to a number of 
opinion leaders in both the Nationalist and Labour Parties while a further 100' 
copies were available for distribution to local party stalwarts. 
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The book 
indeed appears to have had a fairly wide circulation among influential sections of 
the governing class of the time. The Labour Minister in the Pact, T. Boydell, 
for example, considered the book "the standard work on the native question in 
South Africa". 67 
At the level of policy, however, Brookes's ideas seem to have influenced 
Hertzog only in the first year or so of the Pact Government. In a speech at 
Smithfield in November 1925, Hertzog outlined the Pact "native" policy and its 
scheme for removing the African voters from the common roll in the Cape and their 
replacement by seven representatives in the House of Assembly and a Union Native 
Council. The assumptions of this policy grew, in considerable measure, out of 
the previous mechanisms of "consultation" which had been established in the 
Eastern Cape through the council system under the Glen Grey Act and the two 
councils in the Transkei., the Transkeian Territories General Council and the 
Pondoland General Council., which were eventually to be merged' in 1931 to form 
the United Transkeian General Council or Bunga. In additiýn the Hertzog 
scheme reflected the growing emphasis in native policy upon communal as opposed 
I S*V 
to individual tenure and the enhanced role being played by "tribal" structures. 
Thus the Union Native Council was perceived as being essentially "advisory" in 
nature to start with "as the Natives qualify themselves for the task of self- 
government and as the Council acquires influence and confidence amongst the 
various Native tribes". On the other hand, Hertzog also recognised - 
probably as a result of Brookes' s influence - that the land provisions of the 
1913 Land Act needed to be extended so that "within al I Native areas the 
Native is trained and encouraged to be as much as possible self-reliant, to make 
those areas as attractive as possible for himself, and also to govern himself as 
far as possible". 
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The differences between Hertzog and Brookes, which were 
to grow as the discussion on legislation developed, revolved essentially around 
the respective emphases they placed on the role and position of non-tribal and 
kholwa African farmers in the creation of a rural African petty bourgeoisie. 
Initiating a debate that was in ma-ny ways to be repeated in the I 950s between 
69 Dr. Verwoerd and the Tomlinson Commission over the role of Bantu Authorities, 
Hertzog emphasised the role of "tribes" in the rural areas within which the kholwa 
class of African farmers were to fit and the overall importance of communal tenure 
on the pattern initiated by the Smuts government after . 
1921 . Brookes, on the 
hand, emphasised the need to create increased opportunities for non-tribal or 
"detribalised" kholwa with the implicit assumption that there was a need for 
enhanced individual land tenure. 
The differences emerged more clearly in the course of 1926 after the 
publication of Hertzog's four draft bills. Presenting a memorandum to the 
government, Brookes sought 'to modify policy in the direction of providing for 
increased scope for the kholwa. Thus, separate elections for "tribal" and "de- 
tribalised" Africans were suggested for the Union Native Council on the grounds 
that "their interests and outlook are very different". "As the Act now stands", 
Brookes continued, "the qualified Cape voter not only loses his Parliamentary 
, 111 
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franchise, but does not exercise a direct vote even for members of his own counci . 
256 
The implications of this were serious for the development of channels of communi- 
cation and "consultation" with the rural kholwa if the scheme was to be at all 
viable: 
The articulate and informed Native criticism on this Bill 
is that of the detribalised Natives, whom it is important 
to satisfy so far as possible. They in any case will, 
through their education, be the leaders of the Council, 
and it is with them that the Government wil I have to work., 
and their good-will and co-operation that will be needed 
to make the scheme a success. 71 
Brookes, therefore, suggested a modification of the Government scheme 
which allowed for the election of representatives of "detribalised" Africans or 
for those living in urban locations through chiefs, headmen or local councils 
established under the 1920 Native Affairs Act. The aim of Brookes's alternative 
method was the preservation of the independent voting power of the educated 
African kholwa established in the Cape and for their direct election of represent- 
atives to the Union Native Council to ensure a majority in their favour of at 
least one. 
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A similar objective was revealed in Brookes's proposal that the seven 
representatives in the House of Assembly be Africans or that they be allowed to 
have full membership rights. While such a scheme "could hardly be granted 
at once at the present juncture", Brookes impressed on Hertzog the need to co-opt 
the "detribalised" African petty bourgeoisie by providing them with a political 
platform on lines already pursued tentatively by the Joint Councils. 11 In 
conversation with a group of advanced and rather 'agitator' natives the other day", 
Brookes continued in his memorandum, "I was spontaneously and unanimously assured 
that, where the concession granted that they might be represented in the House by 
men of their own colour., all opposition would be dropped and nothing else asked 
for ". 
73 Such recognition of the need to co-opt the kholwa'was also manifested 
in Brookes desire to see portions of land in Released Areas, set up under the Natives 
'L f? 
Land Act, 1913, Amendment Bill, set aside for "village settlements" for "de- 
tribalised natives" who wish to leave the towns either voluntarily or as a result 
of the Government's 'civilised labour policy' ". 
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Brookes's hopes, however, clashed with other powerful pressures acting 
on the Hertzog policy which were pushing it in a direction very much at variance 
with a scheme for co-optation of the "detribalised" kholwa and urban petty 
bourgeoisie. While, hitherto, Hertzog might have been influenced to a greater 
or lesser extent by Brookes's ideas - though he probably saw the chief value in 
Brookes as a party ideologist as opposed to actual policy maker - by the end of 
1926 the mobil isation of agricultural and mining interests in favour of the extension 
of migrant labour inside the -Union, 
75 
combined with a growing political backlash 
to the extension of 1. C. U. organisation to the rural areas, 
76 led to the emergence 
of political opposition to some of the features embodied in the Hertzog scheme. 
Even at the time of the debate on Hertzog's Native Taxation and Development Bill 
in July 1925, there had been some opposition to what was seen as the reduction in 
the "control of the kraal head over the young native". 
77 
But as the scheme was 
elaborated at Smithfield in November the same year, political protests became 
more voca 1. Arthur Barlow, for instance, as an ardent exponent of segregation 
in the Orange Free State declared that ". .. if (Hertzog) is going to allow the 
Native to choose their own representatives in the Free State for Parliament,, then 
he wil I be up against a storm of opposition on the part of al I the younger men. I 
shall certainly oppose him in this direction through thick and thin". 
78 
Likewise, 
in the Transvaal,, the Head Committee of the Nationalist Party appointed a sub- 
committee on "the native question" which rejected any idea of giving Africans 
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representation in Parliament or a vote in the Transvaal for Parliamentary elections. 
Opposition such as this may well have been a crucial factor in Hertzog's growing 
reliance upon the use of external political advisers in the drawing' up of legislation 
and, an 'increasing abandonment of much of the former state apporatus for native 
affairs which had been bequeathed by the Smuts government. The Native Affairs 
211? 
Department,, under increasing control from the Department of Justice in the early 
1920s, appears to have exercised little influence in the drawing up of the bills 
of 1926.80 Loram from the vantage point of the isolated Native Affairs 
Commission, disclaimed all responsibility for the Land Bill in 1926 and declared 
that it came, not from the Native Affairs Department but was "the work of H's 
political friends". 
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Likewise, in the case of the Native Administration Bill 
which the Government succeeded in passing in the course of 1927, the real 
authorship seems to have been the Department of Justice which revised an original 
Native Affairs Department draft with close collaboration between one of the 
Department's law advisers, E. L. Mathews, and Oswald Pirow who later succeeded 
Tielman Roos as Minister of Justice. 
82 kv -C 4A the growing tendency to 
subordinate the Native Affairs Department to political machinery under direct 
control of the government via the Minister of Justice, the Act vested in the 
Governor-General in Council wide powers to legislate by proclamation and 
regulation on the model operating in the Transkei, while also, as a result of 
amendment in Select Committee, extending the Natal model of Shepstone by 
appointing the Governor-General Supreme Chief over the African population in 
South Africa. Reflecting this move towards extending state control in native 
policy and abandoning, for the meanwhile, any policy of political co-optation, 
the Minister of Justice, Tielman Roos, evidenced willingness to neutralise the 
urban African petty bourgeoisie: 
The Supreme Chief gets the power in the fullest sense of the 
word that a chief would have if there was one chief for the 
whole of the natives. I regard it as of the very greatest 
importance that those powers should be conferred upon the 
Governor-General., not only in respect of natives who are 
living under the tribal system, but also over detribalised 
and exempted natives ... who in many cases, are the 
principal agitators in South Africa today. If you have 
the power to remove them from one place where they do 
mischief to a place where they do not do mischief, what a 
useful provision that would be. 83 
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Roos's Act was directed principally at the attempts at organisation of 
African workers by the 1. C. U. and the Communist'Party in the late 1920s, and 
the "Hostility Law" , as it was known, was used against activists like Stanley 
Silwana, Bransby Ndobe and John Gomas who. were accused, under clause 29, 
of actions intended "to promote feeling(s) of hostility between Natives and 
Europeans". The three, as a result., spent three months in jail after protesting 
against the shooting of an African by police in Paarl. 
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The Native Administration Act can be seentherefore as, in some 
senses, introducing a hiatus in relations between the government and white 
liberals on the nature and evolution of "native policy". Hitherto, white 
liberals had given cautious support for Hertzogs policy and they had been supported 
by some sections of the African petty bourgeoisie, both rural and urban, who saw in 
land segregation opportunities for business and land speculation. With the govern- 
ment's increasing move away from individual to communal tenure and the extension 
of rule through legally defined "tribes" on an indirect rule basis following the 
Native Administration Act., scope for the African petty bourgeoisie through the 
government's segregation policy looked increasingly less certain. In addition., 
following the disastrous series of droughts in the 1 920s, the concept of "development" 
of the African reserve looked jaded. The Government continued its 
programme of agricultural schools and appointed a Union Director of Native Agri- 
culture in 1929, R. W. Thornton, but it was clear that the overal thrust of policy 
became increasingly one of relegating the reserves to the status of labour reservoirs 
for industry and agriculture. In 1926 90 African families were ejected from the 
East London district and told to go to a government farm at Peddie: they were, 
however, only to have 140 head of cattle in all and though they had all previously 
been farmers, only 44 of the 90 families were allowed to have lots, while the rest 
received only building sites with no gardens. 
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This overcrowding of the 
reserves and their continuing denudation as a result of over-grazing was made 
26c 
plain in a report furnished by the Native Affairs Department from W. M. Macmillan, 
but never published. Before leaving South African to pursue historical research 
at All Souls College, Oxford, where he published the path-breaking Complex 
South Africa in 1930, Macmillan published a series of articles At The Roots in The 
Cape Times. While confronting some of the traditional liberal dilemmas in 
South Africa through warning against government measures which, while "designed 
to save white civilisation in South Africa" might still "utterly destroy it by 
hastening the process of transforming the natives into a landless proletariat", 
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Macmillan nevertheless destroyed certain assumptions about the conduct of "native 
policy" with respect to the reserves. Basing much of his analysis on research in 
the Eastern Cape, especially in Herschel, Macmillan developed what can be seen 
as an early attempt at an 'underdevelopment' theory. The simple, unilinear 
moderal of orthodox liberal thinking regarding native agriculture was, in Macmillan's 
eyes, inadequate when it came to explaining problems of capital accumulation in 
the reserve economies. Indeed, following a model of circular causation similar 
to that later used by Gunnar Myrdal, 
87 
Macmillan pointed out the limited scope 
for business opportunities in contexts of extreme economic scarcity: 
In parts of the Territories one hears of the rise of native 
money-lenders or "capitalists". Of course, evidence 
of natives of really considerable wealth there is little or 
none. Where the mass is so very poor and the spirit of 
mutual communal assistance still so very strong, mere 
accumulation is beset by the demands of poorer neighbours, 
and of the brothers of the large tribal " family" to an 
extent difficult for us in an individualist society to 
appreciate. 
The situation of scarcity led Macmillan to warn further against the common liberal 
assumption that the educated kholwa and petty bourgeoisie necessarily held the 
leadership positions in the reserves. Economic change in the reserves in the 
direction of labour reservoirs did not imply that the traditional class of chiefs 
and headmen lost all political influence: 
261 
As things are, the philosophers in th'is state would not be 
kings. In practice, no doubt, and in the long run 
education wi II count for leadership. But for the present, 
evidence suggests that the degree of their civilisation is 
an unreliable guide to the grades of native society, and the 
most influential leaders may well be some shrewd old fellows 
dressed in blankets. These and not the modern and younger 
men are the leaders of suspicion and discontent rife in some 
districts like Herschel. The leading malcontents, strongly 
aided and abetted by many of the women, are often men of 
the old school, backward - in the local phrase "reaction- 
aries". 
condition, too, that was not helped, Macmillan argued, by the recent legislation 
that aided traditional authorities and was within a year to be further bolstered by 
the Native Administration Act. 
These arguments suggested a rethinking in "development" theories and a 
shift away from the Glen Grey ideal in many liberals' minds and a search for more 
"efficient" methods of agriculture. The Native Development Fund Macmillan 
showed to be completely inadequate as a means for developing the reserves, for in 
the Cape, especially, this meant an increase in taxation from 20S or even 12s a 
head to 30s a head, cutting even further into the potential for peasant credit. 
Even on existing trends, Macmillan calculated, a district like Herschel was becoming 
approximately 50% dependent for its income on the cash earnings of migrant labour: 
out of a population of 40,000, he estimated that the total annual outlay of some 
E70,000 to E1001000 was met by about F-401000 from produce and anything up to 
E30,000 in wage earnings. In the context of existing government strategies, 
Macmillan pointed out, the situation of further underdevel, opment (with development 
for a tiny few) was exacerbated by the policy of industrial segregation: 
The Government hope to reduce the general reliance on 
native labour is utterly futile because the natives must in 
fact earn wages - or starve. The whole of this 
description of actual conditions has tended to show how 
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hopeless it is to-day to expect the Reserves otherwise to 
support even their present population. Their standard 
of living could not be lower and their poverty makes the 
natives a drag on the country and their competition with 
unskilled whites quite deadly. They can find an outlet, 
now and for long years to come, only in European areas; 
and for the public opinion of this country (i. e. White 
opinion - P. R. )- either ignoring or ignorant of such 
facts as these - to begin its attempt at a national policy 
by such a mere negative as the "civil ised labour" policy, 
and by the Colour Bar Bi II, is much worse than inept. 
The position of the Reserves and of the natives as a whole 
is far too serious to admit of measures closing the better 
sort of avenues long open to them, barring the progress of 
their ablest individuals, and therefore pressing the masses 
of them down to stil I lower depths of poverty. 88 
The assumptions of Macmillan's arrangements were still implicitly segre- 
gationist in that he still foresaw a future condition when there would be a situation 
where self-sufficient African communities would be served by their "ablest 
individuals" and, like the government, he accepted this as a goal of policy. Bult 
the means to obtain this he radically, disagreed about and, unlike the liberals of the 
early 1920s, challenged the assumptions of industrial segregation and the relocation 
of African wage earners, as far as it was possible, back into rural communities. 
To this extent, Macmillan's writings, which were to be elaborated more fully in 
Complex South Africa, marked an important development in liberal thinking at a 
critical time politically. 
For the years 1926-27 also marked the beginning of political cleavages 
between white liberals and the government which were only alleviated in some 
degree by the Native Bills of 1936 and the creation of new political platforms of 
co-optation, whereby white liberals and their African allies were granted a slightly 
wider framework of political discussion via the creation of Natives Representatives 
in the Senate and House of Assembly and the Natives Representative Council. 
In 1927, however, it seemed to most liberals that the existing structures via the 
Native Affairs Commission were inadequate to influence the government when 
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the Native Administration Act could be passed with its "hostility clause". 
Loram and Roberts continued on the Commission for a further two years., but 
realised that they were increasingly ineffective; even Brookes realised, as 
well, that his attempts to exercise some form of "liberal moderation" upon 
Hertzog had been in vain as the government came under growing pressure from 
agricultural and mining interests to extend labour migrancy and restrict the 
potential of the reserves. Though still championing the overal I ideology of 
the government in 1927 in a book entitled The Political Future of South 
Afr i ca , 
90 
Brookes began a period of re-assessment during a visit to the United 
States in the same year. Seeing for the first time the urban dimension of the 
Tuskegee philosophy, compared to its rural side so emphasised in South Africa, 
Brookes was made aware of the potentials of an urban black petty bourgeoisie 
which had grown up in a number of the larger American cities. 
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"I learned 
in the United States"., Brookes recalled, "what more penetrating and thorough 
research might have shown me in my own country - the salutary lesson that 
the black man was capable of considerable achievement in a milieu of white 
civilisation. Simple though this lesson may have been, naive as was the 
young man who learned it, it had a devastating effect on my theories of separate 
development". 
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In actual practice, the effect was not as profound as Brookes 
later liked to imagine for he merely tended to emphasise the role of the urban, 
as opposed to the rural, African petty bourgeoisie, moving as such to a position 
by 1931 where he saw himself "standing for the old Cape policy" and aligning 
with the South African Party of Smuts. 
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There was also in this a high degree 
of personal political ambition for Hertzog had never formally offered Brookes a 
political post in the Pact and Brookes frequently confessed to political ambitions 
and sought in 1931 the SAP candidacy for Woodstock in Cape Town, though 
without success. 
94 
The "retraction" of Brookes, and later public confes*Sion at the Fort Hare 
Conference in 1930 of earlier mistakes 
95 
marked, nevertheless, a significant swing 
24 
in white liberal opinion away from close co-operation with government policy 
and a move towards African political organisation. This trend was to gain 
momentum from the growing divisions in the 1. C. U. in the late I 920s and the 
importation of William Ballinger, a trade unionist from Motherwell in Scotland, 
as an adviser to Clements Kadalie. A significant figure in this was the 
novelist Winifred Holtby who, with fierce anti-communist views, saw Ballinger 
as a crucial figure in stemming what she perceived as a tide of increasing 
communist domination of the 1. C. U.: a view shared by a number of leading 
figures in the I LP and British T. U. C' -' such as 
Walter Citrine and Arthur 
Creech-Jones, who arranged for Ballinger's visit. This intervention, however., 
proved the thin end of the wedge for liberal involvement in African politics for 
it came at a time of growing disaffection inside the African National Congress to 
the leadership of J. T. Gumede. Though formerly one of Alexander Kerr's 
students from Lovedale, Gumede, as the A. N. C. 's President, along with a 
Communist Party delegate James La Guma, attended the Congress against 
Colonial Oppression and Imperialism in Brussels in February 1927 and as a result 
swung rapidly in a leftward direction. After returning from a visit to the 
Soviet Union in 1928, Gumede found himself confronted by political opposition 
of the chiefs and petty bourgeoisie, led by the builder T. M. Mapikela from 
Bloemfontein, after he defended the Soviet system; 
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and as a consequence 
the next two years of his presidency were marked by increasing disaffection until 
he was finally removed at the A. N. C. Congress in 1930 in Bloemfontein and 
replaced by the conservative Pixley Seme with chiefs' support. By this time 
Ballinger's attempts to remodel the 1. C. U. on orthodox British trade union I ines 
exacerbated the splits already developing in the Union such that Clements 
Kadalie, though formerly opposed to Communist participation in the Union and 
the moving force behind the expulsion of communists in 1927 foll-owing the 
Brussels conference of the League Against Imperialism, himself moved leftwards 
as he condemned what he saw as Ballinger's attempts to take over control of the 
abf 
Union with whita liberal allies. 
97 
Asa result, by 1929, the 1. C. U. split 
into a number of factions with a group dominated by Allison Champion, The 
1. C. U. yase Natal, operating in Natal, The Independent 1. C. U. led by 
Kadal ie operating from East London and a third group, The 1. C. U. of Africa 
supporting Ballinger. The sp-lit in the African union which at the height of 
its influence had claimed up to 200,000 members 
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nevertheless provided 
white liberals with a growing power base to influence the nature and course of 
African political organisation. Starting from William Ballinger's control of 
the 1. C. U. of Africa, and with the A. N. C. proving increasingly ineffective 
under Seme's corrupt leadership, white liberals were in a strong position to 
develop their theories of rural "development" in the early 1930s on the basis 
of models of economic co-operation. Until the 1936 legislation provided 
alternative foci for political activity, this scheme for African co-operatives 
became the focus of liberal political discussion. 
The attempt at establishing co-operatives 
William Ballinger's arrival in South Africa in 1928 and subsequent take- 
over of the 1. C. U. of Africa was of considerable significance for white liberals 
in that he sought to elaborate upon a number of informal attempts at rural co- 
operation and development outside state control. The schemes for training 
agricultural demonstrators at Lovedale and Fort Hare continued after the election 
of the Pact, though in November of 1924 Paul Germond, in charge of the Fort 
Hare course, confessed to being disappointed with its lack of popularity among 
African farmers and its inadequate training in practical farm management. 
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The numbers of African farmers associations continued to grow too in the Eastern 
Cape such that by 1926 the first conference of the South African Native Farmers 
Conference could be held at Lovedale with 17 delegations presen t representing 
1 . 400 members and 
funds of El , 000. However, the associations in the Eastern 
Cape only represented for the most part the educated kholwa and richer peasantry 
2 64P 
and though, as we have seen, tentative attempts were made in the direction of 
pooling resources for agricultural machinery and improving agricultural methods, 
the model of the associations was not one that could be widely applied in the 
South African reserves. In addition the associations in the Cape became 
closely involved in political campaigns to defend the Cape franchise after the 
publication of the four bills in 1926 and many of the associations' members 
became involved in the Cape Native Voters Convention. As President of the 
Convention, D. D. T. Jabavu confessed to Sir Wa I ter Stanford in 1926 that "it 
is now taking us all our time to preserve our rights": 
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a situation which was 
even further exacerbated after the passage of the Native Administration Act in 
1927 and the involvement of the Convention in a series of legal wrangles 
(following the subpoenaing of an African farmer from King Williams Town in the 
case of Rex v Ndobi to produce his title deeds) over African land titles which 
were called in under the Act to be replaced by a series of uniform titles. 
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A model for rural development which was to prove much more attractive 
to Ballinger and which was seen to have wider applicability in the South African 
reserves by many white liberals, was undoubtedly that of Father Bernard Huss of the 
Mariannhill Mission in Natal. Huss had developed contacts with white liberals 
as early as 1922 when C. T. Loram had written to him asking him to "put on your 
thinking cap and do something for these poor natives who heed a helper and you 
are that helper". 
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In the tradition of the "helping hand", Huss developed 
the idea of generating the idea of "self help" on lines similar to the co-operative 
movement in Britain and the co-operative store founded at Rochdale; 
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imp - licit 
within this was the traditional missionary conception of moral as well as economic 
rejuvenation of African societies. "Without the development of their mental 
and moral resources", Huss wrote, "there can be no true, lasting and healthy 
material development. Only when the Africans have become mentally, morally 
and socially efficient, will they become economically efficient". 
104 
Huss's 
267 
activities in the 1920s did not go without opposition, however, and Garveyites 
heckled his meetings and formed branches of the 1. *C. U. to counteract his 
inf I uen ce , as a resu It of Ai ch Huss formed h'is own Cathol ic Afri can Un ion in 
1929.105 Though a critic of the "tribal system", in a memorandum drawn 
up for the Native Economic Commission in 1931 the Catholic African Union 
evidenced greater flexibility on the issue of communal tenure than the African 
farmers associations in the Eastern Cape. "Unrestricted and universal individual 
land tenure", the C. A. U. argued "would ... 
lead to the impoverishment of 
great masses of the native", necessitating a "middle way" through the establish- 
ment of "small communities under the jurisdiction of the chiefs or headmen, 
which have however a great deal of power of self government. The members 
of these communities may own some small plots by freehold tenure, but the greater 
part of the land - especially grazing land and forestry would belong collectively 
to the whole community so that the community may always have the necessary 
resources for the promotion of the general welfare of the whole community, as 
well as for the relief of its desitute members". In addition it was pointed out 
tha t: 
The establishment of such communities would provide 
employment for a great many Natives who are at present 
working in towns or are unemployed in the administration 
of the communities, the better development of the 
locations and other cultural works. 1 106 
This comparatively favourable attitude to communal tenure was very 
probably the reason why Huss's ideas were well received by Native Commissioners 
in the 1920s in areas like the Transkei. Courses on economics and co-operation 
were taught by Huss at Mariannhill after 1923 and were attended by numbers of 
Africans from the Transkei and in 1926 Huss was invited by the Chief Magistrate 
to address the Transkeian Bunga on co-operative credit. As a result of this and 
other frequent talks in the Transkei - one of which in Idutya*lasted six hours - 
a number of co-operative credit societies were formed. By January of 1928 Huss 
26it 
found some 20 societies in existence, two of which were reported as having over 
EI 500 circulating as loans among their members, while one had made E50 profit 
in its first year and circulated 200 bags of fertil-izer among its members. 
107 
Despite the Depression, it appears that the co-operative ideal continued in the 
Transkei in the early 1930s, for Howard Pim found in a survey of the Transkei 
that there were 36 societies in 1932 with total receipts of E25,000, though the 
movement's development was "less than was hoped for". 
108 Nevertheless, 
the apparent "success story" of Huss's movement kept alive the liberal ideal of 
rural development of the African reserves and the exclusion of African workers 
from the labour market. Thus in 1933, Huss could write: 
Fortunately the Natives of South African are to some extent 
independent from the vicissitudes of the political life of the 
country, in so far as they can find their livelihood in their 
own Reserves by carrying on their own trades amongst their 
own countrymen. It should therefore be always their chief 
aim to become as independent as possible from the world's 
labour market. 
Huss's ideas, therefore, can be seen as to some extent perpetuating into 
the late 1920s and early 1930s the earlier liberal views on paternalist segregation, 
which had come under attack by W. M. Macmillan, and provided a ready model 
for the schemes of Wi II iam Bal I inger and Howard Pim. The model of co-operative 
credit societies suggested the need for more active attempts by liberals to make the 
reserves economically viable. Following the Co-operatives Credit Act of 1922 
where provision was established for limited liability for co-operative societies, the 
movement gained increas'ing effectiveness in the 1920s in assisting farmers in South 
Africa and seemed readily applicable to the "problems" of the reserves. The 
frequent mistake the I iberals made in their analysis of the situation, though, was 
to assume that the mechanisms for' "development" in the African reserves were, 
substantially the same as other societies, such as Britain, in previous historical eras 
prior to economic "take off". Macmillan had made some inifial warnings against 
this in 1926, but after this he was in England until 1931 and returned to find his 
I 6q 
more radical ideas unacceptable in the Johannesburg Joint Council. 
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The 
evolutionist and neo-Darwinian assumptions of earlier liberal thinking, continued, 
therefore, to prevail when it came to understanding the course of economic change 
in the reserve economies despite the fact that more radical writers like Edward 
Roux, who returned from Cambridge in 1928 to lead the Communist-dominated 
League of African Rights, warned of an "agrarian revolt" as a result of the 
government's proposals to increase the farm labour supply by tightening the laws 
on squatting and increasing the number of days of compulsory labour demanded 
of labour tenants from 90 to 180 a year: 
III 
a scheme that was, indeed, to 
reach fruition in 1932 with the Native Service Contract Act. 
The reality was, in fact, substantially different from what liberals 
imagined. The peasantry in England in the period prior to the Industrial Revo- 
lution had not been herded into reserve economies and had been able to make use 
of the money market in economy as a whole. Indeed, contrary to the prevalent 
myth of continually associating the English peasantry with indebtedness., recent 
research has tended to revise the Tawney thesis (an important intellectual influence 
on Macmillan) of associating credit in the English peasantry with the need to ward 
off temporary shortages in agrarian economic activity. There have, instead, 
been indications that credit in the English peasantry was of sufficient volume as 
to negate any need in the eighteenth century to create a new money market, for 
one already existed. Furthermore, the widespread nature of this credit indicated 
that the peasantry was not at the mercy of a small class of money lenders who were 
in complete control of the money market. As B. A. Holderness has pointed out: 
In England, the combination of a considerable suplus above 
immediate consumption for a broad spectrum of agrarian 
society, at least in a long period analysis, the habit of 
using the surplus as credit, and the wide diffusion of lending 
among country people, was of particular importance in the 
process of economic development. Savings may not have 
equalled investment., but the peasant proclivit-y for hoarding 
gold under the bed was not very pronounced. The appar- 
; Z? v 
ently heavy commitment to consumption in the exploit- 
ation of these credit facilities may not have been an 
ideal component in the development of a credit market, 
but since credit facilities in rural communities formed a 
more or less integrated system by 1700 the most important 
consideration was the will to lend, not the destination of 
particular loans. 112 
In South Africa, however, the African peasantry was at the com'plete 
mercy of only a small number of money lenders for the supply of external credit 
in an economy dominated by mining and commercial and industrial capital. 
Furthermore., when it came to making greater use of internal resources for 
credit, these limitations on the mobilisation of credit hampered the development 
of a class of independent kulak farmers. The peasantry in the Eastern Cape 
had emerged in the nineteenth century in to a position of close economic 
dependence on white trading and commercial interests and the growth of 
individual African land tenure had, in turn, been managed by a class of 
powerful white lawyers and middlemen. Richard Rose-Innes, for instance, 
had managed a number of African property transactions and had been in a 
powerful position to determine the sources of African credit, shaping the business 
affairs of both John Tengo Jabavu and his son, Davidson Don Tengo Jabavu. 
As late as 1925, Richard Rose-Innes handled, together with his son, F. G. Rose- 
Innes, the property transactions of D. D. T. Jabavu. With the disasters of the 
drought in the mid-1920s, Jabavu sought the sale of a small-holding he owned 
at Rabula, some 40 miles from Middledrift. In the event, the sale does not 
appear to have gone through, for Jabctvu sti II owned the property at the time of 
his death in 1959.113 Nevertheless, Rose-Inne's attitude to the proposed sale 
indicated the degree of control exerted by white lawyers and financial brokers 
on the African property market. The Bond on the property was E600 on which 
Rose-Innes was prepared to reduce the interest from 8% to 7% "to ease matters". 
Rose-Innes, though, was unwilling to accept an African as mortgagor in place 
of Jabavu unless he fulfilled the conditions of "satisfactory 6nd continuous 
cultivation of the ground" and "prompt payment of interest for the half year 
III 
without bother or trouble". Preferring, in fact, "a German agriculturalist 
as a buyer, if such a one could be found", he iM'posed the condition of payment 
of the E600 bond in cash on the African farmer, James Mbiko, who was actually 
farming the property at the time and wished to buy it. "What guarantee", 
asked Rose-Innes of Alexander Kerr, " have I that he (Mbiko) wil I do better 
under the new arrangement than under the old one? "l 
14 
In addition to this external control over African credit and property 
transactions, there was also in South Africa the feature of labour migrancy and 
its effect on the "will to lend" in the reserve economies. The psychological 
impact has been observed by Sandra Wallman and others in the case of Lesotho, 
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but little attention has been paid to the effects on the South African reserves. 
Clearly similar features manifested themselves in the form of defining attitudes 
towards agricultural innovation. Selective evidence emerged even by the end 
of the 1920s to the proponents of co-operative model that the introduction of the 
cash nexus via labour migrancy hindered rather than aided agricultural innovation. 
Margaret Hodgson, later Margaret Ballinger, noted in her diary in 1929, for 
example, that in the Ciskei starvation and severe economic stress did not necessarily 
encourage migrant labour for "all prefer to starve together", especially as the 
voluntary system of labour recruitment meant that a migrant had to sign on for 
work in Johannesburg before he could get any advances for his family. This 
reluctance to migrate also explained in part the growing overcrowding in the 
locations as squatters who were supposed to have been removed under the 1923 
Act stayed "partly because people themselves won't expel them - naturally 
they are their relations - partly because there is nowhere for them to go" and 
thus in turn aiding further landlessness. 
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Furthermore, evidence emerged 
from the survey of the Transkei by Howard Pim that when Africans did migrate, 
little of the wages that were returned actually went on agricultural innovation: 
of the sales of 90 stores., for instance., only 8% was on agricultural implements 
and fencing. 
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Finally, and in many ways most crucially, there was the issue 
2 lz 
of African class differentiation which white liberals were forced to re-assess. 
Until Macmillan's warning about the potential for "reactionary" sections of the 
African peasantry leading organised resistance, it had been a cardinal article 
of liberal wisdom that the educated class of kholwa were in the vanguard of 
economic change: this, for instance, had been the basis of Brookes's formulation 
of rural segregation and Loram's ideas on restructuring African education to enhance 
a ru, ral African peasantry, schooled in the skills and values of industrial training, 
Tuskegeeism and the Jeanes Schools. As the 1920s progressed, however,, it no 
longer became so plain that even the African elite was going to maintain itself in 
the vanguard of a model of progressive change, as migrant labour increasingly_ 
restructured the reserves into labour reservoirs. The effect of subordinating 
African agriculture in the reserves was, to some considerable extent, to de- 
emphasise the more "traditional" distinctions between "School" and "red", 
educated and "traditional" which had been one of the cardinal assumptions behind 
the nineteenth century missionary enterprise and the folk wisdom, too, of a 
considerable amount of later anthropological research. William Beinart, for 
instance., has shown for the inter-war period that there were a considerable 
number of bridging factors introduced by labour migrancy in Pondoland which 
overlay the "School-Red" gap, though how far this can be extrapolated to other 
reserves remains problematical. 
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The Native Administration Act of 1927 
had the effect of revamping the powers of the tribal chiefs and the belief of the 
liberals, such as Brookes in his memorandum of 1926 to Hertzog, in enhancing 
as far as possible the influence of the educated School elite as the basis of a 
class of African master farmers, received a severe jolt through the economic 
denudation of the later 1920s. By 1929 and the failure of Jabavu's campaign 
to resist the Rex v Ndobi judgement on African land-ownership, it seemed that 
a reformulation of liberal ideology towards the African rural elite became 
essential. 
An important influence on this was the experience of the liberals in 
42 
fighting the Cape African franchise issue. The combination of depriving, the 
rural African political class of the vote, together with increasing restrictions 
on the African small-holders' ability to develop as a result of increased taxation 
through the 1925 Native Taxation and Deve lopmen t Act as we II as the in itiation 
in 1929 by the Native Affairs Department of a reserve reclamation scheme al I 
illustrated the incr--asing loss of independent control by missionary and liberal 
educational schemes over the African political elite. "Strong government and 
heavy taxes are identical" wrote Marx in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte: 
By its very nature, small holding property forms a suitable 
basis for an all-powerful and innumberable bureaucracy. 
It creates a uniform level of relationships and persons over 
the whole surface of the land. Hence it also permits of 
uniform action from a supreme centre on all points of this 
uniform mass. It annihilates the aristocratic intermediate 
grades between the mass of the people and the state power. 
On all sides, therefore, it calls forth the direct interference 
of this state power and the interposition of its immediate 
organs. 119 
It was this threat from the central state in South Africa towards liberal 
ideological hegemony over the African population in the reserves -a threat which 
successively increased in the first half of the twentieth century to culminate in the 
establishment of Bantu Authorities in 1951 and the national isation of the missions 
through the 1953 Bantu Education Act - that led to the shift in liberal thinking 
away from the more traditional form of paternalism rooted in the old Cape 
assimilationist ideal. Doubtless the growth of African worker consciousness after 
the first world war and the growth of the 1. C. U. amongst rura I African farm workers 
played a considerable role in this too, but it was the threat from the state to the 
I ibera I -controlled "aristocratic intermediate grades" which forced a reformulation 
of liberal ideology in the direction of the assimilation of the educated African elite 
into a common society governed by the values of "western civilisation". A large 
part of this reformulation took place in terms of a debate on education, with 
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institutions such as Fort Hare being seen as critical in the dissemination of 
positivistic and scientific values to a. pascent African intelligentsia. Native 
education is not a thing apart" said. Alexander Kerr in 1931 1 "but one branch 
of educat. ion in general. There is at most nothing that can be said about 
education that cannot at the same time be said about Native education ... 
But lately the education of the young has become so much an accepted part of 
the activity of the organised State that few of us stay to put the question. Yet 
clearly it is a question that ought to be asked, otherwise the end of the activity 
is likely to be blurred and its complete achievement frustrated". The answer 
to the question for Kerr lay in the enhancement of education as a bridge-building 
exercise in order to ensure that "peace and harmoney are to prevail ... between 
its separate communities": 
No such understanding or appreciation is possible unless 
there is some common ground between the groups, some 
knowledge of the fundamental elements that underlie all 
civilisation., whatever be the character of the superstructure 
that is raised on the foundations. Such knowledge can 
only come through the processes of education, and the higher 
the education the more thorough the knowledge. 120 
This formulation of liberal education coincided to a considerable degree 
with the conception of inter-racial "harmony" underpinning the creation of the 
Institute of Race Relations in 1929. Furthermore, it illustrated both the- liberal 
requirement to respond to the burgeoning role of the state in "native admini- 
stration" (with the concomitant decline in the old Native Affairs Department to 
that of the Department of Justice) as well as defining an area where liberal 
activity and predominance could be maintained. The "assimilationist" ideals 
underlying liberals ideals on education, therefore., were at the same time capable 
of being accommodated to whatever "superstructure", in Kerr's, words, predom- 
inated. In other words, pace Shingler and Legassick, assimilation did not 
preclude the continuation of a segregationist policy by the state and was only 
likely to directly. clash with it if liberals felt in a sufficiently influential position 
-to do so. 
For the 1920s and early 1930s this political influence by the liberals 
was considerably lacking and the ideals tended to. be merely stated. "During 
the last five years", said Howard Pim to a St. George's Day banquet of the 
Southern Transvaal Lodge of the Sons of England in April 1929, "1 have had many 
opportunities of gauging the capacity of this (educated) class of native, and my 
feeling that that are very like ourselves has steadily grown1l. Consequently 
they "should receive every inducement we can give them to become civilised": 
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how, though, was this to be achieved? Pim privately confessed to doubts in 
the commonly accepted "capacity" of the African population in South Africa as 
a whole to respond to the western market model as the basic stimulus to economic 
development. "I am wondering", he wrote to Sir James Rose-Innes in January 
19301, "if we have begun to understand I iving alongside a people to whom 
competition is unknown and markets. Who hold all necessities of life in 
common ... How can the rules of our economics 
be applied? " 
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The question increasingly confronted liberals by the early 1930s as, with 
an early version of "limited good" governing their perspective of the "failure" of 
the reserves to respond to market challenges, liberal ideologists looked to alter- 
native methods of economic regeneration. The subject had led to a debate in 
the Johannesburg Joint Council where an economic commitee had been established 
to include W. M. Macmillan, William Ballinger, Margaret Hodgson, Selby Msimang 
and A. B. Xuma 
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and the co-operative model on lines similar to. those already 
experimented with by Father Huss clearly tended to be favoured. William 
Ballinger's influence in this respect was especially crucial for having been drawn 
into Joint Councils circles at a relatively early stage, he was in a position to 
influence white liberal thinking with co-operative stores in his native Motherwell 
before he came to South Africa. Furthermore., by 1930 Ballinger had become 
disillusioned with the whole idea of trade unionism for Africans. "The 1. C. U. 
is much more adapted in policy and structure", he wrote to Arthur Creech Jones, 
"for mass production - the next phase of industrial development in Africa - 
176 
than are the other unions". 
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Ballinger's keenness to turn away from the 
formal organisation of workers towards land schemes was probably one reason for 
the receptiveness of a number of white liberals to his ideas on co-operatives, 
marking a distinct shift from 1927 when, in the first edition of the Joint Council 
pamphlet The Native in Industry, Rheinnalt-Jones had seen the spread of African 
trade un ion ism on 1. C. U. as inevitab le and ca I led for the lega I recogn ition of 
the m. For Ballinger, the very explanation for the "failure" of the 1. C. U. lay 
in its lack of success in procuring land. Rivalry, too, with Kadalie's 
Independent 1. C. U. organisation which claimed in 1929 to have established an 
"African Native Land Settlement Corporation Ltd. " with a nominal capita I of 
f-100,000, undoubted Iy acted as a fi II ip to Ba II inger's efforts to secure aI and. 
deal with his own African supporters. 
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The same year, therefore, Ballinger's 
1. C. U. of Africa reported that a "Native Development and Trust Company Ltd. " 
had been registered with the hope that "with the assistance of the African Congress 
combined with the I. C. U. this will prove a success and will restore the confidence 
of the masses". 
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The reality was, though, that the company was registered at 
the Volksrust farm of A. N. C. founder Pixley Seme who succeeded in 1930 Gumede 
as the President of the African National Congress. With a nominal capital of 
E25,000 the company played a key role in tying Seme to the purse strings of the 
white liberals, especially as the scheme was seen as the first of a number which 
would link the creation of a trading class of Africans in the urban areas in South 
Africa to the regeneration of the peasantry in both the reserves in South Africa and 
the Protectorates. By the close of the decade liberals increasingly looked further 
afield for ways of accommodating development in -the reserves to government 
policies on territorial segregation inside the Union. 
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Chapter Eight 
Renewed liberal debates 
William Ballinger's rethinking of the value of African cooperatives and 
trading mechanisms linking peasant agriculture in the reserves to the burgeoning 
black proletariat in the towns came at an important time politically in the fortunes 
of Southern Africa. The effective collapse of the 1. C. U. in 1929 was also the 
year in which Smuts lost the election to the Nationalists on the "Black Manifesto" 
which his opponents charged would result in "a black Kaffir state ... extending 
from the Cape to Egypt in which white South Africa would vanish". The return 
of the Nationalist government to power without being dependent upon the British- 
orientated South African Labour Party necessitated the rethinking of South African 
liberalism, especially as, following the failure of the Non-Racial Franchise 
Association, the old Cape ideal of preserving the African franchise looked increasingly 
dead politically. 
The issue posed by the Black Manifesto in 1919 was by no means a new one 
on the South African political scene, for it had been envisaged at the time of Union 
in 1910 that the Protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland, together 
with the Rhodesias, would eventually be incorporated into the Union. This hope 
had been renewed as recently as 1924 when Hertzog became Prime Minister but British 
intransigence prevented the incorporation hoped for by the white South African parties, 
Smuts's S. A. P. and Hertzog's Nationalists alike. The explanation for this opposition 
has been posed by liberal historiography in terms of an altruistic British concern for 
maintaining the old Cape ideal and the fostering of a trusteeship policy whereby 
African interests in British African colonies would be paramount, as had been outlined 
in the Passfield white paper of 1923. "South Africa's expansion was self interested", 
Ronald Hyam has written. "Imperial Britain was concerned about trusteeship". 
1 
This depiction of the seeming clash of interests between Britain and South Africa, 
however, has been recently re-assessed by Martin Chanock who has argued that 
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Britain was by no means unse If -interested in Southern Africa and was dictated less 
by a simple moral aversion to South African segregation policy, but by a desire to 
maintain the British "imperial factor" through connecting the Protectorate territories 
to the white settler states in Central and East Africa as a means of offsetting the 
Afrikaner settler power in the Union. Especially after British hopes of neutralising 
Afrikaner influence inside South Africa through the incorporation of Rhodesia were 
dashed in the 1922 Referendum., when Rhodesian settlers opted to go their own way, 
British policy became increasingly concerned with fostering white settler interests 
under her own tutelage. Thus Hyr an's concentration on British concern to protect 
African interests in the Protectorates has to be seen in a wider context of British 
interests in fomenting a wider sphere that crossed the Zambesi and where "settlers 
2 
were to be co-trustees". In such a context: 
In the High Commission territories, where African lands had 
been guaranteed in the schedule (to the Act of Union), the 
British authorities placed their emphasis on securing admini- 
strative separation combined with the functioning of some form 
of African assembly. In Rhodesia, where the immediate 
problem was to render African land holding secure, the major 
imperial intervention was to ensure that the reserves policy 
would not dissolve into theory before the Union took over. 
Where there were white settlers it was imagined that "native 
questions" could best be dealt with by experts free from 
electoral pressure. Where old African institutions had been 
destroyed, territorial and administrative separation was to be 
combined with the creation of separate local councils. The 
Cape policy was dead, and while the British government 
insisted where it could that its memory be honoured by preserving 
the traces it did not aim at promoting political integration in any 
part of Southern Africa. 3 
In the years after 1923, therefore, British policy, especially under the 
Colonial Secretary L. S. Amery, became concerned with neutralising as far as possible 
the trusteeship provisions of the Devonshire Declaration. Amery was a symPathiser 
of white settlement in Africa on lines close to that of Lord Delamere's settlers in 
Kenya, and in the 1920s he began to foster schemes for the economic development 
of the Protectorates in alliance with South African mining capital, led by Sir Ernest 
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Oppenheimer. As he observed in 1927 on visiting Southern Africa f the 
future position of the Empire in South Africa is going to depend largely on the 
Protectorates and Rhodesia, both as regards native development, and on a smaller 
scale as regards British white developments". 
4 
The attractiveness of these development schemes was not lost on liberals 
inside South Africa. Just as some liberal critics of South African government in 
Britain itself, such as Leonard Barnes, author of Caliban in Africa and The New 
Boer War and Lord Olivier, author of Anatomy of South African Misery, looked 
to British fostering of the Protectorates as a means of influencing South African 
segregation policy, 
5 
so in turn South African liberals began by the late 1920s to 
look outwards to the Protectorates as a means of both testing new ideas on economic 
and social development as well as seeking new political alliances to offset their 
weakness inside the Union itself. Concomitant, therefore., with the reports 
commissioned by the British government from Sir Alan Pim (brother of Howard Pim) 
on the Protectorates., which were published between 1933 and 1935,6 so South 
African liberals began to turn their attention to similar areas. Howard Pim's report 
on the Transkei was published in 1934, recommending a stepping up in land reclamation 
schemes, cattle culling and economic cooperation 
7 
while William Ballinger and 
Margaret Hodgson4later Ballinger) began work on the Protectorates too in the early 
1930s, publishing Indirect Rule in Southern Africa in 1931, Basutoland the same 
year and Britain in Southern Africa (No. 2): The Bechuanaland Protectorate in 
1932.8 
For the Ballingers, especially, the research on the Protectorates offered 
a valuable means to reformulate liberal ideology in a more radical and collectivist 
direction so as to move it away from the paternalist welfare role that had been its 
central definition in the 1920s through the activities of Loram, Rheinnalt-Jones and 
Pim around the Joint Councils. This essentially political definition of the role of 
South African liberalism had alienated Ballinger from Loram by the end of 1929, with 
Loram opposing the idea of Ballinger being employed in any fornial capacity by the 
newly-formed Institute of Race Relations. 
9 
This exclusion of Ballinger from the 
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Institute forced him to look for alternative avenues of support and the following 
year he began to forge contacts with a small committee that had been formed in 
London by the former Secretary of the Pretoria Joint Council and warden of the 
Bantu Men's Social Centre, Fred Livie Noble, together with Winfred Holtby and 
F. Pethwick-Lawrence. This committee., which eventually became the London 
Group on African Affairs, sought "to act as a sort of informal clearing house on 
matters of African interest" and was especially anxious for information on the 
Protectorates in order to strengthen its lobbying position on the British government 
in order to at least delay transfer of the Protectorates to South Africa. 
10 
The 
support of this committee enabled William Ballinger to cease for a period his involve- 
ment in the 1. C. U. of Africa and in 1932 he wrote to his former supporters meeting at 
Heilbron in the Orange Free State that the research was essential "in order to judge 
the full effects of the impact between the indentured, semi-tribal and detribalised 
native conditions". 
11 
In the course of their research work, William and Margaret Ballinger sought 
to apply British social democratic values to the question of economic and social 
development in the reserves, providing a different approach to the current orthodoxy 
of seeking to maintain tribal institutions and "adapt" them to modernised economic 
conditions. This adaptationist approach, which was especially represented by the 
Report of the Native Economic Commission (which is examined in detail in the 
following chapter) owed a considerable amount to the fostering of anthropological 
research in South African universities under the auspices of such prominent influences 
on fund-raising as C. T. Loram. Attempts at blocking this trend actually within 
Joint Council circles proved, in the event, to be ineffective, as W. M. MacMillan 
discovered on his return to South Africa in 1932. While MacMillan's history 
department at the University of the Witwatersrand continued to be starved of funds, 
C. T. Loram's connections with American fund-raising ensured that Rheinnalt-Jones 
was able to head a new department of Bantu Studies, even in the midst of economic 
depression. 
12 
Thus the Ballingers' work was of significance in its marked lack of 
enthusiasm for the perpetuation of tribal institutions as the basis of a development 
programme in the Protectorates. Chieftainship, they argued in Indirect Rule in 
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Southern Africa was a "doomed institution" for: 
While the chiefs are desperately clinging to the old forms 
and justifying themselves on the grounds of defending tribal 
claims to the land, they are entirely ignorant of the economic 
and political forces which are crushing out the nation's life 
... They see their young men go out to work in the Union 
without a glimpse or appreciation of the factors involved both 
for themselves and for others. 13 
The British colonial service, furthermore, was guilty of having failed to 
understand these forces for they had allowed the apparatus of native administration 
in the Protectorates to become "enmeshed (with) private enterprise to exploit the 
resources of the country to its own benefit". 
14 
What was wanted was a programme 
to ensure cultivation and' development, which the new Agricultural Department was 
likely to initiate. This programme could ensure that while "tribal methods" and 
the "conservatism of the chiefs" could be gradually abolished at the same time 
"tribal ownership" could be maintained as the basis for a new scheme of rural co- 
operation since ''it should mean the use of all the resources of the country for all 
the people". 
15 
By means of education the chiefs could be taught to "help their 
people forward rather than to hold back in the interests of their own power", while 
instead of simple industrial training on the Tuskegee model which had continued to 
dominate liberal thinking in the 1920s, a programme of general cultural education 
could be provided in order to instil values of progress and improvement in a burgeoning 
African educated class, which the Ballingers saw the germ of. in the Basutoland 
Progressive Association. 
The arguments in Indirect Rule in Southern Africa represented an interesting 
and important formulation of rural development policy to that of current liberal 
orthodoxy. Their basis in Basutoland was important, too., for it had been here that 
Howard Pim had been impressed with the tribal model of social control in 1904 when 
he visited the territory before presenting his 1905 paper on segregation to the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science. However, the Ballingers' pleas for a 
more politically sophisticated colonial administration in the territory in order to 
develop it away from its current condition "which Britain has explicitly set her face 
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aga instil- 
16 
betrayed a lack of understanding of the forces behind the shaping of 
British policy in Southern Africa. Having taken the Devonshire Declaration at 
face value, the Ballingers failed to perceive the wil lingness of British policy to 
accommodate itself where feasible to white settler interests, especially as a former 
member of the Round Table, L. S. Amery, had specifically guided British policy in 
this direction in the 1920s. Basutoland's real condition as a labour reserve became 
even more obvious a year after the report was published when, in the drought of 
1932-33, some 50% of the country's livestock was destroyed while maize production 
fell to the point where it had to be imported to feed the population. The early 
1930s, indeed, were a turning point in the fortunes of Basutoland agriculture for a 
down-turn was reached from which the economy never recovered. The population 
remained virtually static between the censuses of 1936 and 1946 and more and more 
men were forced into migrant labour in order to maintain a basic economic 
subsistence. 
17 
Political events in Southern Africa acted, nevertheless, to keep up the 
momentum of the Ball ingers' cooperatives model for a few more years. In 1932, 
Hertzog renewed his bid for the incorporation of the Protectorates, backing them -up 
this time with economic threats that included the exclusion of Africans in the 
Protectorates from the Union's labour market. 
18 In addition, in 1933 the Protectorý- 
ates issue came forcibly into the political limelight following the forceful removal of 
the Regent of Bechuanaland, Tshekedi Kgama, by the acting High Commissioner, Vice 
Admiral Edward Evans with a force backed up, by Union troops. Though Kgama was 
soon reinstated, the affair served to highlight the position of the Protectorates, 
especially as Tshekedi had attempted unsuccessfully to renegotiate the concessions 
granted to the British South Africa Company in 1929. Through the mediation of the 
Governor-General in South Africa, the Earl of Athlone, the British government had 
successfully accomplished a series of new concessions to Sir Ernest Oppenheimer's 
Anglo-American and De Beers Companies for mineral exploitation in the territory. 
19 
Though Tshekedi's objections ("we know that when mining takes place in a country it 
won't be a notion. We know we can uplift ourselves by means of cattle not by 
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means of mining") had not been able to reverse the British policy, it was still the 
hope of liberal critics in Britain that the whole affair could be served to show the 
dangers of actual incorporation of the Protectorates into the Union. For Leonard 
Barnes, the issue was a valuable card to play in at least delaying the transfer for 
while "theProts are bound to go to the Union sooner or later and the South Africa 
Act contemplates as much", nevertheless liberal critics could continue "to insist 
that this is not the time, and to go on doing so as often as the question of transfer 
is raised, until at last we are defeated". 
20 
More forceful opposition came from 
Margery Perham through a series of articles in The Times in September of 1933, as 
a result of which a debate was instigated between her and Lionel Curtis, formerly 
of the Milner Kindergarten and anxious to see the Milnerite vision at least partially 
accomplished through incorporation. 
21 
The controversy served to enhance the role of the Ballingers' research, 
especially as the more conservative liberals in the Institute of Race Relations 
equivocated on incorporation. In 1933 Rheinnalt-Jones considered the incorpor- 
ation of Basutoland as "inevitable", while not being sure about the other two. 
22 
Two years later as the issue began to reach the level of serious political discussion 
as the British government began to modify itself towards Hertzog and the Afrikaner 
Nationalists in the wake of Fusion, Jones sought to use it as a means to enhance the 
prestige of both himself and the Institute. Writing to Livy Noble of the Friends of 
Africa, he argued for a Commission of Enquiry to be set up on the whole incorporation 
issue containing representatives from the British and South African Governments 
together with African representatives and "missionaries". Recommending D. -D. T. 
Jabavu, John Dube and Z. K. Mathews as the African representatives from the Union, 
Rheinnalt-Jones suggested a number of additional white liberal possibilities including 
Professor Hoernle, Professor Walker, Edgar Brookes and himself. "At present", he 
continued, "I am the onl yI ink in South Africa between al I the missions The 
Institute has been useful in acting as a consultative agency without being either a 
government department or a missionary institution. But possibly even the Institute 
and myself might be suspect, being in the Union. "23 The proposal got as far as 
being sent to Lord Lugard for serious consideration. 
24 
lq# 
In contrast to R heinnalt-Jones and the Institute, Ballinger had in the 
early 1930s far closer and more direct contacts with liberal opinion in Britain. 
These were used to discredit, as far as possible, the -values and assumptions of 
the Joint Council movement and the Institute which Ballinger saw as being rooted 
in an out-dated and paternalistic approach. Those in charge of the Joint Councils, 
he wrote to Livie Noble in 1933 "either cannot, or do not want to see, that they are 
not Supported, so far as the non-Europeans are concerned, by the rising Native 
middle class". 
25 
He accused the Institute of being manipulated by the Chamber 
of Mines, especially in the case of the appointment of Edgar Brookes to the Institute 
in 1933,26 while in his own case, he could point to a number of contacts in order to 
establish his own political credibility. as the defender of African and Coloured 
interests. Following his attendance at the I\bn-European Conference in the Cape 
in 1930, Ba II inger was ab Ie to report that Abdurahman and D. D. T. Jabavu sought 
his candidature for a parliamentary seat, though in the event he was ineligible as a 
non-South African citizen. 
27 
Then in 1933, he became the supervisory editor of 
the radical A. N. C. paper The African Defender which was established by a group 
inside the African National Congress to fight the conservative policies of the 
President, Pixley Seme. Despite its decl ine, the I-C. U- of Africa was not 
complete Iy defunct by this time either. Bal I inger claimed that the 1. C. U. of 
Africa was still the "parent 1. C. U. " of eight separate sections which now existed 
and argued that he was only unable to rejuvenate the organisations through lack of 
funds for travelling around South Africa. The Acting General Secretary of the 
1. C. U. of Africa, Daniel Budulwayo, was reported as visiting a number of branches 
in order to coordinate membership lists and achieve some form of reorganisation. 
28 
Furthermore, William Ballinger was able to claim the successful develop- 
ment of some African cooperative enterprises, which he saw as the partial answer to 
the problems of development in the Protectorates. In the first year of operation, 
the Western Native Township Co-operative, based in Orlando, made a small profit 
and Ballinger jubilantly reflected that "the tree of Native cooperation is well rooted 
and is going to throw out many strong and varied branches". Contact had been 
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established with the Resident Magistrate in Swaziland, T. Ainsworth Dickson in 
the hope of being able to develop marketing links between Swazi producers of 
butter, tobacco and other commodities and the African market on the Rand. Illf 
you could get those in charge of the Colonial Development Fund to spend a few 
thousands on cooperative activities", Ballinger wrote to Livy Noble, "it would 
do much to assist the Natives to adapt themselves to the better aspects of our 
economic system and money economy. As it is today, the most intelligent 
Natives are suffering from the shocks of a money economy, which is so far removed 
from their subsistence economy, and the breakdown of our commercial -industrial 
system which leaves them so bewildered. When they invest, or rather put on 
fixed deposit E25 of their surplus from cooperative retail sales, I have to warn 
them about high rates of interest and the meaning of fluid as against frozen capital". 
As a consequence "the success of the first year's work of the Western Native Town- 
ship Coop is bringing many anxieties". 
29 
The apparent success of the first year's operation of the Western Native 
Township Coop led to efforts by Ballinger's friends in England to seek support from 
the British government for cooperative enterprises in the Protectorates. Winfred 
H. oltby succeeded in gaining contact, via the Reverend A. G. Fraser, Principal of 
Achimota College in Ghana (where Aggrey had been Vice Principal) with Lord 
Lothian. 
30 
As Secretary of the Rhodes Trust, former member of the Milner 
Kindergarten, and prominent appeaser towards Nazi Germany (he was later British 
Ambassador in Washington) Lothian represented one of the most valuable contacts 
between liberal opinion on colonial development and official government policy. 
The Colonial Secretary in the early 1930s was J. H. Thomas, formerly General 
Secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen; but as a member of Ramsay 
MacDonald's National Government, influence on policy was increasingly being 
made by the Baldwinite Conservatives, who in turn came to dominate policy more 
or less completely following MacDonald's resignation in 1935. ý Thus the support 
of Lothian for the cooperatives could be said to be a key to the scheme's success. 
Ballinger sent to Lothian a summary of what the scheme had achieved so far, arguing 
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that "for various reasons, African natives grasp far more quickly the princip-les of 
co-operative than of individualist economics, and that if a beginning could be 
made which would in some way link native production within the Protectorates to 
a market outside, a partial solution at least would have been reached for the 
present problems of the Territories". Pointing out that the Western Native 
Township Cooperatives had made a profit of E340 in the year following its opening 
in April 1932, allowing for a dividend of 5% to be paid, Ballinger argued that 
"such stores are both needed, and can, under European supervision, be developed". 
31 
The Resident, Commissioner in Swaziland's enthusiasm for the idea also gave credence 
to Ballinger's scheme and it was hoped that the Swaziland Protectorate Authorities 
would assist the marketing of cattle, butter, "Native hand-made cigarettes" and 
"kaffir corn and meal ies" , thus possibly supplying the basis for "the transition stage 
between industrial and tribal economics". 
32 
Despite finding the Rhodes Trustees cautious, Lord Lothian himself was 
enthusiastic towards the scheme. "Obviously", he wrote to Howard Pim in 
December 1933, "it would be of immense advantage if agriculture could be made 
more productive in the native territories with a steady market within the Union, thus 
keeping the money in the country and giving the nativesan economic interest which 
might save_ them from rushing prematurely into politics". 
33 
Similarly, approaches 
were made to the cooperative guilds in England for funds to develop the scheme, 
though only a small sum of money was in the event forthcoming. But the overall 
objectives behind the fund-raising were not achieved and by 1934 it became clear 
that Ballinger, together with his small number of liberal supporters in Britain, would 
have to go it alone. Even before the scheme was started, it was clear that the 
British Government was not going to be over-enthusiastic for its success. In 1932, 
J. H. Thomas had refused to support a proposal from Lord Olivier and a group of 
supporters of the cooperatives idea that Ballinger should be put on the staff of the 
High Commissioner for South Africa, Sir Herbert Stanley. 
34 
Fur . thermore, until 
at least 1933 it was the general view of the Dominions Office, according to Alan 
Pim, "that absorption is ultimately unavoidable on general economic grounds though 
N 
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they disHke the idea and this ultimately, defeatist view must affect the attitude of 
the Treasury to financing 35 essential developments". Even while the resistance 
to incorporation was. sufficientl' trong, after fusion in 1934, the d' velopme yse nt of 
South African -mining after South Africa came off the gold standard represented 
another key factor in ýritish policy not wish. ing to antqgonisp the basic labour 
requirements of the mining industry. In this respect, British colonial policy in 
the early 1 930s so far as ýouthern Africa was concerned had not yet moved towards 
a developmental ist view that sought to initiate any independent economic projects 
in the Protectorates that might run counter to the requirements of migrant labour. 
For the most part British policy was guided by the consideration that, even with the 
Union becoming "unbritish", the pro-British settlers of East and Central Africa were 
too small to form an effective counter bloc and that both economic and political 
ties with the Union were likely to persist for some time to come. 
36 
Though there 
were critics of South African policies in the British Government in the 1930s, such 
as the High Commissioner Sir William Clark in 1938,37 for the most part British 
opposition to South African segregation in the 1930s failed to link itself to the 
"forward thinking" which had been initiated by Amery in the 1920s and institution- 
alised through the creation of the Colonial Development Fund in 1929. It was 
only after 1938 with the re-examination of colonial development grants in which 
W. M. Macmillan was involved, that a critical re-assessment began to take place; 
especially with the publication in that year of the first edition of Macmillan's book 
Africa Emergent. 
38 
The continuation of the debate in South Africa 
The rebuff to Ballinger's attempts to obtain official British support for his 
cooperative schemes left him with only a narrow base in Britain through the London - 
Group on African Affairs. The Group had been seen by Ballinger as an essential 
pillar behind his activities in South Africa and the Protectorates following his 
effective exclusion from the Institute of Race Relations. 
39 
In September 1934, 
during a visit to England of Margaret and William Ballinger, an ew committee was 
formed to continue the support for the Bal lingers' work on cooperatives. With the 
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aim of raising El 000 a year for five years to cover Ballinger's expenses "in order 
to co-ordinate knowledge of the various Co-operative or Industrial movements in 
different parts of the continent", the British committee set itself the task of both 
backing the Ball ingers' work and pressurising the South African government to 
ratify the forced labour convention. "Since his arrival in South Africa", a 
draft statement appealing for funds recorded, "Ballinger has done his best to 
persuade the White Labour Movement that any attempt to repress Native Standards 
is short-sighted, even from the point of view of European interests. Ultimately 
it is to the interests of White labour to. see the black, worker is not exploited. 
Co-operation adds to Native bargaining power, and should thus help in the long 
run to raise both Black and White standards of living". 
40 No mention was made 
of developing specifically African trade unions. 
Nevertheless the emphasis upon some form of industrial organisation 
probably reflected Ballinger's declining faith in Cooperatives as a model of economic 
development in the aftermath of his failure to obtain widespread British support. The 
initial optimism behind the Western Native Township Cooperative soon waned in the 
light of inexperienced management and pilfering. By 1935-36 it was reported that 
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the profit margin had fa II en to be between 10 and 15% on a turnover of E3,000. 
Though three African cooperatives were registered at the office of the Registrar of 
Cooperatives in that year, it began to appear as that the most successful base for 
cooperatives trading was a tribal one, with ethnic ties and chiefly control reducing 
the incidences of corruption. . One of the more successful efforts was that of the' 
Bakgatla Co-operative Society Limited under Chief Makapan at Makapanstad near 
Pretoria whose objectives extended beyond trading to "tribal coordination" and the 
integration of the four separate groupings of Mosetlha, Mocha, Makau and Pilane. 
42 
Another relatively successful example of a cooperative society fostered as a result of 
Ballinger's efforts was one at Orlando under the Reverend S. S. Tema of the Dutch 
Reformed Church while at Boksburg the Reverend N. Tantsi of the A. M. E. Church 
also had a cooperative society. 
43 
These attempts at cooperation, however, did not provide Ballinger with a 
2" 
very strong political base, especially as efforts to link them to industrial organ- 
isation and trade union formation seemed unsuccessful. By 1934, attempts were 
being made to revive African unions after the collapse of the Communist-dominated 
South African Federation of Native Trade Unions and the lean years of the depression. 
On the Witwatersrand., the only two African unions that appear to have survived the 
early 1930s were the clothing and laundry workers, and the Laundry Workers Union 
became the nucleus of the Joint Committee that was formed in 1934 to extend'union 
formation to African workers in South Africa's burgeoning industry. 
44 As the 
numbers of African industrial workers grew in the 1930s, from 66,751 to 134,233 
between 1932-36, so in turn did the number of union ised workers, who were 
estimated to total some 20,000 by 1940. For William Ballinger, it thus seemed 
a ripe opportunity to return to his union-organising activ-ities of the late 1920S and 
learn by past mistakes. Hopeful that African unions could be modelled on lines 
similar to the British Transport and General Workers Union, Ballinger claimed a 
limited success in 1934, announcing to Livy Noble amongst other things that he had 
been instrumental in the establishment of a Native Building Workers Union. 
45 
But 
his previous attachment to the 1. C. U. of Africa and continued links with the Joint 
Councils probably led a number of black trade union organisers to treat Ballinger 
with a good deal of suspicion. This weakness in Ballinger's organising ability 
was compounded by the arrival of a serious rival on the Witwatersrand in 1935 in 
the form of Max Gordan, a former industrial chemist and Trotskyite from Cape 
Town, who soon proved adept at submerging himself in the work of trq& union 
formation. -Aided by links with his former friend from t he University of Cape 
Town, Lynn Saffery, who was now Secretary of the Institute of Race Relations, 
Gordan became Secretary of the Laundry Workers Union and proceeded to develop 
tactics of working inside the existing legislation governing trade unions, while at 
the same time appealing to African workers current needs by developing schemes 
for legal aid, literacy and book-keeping classes. 
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The comparative success of Gordan and Saffery in the late 1930s before 
Gordan's internment by the Smuts Government in 1940 has led to the view that 
3oo 
Ba II in ger was I eft a margina I figure, "confined", in Baruch Hirson's words, "to 
the periphery of events". 
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Certainly, Ballinger failed to develop trade 
union organisation amongst African workers in the same degree as his political 
rivals and his exact political role remained unclear. ' Though his wife, Margaret, 
claimed at a conference on the question of recognition of African trade unions in 
1939 that Ballinger was a "representative of Native Trade Unions", 
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the locus of 
his political Support was problematical. On IyaI imited degree of backing had 
been secured from the Al I African Convention in 1936 at the time of the election 
for Natives Representatives in the Senate and, in the event, Ballinger had been 
beaten in the campaign for the Senatorship of the Transvaal and Orange Free State 
not only by Rheinnalt-Jones of the Institute of Race Relations, but the former 
Communist Hymie Basner as well. 
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On the other hand, it is important to recognise that Ballinger's ties with 
the Friends of Africa acted as an important check on a monolithic white liberalism, 
completely under the control of Rheinnalt-Jones and the Institute. In the years 
after 1936 and the Native Franchise and Native Trust and Land Acts, the bulk of 
white liberal opinion inside the Union shifted away from any former interest in the 
Protectorates and the incorporation issue towards seeking to make the segregationist 
provisions of the Native Trust and Land Acts workable. Having been prepared, 
from as early as September 1935 to sacrifice the Cape franchise as part of this 
objective, 
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Rheinnalt-Jones in particular saw the La. nd Act as opening up 
opportunities for development in the reserves. Indeed, on the question of 
agricultural innovation, Jones wrote on similar lines to the Native Economic 
Commission arguing that "more has been achieved in this direction than is generally 
realised - enough to justify confidence that the Bantu can be developed into a 
reasonably progressive agricultural people working in harmony with the restricted 
conditions of close agricultural settlement". 
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Given such possibilities, and 
with a "splendid lot of men" in the Native Affairs Department,, it no longer made 
sense, Jones wrote to Livy Noble, to consider the additional incorporation of the 
Protectorates, for ". .. the Union Native administration has enough ... for the next 
ten years to carry out the promises made to the Natives in regard to the land and 
3ol 
Native development to prevent it giving adequate attention to the Territories and 
the spending of money which should be spent on them". 
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The result of this 
strategy, however, as the next. chapter seeks to show, was the co-option of the 
Institute into the working of the government's trusteeship policy and the complete 
isolation of white liberal thinking from the groundswell of the emergent African 
nationalism in the 1940s. Rheinnalt-Jones himself pai d the price for this by his 
loss of the senatorship to Basner in 1942, and the wider implications were felt 
after the. 1946 African mine workers' strike and the collapse of the Native Represent- 
atives Council. 
For Ballinger and a minority of more radical ly-inclined liberals, this path 
of co-optation was seen as a disaster even before the end of the I 930s. "There 
can be little doubt", Ballinger wrote vitriolically to Xuma in May 1939, "that 
Jones imagines that he has a right to corner Natives and all they do or intend to do. 
If he ever wakes up to the fact that many of the Natives in Southern Africa are very 
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conscious that they are Africans-he will die of shock". There was probab Iy an 
element of personal sour grapes in this attitude of Bal I inger, whose income from the 
Friends of Africa progressively declined throughout the 1930s while Rheinnalt-Jones 
was able to obtain a salary from the Institute of some E700 a year. Ballinger, too, 
tried to carve out a position for himself as a "liaison officer" between White and 
African Trade Unions and the Department of Labour in a paper read to the Joint 
Council in Johannesburg in March 1939,54 without any apparent success. But 
Ballinger's opposition to the idea of "segregated cooperatives for Natives under the 
control of the Institute and Department of Natives Affairs" 
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and his previous 
attempts at fostering African cooperatives in the Protectorates acted as an important 
basis for the development of a radical liberal critique of the strategy adopted by 
Rheinnalt-Jones and the Institute. Such a critique grew, especially, after South 
Africa's entry into the second world war, and the rethinking by many liberals of 
their role in the political system. 
Splits in the Institute 
William Ballinger's opposition to Rheinnalt-Jones's running of the I'nst-itute 
3DI 
of Race Relations was by no means an isolated one. As we have seen, Howard 
Pim had opposed the apolitical stance defined for the Institute by C. T. Loram even 
before it was formed. In the early 1930s there had been various groups of 
radical ly-inclined liberals who sought a more collectivist and social democratic 
orientation. In 1933 the Cape Town Joint Council was reported as being "strongly 
antagonistic" to the Institute, refusing even to affiliate to it, 
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while around 1935 
the Reverend R. G. Milburn proposed in a memorandum that the Joint Councils 
should be reconstructed into a "liberal association" so that "all political progressives 
should act together" outside the Institute's control. 
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Even prominent Cape liberals 
such as James Rose-Innes, previously involved in the Non Racial Franchise Association, 
doubted the wisdom of Rheinnalt-Jones's ostensibly "apolitical" definition of the 
Institute's activities, considering it likely that the Institute would "become all things 
to all men". 
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However, after 1935 there were increasing pressures on Rheinnalt-Jones to 
continue the "apolitical" course mapped out in 1929. Even though the Executive 
of the Institute in that year resolved to reduce as far as possible its financial 
dependency upon the Carnegie Corporation and raise money from local sources, which 
currently stood at E2,000 a year, 
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increasing ethnic fissures as a result of the growth 
of Afrikaner nationalism in the early 1930s acted as an important check on any radical 
tendencies in Institute policy. In 1935 a rival body to the Institute was established 
in the form of the Rasserverhoudingsbond van Afrikaners whose secretary was M. D. C. de 
Wet Nei (who had previously received a grant from the Institute for a doctoral 
dissertation). Declining Rheinnalt-Jones's requests for collaboration between the 
two bodies, de Wet Nel's Rasserverhoudingsbond acted as an immediate magnet for a 
number of Afrikaans-speaking universities, such as Stellenbosch, Pretoria and the 
Orange Free State, who consequently proceeded to withdraw their affiliation to the 
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Institute, which was increasingly being seen as a "liberal" body. The increasingly 
statist and "neo fichtean" definition of Afrikaner nationalism in the- 1930s, reflected by 
the publication in 1936 of Dr. Diederichs's Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing, reinforced 
such tendencies, this making it even more'important for Rheinnalt-Jones to dissociate 
3D3 
as far as possible the Institute from any political tendency that was critical of 
the basic assumptions behind the government's trusteeship policy. 
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In addition, the elections to the Senate and House of Assembly in 1937, 
together with the creation of the Natives Representative Council, served to 
reinforce the previously fragmented liberal opposition to the Rheinnalt-Jones 
pol icy. While Jones himself, together with the conservative Edgar Brookes 
carried the Transvaal - Orange Free State and Natal senatorial campaigns respect- 
ively, newer forces were being organised in opposition to the policy of complete 
collaboration with government policy. In the Eastern Cape, Margaret Ballinger 
won the election for the Natives Representative in the House of Assembly, while 
Donald Moltenu carried the Western Cape. Both candidates won through con- 
siderable A. N. C. support, especially that of the new Secretary-General from 
Cradock, James Calata. But doubts about the effectiveness of Natives represent- 
ation, especially as regards the huge size of the constituencies which made consider- 
able demands on candidates' energies and organisational resources, began to make 
themselves felt. 11... we were both tired out and sick to death of it long before 
the end", Margaret Ballinger wrote to Selby Msimang in 1937, "This whole Natives 
representation is a mad affair and the sooner it is changed the better, is my present 
fee I ing ". 
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These doubts became reinforced when the question of land allocations to 
Africans began to be assessed in the I ight of the 1936 Native Land and Trust Act. 
Before 1936, the main thrust of the I iberal critique of current policies of African 
land-holding had been directed outside the Union towards the reserves.. This had 
been the main implication of the Ballingers' work on cooperatives in the Protactorates,, 
though W. M. MacMillan pointed out the growing overcrowding in the reserves where, 
in the case of the Transkei, there were 57.41 Africans to the square mile compared to 
the Union's average of 14.64 and "that Kaffir pastoralism - and we have done little 
to train them anything better - cannot possibly be made to support even at their low 
standards of I iving a population at 50 to 6Q or 100 to the square mile". 
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But 
these warnings failed to have the impact of official scientific surveys and were quite 
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capable of being used to substantiate the official government policy of adaptation 
contained in the 1932 Report of the Native Economic Commission. 
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A different emphasis began to emerge with t-he report of William Fox and 
Douglas Black on the Ciskei and Transkei in the middle 1930s which was sufficiently 
tendentious in its conclusions for the Chamber of Mines to suppress it for a number 
of years. 
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The report particularly attacked the prevailing myth behind the 
adaptationist policy that migrant labour and cash wages were an essential means 
for transforming the "traditional" sector of African agriculture into a more modern 
condition. This early dualist theory, which had been substantially upheld by both 
MacMillan, Howard Pim and the Native Economic Commission, had only been 
partia IIy cri ti cised by the Ba II ingers' earl y work in the Protectora tes, wi th the 
implication in Indirect Rule in Southern Africa that transformation of the reserve 
economies could be achieved through limited social -engineering to remove chiefly 
control and establish an economy based on cooperative enterprises. For the Fox 
Report the structures of labour migrancy were such that far more radical changes were 
necessary if anything like genuine economic transformation was to be acco. mplished in 
the reserve economies. Pointing out that the African population density in the 
Ciskei was 91 to the square mile, the report showed that very little of the cash income 
from migrant labour went on agricultural improvement: of the sales of 90 stores in 
the reserve, for instance, only 8% consisted of agricultural implements and fencing 
equipment: 
In part of the Ciskei erosion and denudation of the land have 
reached such a stage over wide areas that it is questionable 
whether, even if all the resources of modern science were 
brought to bear with a total disregard for expenditure, it would 
be possible for the land to be brought back to a productive 
stage within a lifetime. 66 
This criticism by two nutritional specialists of the viability of the government's 
trusteeship policy and attempts at land reclamation in the reserves through a betterment 
areas scheme began to influence liberal thinking by the onset of the second world war. 
In particular, it began to emerge by the early 1940s that one essential tenet of 
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political thinking held by many white liberals, namely the creation of a stable 
African peasant class in the reserves, was becoming. increasingly implausible. 
Not only had the discussion on the recognition of Afr-ican trade unions in the late 
1930s influenced this, but the working of the trusteeship policy in the reserves 
was clearly being made to coincide with the growing labour requirements for 
industry and mining as a result of war-time industrial isation. Margaret Ballinger, 
especially, became aware of the effects of the government's policy of land re- 
allocation on African social life in the Eastern Cape. Headman Ntentei. n Kapase 
of Gogodela, for instance, owned his own plot of ground as well as that of his 
father and wished to transfer it to his son, as the original Glen Grey Act had 
provided. Having paid 2/6d stamp duty on his own title and 17/6d for a new 
title for his father's land, he found in 1940-41 that his land was taken from him 
under the land allocation provisions. Similarly in the case of Diamond Fuzani 
of Zingqutu, land was taken by the government after he had been away from the 
district for eight months, despite his having obtained permission to be absent for a 
yea r. 
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These cases and others I ike them had led Margaret Ba II inger to doubt 
the whole basis of the segregation policy by 1943: "The general effects of this 
direction of land policy are causing me much anxiety", she wrote in December of 
that year 
I am certain that this must be disastrous, both to the Africans 
and to the country as a whole, by preventing for all time the 
growth of an African peasantry or farming class, and con- 
demning the African in perpetuity to the position of a 
subsidised rural urban worker, and incidentally South African 
industry to this extremely unhealthy foundation. 68 
This lack of faith in the government's land policies thus orientated a section 
of the liberals increasingly around the issue of recognition of African trade unions, 
which were now seen as the essential mechanisms by which fundamental social and 
economic reforms inside South Africa could be achieved. With war-time emphasising 
in Britain the enhanced role of the welfare state, together with the publication of the 
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Atlantic Charter in 1941, many liberals looked to a reassertion of the social demo- 
cratic values that before the war had been upheld by. such fragmented groups as 
Ballinger's Friends of Africa and the Fabian Society organised by Julius Lewin in 
Cape Town. 69 
On the issue of African trade union recognition, it had been the hope of 
a section of liberals inside the Institute that closer contact could be forged with 
Ballinger's Friends of Africa in order to push the Institute behind a more overt 
political programme. In 1939 William Ballinger was in fact invited to attend a 
discussion of the Institute's council on trade unions, but an abusive letter he wrote 
in reply to Lynn Saffery led to the idea being dropped, at least for a short period. 
Nevertheless, Ballinge? s ideas clearly exerted some influence on such liberals as 
Donald Molteno and Douglas Malcomess 
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who reflected the suspicion of many 
Cape liberals to the narrow, positivist and politically colourless liberalism of the 
Institute based on the Witwatersrand. The first really vocal opposition in fact 
came from the former lawyer defending Tshekedi Khama, and Chairman of the Friends 
of Africa Society, Douglas Buchanan, who had already been partially involved in 
some of the Protectorate schemes of the Ball ingers. Voicing opposition in 1941 to 
the apolitical stance of the Institute at a council meeting (though at the time in 
ignorance of the original funding policy laid down by the Carnegie Corporation), 
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Buchanan initiated the start of a campaign which soon gathered momentum as the 
African National Congress under its president, after 1940, Alfred Xuma, started to 
demand where the Institute stood on such key political issues as the pass laws, the 
recognition and registration of African trade unions and the Union native policy of 
segregation. 
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Xuma's request, which was prompted both by the A. N. C. executive, togethe, r 
with the revival of charges by the Pretoria trade union organiser and A. N. C. activist 
Archie Mbelle that the Institute was controlling African politics 
73 led to a debate in 
the Institute on the exact role it should play towards Union native policy. At the 
executive meeting in July 1942, Margaret Ballinger urged a reconsideration of the 
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whole policy of the Institute, though the issue was postponed until the meeting 
of the Council in january 1943. In the months , that followed. there was discussion 
on the exact role and nature of the Institute. " Race relations" for many of the 
Institute members centred around the gathering and dissemination of factual information 
on racial issues in South Africa, with political involvement being confined to the 
encouragement of African trade union and political organisations only in an. indirect 
manner. This conception, heavily dependent upon American precedents, was 
accepted by not only the most conservative liberals for Julius Lewin wrote an 
unpublished memorandum some time in 1942 advocating this form of detached role. 
"The Institute is in no sense a political party", he argued, "and cannot act like one". 
Though there were weaknesses in the decision-making structure of the Institute, since 
the Council only met about once or twice a year - the most that could be done was 
to "take advantage of the prevailing winds of public opinion": 
The work of stimulating public opinion must be carried on. 
The bodies that can carry it on most effectively are the 
political parties, and bodies like the Joint Councils and 
the African organisations themselves. The Institute is 
always ready to assist such bodies in their campaigns with 
advice and information, and such assistance is not the best 
valuable function the Institute can perform. But we do 
not believe that we can strengthen the Institute by ourselves 
undertaking work of this nature. 75 
The fact that Lewin argued for this course in the Institute reflected the 
state of liberal thinking in the wake of the debate on the recognition of African 
trade unions. Following Max Gordan's internment in May 1940, there had been 
uncertainty as to who was to take over the running of the Joint Committee. While 
Gordan had advised from the concentration camp where he was detained that Saffery 
succeed him, this had by no means been universally acceptable to the African members 
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of the Joint Committee. The growing financial independence of many African 
unions by the late 1930s (the Commercial and Distributive Workers Union collected 
E3,200 from its members in the twelve months prior to the war, while the General 
Workers col, lected over F-5,000) led, to increasing opposition to what was perceived 
909 
as Institute interference in policy making. This "interference" may well have 
been crucial to the success of Max Gordan's efforts, for he had been subsidised 
by grants from the Institute-administered Bantu Welfare Trust., while legal aid had 
been provided from the Institute's Legal Aid Bureau and, general secretarial 
assistance in the typing and roneoing of memoranda. 
77 On the other hand, 
Max Gordan discussed all the memoranda drawn up by the Joint Committee with 
the Institute before they were presented to the Government Wage Board; while 
both Lynn Saffery and Max Gordan worked together to gather information which 
was presented to the Wage Board by Rheinnalt-Jones in his capacity as Natives 
Representative. It was probably this strong influence exerted by the Institute 
on wage negotiations which angered a number of radical African, trade unionists. 
Gana Makabeni's African Clothing Workers Union rejected all white officials and 
Dan Koza of the African Commercial and Distributive Workers Union mounted an 
attack on the continuation of white supervision as in the days of Max Gordan. 
The issues involved in the relationship between the Institute and African 
unions became clarified in 1941 when a coal strike in five Johannesburg coal yards 
led to the Secretary of Justice circularising the police not to arrest striking Africans 
until the Departments of Labour and Native Affairs had had time to clarify the issues. 
While there was no question of the government conceding recognition of African 
unions under the Industrial Conciliation Act, the effect of the decision was undoubtedly 
to contribute to a growing optimism in the ranks of the African unions and burgeoning 
membership figures. As a result, the Council for Non European Trade Unions (CNETU) 
was formed in November 1941 , claiming the support of twenty-five unions, and some 
37,000 registered members. 
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The CNETU marked an important shift in the thinking 
of a number of liberals involved in labour organ isation for it now became clear that 
African unions were increasingly capable of both standing and organising on their own 
without Institute help. A report in September 1942 by E. S. -Sachs, A. Fischer and 
Julius Lewin reffected this change. Direct social control via paternalistic liberal 
involvement in the organisation and , running 
of trade unions was now seen as 
increasingly outmoded and the main strategy should now be directed towards the 
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creation of internal social control mechanisms through the consolidation of a small 
African labour aristocracy via sectional and craft unions: 
Certain classes of workers have been able to raise themselves 
well above the general level of unskilled labour and thereby 
to attain substantially higher wages, e. g. Transport Drivers. 
This development should be encouraged both by paying special 
attention to the sectional interests of these workers ... and 
also in certain circumstances by separate organisation for 
them. 79 
In this context, it was less the case, as Baruch Hirson maintains., that Lynn 
Saffery's efforts by the end of 1941 had "fail-ed" when he left for the Northern 
Rhodesian Copperbelt, 
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but a real isation that newer structures of control over 
African trade union formation were'now the order of the day. The choice of the 
Copperbelt was not accidental in this reformulation of liberal ideology, for it was 
here that experiments were being tried by the early 1940s in both the permanent 
urbanisation of African workers and social control through the legal recognition of 
African unions in the wake of the 1935 and 1940 strikes. 
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"The time is past 
when European organisations can dictate to the Africans", Saffery remalrked in 1943. 
"The function of persons interested in assisting the Africans should be to stand behind 
the African organisation and to render advice and guidance when it is sought". 
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This was substantially the position of the CNETU in 1942, and this has a close 
bearing on the debate in the Institute that year on its relationship to political 
activity. 
In fact, by the time of the Council meeting in January 1943 on the questions 
posed by Xuma's letter of the previous July, it become clear that the old Bal I inger 
line of hostility to the Institute's apoliticalism was outflanked on both sides of the 
political spectrum. Whi'le the dominant strand of conservative thought represented 
by Rheinnalt-Jones, Alfred Hoernle, Edgar Brookes and the mainstream white liberals 
sought the continuation of the Institute's position laid down in 1929, on the other 
flank the liberal radicals no longer thought of the Institute as a"suitable body through 
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which to conduct political activity. Thus Lynn Saffery, J. ulius Lewin and others 
including Solly Sachs stood outside the debate which was now for the most part 
conducted by the Cape liberals centred around Margaret Ballinger, Douglas 
Buchanan and, more tentatively, Donald Molteno. Having failed to win wider 
aflies, this latter group were easily isolated and defeated. 
The leader of the attempt to politicise the Institute, Douglas Buchanan, 
lacked the extensive contacts and inside knowledge that the long-serving members 
had and, given his close connections with both the Friends of Africa and the Cape 
Committee of the Institute, was seen as threatening the traditional domination from 
the Transvaal. 
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While asking for the Institute to "give a lead" on political 
issues for African and Coloured organisations, it was clear that the bulk of feeling 
in the Council meeting in January was for the status quo. Graham Ballenden of 
the Johannesburg City Council confessed to being "worried lately by the trend of 
events within the Institute., where there seemed to be attempts to capture the Institute 
for political purposes"; similarly Professor Reyburn of the University of Cape Town 
argued that General Smuts's statement in 1942 that "segregation has fallen on evil 
days" could not have been made at an Institute meeting if the body had been a 
political one. These arguments were supported by some of the more conservative 
sections of the African petty bourgeoisie present such as the Reverend E. E. Mahabane 
and D. D. T. Jabavu who argued that "The Institute is the strongest organ isation to 
help in building up public opinion which will help African organisation. If the 
Institute became too specific it would fly asunder". 
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This alliance of opinion carried the day, despite a moderate rearguard 
action by Donald Molteno who questioned the meaning of the word "political" and 
urged the Institute to take such action as promoting legislation on education and 
pena I reform. But the Council meeting reaffirmed its support for the line of 
dispassionate research laid down in 1929, though recognising that "scientific study 
and research must be allied with the fullest recognition of the human reactions to 
changing racial situations", and "respectful regard must be paid to the traditions and 
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usages of the various national, racial and tribal groups which comprise the 
popu Iat ion ". 
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When it came to the question of replying to Xuma's letter of 
July 1942 some nine months later, Rheinnal t-Jones studiously avoided the whole 
question of the Institute's relationship to Union segregation policy, merely stating 
that the Institute had "in many directions initiated efforts for progressive 
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reforms and development". 
The longer-term consequences 
Even by the time of the temporary resolution of the debate in the Institite 
in January 1943, there had been pronounced trends in African political conscious- 
ness that weakened the attachments to white liberal organisations. Rheinnalt- 
Jones's election defeat in 1942 served as a reminder of these trends,, though the 
full impact was only fe-It after 1946 when the Congress Youth League initiated 
moves to boycott what were now seen as the collaborative bodies of the Natives 
Representative Council and location advisory boards. The Institute's attachment 
to its traditional conception of a dispassionate body devoted to empiri call research 
reflected a political co'nservatism that was suspicious of more formal political 
alignments, together with a genuine optimism in some quarters that the current 
wave of war-time industrial isation was by itself sufficient to initiate important 
political changes in a liberal -democratic direction. The origins of this view 
are examined in the following chapter, but it is important to note that by the early 
I 940s the growth in the Institute membership from some 1 060 in 1939 to some 2,303 
by 1944, together with an increase in both funds and publications (more between 
1941 -42 than over the whole previous period of the Institute's existence) led to a 
general feeling that the positivist and apolitical stance of the Institute was paying 
off. 
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In the longer-term, however, the triumph of the conservative line in the 
Institute had the effect of reinforcing a general hardening of ideological arteries 
during a period which has traditionally been seen by liberal his'toriography as one 
of comparatively open debate. 
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White clearly many more ideas were being 
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discussed compared to the 1930s and also to the increasing repression of the 1950S 
as Nationalist policy began to be implemented in a comprehensive manner, at the 
same time it is important to recognise that the cooptive strategy pursued by the 
dominant sections of the liberal hierarchy in South Africa had the result of 
excluding a number of important themes from serious political debate. The 
perception of race relations as defined in the Institute's January 1943 meeting, 
whereby "respectful regard must be paid to the traditions and usages of the various 
national, racial and tribal groups which comprise the population" marked the 
formulation of an early plural model of South African society which was seen as 
typified by the interaction of autonomous groups defined on "national", "racial". 
or "tribal" lines. The wider structural basis to explain the formation of such 
groups, which has marked the extensive critique of pluralism, was signally lacking 
in the Institute's analysis. 
89 As a consequence, the role of the Institute came to 
be seen as increasingly integrated into the working of the government's own policy 
as the 1 940s progressed. 
In fact, doubts about the Institute's perception of a "plural" model of race 
relations began to be expressed by no less a person than the Institute's president, 
Alfred Hoernle, though his critique was never fully formulated before his premature 
death in 1944. In an unpublished memorandum, "Reflections on the Racial-Caste- 
Society of the Union", Hoernle borrowed the model of caste that had been popularised 
in some American studies in the 1930s such as John Dollard's Caste and Class in a 
Southern Town. 90 The important point about the caste conception as it was used 
by Hoernle was that it directly attacked the notion of inter-racial cooperation as it 
was perceived by the Institute. While a caste society might also be a class 
so. ciety, for Hoernle the important point about South Africa was that "caste unity 
overrides class unity". The government's policy of trusteeship might secure for 
the dominated castes a certain level of "progress", while at the same time ensuring 
"retrogression" in other spheres, particularly the "slow, but steady disintegration of 
tribal bonds and tradition" but the important point was that "no-balance of improve- 
ment over retrogression does in fact touch, or weaken, the caste structure", for 
313 
indeed, if anything, they only strengthened it. Thus formulating what in many 
respects can be seen as an early version of Heribert Adam's view of the continuous 
modernisation of racial control in South Africa. # 
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Hoernle went on to question 
many of the assumptions behind the reformist liberalism of the Institute and the 
Joint Councils. It could no longer be enough, Hoernle argued, for liberals to 
merely, "make the caste society more tolerable for the underling castes within it" 
which was mere "ambulance work" that "did not touch the caste society principle 
itse If". 
Hoernle, therefore, urged his fellow liberals before his death to address 
themselves to the question of formulating an alternative liberal theory to that of 
the prevailing caste society that underpinned trusteeship: 
--* the opponent's theory has the support of actual practice in the established order. Against this combination, the 
Liberal's theory has no chance of prevailing, unless he is 
prepared, not merely to advocate general principles in the 
abstract, but these principles embodied in some definite 
social structure into the practice of which men can think 
themselves in imagination, instead of being put off by an 
impalpable blank when they ask for the alternative, or 
alternatives., to the established order. 92 
Despite many weaknesses, this analysis of Hoernle is of i, nterest in revealing 
doubts by one of the foremost I iberal ideologists in South Africa of the I 930s and 
early 1940s on the course taken by maintstream liberalism in refusing to challenge 
the essential tenets of territorial segregation. It thus refutes the allegation that 
Hoernle was merely involved in the formulation of territorial segregation, 
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while at 
the same time revealing certain ideological inadequacies in South African liberalism 
at a critical time in South Africa's economic and political history. The caste 
concept as it was used by Hoernle lacked any independent means of explanation and, 
given its cultural roots in Hindu society, could not be applied uncritically to a 
capitalist society like South Africa. Given the unique typology of caste, it thus 
was probable that Oliver Cromwell Cox was correct in observing that "it is beyond 
all social logic ... to conceive of a caste society developing spontaneously within 
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a capitalist system. We cannot even conceive of social status, as it manifests 
itself in the caste system, having an identical or similar manifestation in the 
capitalist system". 
94 
Similarly, in the formulation of an alternative liberal 
theory to the dominant racial ideology in South Africa, Hoernle developed an 
ahistorical utopian perspective. His formulation of the idea of a liberal utopian 
world view (in Mannheim's sense) being generated in opposition to the dominant 
ideology of segregation depended on the hiatus view of I iberal history in South 
Africa which Chapter Two has sought to question. Perceiving that the "liberal 
experiment at the Cape was destroyed when the Cape, through the Union, was 
yoked together with the illiberal theory and practice of the three Northern 
provinces", Hoernle ignored the systematic and complex relationship developed 
by liberals in the Cape even before Union to the development of segregationist 
theory. As such, he betrayed a lack of historical understanding of the nature 
and function liberal ideology has performed within the South African social 
formation. 
This role, in fact, was illustrated by the relationship of the Institute to 
the apparatus of natives representation in the years after 1936. Hoernle's 
retreat to a utopian formulation for an alternative liberal ideology was both a 
reaction to the failure of previous liberal experiences since 1936, but also a 
crisis in liberal ideology itself by the middle of the second world war. It was 
a crisis that was never fully resolved by the time of the appointment of the Fagan 
Commission in 1946 in the crisis period after the war, and the polarisation of 
political ideology that accrued from the development of the alternative Nationalist 
formulation of apartheid. 
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Chapter Nine 
Trusteeship and the crisis in liberal ideology 
I have always felt ... that the more we look upon the 
native in South Africa as a scientific problem the less 
we sha II fee I that he is a soc ia I danger. " 
Sir Matthew Nathan, 1914 
The ideological crisis in South African liberalism pinpointed by Hoernle 
in 1941 had varying cultural and political roots. In formal political terms, it 
could be said to be a reflection of the pessimism felt by a cultural idealist such 
as Hoernle in the growing positivism and scientism expressed in the liberalism of 
the Institute., which closely resembled the emphasis upon factual and empirical 
analysis by the Department of Native Affairs itself. This positivism as we have 
seen, was a result in good measure of the reformulation of liberal ideology in the 
1920s by such opinion formers as C. T. Loram and J. D. Rheinnalt-Jones, though 
the roots go farther back to the 1905 meeting of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science in Johannesburg where Howard Pim had read his important 
paper on segregation. In wider cultural terms, however, Hoernle's disillusion 
could be said to relate to the very way that the "trusteeship" ideology had been 
formulated by the South African government, and in which liberals had actively 
co] I abora ted. 
"Trusteeship" was not an especial Iy new doctrine for the nineteenth 
century imperial phase could be said to have consciously contained within its 
notion of a "civilising mission" the sense of trust. The term had gained wider 
currency from the heyday of direct British rule in India and had been widely used 
by colonial administrators in other parts of the Empire: Lagden, for instance, 
had used it as the apology for territorial segregation in the Tra"nsvaal and in 
opposition to the Tsewu v Registrar of Deeds case in 1905. By the end of the 
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first world war the growing sense of imperial self-doubt could be said to be 
reflected in the changing meaning attached to Trusteeship when the term came 
to be linked to the Leage of Nations doctrine of an Imperial mandate to rule 
territories, such as Palestine or South West Africa, which would become formally 
free at some more distant date. Now, instead of the "civilising mission" 
necessitating an imperial presence in a territory for as long as the mind could 
conceive, the phase of imperial rule became far more truncated and less certain. 
This loss of certainty inherent in the Trusteeship notion by the 1920s led 
to a variety of responses by colonial and native administrators. Just as the 
administrators at the periphery could, in many respects, be said to be a more 
accurate barometer of imperial ideas in the nineteenth century than what has 
been called "the official mind" of imperialism., 
2 
so by the second and third 
decades of the twentieth century many administrators indicated a growing cultural 
malaise that almost bordered on what Fritz Stern has defined as "cultural 
despair". 3 George Heaton Nicholls, for instance, had developed 
views by the early 1920s as a result of his experiences in Northern Rhodesia as a 
4 Native Commissioner and as a Natal sugar planter. Similarly, the former 
Native Commissioner in the Zoutpansberg and Rustenburg, Ernest Stubbs, indicated 
a similar cultural pessimism in his segregationist pamphlet Tightening Coils, 
published in 1925. Retrenchments inside the Native Affairs Department, the loss 
of contact at the local level between Sub Native Commissioners and local African 
tribal and kinship groups, the extension of unionism amongst Africans to the rural 
areas by the middle 1920s, all these were strong influences on Stubbs's growing 
doubts in the ability of "western civilisation" to automatically perpetuate its own 
cultural and racial domination. Indeed, taking up the nineteenth century social 
darwinist assumption of "progress", Stubbs argued that civilisations were equally 
capable of declining as well as progressing: 
The pitifut remnants of the Greek civilisation, squatted upon 
and defiled b-y a people still essentially squalid and barbarous 
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in temper, furnish an example of the fate that may over- 
take the highest order of human be * 
ings. The Aryan 
Armenians, the Aryan Georgiansf the Aryan Tadiies of 
Central Asia constitute in their several communities an 
inferior and despised caste. 5 
This was the lot of "white civilisation" in South Africa unless policy 
was so directed to tackling the issue of the "poor whites" who were a "sign and a 
warning" of the dangers to come and the loss of control by a ruling class threatened 
by racial intermixture: 
The mixture of white and black is abhorrent to the White 
ra ce: the Natives can never be permitted to become a 
member of the ruling class, while the ruling class itself is 
deprived of the accessions of strength and vigour which is 
necessary to its permanence. The foundation of every 
political society is its labouring class. If there is go 
cohesion between the foundation and the structure reared 
upon it, the whole fabric must topple to the ground. 
Decay is already apparent in our South African slave economy. 6 
The only remedy for Stubbs was the vigorous application of a policy of 
territorial segregation to ensure that the African communities did not threaten the 
white "ruling class" by being allowed outlets in their rural economies. 
7 
This 
theme, of course, was not a new one for it was repeated by liberal writers such 
as Loram and Brookes and found support through the establishment of such training 
institutions as Fort Hare. On the other hand, the post first world war strike wave 
and the emergence of the 1. C. U. gave a note of added urgency to Stubbs's plea 
with its emphasis upon "cohesion" between the "foundation" of the "African 
labouring class" and the "structure reared upon it". But what sort of ideological 
structure? This was the theme for debate in the 1920s and 1930s, and in which 
the liberals so actively participated. 
At one extreme, there were the racists such as Heaton Nicholls who 
inherited the fears of the petty bourgeois "Black Peril" scares 'from before the first 
world war. The most virulent expression of these feelings were the lynchings of 
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blacks during the 1922 white strike on the Witwatersrand. On the other 
extreme, there were isolated calls for an almost complete abandonment of the 
whole idea of "western civillisation" and the effective intermarriage of black 
and white. This "Portuguese" alternative received very few advocates in 
South Africa after the first world war, despite the loss of imperial self-confidence, 
and was noteworthy probably only for its able expression by William Plomer in his 
novel Turbott Wolfe in 1925. The son of a Native Affairs official who had been 
retrenched in the early 1920s and taken up trading in Zululand, Plomer developed 
an early and precocious literary sarcasm towards the whole idea of "western 
civilisation" in the aftermath of the first world war. Developing an anti- 
puritan consciousness that "whether Cathol. ic or Protestant, falsified, misled and 
distorted human nature", 
8 
Plomer set out in Turbott Wolfe to explore the themes 
of social and sexual intermingling between races in the South African context that 
remained unparalleled until Nadine Gordimer's similar quest in A World of Strangers 
in the middle 1950s. Despite active attempts, though, to develop a conscious 
empathy towards Africans, Plomer's effort was characterised by an aloof 
aestheticism that was characteristic of contemporary literary movements in Britain 
centred around Bloomsbury. It was not surprising that the first edition of the 
novel was published by Leonard and Virginia Woolf's Hogarth Press, and Plomer 
himself eventually came to stand on the peripheries of Bloomsbury when he finally 
came to settle in Britain after a career of wandering that took him to Asia and 
Japan. 
But for all its defects, Turbott Wolfe must be considered a remarkable 
early vision of an alternative society in South Africa free of racial distinctions. 
The vision., for instance, of the young missionary Friston in the novel reflects, 
probably, the questioning by a small number of more radical missionaries of the 
conventional proselytising assumptions behind missionary expansion in Southern 
Africa: 
"Credo", he announc-ed in a voice of awe, prodding the 
ground with his forefinger, and speaking as distinctly as 
3.1 f 
an oracle. I believe that the white man's day is over. 
Anybody can see plainly that the world is quickly and 
inevitably becoming a coloured world. I do assert yet 
that miscegenation should be actively encouraged, but I 
believe that it is the missionary's work now, and the work 
of any white man in Africa worth his salt, to prepare the 
way for the ultimate end. Let us take the native, and 
instead of yapping to him about Jesus Christ and Noah's 
Ark, let us tell him about himself, not in relation to Hebrew 
folk-lore, but in relation to himself and to the white man. 
I think that's where my work'lies. "9 
Plomer's novel contains an interesting semi-satirical account of a political 
organisation - Young Africa - founded by Friston together with a white liberal 
Mabel van der Horst. The description of the. African member of the organisation, 
Zachary Msomi, the "slightly contemptuous ... kaffir intellectual, his over- 
developed torso constricted in a black coat", 
10 
was based quite possibly on John 
11 
Dube whom Plomer visited at his Ohlange Institute in Natal. The article 
contributed by Msomi to The Morning Chronicle "a leading native newspaper" 
parodies the pretentious style of the African petty bourgeois intelligentsia in such 
papers as I langa and lmvo: 
It is extra-superfinely fortunate for the auspices of the 
Association and happily portends that its two leading members 
or founders should occur to be Europeans familiar with 
prevailing sociological conditions as they are amongst the 
native peoples. 12 
The thrust of the novel., though, is, if anything, one of regret that Africans 
had ever been "civilised" at all. This regret becomes the basis, and more 
especially the vehicle, for Plomer to convey wider doubts about the values inherent 
in western civilisation itself. I have reached the pitch of understanding with 
the nerves", says Friston: 
I look forward to the great compromise between"white and 
black; between civilisation and barbarism; between 
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the past and the future; between brains and bodies; 
and, as I like to say, between habit and instinct. 13 
This attack on Western cartesianism parodies the modern movement in 
literature and the arts and the "appendix" to the novel contains some alleged 
"notes" by Friston on "the politico aethete" who remains an essentially divided 
figure for "on the right hand he is a politico, on the left aesthete". 
14 
This 
division reflected Plomer's own uncertainties and indicates why, following the 
failure of Voorslag which he edited with Roy Campbell, he decided to leave 
South Africa for artistically richer pastures. 
15 
But his one South African novel 
did have some impact: hardening, if anything, many white attitudes on segre- 
gation. One editor of a Durban paper was reported as having "his jaws chattering 
together with rage" as a result of reading the book 
16 
and clearly the book did 
represent an important alternative viewpoint to the supposed ideological consensus 
in the 1920s among whites on the values that should underpin native policy. 
The anthropological input 
The legacy of Turbott Wolfe soon became clouded by the emergence of 
social anthropology in South Africa as a more "scientific" method in which to 
organise relations between racial groups. It was this fresh input from the middle 
1 920s onwards which served as an effective counter to the earlier doubts expressed 
by many Native Administrators and, in turn, anthropological research provided 
an increasingly important empirical base on which to formulate policy on tribal 
reorganisation, reserve reclamation and native law and custom. 
Before 1920 anthropology in South Africa had been very much on an amateur 
footing and had been divorced to a considerable degree from the practical imple- 
mentation of policy. Selective works had been published by missionaries and 
"native experts" such as Dudley Kidd and Maurice Evans and Henri Junod, author 
of The Life of a South African Tribe in 1912.17 But a firm state commitment to 
research into ethnology was not entered into, despite pleas evýn from some African 
leaders, until 1925 when an ethnological section was created inside the Native 
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Affairs Department. By this time, a firm foundation had been laid for academic 
research by the establishment of a School of African Studies at the University of 
Cape Town under the professorship of A. R. Radcl iffe-Brown. Invited there by 
General Smuts, Radcliffe-Brown brought a firm commitment to the development 
of rigorous anthropological research governed by the values of Durkheimian 
sociology together with an absence of any real doubts in the values underpinning 
"western civilisation". Coming from a lower-middle class Birmingham background, 
Radcliffe -Brown's aspirations were upwardly mobile. It was symbolic that he 
changed his name to the double-barrelled Radcliffe-Brown in 1926 and his mannerisms 
affected those of the English aristocracy, suggesting that the basic premises behind 
western colonial rule in Africa were not in question., at least at this stage in his 
career. 
18 
Indeed, the basic problem for Radcliffe-Brown was the development 
of a scientific and positivist anthropology that could act as a firm guide to the 
"regulation" of race relations: 
The one great problem on which the future welfare of South 
Africa depends is that of finding some social and political 
system in which the natives and the whites may live together 
without conflict; and the successful solution of that problem 
would certainly seem to require a thorough knowledge of the 
native civilisation between which and our own we need to 
establish some sort of harmonious relation. 19 
Radcliffe-Brown himself did not stay long in South Africa to carry through 
this vision of a" conf I ict free" anthropology since he returned to Australia in 1926. 
There were others waiting in the wings, however, to jump onto the bandwagon and 
link the claims of anthropology to a wider view of the nature and role of a liberal 
intelligentsia. C. T. Loram had called in 1921 for a scientific approach to native 
policy 
20 
and this had been underlined the same year by the establishment of the 
Joint Councils under the influence of the research of the Phelps-Stokes Commission 
on education in Africa. With Loram continuing his work on the Native Affairs 
(ýommission, the one other individual to establish the links between liberal institutions 
centred around the Joint Councils and anthropological research was Rheinnalt-Jones. 
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In 1926, therefore, Rheinnalt-Jones delivered an important presidential address 
to Section E of the South African Association for the Advancement of Science on 
"The Need of a Scientific Basis for South African Native Policy" where some of 
the themes that had been emphasised by Radcliffe-Brown were taken up in a more 
openly partisan manner. Arguing against an historical approach to native policy, 
Rheinnalt-Jones emphasised. the values of a static, positivist standpoint on which to 
base research on race relations: 
Political experien. ce and historical knowledge have not given 
us the panacea for our racial difficulties, but have led us 
instead into a wilderness where the road is lost in the thick 
undergrowth of racial pride, passion and prejudice. We 
may well turn aside to look for other paths, even though they 
may prove less direct. 21 
Jones then turned to the arguments propounded by the advocates of 
complete racial separation, who had taken comfort from the theory of a "primitive 
mentality" propounded by the French anthropologist Levy-Bruhl. This pseudo- 
scientific argument had been much favoured by the cultural idealists who had argued 
that the "Bantu culture" of the Africans was so inherently different to that of the 
whites in South Africa that it would be morally wrong to impose the values of 
"Western civilisation" upon it. The evidence for this Rheinnalt-Jones dismissed 
as thin and drawing on eclectic examples, varying from the well-known case of 
George Washington Carver's scientific researches at Tuskegee to the precedent of 
the Mfengu in the Eastern Cape, concluded that "the emergence of the Bantu from 
the Power of animism and the tribal organisation that is based upon it 11 was 
"inevitable". 
22 
Thus such legislation as the Native Administration Bill (which 
became law the following year) was undesirable in so far as it perpetuated tribal 
institutions in South Africa and inhibited the absorption of Africans into "Western 
civilisation": 
If the civilisation of a people or an individual pan be 
measured by the degree of emancipation from the power of 
animistic beliefs., and of social organisations based upon 
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these beliefs, and if we accept the conclusion that the 
Bantu people are capable, at whatever rate of progress, 
of assimilating our rationalised civilisation, any Native 
policy which seeks to drive the Native back into Bantu 
culture, is setting the Native's face in the wrong 
direction - not towards liberty, but into thraldom. 
Rather should it aim at surrounding and permeating Native 
life with all those civilising agencies which enrich our own life - such as educational and religious teaching, economic 
development, hygenic organisations and governmental con- 
trol. To give every encouragement to those -who show 
signs of adopting civilised ways would be logical. 23 
This argument was not simply a return to the old Cape assimilationist 
ideal of the middle nineteenth century, though the renewed confidence instilled 
by the anthropological input clearly meant a strong revival by the middle 1 920s 
of some aspects of the "civilising mission" among white liberals. More importantly, 
it represented an important introduction into the cultural and ideological atmosphere 
of South Africa of some of the revised ideas on racial differences in Britain and the 
United States where the old ideological underpinnings behind Jim Crow segregation 
were under significant attack by the rising liberal intelligentsia schooled in the 
idea of the essential similarity of different racial groups. This attack on the old 
racist belief in the differences of ability and aptitude between races could be traced 
back to at least before the first world war in America, with the publication in 1911 
of Franz Boas's The Mind of Primitive Man, but it was not until the early 1920s that 
24 
they received a public airing in the South African context. Thus, formally at 
least, Rheinnalt-iones's vigorous statement in opposition to the cultural idealist 
assumptions behind segregationist ideology represented an important new departure 
in liberal thinking in South Africa by the middle 1920s, especially as it could be 
linked to the growth of such organisations as the Joint Councils. 
On the other hand, the response from the government itself over the 
following five years or so indicated the oblique nature of the anthropological 
a tta ck. In a sense the "scientific" nature of Rheinnalt-Jon*es's attack on the 
"primitive mentality,, school was as blunted as the "scientific" pretensions he was 
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attacking: science, in this context, could be seen to be used to support a 
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case both for and against racial separation. There was, furthermore, the 
problem of translating the more general anthropological attack on cultural 
separation into a concrete programme that led to a completely different social 
and political order to that presumed by the cultural idealists: this, as 
previous chapters have indicated, was completely lacking in liberal thinking 
in the 1920s as the issues became bogged down in the Cape franchise issue. 
It was only by the early 1930s with the work of the Ballingers; on the Protectorates 
that an alternative model began to emerge which was not based on more or less 
the same foundations as that of the government itself; but even then, this 
alternative formulation took place outside the context of the Institute of Race 
Relations and the Joint Councils, In reality, therefore, Rheinnalt-Jones's 
initial attack on native policy in 1926 failed to be translated into an effective 
alternative policy. 
The State's response: "Adaptation" and "Trusteeship" 
The reason for this failure lay to a considerable degree in the links 
formed between the government policy makers and administration officials in the 
Native Affairs Department with the white liberals, together with an important 
reformulation of government segregation policy behind the notion of "trusteeship". 
Despite Rheinnalt-Jones's opposition to the Native Administration Bill in 1926, by 
that year there had already been established an important Bantu Studies course for 
Native Affairs administrators at the University of the Witwatersrand. The value 
of such courses, apart from the academic prestige they brought, had always been 
such that they were too strong an ideological influence for both Rheinnalt-Jones 
and C. T. Loram to sacrifice on-, thealtar of political action, despite successive 
disappointments after 1926. As a part-time lecturer in Bantu Studies at the 
University of the Witwatersrand from 1927 to 1937, when he became a senator, 
Rheinnalt-Jones looked upon his academic lecturing as in many ways more 
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important than his work on the Joint Councils and in 1929, when he suffered from 
a bout of ill health, was prepared to sacrifice if necessary the Joint Council 
activities. 
26 
This priority to Bantu Studies was reinforced in the early 1930s 
when, through Loram's assistance and funds from the United States, the Bantu 
Studies course under the professorship of the language scholar C. M. Doke was 
expanded into a Department in its own right without any ties to History. 
27 
By 
this time Rheinnalt-Jones's control of the Institute of, Race Relations and the 
reigning in of the more radical activities of the Joint Councils were added factors 
contributing to compromising with government policy. Thus it was not surpris-ing 
that earlier hopes of land reform in the reserves, which Rheinnalt-Jones had 
espoused in the middle 1920s, became emasculated under the government's policy 
of Trusteeship after the publication of the report of the Native Economic Commission. 
Rheinnalt-Jones himself aided this in part by publishing an abridged edition of the 
28 
report through the University of the Witwatersrand's journal, Bantu Studies. 
Thus, by the early 1930s a new ideological consensus could be said to 
have been formed between the more conservative sections of the liberal intel I igentsia 
centred around the Institute and the government policy of Trusteeship. Previous 
informal liberal attempts at development in the reserves were I given up in favour of 
state control as the Native Economic Commission in 1932 spoke in favour of a "wise, 
courageous,, forward policy of development in the Reserves". 
29 More particularly, 
this rapprochement with state policy implied a moving away from the previous 
emphasis upon "assimilating" Africans into "Western civilisation" towards one of 
if adaptation" which was the principle ideological emphasis of the Report-, 
The inevitable effect of the under-development of the Reserves 
is that the orientation of the most advanced Natives has been 
towards the European. Instead of finding in their own area a 
fruitful field for using their energies, and their knowledge to 
uplift their people, they have been forced out from among them 
and have become "exiles" elsewhere. To develop the Natives 
and the Reserves: to make the dead hand of tribalism relax its 
I 
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grip; to convert tribalism into a progressive force; to 
set the Native mass in motion on the upward path of 
civil isation., and to enable them to shoulder the burden 
of their own advancement - such Must be ... the main 
approach to the solution of the Native problem in its 
economic aspect. 30 
This "adaptation ist" ideal was reinforced by the Commission's claims 
on the government's attempts to develop the reserve economies. The Native 
Administration Act was shown to have been beneficial in this respect since it 
allowed the Native Affairs Department control over all the native administrators 
in the reserves and by the time of the Report's publication, the Director of Native 
Agriculture, R. W. Thornton, had some 155 African demonstrators working in the 
field (though it was estimated that at least 400 would be needed over the next 
decade). 31 In addition, contrary to Rheinnalt-Jones's and W. M. Macmillan's 
arguments in the 1 920s on the necessity for land reform in the Union, the 
Commission considered that the key basis for "development" in the reserves lay 
less in the provision of more land, but in the effective utilisation of existing 
areas. Its central reading of history in South Africa since the 1913 Natives 
Land Act was that if there had been an "intensive campaign of Native agricultural 
education" the African demand for further land would be "less insistent and less 
urgent". 
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Agricultural demonstrators were seen to be the essential means 
towards breaking down peasant conservatism, ensuring the introduction of better 
livestock strains, stock limitation, fencing, paddocking and irrigation and a 
careful programme of land reclamation. Praising the efforts of Father Huss in 
his efforts to introduce co-operative societies in the Transkei, the Commission 
recommended state action in this sphere, with the emphasis upon a Native 
Agricultural Bank since "European private capital" was virtually excluded from 
the reserves. At the same time, echoing the emphasis upon instilling sound 
business ethics into the aspirant African trader class in the reserves by Howard 
Pim, William Ballinger and others, the Commission urged that "very close watch 
should be kept on the use made of the borrowed money" for "it must be remembered 
that to the Abantu, money economy is a new thing" (sic). It was necessary for 
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there to be "education on the use of credit" which the Commission considered 
could be achieved by "imposing very strict limits on the purposes for which 
money can be borrowed" and by "employing existing Native agencies, such 
as Councils and Chiefs to supervise this". 
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The Native Economic Commission, therefore, sought both to nationalise 
many of the more informal efforts at capital mobilisation in the reserves and the 
creation of a class of traders and rural petty bourgeois, while at the same time, 
through the ideology of "adaptation", manipulating "tribal" and traditional 
social mechanisms as the main basis of social control. 
34 
In its essence, the 
strategy proposed by the Commission resembled in many respects the later state 
efforts at manipulating tribal institutions through the creation of Bantu authorities 
in the I 950s and the enhancement of rural petty bourgeoisies in the reserves around 
such factions as Chief Matanzimia in the Transvaal,, Lennox Sebe in the Ciskei and 
Chief Mphephu in Venda. 
35 This ideological continuity was further underlined 
by the fact that the Chairman of the Native Economic Commission, John Holloway, 
who, as Director of the Office of Census and Statistics at the time of the Report's 
publication had had a significant influence on the Report's findings, was himself 
an important advocate of a pragmatic form of apartheid after 1948. After being 
economic adviser to the Treasury between 1934 and 1937, and Secretary for Finance 
between 1937 and 1950, Holloway was looked upon favourably by the Nationalist 
government of Dr. Malan in the 1950s and was appointed Ambassador to 
Washington in 1954. In an article in 1956 Holloway spoke of the apartheid 
doctrine as being "not a dogma but a policy" and interpreted it very much in terms 
of the adaptationist formulation of the Native Economic Commission. "The 
; millions of Bantu in Southern Africa", he argued: 
can no longer be fed unless the high level of industrial 
technique introduced by Western civilisation is maintained 
intact and in sound working order. 36 
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There were, furthermore, "reforms which have still to be introduced 
to make the Bantu survive at all in a civilised environment ... A totally 
improvident race will never become a civilised race". Thus "a long time 
will have to elapse before the Bantu areas can be fully developed. Just as 
in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, so in the South African Bantu reserves capital 
will have to come from outside to create a basis for civilisation. This also 
means that for a very long time to come the Bantu will be dependent on the 
Capital investment which has already been made in the white areas". 
37 
For the liberals in the Institute of Race Relations, acceptance of the 
framework for Union Native policy outlined by the Native Economic Commission 
marked an important transformation in their ideological thinking. It is, indeed, 
with this reorientation of liberal ideology around the adaptationist concept in the 
early 1930s that the seeds of the later crisis outlined by Hoernle in 1941 can be 
traced. "Adaptation", with its implied synthesis of the values of "western 
civilisation" with those of "traditional" African culture, became the basis of much 
anthropological work in the 1930s centred around the idea of "culture contact" 
disseminated through such organs as the journal Africa published by the International 
Institute of African Languages and Cultures. The influences on this debate were 
in a markedly culturalist idealist direction especially as the editor of the Journal 
and the Director of the Institute was Professor Diedrich Westermann. As the 
Professor of African Languages at the University of Berlin, Westermann was steeped 
in the cultural ethnography of the German school of Anthropology, which was also 
one of the dominating influences on the development of Afrikaans volkekunde at 
such centres as the University of Stellenbosch under Professor W. W. M. Eiselen. 
38 
it was through these sources that the culture contact school in the early 
1930s underlined the adaptationist concept by emphasising the need to maintain 
and modernise traditional structures of social control in Africaq societies. 
Perhaps in keeping with the mood of a European intelligentsia that was itself 
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disillusioned with the values of liberal individualism in the wake of the depression, 
the importance of this influence in reinforcing an ideological consensus between 
liberals and trusteeship policy cannot be ignored. In his book The African Today 
published in 1934, Westermann welcomed the efforts of the Joint Councils which 
were "trying by discussions and consultations to alleviate the racial antagonism and 
to induce co-operation where possible". 
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While conceding that "nobody will 
maintain that the South African Natives have been treated liberally in the distri- 
bution of land, in payment for work done, and in being given opportunities for 
advancement", Westermann nevertheless argued for some form of racial separation: 
Though a radical separation is impracticable, both races will 
agree that social intercourse between the two will probably 
not be the rule, and that consequently they must aim at 
I iv ing pea cefu IIy together s ide by s ide ... By I iving, apart 
many possibilities of friction and conflict are diminished, and 
each community can develop its own institutions undisturbed 
and live its own life. The same conditions have been 
evolved in North America after long experience and are 
regarded there as the most satisfactory arrangement by both 
races. 40 
But such racial separation was maintained essentially, Westermann argued, 
by the preservation of social and familial institutions, especially through educational 
means: 
Every man is born into a social organization, into a family, 
tribe, people and state. He will always have relations, 
neighbours and fellow workers. The feeling of solidarity 
with the village and the clan, with men of the same age- 
grade and with friends in the same association, will remain 
alive in the future in large parts of Africa. Efforts are 
being made today in European countries to revive associations 
which have fallen into decay, because the values inherent in 
them have been recognised. In recognising these values 
there is a conviction that in contrast to an atomizin'g 
individualism, nothing is more likely to let altruistic feelings 
gather new strength than the cultivation of such'natural 
bonds. Such institutions are still alive in Africa, and it 
would be short-sighted to let them die of neglect. 41 
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In this ideological climate of a considerably rejuvenated cultural idealism 
in anthropology in the early 1930s the earlier positivism of the 1920S began to lose 
influence. In so far as its chief objective, in the form of the fact-gathering and 
empiricist body the Institute of Race Relations, had already been achieved, it was 
hard to discern what further objectives were actually open to it. The main 
figures associated with positivism were of considerably less influence by the 1930S 
as well. Howard Pim became an honorary figure in the Institute and his last 
major contribution was his study of the Transkei, which came out shortly after his 
death in 1934. C. T. Loram moved to the United States and Yale in 1931 where 
his influence could only be indirect, mainly in fact, in terms of the academic 
expansion of the Bantu Studies course at the University of the Witwatersrand. 
Rheinnalt-Jones became engaged in the Institute of Race Relations before becoming 
a senator in 1937. Thus, it was not surprising that the ideological developments 
in liberal thought came from newer influences., especially in terms of cultural 
idea I ism. 
This reformulation of liberal thinking was evidenced particularly by the 
pub I ication in 1934 of a col I ection of essays by a group of I eading I ibera Is 
entitled Western Civilisation and the Natives of South Africa. Described as 
"studies in culture contact", the editor, Isaac Schapera, attempted in the preface 
to reconcile the adaptationist formulation of the Native Economic Commission to 
the older assimilationist ideal of the Cape liberals and the anthropology of the 
1920s. With the emphasis upon the preservation of African social institutions, 
however, the pattern of argument revealed the general trend of thought: 
As an immediate practical Policy there is much to be said in 
favour of utilizing Native institutions in the administration 
and economic development of the reserves. The arguments 
adduced to this effect by the Native Economic Commission 
are not without validity. But it must always be remembered 
that there are numerous influences apart from the Administration 
bearing upon the life of the Native, and that they are all 
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tending to assimilate his culture to that of the Europeans. 
As a means of facilitating the transition to : issimilation 
(and, as the records show, ! his does not mean identification) 
there is every need for a policy of adaptation. But it 
cannot be regarded as a final solution of the Native 
question. Bantu culture will change and develop, drawing 
most of its impetus from the elements of our own civilisation, 
no matter what we can do now or how we attempt to control 
i t. 42 
This interpretation of adaptation was on lines similar to the indirect 
rule policy that had become the basis of a lot of British administrative theory 
in African colonies to the north. 
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Shapera hoped that this looser view 
would thus reduce the adaptationist concept to a more interim policy which . 
basically accepted the long-term inevitability of cultural "assimilation". But 
this attempt at synthesising the concept of adaptation with that of assimilation 
was for the most, part unsuccessful and Schapera himself did not stay in South 
Africa to support it, but went instead to Bechuanaland to conduct research on 
the effects of migrant labour in a more detailed and scholarly manner than the 
previous efforts of the Ballingers. 
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The genera I trend in, the I 930s, in fact, 
was towards a liberal acceptance of the ideological assumptions behind the 
adaptationist concept. 
It is for this reason that the name of Alfred Hoernle is associated most 
closely with South African liberalism in the 1930s and early 1940s. Between 
the publication of Edgar Brookes's Phelps-Stokes lectures in 1932 The Colour 
Problems of South Africa, which represented a separate strand of Christian 
trusteeship, though favourable to the general anthropological shift away from 
assimilation, 
45 
to Hoern le's Phe lps-Stokes lectures in 1939 entitled South African 
Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit, a pronounced change could be said to have 
occurred in liberal thinking. Now liberal ideals became founded on a basic 
acceptance of cultural diversity as a result of the impact of the culturalist 
idealist school in anthropology. The context of this reformulation is of 
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importance. As President of the Institute of Race Relations, Hoernle was as 
aware of the "threat" from the rival Rasseverhoudingsbond van Afrikaners of 
M. D. C. de Wet Nel in 1936 as Rheinnalt-Jones and it was the arguments of 
cultural ethnicity propounded by the Bond under the influence of neo-fichtean 
nationalism from the F. A. K. that influenced his conceptual isation of the 
adaptationist and assimilationist dichotomy posed by the Holloway Report. In 
some unpublished notes written after his attendance at a conference of the 
Rasserverhoudingsbond, Hoernle more or less revealed his acceptance of 
Holloway's arguments on assimilation. Indeed, he made a basic distinction 
which Holloway himself came to make after a visit to the United States in 1934 
after the Commission's report, 
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namely that the cultural basis for assimilation 
in the United States was substantially different to that of South Africa where 
there were much firmer indigenous cultural and tribal institutions amongst the 
Africans: 
.*. whilst the 
American experiment shows that Negro 
hu manity can assimilate Western culture successfully, 
such assimilation is obviously both more difficult and 
more time-consuming where Bantu culture still exhibits 
a considerable degree of cohesion and vitality. Again, 
the more closely we study Bantu culture, the more we 
recognise that, even if it does contain elements of which 
by the standards of Western, and above all Christian, 
culture, we cannot approve of, it also contains much that 
by any standards is worth preserving. Thus, not unreason- 
ably we begin to regret the indiscriminate breaking dow 'n 
of 
Bantu culture and to talk of giving the Bantu a chance to 
build up on the basis of their own cultural heritage. 47 
On the other hand, "culture contact" did have its destructive effects on 
"Bantu culture" with the assimilationist results, as argued by Schapera. This 
furthermore raised the problems of how far assimilation of Africans-into western 
culture threatened the cultural identity of Afrikanerdom: 
We simply cannot Christianise without to a greater or less 
degree de-Afrikanderising ... We cannot administer 
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Native tribes as we do in the Union without Europeanising 
the people through contact with our Western methods of 
Government. 48 
This dilemma for Hoernle thus left him with the only option of propounding 
a "middle course" which involved "assimilation in culture whilst practising such 
differentiation in matters social and racial, as both groups may agree by mutual 
consent to practise in the interests of racial good-will and co-operation". 
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This, however, amounted to a political version of the formulation earlier pro- 
pounded by Schapera and its was unclear, in 1936, what "differentiation" mutually 
agreed upon in the interests of "racial good-will and co-operation" amounted to 
beyond the existing influence exerted by the Institute over sections of the con- 
servative African petty bourgeoisie in the period before and after the 1936 land 
and, franchise legislation. There was a vacuum in Hoernle's thinking at this 
point which was never fully resolved. 
But the importance of Hoernle's thought lay in its shifting liberal thinking 
away from the previous assimilationist tradition derived from the mid-nineteenth 
century Cape liberal tradition and redefining it in terms of the newer anthropological 
perspective of adaptation. The political implications of this were spelt out more 
cogently not by Hoernle but by the apostle of Christian Trusteeship Jan H. Hofmeyr 
in a lecture at the University of Witwatersrand in August 1936. With the 
destruction of the Cape African franchise, Hofmeyr was aware that there was a 
need to shift away from the Old Cape liberalism which "in later years" had "become 
too largely a thing of sentiment". What was now needed was "a new liberalism" 
which Hofmeyr defined in terms of the current anthropological approach: 
I 
the acceptance of, in essence, the same broad principles 
as those for which the old liberalism has stood, together with 
the application, to the working out of those principles, of 
sympathetic first hand acquaintance with the Native peoples - 
or, to put it differently, eager study and thoroughgoing 
investigation, with a view to giving form and substance to the 
otherwise possibly dry bones of idealism. 50 
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Such an approach for Hofmeyr involved the acceptance of "constructive 
segregation" which involved the development of the reserve conomies on principles 
similar to those spelled out by Holloway while also recognising in the urban areas 
a "class of detribalized urban native as a permanent factor, of accepting the 
members of that class as co-workers in the building-up of South Africa's economic 
Ii fe ". 
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Such was the course outlined by Hofmeyr with its depoliticising con- 
sequences for the white liberals in the Institute compared to the activities even 
seven years previously in the Non Racial Franchise Association. When tackled 
on the course of government policy by Alfred Xuma in November of 1936 with the 
warning that the Trusteeship policy "establishes, with leadership of the State 
itself, what I choose to call real racialism in South Africa, from which one may 
expect very serious conflicts and antago I nisms between the White and Black races 
in South Africa, unless better councils ... prevail", 
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Hofmeyr could see no 
alternative course other than one of "accepting the position thus created at least 
as a foundation on which to build a more adequate structure of race co-operation 
in the future. 
53 
Growing collaboration 
In the years after 1936, therefore, the ideological basis of the political 
divisions between the Institute and Government policy were minimal, despite the 
attempts by some historians to interpret the period of the late I 930s and 1 940s as 
one of intense ideological debate. - 
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The failure of the liberals to formulate 
an alternative ideology to Trusteeship effectively left them at the political mercy 
of a new class of politicians - later described as "native politicians" - who 
were created as a result of the 1936 legislation. Foremost among these was 
the Natal segregationist George Heaton Nicholls whose views had considerably 
changed since his Black Peril novel Bayete in 1923. As Shula Marks has shown, 
Heaton Nicholls's views by the late 1920s had been consider9bly influenced by 
the gradual reassertion of Zulu tribal authority under the Regency of Solomon ka 
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Dinuzulu's Ink. atha ka Zulu. Seeing the revival of tribal power and the 
recognition of Solomon as king, which had continued to be opposed by the Native 
Affairs Department in Natal still mindful of the 1906 Bambata Rebellion, as an 
essential means to combat growing class consciousness in Natal, Heaton Nicholls 
manifested an acute insight into the way social control could be manipulated via 
tribal institutions. 55 Indeed, this was essential if the adaptationist concept was 
to work: 
... the conflict today has ceased to be the conflict between 
the tribal assegai and the European and is developing into a 
class war of a native proletariat. The recreation and 
maintenance of that old native aristocracy is essential to the 
growth of the adaptationist ideal. The creation of a Bantu 
nation having its nucleus in the Native Reserves, with its 
loyalties gathered round native institutions rooted in the soil 
of the native areas, requires the establishment of paramount 
chiefs. No Native race in Africa is prouder of its past, its 
traditions, its institutions and its Royal House than the Zulus 
and if native policy could be directed to capturing the latent 
loyalties of the Zulu race by recognising the Royal House as 
paramount, it would go far to satisfy native opinion and to 
re-orient that opinion in the direction of building up a Native 
society in the reserves. 56 
Heaton Nicholls's perception of "an amazing unanimity amongst educated 
natives in their desire to increase the powers of the chiefs" 
57 
related in good 
measure to the conservative nature of the African petty bourgeoisie in Natal 
compared to other parts of South Africa and the absence of the assimilationist 
ideology based on the Cape African franchise. In the early 1930s Heaton 
Nicholls, who was driven by an intense loathing of universities and intellectual 
life born of a sense of marked colonial inferiority, sought to establish a power 
base of his own outside Institute control. On the basis of attachments with 
John Dube, he attempted to widen the class alliance that had been established in 
Natal by 1930 between the sugar planters, Native Affairs Department officials 
(who later formed the Zulu. Society in the 1930s) and the African petty bourgeoisie 
58 
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onto a Union-wide basis. Ostensibly seeking to "escape party politics 
with whites which will only lead to confusion and ill-feeling", Heaton Nicholls 
approached Dube in February 1931 to sound out African leadership's opinion on 
land allocations to the reserves offered in exchange for the removal of the Cape 
fran ch ise. As a result of a tour of the Union, Dube succeeded in gaining 
considerable support for a memorandum on "Land Settlement" that sought to 
create compact African reserves in each province of the Union on lines similar 
to the Transkei., in addition to establishing a Union Native Council for members 
elected from provincial councils. For such prominent representatives as 
Chief Victor Poto of Pondoland and the tobacco grower and stock breeder 
Qamata of Cala in the Transkei the scheme was found to have considerable 
approval. Indeed, Dube reported from the Transkei that "all the leaders" 
there were prepared to accept the "Compromise" since "they say land and 
development measures are more acceptable to them than the vote ... So 
you can remain assured that all of the Transkei is with you in this matter ... 
It was quite clear to me that we need have no fear of Natives opposing this 
measure. They all say Natives want land more than the vote". 
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The use of Dube in this scheme of Heaton Nicholls was of importance, 
since Dube had fallen out in the 1920s with the white liberals over their support 
for increased white control over the financiall insolvent Ohlange Institute. 
With Dube's failure to secure financial support from philanthropic circles in 
Britain, especially John Harris and the Aborigines Protection Society, by 1929 
the Institute had fallen under increasing control from Natal sugar planting 
interests. Marshall Campbell, a prominent sugar magnate who later became 
a senator, was asked by Dube to become one of the trustees of the Institute so 
that by 1931 it was not surprising to find Dube so beholden to Heaton Nichol Is. 
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The longer-term consequence was the gradual weaning away'of sections of the 
African petty bourgeoisie and tribal chiefs from liberal influbnce centred around 
the Joint Councils. Though this was unlikely to appease the Cape members 
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whom Heaton Nicholls despaired of completely winning over, 
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it seemed 
very likely by the time of the publication of the Native Bills in 1935 that not 
all sections of African political leadership would necessarily fall behind 
D. D. T. Jabavu's Cape-based and Joint Council influenced All African 
Convention. 
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This consideration was reinforced by 1935 when it began to emerge 
that Heaton Nicholls was one of the chief ideological exponents of the United 
Party government's version of Trusteeship. In an address in September 1935, 
Heaton Nicholls precluded any possibility of maintaining the Cape franchise 
on the basis of a stark manichaean dichotomy of preserving white rule rooted 
in trusteeship or accepting the inevitability of class struggle and black majority 
rule. The South African polity, he declared was faced with the choice of 
either "trusteeship with Native reserves and institutions" or "common citizenship 
and the evolution of a class society": with the deciding factor being the Cape 
franchise. The logic of this argument led to a situation or turbulent unrest 
similar to that depicted at the end of his novel Bayete: 
-*- and when all this is done as -the 
logical consequence 
of a common citizenship, we shall have succeeded in 
creating a landless black proletariat - sullen, discontented 
and bolshevised - with the limited right to vote indeed, 
but intimidated in its exercise by precisely that form of 
pressure which rules the ballot box in the Southern States of 
America. 63 
Furthermore, like Hoernle, it was also clear that Heaton Nicholls disagreed 
with the American parallel of assimilation. Aware of the existence of a "separate 
Bantu ethos", Heaton Nicholls argued for the preservation of separate African 
cultural institutions in order to ward off eventual class conflict: 
The Bantu of Africa should not be regarded from the same 
angle as the Negroes of America, who form a-submerged 
class of a mixed population. On evolutionary principles 
the American Negro has branched off from the main stream 
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of his race and is fast becoming a hybrid. Assimilation 
is everywhere in progress in America, retarded in the 
higher and changing classes of the community solely by 
social prejudices. To transplant American class ideas 
into South Africa is to lead the way to a coloured South 
Africa, since classes have everywhere, and all through 
the ages, ended by becoming absorbed into the body of 
the general community, no matter what legal impediment 
there may be. Hence the need for a clear recognition 
of what assimilation entails It matters not whether 
they are tribalised or detribalised, educated or ignorant, 
civilised or barbaric, the Natives belong to a distinct and 
separate "race". Classes are emerging in the race itself 
and may require separate administrative treatment, but the 
race remains as a separate entity. The proposed legislation 
we are considering has, therefore, no application to "classil 
it is concerned with the maintenance of the Bantu ethos in 
the interests of Western civilisation. 64 
This was a considerably less sophisticated version of the cultural idealism 
that had begun to be rejuvenated in the early I 930s in the aftermath of the Native 
Economic Commission and which began to colour Hoernle's thought by 1936, the 
following year. In its emphasis upon evolution, "hybridsl" and the separate 
racial "ethos" of "the Bantu" it recalled nineteenth century social darwinism and 
eugenics. 
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For the positivist school of anthropology the arguments were easily 
dismissable. Rheinnalt-Jones wrote, for instance, that the biological basis 
behind Heaton Nicholls's racial theories were unsupportable and "when he is 
tackled about it he loses his temper and there is no further argument". Further- 
more., in his emphasis upon complete racial separation, given his admittance to 
Rheinnalt-iones at meetings of the Native Affairs Commission that it would still 
be impossible to settle a self-sufficient African peasantry on the land, the arguments 
favoured -the repressionist school. 
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Despite these ideological objections from the positivists, however, it'was - 
by no means clear that Heaton Nicholls's ideas were completely incompatible with 
some of the arguments of the cultural idealists in the attempt to preserve a separate 
34-9 
African ethnic identity. These considerations ývere reinforced by the 
political weakness of the Institute in the wake of the passing of the two bills 
in 1936. Despite hopes by D. D. T. Jabavu for a last-ditch struggle against 
the Native Representation Bil I in 1935 so as "to give the government a ful I 
run for their money by dying hard so that we may go down still fighting", 
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it became clear in the course of 1935 that the liberals in the Institute had too 
much at stake to risk a complete confrontation with the government. On the 
16th May, Edgar Brookes advised Rheinnalt-Jones against any policy of non 
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co-operation towards the Bills and on May 26th Jones himself went to consult 
Smuts on a scheme for a series of conferences with African leaders on the Bills. 
Though Smuts was in favour of one general native conference, the liberals in 
the Institute favoured a series of Union wide conferences which could increase 
their general political influence, and this proposal was agreed upon through 
the influence of D. L. Smit, the Secretary of Native Affairs. 
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With the 
increasing isolation of Jabavu's All African Convention in the coming months, 
liberals got increasingly involved at the local level with establishing class 
alliances of their own with sections of the African petty bourgeoisie in supporting 
the removal of the Cape African franchise. This became clear, for instance, 
in Natal where Edgar Brookes, who himself sought to renew his political 
ambitions by standing for the senatorship in Natal under the proposed legislation, 
championed an alliance with John Dube. Following the opposition of the 
conference in Natal to the Bills and its championing of the Cape African franchise, 
Brookes warned Dube of "the grave danger" involved in his "selling the past" and 
allowing the more radical sections of African political leadership prevail. 
70 
In the hope of outmanoeuvring the radicals, who were widely believed to be 
influenced by the activities of Carl Faye, a Zulu linguist in the. Natal Native 
Affairs Department involved in the establishment of the Zulu Society, Brookes 
suggested that Dube press at the A. N. C. Congress in Natal on December 15th 
for the immediate establishment of the Natives Representative Council, while 
3*1 
the other legislation on land, native representation and the Cape franchise could 
be worked out with the government through the N. R. C. This de facto 
acceptance of the government's policy clearly depended upon Dube being able to 
maintain Congress support, though Brookes, working in conjunction with Douglas 
Shepstone - the grandson of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, a lawyer and later rival 
to Brookes in the 1937 senatorial election in Natal - and the Chief Native 
Commissioner in Natal, H. C. Lugg, kept open the option of supporting Z. K. Matthews 
should Dube have failed. 
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In the event Matthews was not needed and Dube main- 
tained Congress support for the effective acceptance of the government's proposals, 
providing the Cape franchise was not abolished. 
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Thus Brookes had led the way 
into effectively integrating liberal political activity in Natal into the class alliance 
already forged by Heaton Nicholls between the Natal sugar planters, the Native 
Affairs Department and the African petty bourgeoisie: a process that was further 
extended in 1937 when Brookes became senator for Natal on the basis of support 
from the Zulu Paramount Mshyeni ka Dinuzulu and the tribally-based Zulu Society 
that was centred in the offices of the Native Affairs Department. 
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Given this political trend, and the eventual support for the Bills by John 
Dube after he went to Pretoria with the Zulu Regent Mshiyeni, 
74 it was not 
surprising that Heaton Nicholls began to recognise the potential importance of the 
Institute in the co-optation process. Writing to Rheinnalt-Jones in November 
1935, he urged the Institute to abandon its ivory tower outlook and to "set to work 
to study what can be done along the material lines of the Bills". Indeed, he 
believed the Institute "could do much to assist in the coming development, and 
incidentally bring a better relationship, if you go with the national current; but 
on no. other terms". 
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This tended, in fact, to be precisely the trend of policy 
in the Institute as both Brookes and Rheinnalt-Jones became elected as Natives 
Representatives in 1937 in the wake of the Bills passing into law. Rheinnalt- 
Jones, for example, began to integrate his work significantly into that of the 
Native Affairs Commission, then under the control of Heaton Nicholls, seeing his 
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role as a communicating link between African chiefs, farmers and headmen on 
the one hand and the Commission on the other. Writing to John Dube in 1937 
shortly after his election as Senat: )r, for example, Rheinnalt-Jones boasted of 
his being successful in getting African chiefs and headmen to speak to the Native 
Affairs Commission which "welcomed my presence and told the chiefs etc. that I 
was there to help". 
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This close collaboration also entailed a curtailed 
opposition to the Commission's policy on land allocations under the Native Trust 
and Land Act. Despite repeated claims by Rheinnalt-Jones that the white 
liberals had done their best to persuade the South African Parliament not to pass 
the Act, 
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it became increasingly clear that he saw his role as one of explaining 
and justifying previously worked out government policy. The tribal basis of 
the policy, for instance, prohibited him from campaigning for land claims by 
groups outside recognised "tribal" structures such as the Hlubi clans of Chief 
Msiti in the Orange Free State. Despite the fact that these people had been 
a recognised chiefdom until the end of the Anglo-Boer War, there were no land 
provisions for them under the 1936 Act and Jones doubted, in a letter to one of 
the group's leaders in Matatiele, whether it was worth applying for land to the 
Chief Native Commissioner, Northern Areas, who was "finding it quite impossible 
to do anything for scattered tribal people in the 0. F. S. , or even for some not so 
s ca ttered ". 
78 Such a response indicated, if anything, Rheinnalt-Jones's desire 
to shield the apparatus of Native Administration from attack and to smooth over 
the administrative process of the Trusteeship policy. 
It was therefore in the general political context of growing liberal 
collaboration with the evolution of the government's Trusteeship policy that the 
reformulation of liberal ideology onto a culturalist idealist basis in the late 1930s 
occurred. Here, the philosopher Alfred Hoernle, as. President of the Institute 
of Race Relations, was of crucial significance for he had the necessary intellectual 
and ideological armoury to synthesise the anthropological arguments of the cultural 
idealists with the philosophical ones of contemporary liberalism: in this he was 
undoubtedly aided by his Wife Winifred who had been trained in the United 
States 
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and taught Bantu Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand. Furthermore , 
in comparison even to Rheinnalt-Jones, who manifested an apparent reluctance 
to engage Heaton Nicholls in open debate until at least 1941,79 Hoernle sought 
to discuss with an ostensible opponent the underlying similarity in their ideo- 
logical outlooks. "I have always recognised that the argument for complete 
segregation is very strong", Hoernle wrote to Nichol Is in April 1937, "what I 
have criticised is the incomplete segregation which is, to mel a mere sham". 
Heaton Nicholls's idea of "keeping the Bantu race in its own reserves" had an 
attraction, therefore., to Hoernle who was prepared to support it in its full 
"literalness", especially if by total segregation there would be ensured the ending 
of "the disruption of Native social and economic life by the prolonged absences of 
the men for the purposes of earning wages in white employment" which could not 
be really described as "segregation". 
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Such considerations were probably re- 
inforced in Hoernle's mind by the fact that by the late 1930s it was becoming 
increasingly obvious that African political leadership was reluctant to accept 
automatically the guidance and paternal authority that had been hitherto the 
prerogative of the Institute and Joint Councils. As Xuma had warned Hofmeyr 
in 1936, African political opinion mobilised through both the A. N. C. and All 
African Convention was becoming increasingly radicalised, forcing the hitherto 
"moderate" leaders into severing their former uncritical class alliance with the 
white liberals. This process became clear by 1938 in Johannesburg where the 
African membership of the Joint Council became strained after the success of the 
radical faction in the Transvaal centred around the Transvaal African Teachers 
Association, and the Transvaal African Congress. This group had supported 
Hymie Basner in the 1937 election against Rheinnalt-Jones and, though they had 
been beaten through the weighting of the voting in favour of the chiefs, had 
nevertheless made a considerable impact on the urban intelligentsia. 
81 
Thus , 
it was not surprising that on an issue such as the Protectorates,. when it was 
discussed by the Joint Council, a number of African members present wholly 
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opposed the idea of their transfer to the Union. "Our Natives managed to 
disappoint us al I, more or less", Hoernle wrote to. John Harris of the Aborigines 
Protection Society. "I have known them in much better form The 
"general effect" of the discussion, however., was to set Hoernle thinking on the 
value of tribal structures: 
The general effect on me at least - and much against my 
wife - was to set me wondering (not for the first time) 
how these detrilaalised Natives can really speak for the 
Native peoples as a whole; or how much helpful advice 
they can really give to the Natives in the Protectorates. 
Compared with a chief who has a real following among his 
tribe, these advanced Natives have no following at all; 
and would be in opposition, if they had to live and work 
under a chief. This fundamental division between the 
(more or less) detribalised and the (more or less) still 
tribalised, when added to solid surviving trival jealousies 
and enmitias., makes any strong and wise leadership of 
Natives by Natives impossible. 82 
With growing doubts, therefore,, in the ability of such liberal organisations 
as the Institute of Race Relations and the Joint Councils to maintain their ideo- 
logical and political hegemony over the African political elite, Hoernle undertook 
his reformulation of liberal ideology in his Phelps-Stokes lectures of 1939, South 
African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit. The cultural idealist arguments 
on the value of social communities as the essential basis of social control became 
linked, in Hoernle's analysis, with an interpretation of liberalism heavily influenced 
by the liberal-hegelian school of idealists of late nineteenth century England. 
The static notion of a "liberal spirit" thus became bound up with the preservation 
of "culture" in the group-orientated sense of the cultural idealists: 
individuals live their lives as members of social groups, and 
the excellence of their lives is relative, therefore, to the 
culture (in the widest sense) of their group; the cu I ture to 
the pattern of which individual lives are moulded, the 
culture from which they draw the materials, ai it were, for a 
life worth living. The liberal spirit, in this aspect, shows 
itself as a respect for social groups other than one's own, for 
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cultures other than one's own, for sentiments and traditions 
other than one's own, though always coupled with a willing- 
ness to share one's own. 83 
Out of this cultural relativism, Hoernle formulated a liberalism that 
bore close similarities to the cultural pluralism of the later post-war school of 
plural scholars such as J. S. Furnival, Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith and which 
marked an important step away from the individual ist-orientated free market model 
of nineteenth century Manchester school liberalism. 
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At the same time., 
recognising that within this cultural pluralism, Afrikaner Nationalism was a growing 
political force, Hoernle gloomily reflected on the "heartbreak house" of con- 
temporary South African race relations. Perceiving that the choices were three- 
fold, in a manner similar to the -Native Economic Commission, Hoernle argued for 
a policy of "separation" as opposed to "parallelism" or "assimilation". Butsuch 
II separation" meant "the sundering or dissociation so complete as to destroy the 
very possibility of effective domination" if the "liberal spirit" was to be achieved. 
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But this did not, Hoernle recognised, represent a very practical political programme 
and he was forced to concede that there was "no ultimate hope for the liberal 
spirit". 
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Towards the politics of hope 
Hoernle's thinking in the. 1930s reflected to a high degree the tensions 
implicit within liberal political activity in South Africa at a crucial time. His 
ultimate admittance in 1939 that there was no "ultimate hope" for liberalism drew 
the scorn of a number of fellow liberals, most notably the Bishop of Johannesburg, 
Geoffrey Clayton, who attacked him for "abandoning hope" which he interpreted 
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as lying at the heart of the Christian message. But while such "hope" 
continued to lie at the basis of much I iberal thinking in the 1940s and 1950s, 
expressed, for instance, by Alan Paton who published a collection of essays 
entitled Hope for Africa, 
88 
the secular basis of I ibera I ideoloýy as expressed by 
Hoernle was clearly in a state of crisis. As we saw in the last chapter, the 
I 
'divisions in the Institute of Race Relations in 1942-43-only magnified this crisis 
a, nd it was uncertain, after 1943, exactly in what direction liberal thinking 
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could move if it was not to be merely. a pale reflection of the government's 
89 
Trusteeship policy. Events-during the Second World War and the -revised 
thinking taking place in,. the colonial powers magnified this sense of crisis so 
, -hat by 1945 and the victory of the Al-lied Powers over the fascist Axis, a new 
set of I ibera I principles in keeping with Roosevelt's "Four Freedom" and the 
Beveridge Plan for a welfare state in Britain seemed imperative. The growing 
issue of Afr;. con urban isa tion, broug ht on as a resu It of Sou th Afr i ca's warti me 
industrial isation enhanced the importance of this, also, so that by the time of 
the appointment of the Fagan Commission in 1946 to revise government thinking 
on Native policy it seemed that a more radical liberalism might yet emerge. 
The colonial basis of South Africa's industrial isation and the imperatives of 
capital accumulation, however, were in the event to belie this. 
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Chapter Ten 
The growing democratic challenge 
The internal malaise of South African liberalism wh - ich, by the early 1940s, 
had surfaced in the form of growing ideological divisions within the Institute and the 
deep despondency of Hoernle, was compounded over the following years by a renewal 
of democratic optimism ushered in by the second world war. Hitherto, as we have 
seen, periodic upsurges of African political consciousness had been followed by 
periods of stabilisation where liberal political influences'ofte*n increased. The 
phase of Ethiopian church separatism in the 1890s and 1900s, for instance, had led to 
an extension of the avenues for African higher education and the establishment of 
Fort Hare. Similarly, the POst-war strike of 1918-20 had led to further avenues 
via the Joint Councils, Umteteli wa Bantu and the Bantu Men's Social Centre. The 
development of the 1. C. U. in the 1920s had led, too, to a number of responses that 
ultimately strengthened certain liberal avenues: The Bantu World, for instance, had 
been set up partly to neutralise the Africanist Abantu Batho while the creation of 
Natives Representatives under the 1936 Representation of Natives Act had strengthened 
the local anti 1. C. U. alliance in areas like Natal by the inclusion of a liberal like 
Edgar Brookes. So., at least until the late 1930s, the liberal position had never 
been directly challenged by a mass-based democ ratic movement in South African 
politics and continued African financial weakness and factional disputes had never 
seriousl-y threatened the essentially paternalistic role the liberals had continued to play 
with respect to black political movements. - 
By the onset of war in 1939, however, it was beginning to become clear that 
things were starting to change. The well-intentioned, if somewhat misconceived 
fabianism of the Ballingers and the Friends of Africa Society in the 1930s had begun to 
N 
check the monolithic liberal segregationism of the Institute of Race Relatiqný under 
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Rheinnalt-Jones, while the extension of African trade unionism in the late 1930s 
under the Federation of Non European Trade Unions indicated a potentially new 
political base for African political organisation outside the ties of patron-client 
relations that had been endemic to financially starved African movements like the 
A. N. C. and A. A. C. A new generation of African political leaders was beginning 
to come to the fore by the 1940s who were also far less likely to accept as automatic 
the clientelism by which the white liberals had continued to rest their political appeal 
to Africans. Even before the emergence of the Africanist-inclined Congress Youth 
League inside the A. N. C. in 1943 under the leadership of Anton Lembede, Nelson 
Mandela, Oliver Tambo and others, this resistance to white liberal control was 
becoming apparent. At the time of another "African deputation" to the Minister 
of Native Affairs, H. A. Fagan, in 1939, which was led by Rheinnalt-Jones, Alfred 
Xuma confessed to the seeming inability of Africans to generate their own distinct 
political ideas: 
Many of us have no views of our own; but are making expressions 
and acting according to instructions from our patrons. There 
seems to be more co-operation with and more faith in certain people 
on the part of the African leaders, than with their own compatriots. 
Because of this situation many policies which are against the interest 
of our people have been implemented with cooperation and blessings 
of some of us. 2 
Xuma's opposition was prompted in part by his growing opposition to attempts 
by the Institute of Race Relations to act as a mediator in such things as African student 
visits overseas. As Rheinnalt-Jones sought to tie in Institute activities in the late 
I 930s to government trusteeship policy under the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, so 
there had been moves to extend controls over the activities of African students who went 
to study in London. As a self-taught student in the United States, Xuma was in a 
strong position to attack the suggestion of Rheinnalt-Jones in an Institute memorandum 
that Africans from South Africa would not be "at ease" in the company of West Africans 
at Aggrey House in London and would be better off in hostel accommodation at the 
Student Movement Club where there were fewer African students. Xuma therefore 
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opposed the idea of establishing a specific committee "dealing with the welfare of 
non-Europeaýs from Southern Africa" which "may tend to run the segregated South 
African hostel I ike a reformatory or detention home from which men come out 
educationally and culturally no better than they were when they left South Africa" 
and would furtherefore help to extend the South African government's own ideas on 
3 
racial segregation in African higher education into an overseas context. 
While the Institute under Hoernle's moderating influence toned down many 
4 
of Rheinnalt-Jones's proposals to meet Xuma's objections, the issue pinpointed many 
of the features of the African hostility to perceived white liberal political and 
cultural control over African political expression by, the start of world war two. One 
of the main reasons why many African students went abroad for further education was 
to escape the tight segregation in higher education in South Africa and the failure of 
attempts to broaden the basis of courses at Fort. Hare. As a member of the All 
African Education in the 1930s. Xuma had maintained contact with one of his black 
American acquaintances, Max Yergan, who had acted as "Secretary for External 
Relations" for the A. A. C. in New York. Yergan at this time was strongly in 
favour of establishing independent black educational and research efforts and had 
been a guiding influence behind A. A. C. efforts to establish at Fort Hare an institute 
for the training of African social workers and so escape the white monopolisation of 
social work through such liberal controlled institutions as. the Jan Hofmeyr School of 
Social Work in the Johannesburg Bantu Men's Social Centre. The attempt had not 
been successful as a consequence of government resistance to the proposals, and after 
1937 Yergan's interests in New York became diverted into the International Committee 
on African Affairs, of which he became director. 
5 
But undoubtedly the legacy of 
Yergan's influence in favour of independent African efforts at educational autonomy - 
an influence which in itself strongly resembled earlier Negro American- influences in 
South Africa such as that on African separatist churches in the 1890s - left a lasting 
imprint on Xuma's mind. 
6 
It was not surprising that when Xuma became President of 
the bankrupt A. N. C. in 1940 he would begin to emphasise as far as possible independent 
black political action. that was free from white liberal control and to 
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challenge the domination of the Institute of Race Relations and Natives Representatives 
like Rheinnalt-Jones. 
7 
One of the basic problems Xuma faced, however, together with the tiny 
educated leadership at the head of the A. N. C. , was the inadequacy of research 
sources and organisational funds to fund a campaign that could resist the permeating 
empiricist and neutral ising influences stemming from the Institute. As we saw in 
chapter eight, it was only for a brief period under the secretaryship of Lynn Saffery 
that the Institute had begun to move from its role of presentor of factual information, 
as the somewhat curious alliance had been forged with Max Gordon and-the Federation 
of Non European Trade Unions. 
8 
By 1942 this phase had ended after Gordon had 
been interned, Saffery and the radicals in the Institute progressively isolated and 
Institute policy reaffirmed in a direction that accommodated itself to government 
trusteeship policy. Thus a tension began to set in as African Unions continued to 
develop in the early I 940s under the organising influence of leaders I ike J. B. Marks 
and Gaur Radebe, the "Secretary for Mines" in the Transvaal African Congress. The 
founding of the African Mine Workers Union in 1941 had acted as a crucial fillip to 
hopes for the extension of African unionism for it was seen as a key means to "create", 
in Gaur Radebe's words', "an organised body capable of taking its proper place in the 
advance of the African people out of their present state of national oppression", 
9 
while the establishment in November the same year of the Council for Non European 
Trade Unions (CNETU) acted as a key organisational base on which to build African 
political and industrial movements free from white liberal control. Inside the 
Institute., this development was but half understood, and only a small number of white 
liberals such as Julius Lewin and Solly Sachs had pressed for a new approach that 
avoided direct white control over African unions and instead entrenched a semi- 
ski I led African labour aristocracy. 
10 
By the end of 1941 it was clear the relations 
between the A. N. C. leadership and the Institute were further deteriorating as Xuma 
came under pressure to make the advancement of trade unions and increases in African 
wages one of the central planks of the A. N. C. platform. 11 . i, . the 
Africans are 
getting more and more apprehensive of what they consider to be compromising their 
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-- 
rights piece meal", he wrote to Alfred Hoernle in August 1941, and ývhile still 
acknowledging that "we (Africans and white liberals) are all working for one common 
goal", nevertheless considered that "the Africans' personal views and attitude must 
be more and more essential in any scheme towards that goal". 
II 
By 1942, even this relatively conciliatory approach by Xuma to the Institute 
liberals became strained as the development of the A. N. C. anti-pass campaign led 
Xuma to seek clarification of the Institute's attitude towards the government's 
segregation policy. 
12 
Before the resolution of this with the Institute's Council 
meeting of January 1943, the additional dimension of the senatorial election in the 
Transvaal injected a further radicalism into the A. N. C. 's leadership's policy. By 
the time Hoernle asked Xuma and the A. N. C. treasurer P. G. Baloyi (a prominent 
Alexandria businessman) to nominate Rheinnalt-Jones in opposition to the ex-co, -nmunist 
Hymile Basner it was already clear that Basner was going to win the election and that 
the political position of the A. N. C. leadership depended upon its bowing to mass 
pressure from the African electorate. The most that could now be looked for from 
white liberals, wrote Xuma, was the less organised voluntary support of radical white 
sympathisers of Congress: 
... no individual 
European elected to the Senate is going to save 
the African people from disaster. They may help but one need 
not go to Parliament to serve the cause of better race relations. 
There are many Europeans - unsung heroes - who are doing 
their bit quietly. The salvation of the African people from 
himself through his organisation which finally imply his proper 
representation. 13 
This break with the old clientelist ties, as Basner won the election following the swing 
of several prominent chiefs in the Transvaal away from Jones 
14 
acted as a critical 
turning point politically. For now the ideological homogeneity of white liberal 
representation in parliament had been broken, together with the fact that there were 
alternative radical liberals to whom the Congress leadership could appeal to for support. 
Indeed, it had been precisely the "breakup of the present team of representatives of 
the Africans in Parliament" which Hoernle had feared when he had sought Xuma's 
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nomination for Rheinnalt-Jones. 
15 Ever since the first election of the Natives 
Representatives in 1937 the group, consisting of Senators Brookes, Rheinnalt-iones, 
Malcommess and Welsh and MI's Mrs. Ballinger, and Messrs. Hemming and Burman 
had agreed to act as a distinct caucus free of I inks to any of the party groupings in 
the South African Parliament. 
16 
The election of Basner for the Transvaal in 1942 
now directly challenged this view of Natives Representation., governed as it was by 
the-distinctly conservative liberalism of such leading liberals as Rheinnalt-Jones and 
Brookes. The basis of Basner's election campaign had been both a strong attack on 
the ostensible political neutrality of the Institute of Race Relations and the toenadering 
of Rheinnalt-Jones with government segregation policy. The reason, Basner's 
election manifesto argued, for the "low level of political and economic thought in 
South Africa" was due to "European racialist politicians" and this could only be 
rectified by "energetic propaganda and political courage". Of the Native 
Representatives only Margaret Ballinger and Donald Molteno in the Cape had "brought 
the economic facts home to Parliament and to the people of South Africa", while 
Rheinnalt-Jones as a "social worker" from the Institute had essentially masked' over the 
differing interests of "firms and municipalities and the Native people". Thus, 
appealing to the growing African trade union movement, Basner rested his election 
campaign on a basically anti-fascist and democratic platform: 
The defeat of fascism is even more important to you than to the - 
European section, because Fascism aims at a greater and crueller 
exploitation of the workers and peasants of other races. Fascism's 
main characteristic is race oppression. If the government is in 
earnest about this war it must arm the African soldiers. If the 
Government is in earnest about this war it must give the Africans 
some democratic rights to fight for. 17 
This, challenge to the traditional Institute hegemony in the cooptive structures 
created in 1936 had a si,,,, nificant impact on the movement of African political conscious- 
ness in the coming years; and it can be seen to contribute to a growing democratic 
liberalism amongst both younger Africans and white liberals influenced by the war-time 
alliance against the Axis. By the end of 1942, Xuma was driven to admitting that on 
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the role of the Institute there was "no halfway house" between political involvement 
or a ', research and information bureau": if it was not prepared to come out in favour 
of the former then it would be better "to give up the attempt to deal with everyday 
problems and to leave the responsibility for dealing with daily issues of race contacts 
Committee on Race Contacts which have defined their objectives". '- The Institute, 
and conflicts to such united bodies as the Friends of Africa and the Cape Central 
he charged, had been taken in a considerably different direction by Rheinnalt-Jones 
than what had been originally intended by such liberals as his former friend Howard 
Pim, and he turned down the offer of being elected onto the Institute's Council. 
19 
But, at the same time, it was also clear that the rising nationalism inside 
Congress prevented too firm an alliance with the smaller and less well organised 
democratic liberals centred around Ballinger's Friends of Africa-and Basner. Xuma 
himself confessed to knowing less personally about these groups than the Institute, 
20 
and though some selective assistance was made use of by the Congress such as a 
memorandum on African wages prepared by William Ballinger which was used to 
buttress the Congress's evidence to the Native Mines Commission in July of 1943,21 
the emergence of the Congress Youth League in the course of that year began a 
movement towards avoiding any close contact with any white I i. berals or democrats of 
whatever political hue. The CYL began as a movement amongst the African 
intel I igentsia, many of whom had been educated at Fort Hare or Adams College in 
Natal and had direct acquaintance with the control over higher education for Africans 
by such liberals as Alexander Kerr and Edgar Brookes. Unlike the groping national- 
ism of Xuma, Calata and the Congress leadership, the League began by injecting a 
strongly racial conception of African nationalism that initially was hostile to the class 
analysis of the Communist Party and the democratic left. However, by appealing back 
to a distinctly African cultural tradition that stood antiposed to the "white western 
civilisation" and that was see n to be oppressing the African nation in South Africa, 
the CYL was able to invoke a sense of African ideological identity. This was 
lacking in much of Xuma's American-influenced pluralism that assumed that the 
A. N. C. could mobil ise South African blacks in a manner similar to the political 
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machinery of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People and 
it was thus not surprising that in the years after 1943/44 the CYL began to spread 
slowly outwards from Johannesburg to small areas in Natal, the Orange Free State 
and the Eastern Cape. where there were small groups of African teachers, medical 
22 
students and professional men. Foremost amongst the League's early ideologists 
before his premature death in 1947 was the UNISA philosophy graduate Anton Lembecle 
and it was he wýo injected the strong Africanist strain into the League's programme 
which directly challenged the entire conception of Trusteeship under which liberal 
activities had been conducted in South Africa since the early 1930s. 
23 
Trusteeship, 
in fact, the CYL Manifesto of 1944 proclaimed: 
... has meant, as it sti II seems, the consolidation by the Whiteman 
of his position at the expense of the African people, so that by the 
time of the national awakening opens the eyes of the African people 
to the bluff they live under, White domination should be secure and 
unassailable. 24 
Rejecting therefore the entire apparatus of "trusteeship" established under the 
1936 legislation, the League emphasised the necessity of directly challenging the 
psychological underpinnings of the Trusteeship ideology that contributed to the apparatus 
of state control over the African population: 
While Trustees have been very vocal in their solicitations for the 
African their deeds have shown clearly that talk of Trusteeship is 
an eyewash for the Civilised world and a-n empty platitude to soothe 
Africans into believing that after all oppression is a pleasant 
experience under Christian democratic rule. Trusteeship mentality 
is doing one thing and that very successfully, to drive the African 
steadily to extermination. Low wages, bad housing, inadequate 
health facilities, "Native education", mass exploitation, unfixed 
security on land and halfhearted measures to improve the African's 
I iving conditions are al I instruments and tools with which the path 
to African extermination is being paved. 25 
There was undoubtedly a considerable amount of ambiguity in the Youth League's 
position despite their fervent rejection of any collaboration with white liberals in the 
development of African nationalism. Many of the discussions that led to the original 
. ýU- 
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1944 Manifesto, for example, took place in the Johannesburg Bantu Men's Social 
26 
Centre and it was clear that, despite Lembede's appeal back to the values of 
"traditional" African society with its alleged "democratic" and "socialistic" features, 
the Youth League was still very much dependent upon the existing organisation of the 
African National Congress. 
27 
In terms of actual n'umbers, the CYL failed to extend 
beyond a narrow circle of the educated African intel I igentsia and by the end of 1947 
28 
stil I only had 278 members based in some four branches. But on the other hand, 
the addition of a strain of Africanist philosophy in Congress added to a sense of 
intellectual reassertion amongst the African political elite which had hitherto been 
lacking. Congress meetings in the earl y1 940s were sti II poorl y organ ised and 
attended, 
29 
while the cultural domination from white liberalism had a marked effect 
on African self-confidence. As late as 1943, for instance, Ilanga lase Natal wrote 
that African intellectuals still gave the impression of being "intimidated" for: 
They speak as though afraid of the echo of their own words. Indeed, 
in many instances when our men of ability and intellect were exchanging 
views with Europeans of liberal minds, it was left to the European to 
express themselves with moving sincerity of some of the problems con- 
fronting our people. If utter condemnation of conditions that 
perpetuate the suffering of the non European was called for the 
European did the talking while the intellectuals glossed over these 
things and kept on thinking of half loaves of bread all the time. 30 
It wa. s this PsYchological and cultural dependence upon white liberals -a 
phenomenon once termed the " Prospero complex" by the French anthropologist Mannoni 
in a study of French colonialism in Madagascar 
31 
that was to a degree broken by 
the Youth League in the years after 1944 as an increasing radicalisation began to occur 
within the Congress leadership. The initial period of political optimism in the early 
years of the war Hiat was summed up by General Smuts's statement to the Institute of 
Race Relations in Cape Town in 1942 that "segregation has fallen on evil days", began 
to fade by the end of 1943 when it began to become clear that the pass laws were not 
going to be completely removed by the war-time govdrnment, African trade unions were 
not-going to receive immediate recognition while African strikes were made illegal in 
1942 under War Measure, 145. The Atlantic Charter signed in 1941 by President 
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Roosevelt of the United States and Winston Churchill, prime minister of Great Britain, 
formed the basis for the A. N. C. document African Claims that was adopted in 
December of 1943. Rejecting completely the policy of segregation on the grounds 
that it was "designed to keep the African in a state of perpetual tutelage and militates 
against his normal development", 
32 
African Claims indicated -the growing democratisation 
of African political consciousness in the 1940s under the impact of ideas like Roosevelt's 
"Four Freedoms", the Beveridge Report in England and, after 1945, the Labour Govern" 
ment in England under Clement Attlee. While re-stating traditional political 
objectives such as the extension of the franchise, equal justice before the law, freedom 
of the press and the right to own and sel I property, Afr ican Claims also sought a welfare 
state programme that would lead to the state provision of education for African children, 
free public health and medical services, industrial welfare legislation and unemployment, 
sickness and old age benefits. 
33 
These social democratic objectives continued to characterise the A. N. C. 's 
political strategy as well, at least until the 1946 African mine strike and the collapse 
of the Natives Representative Council. Having moved as far as possible outside the 
paternalistic sphere of the white liberals in the early 1940s, Xuma hoped to model the 
A. N. C. on lines close to that of the British Labour Party, with a new power base lying 
in areas like African trade unions. The initial involvement, for example, by. African 
trade un. ions in the anti-pass campaign had given grounds for optimism for, at an Anti- 
Pass conference called by the Communist Party in November 1943, the largest delegation 
was some 43 delegates representing 26 unions, total I ing in al 1 40,160 members. 
34 
Xuma, 
however, as President of the A. N. C. , sought to guide the African unions 
into specifically 
non political channels, so that they could focus upon "industrial" and "economic" issues 
while the Congress itself, like the Labour Party, could deal with "political" questions. 
"Trade unions are not political organ isations", he said at a conference of Non-White 
Trade Unions in August 1945, "and to act as such is to prejudice their own functions as 
35 
instruments for collective bargaining of their members". Within this conception, a 
high degree of political lassitude was left to the Congress leadership within an essentially 
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elitist political philosophy that sought to control the activities of African unions. 
This implied political role for the A. N. C. as the mobiliser of Africans in 
Unions as part of a single national movement, came seriously unstuck when it came 
to the question of the organisational means by which it was to be achieved. On ce 
again it raised the question of how was Congress to reach its own members without a 
newspaper under its own control. The Youth League had an advantage here since 
it had after 1945 its own organ Inkundla ya Bantu in Natal, edited by Jordan Ngubane, 
who sought to press Xuma on launching a campaign of propaganda through the white 
press in South Africa and also through overseas newspapers. 
36 
But though he had 
been favourable to the idea of an independent African paper in the 1 930S when African 
papers had been taken over by white controlled syndicates 
37 
Xuma himself was unwilling 
to press ahead with a scheme for an independent paper run by Congress itself. 11MY 
fear is", he wrote, evincing his elitist political inclinations, "that if such a paper is 
owned by Congress, it will suffer from mass control. It will be everybody's business 
and nobody's business. Incompeten, t people by mass vote will be placed in offices 
and positions that will do the cause no credit. The last Abantu Batho, suffered and 
died from that. " 
38 
It was political caution like-th. is which stultified Congress's 
organisational efforts and progressively alienated Xuma from the Youth League and the 
Congress radicals. 
-The relative failure of Congress to stimulate mass involvement in a political 
campaign shaped by overseas social democratic models led to a coun-ter movement by 
the Youth League, together with a small number of Communist allies, to seek an early 
and precipitate mobilisafion by boycotting all the existing institutions of segregated 
political representation. If Congress was unable to raise the level of political 
awareness, then a' campaign of boycott might itself lead to crystal lising of attitudes 
around the institutions which kept Africans in a state of subjection. This was the 
reasoning which began to prevail as the movement entered the critical year of 1946 as 
overseas in India there began the movement of decolonisation/ while in New York 
attacks began on the South African policy of segregation, and the administration of 
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South West Africa, in the newly founded United Nations. 
39 
With the strike by 
African miners, and the adjournment of the N. R. C. shortly afterwards, the issues 
became crystallised. Even the leading moderates like Z. K. Matthews and Paul 
Mosaka were now resigned to the fact that the "toy telephone" of Natives Represent- 
ation had completely failed to meet their hopes of a political platform through which 
they could influence and modify government policy. the Council has developed 
0 
into a meeting with senior officials of the Native Affairs Department", Matthews 
declared, "who not unnaturally are beginning to regard the Council as part of the set- 
up of their Department and the members as Government servants like themselves". 
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In such a situation, the initiative passed to the radicals inside Congress and the Youth 
League organ Inkundla urged a "ruthless struggle on a national scale" as a means to 
transform government pol-icy. 
41 
In October 1946 the A. N. C. met in conference at 
Bloemfontein and resolved on a policy of boycott. 
42 
The boycott issue: 
As these moves towards boycotting natives representation began in the last 
quarter of 1946, many of the previous pressures at both the local level and within the 
national leadership against alleged liberal control of African politics came to a head. 
In an important sense, the use of the boycott weapon came as a direct response lo the. 
defeat through extensive state power of -the African mine strike, 
43 
and indicated that 
the strategy had passed to institutions and movements other than those of trade unions. 
Now political struggle could no longer be centred around the withdrawal of African 
labour power, which had failed to involve Africans on a wider scale outside the mines 
beyond simple condemnation of government methods in suppressing the strike. The 
alternative was to TIOCUS upon the boycott of such bodies as the Natives Representatives 
Council and the Advisory Boards established under the 1923 Urban Areas Act as a means 
of raising the wider national consciousness that was essential for a nation-wide political 
campaign. The Youth League therefore pressed hard for the boycott in the period 
after September 1946, since many of the CYL members such as Oliver Tambo and 
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Godfrey Pitie had first been involved in political activity as students at Fort Hare in 
the early I 940s when the boycott weapon had been used to improve the quality of 
food provided in the canteen. 
44 
As the Youth League leader A. P. Mda argued 
in July 1947: 
If the militants within Congress ioin hands with the present N. R. C. 
members ... the urban location boards, the rural election committees 
and progressive organisations throughout the length and breadth of 
the country, it should be possible to paralyze the whole segregationist 
machinery in South Africa, and to usher in a new period of struggle 
for direct representation in Parliament. 45- 
In this sense, the boycott was a nationalist weapon that was being used to 
try and strengthen African sympathies behind its traditional vehicle of expression, the 
A. N. C. . As such, it was still a meliorist and reformist means of effecting political 
change for it was based, as lmvo came to argue, on the idea that ". .. Africans will 
have to educate the ruling class about their wants and activities and needs before they 
can be allowed much latitude of 
. improvement". 
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But., as with independent church 
separatism in the 1890s, and later with Carveyism and independent trade union activity 
centred around the 1. C. U. , the whole strategy behind the boycott campaign was to 
wage an independent African initiative free from white liberal control. Boycotts 
directly attacked the very legitimacy of the white natives representatives to speak on 
behalf of Africans, whilst it even by-passed the question of inter-racial class solidarity 
through the expansion of trade unions. Thus it put into question not only the more 
conservative liberalism of the Institute of Race Relations and the Natives Representatives 
and showed it up as an outmoded form of paternalism, but also the more radical liberalism 
that had been espoused by the Friends of Africa, Hymie Basner and Sol ly Sachs. 
The boycott weapon, therefore, challenged not only the patron-client 
structures which had been traditionally dominated by the mainstream liberals, but even 
the white radicals, who had hoped for a fostering of trade union organisation as the 
basis behind a br: >ad-based democratic movement that would entrench an African urban 
working class as well as mobilise savings in order to generate an African business and 
trading petty bourgeoisie. The problem was that this group of left-wing inclined 
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I ibera I progress ives was both tin y and iII-I organ ise d, despite the growth in democratic 
sympathies amongst some sections of the white population during the war as a result 
of such organisations as the Springbok Legion. Before the emergence of the boycott 
issue in 1946, the only really significant achievement of this group of democrats had 
been the elec-tion of Basner in 1942., which had if anything split the white liberal camp. 
For the most part the ideas of the progressive liberals remained very much paper ones, 
though their importance was to point out the I imitations of the existing strategy of the 
mainstream liberals and to indicate the way towards a realignment of forces into a 
social democratic alliance. Leo Marquard's book The Black Man's Burden (written 
under the pseudonym of John Burger) was a land-mark in this respect, coming as it did 
from a former founder of the I ibera I student union N. U. S. A. S. and a member of the 
Institute of Ra'ce Relations who had conducted a survey of farm labour in the Orange 
Free State. 
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As a member of the Army Education Corps, Marquard was affected 
by the rising democratic tide during the war and the second edition of his book in 1943 
applied a critical marxist methodology to South African political economy in a pene- 
trating insight into the limits of liberalism. The advent of the United Party in 1934 
through the merger of Hertzog and Smuts had weakened liberalism's influence, argued 
Marquard, and the further advent of Afrikaner nationalism left liberalism "fighting a 
gallant rear-guard action ... al 
I it can do is to try to prevent the forces of reaction 
from having it all their own way. It is, indeed, apparent that the limits of reformism 
have been reached, and that any further improvement in the living conditions of the 
non-European proletariat will have to be achieved along the lines of industrial action 
rather than by liberal influence in politics". 
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This social democratic argument contrasted with much of the optimism engendered 
in many liberal circles through war-time industrial isation and the belief that marginal 
changes in government policy to allow for a larger urban African work force would in 
time lead to some more substantial political change in a liberal direction. 
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However, 
Marquard's words were only shared by a small number of fellow liberals who pressed for 
moves on the industrial and trade union front in order to establish a democratic power 
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base amongst organised African labour power. "It is high time that the liberals in 
South Africa descended from their lofty pedestal", wrote Solly Sachs angrily in June 
1947, "of abstract the or y and iII us ions and came down to earth and faced the prob I em 
in a realistic and concrete manner. Liberalism in America and in other countries, 
even in England a hundred years ago, made progress only by a correct examination of 
the workers' needs and aspirations and by the closest cooperation with the workers' 
mass organisation. Liberalism in South Africa is doomed unless and until it learns 
to understand the workers' problems and finds a concrete base of cooperation with 
the masses of workers, European and Non-European. 1150 
But how would such a reformulation of liberalism be made and who was to 
make it? Undoubtedly, the war-time experience and radicalisation inside the 
African National Congress influenced some of the African liberals into rethinking 
some of the tenets of liberalism: though it was unclear how far they were prepared to 
move in the social democratic direction. Jordan Ngubane, for example, pointed 
out in the left-wing journal The Democrat that the "fascist attack" from the Afrikaner 
nationalists might not immediately threaten the position of the liberals in the same way 
as it did the "leftist progressives", but any "collapse" of. the latter "would immediately 
expose the Liberals to serious fascist onslaughts". This necessitated a democratic 
realignment despite the problem that the liberals "are not organised into a systematic 
political grouping standing for clearly defined principles". 
51 This question raised, 
however/ the question of how far the white liberals would be prepared to move outside 
the constrictions of white party politics in order to both extend their power base and 
advance their cause amongst the large mass of non-voting Africans. In this respect, 
the 1946 African mine strike and the adjourn ment of the N. R. C. acted as a hiatus in 
many liberals' hopes as it did to the al ignment of forces inside the A. N. C. . The 
growing movement of African nationalism and the pressure for a boycott forced many 
left-wing white liberals back into the white party political camp as they became 
increasingly isolated from the African nationalists. Writing to Hofmeyr on the 25th 
September 1946, for pxample, Leo Marquard indicated the growing mood of many 
white liberals to look to Hofmeyr as a possible leader inside the United Party for the 
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attainment of liberal ideals. Reacting to a series of police raids on the offices of 
the Communist Party, trade unions, the Springbok Legion and private homes, Marquard 
wrote that "African -European relations have deteriorated and that we are rapidly for- 
feiting what African goodwill we still possessed". As one "in contact with a 
considerable left-liberal opinion" he stated that there were considerable feelings of 
bewilderment at the government's "shift away from liberalism and an appeasing of 
reaction". The only hope was for a party led by Hofmeyr which, though it could 
not necessarily control the government, could still have sufficient votes "to enable it 
to hold the balance of power in such a way that no government would be able to pass 
reactionary legislation". Such a party, based on the abolition of the industrial 
colour bar and "some form of universal franchise" would be able to attract "to the 
fight for liberalism a very large number of Left Liberals, it would have your own 
personal following, and it would attract a proportion of industrialists and men of the 
Van Eck and Van Bilioen type. The effect on local and national politics would, I 
am convinced, be far greater than most people would anticipate. But it must be 
done soon if we are to avoid disaster. " 
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This political strategy outlined by Marquard in 1946 came increasingly to 
characterise liberal thinking in the run-up to the 1948 election as it was more and 
more obvious that the African nationalist mobilisation around the boycott issue. was 
going to exclude the white liberals. While Marquard, as a teacher and publisher, 
was not in the front-line of white liberal dealings with the A. N. C. , it began to 
become clear that even those radicals who had been actively involved in African 
politics were finding their political power base ever narrowing. Hymie Basner, 
for instance, had been the focus for democratic hopes after his election defeat of 
Rheinnalt-Jones in 1942; but by 1947 he, too, was forced increasingly onto the 
defensive as he sought to rally African support around the idea of a national convention 
to rewrite the South African constitution. 
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In part, this weakness had been brought 
on as Basner sought to organise his own political bandwagon in opposition to that of 
the A. N. C. via the African Democratic Party. The campaign for constitutional 
reform led to the establishment by the A. D. P. of a campaign organised by Basner and 
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his African supporter on the N. R. C. Paul Mosaka for a E60,000 fighting fund to 
send propaganda overseas to Britain and America. Such activities directly offset 
the organisational work of the A. N. C. and Xuma accused Basner of seeking to "fight" 
the A. N. C. if his plans were not accomplished. 
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But undoubtedly, for Basner 
this was the only avenue left in an increasingly polarised situation where Natives 
Representation was under growing challenge from the boycott. As he argued at a 
meeting of the Cape Town Joint Council; the task of the Natives Representatives 
was to "correlate the activities of all those who are exploited and unenfranchised in 
their efforts to achieve the general franchise and to abolish general exploitation. " 
Such a task involved appealing on a class basis to poor whites as well as Africans for 
Natives Representatives: 
... must educate European public opinion to the realisation that the 
exploitation of the poor-whites and the underpaid white workers is 
closely related to the absence of democratic rights, the landlessness 
and the economic exploitation of the Native people. They must 
also educate the Native people to real ise the necessity of industrial 
organisation, peasant leagues and political parties to become pressure 
groups on the Government for change of the present laws and 
policies ... 
Otherwise Natives Representation is completely use- 
less, and by confining itself purely to parliamentary advocacy can be 
very harmful. It can be harmful by lulling the Africans into a 
false sense of security that their interests are being protected and 
furthered in Parliament and that there is no need to bestir themselves 
for their own freedom and well being. 55 
This activist view of the function of Natives Representation certainly marked 
a significant departure from the more limited whig view of political representation that 
continued to dominate the thinking of the other Natives Representatives such as Edgar 
Brookes, Margaret Ballinger and Donald Molteno who sought as far as possib-le to 
dissociate themselves from Basner's activities. 
56 ()n the other hand, in organising 
the rival A. D. P., Basner alienated certain key elements in the African intelligentsia 
and cut himself off from both the African National Congress and its rival in the Cape, 
the All African Convention. Basner probably felt that it was essential to establish 
his own power base, especially as until the emergence of the boycott issue the Congress 
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leadership had made almost no attempts to organise any mass following by appealing to 
the broad base of peasants and migrants. I-n the early 1940s, following his resig- 
nation from the Communist Party, Basner had picked up a selective following in some 
rural areas as he offered his legal advice to groups hard pressed by the implementation 
of the Government's reserve reclamation programme. In the Northern Transvaal,, 
contacts had been founded with the Zoutpansberg Cultural Association organited by 
the indefatigable Alpheus Maliba, 
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while as squatter camps grew up around 
Johannesburg during the war years the A. D. P. established a following amongst the 
Sofasonke Party of James Mpanza and the Moroka Vigilance Association. Certainly 
pressure from such groups was placed on the A. N. C. leadership to cooperate with 
Basner and the A. D. P. for, as a representative of the Moroka Vigilance Association 
wrote to Xuma, Basner was "indispensable as far as the African people are concerned 
and he cannot be replaced". 
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But the activities of such a body as the A. D. P. were seen to rival that of 
Congress (despite the latter's organisational lethargy) and, moreover, to challenge 
the sanctity of African nationalism. One of the main objectives behind the original 
Youth League Manifesto of 1944 had been to establish an ideological alternative to the 
A. D. P. 1 
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and as CYL pressure grew on the Congress leadership around Xuma, the 
chances for cooperation became increasingly slender. The A. N. C. Working 
Committee rejected a proposal from Basner early in 1947 for a New Party based on the 
supporters of the A. N. C. and A. D. P. on the grounds that it would confound the 
"present confusion" over the boycott issue and, in effect, strengthen the hand of the 
liberals inside the A. N. C. led by figures like Selby Msimang and Allison Champion 
who modified the original Congress boycott resolution of September 1946 with a 
proposal to launch a boycott only when a El 0,000 fighting fund had first been raised. 
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This tendency became strengthened by the real isation in the Congress leadership that 
the hoped for reform of Natives Representation, which we shall discuss in detail in the 
next chapter, was not going to move much beyond the segregationist foundations of 
the 1936 legislation while the proposed Industrial Tribunals Bill to recognise selectively 
African trade unions would in fact lead to a strengthening of state control over them. 
61 
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In such circumstances, the opposition of the A. D. P. and its front organisations like 
the South African Democratic Socialist Party- (established by one of the A. D. P. 
organisers in Johannesburg, Self Mampuru 
62 ) to the policy of boycott was seen as 
increasingly coinciding with the more "collaborationist" followers inside Congress 
who both opposed the continuation of the boycott and supported a candidate like 
Douglas Buchanan in the by election in the Transkei in 1947. For example, The 
Bantu World, edited by Victor Selope Thema, became increasingly hostile to the 
Congress policy in 1947 and 1948 and was eventually to be the vehicle for the splinter 
group organised inside Congress by Selope Thema called the National Minded Bloc. 
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But it was this paper which began to give extensive coverage to the anti-boycott 
speeches of Self Mampuru and Paul Mosaka in opposition to the official policy of the 
A. N. C. and the Congress Youth League. 
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These political limitations on Basner's campaign to mobilise African political 
support behind a radical liberal campaign organised through the A. D. P. exemplified 
the problems of the more democratic liberals in the late 1940s. Hemmed in by the 
growing nationalism of the A. N. C. , cut off 
by rivalries with his former Communist 
colleagues and restricted in his appeal to African support by only a selective regional 
following, Basner's position by 1948 was virtually untenable and it was significant that 
he abandoned the campaign for re-election as senator for the Transvaal and Orange 
Free State to the more ineffectual William Ballinger. The success of the A. D. P. was 
confined -only to its two main 4frican organisers, Self 
Mampuru and Paul Mosaka, who 
were both elected to the N. R. C. that year, Paul Mosaka beating his Communist rival 
Edwin Mofutsanyana by some 52,524 votes to 12,812. The very fact that only 
three new members were elected to the Council that year (including Mampuru) indicated 
the strength of the boycott campaign and that there were increasingly limited avenues 
in which the A. D. P. could develop. Furthermore, by very virtue of the fact that 
Basner's appeal rested through the channels of Native Representation, there was a 
tradition of legalism that pervaded his political appeal. In this sense. the A. D. P. 
was unable to develop such an opportunistic political pla*tform as the Communist Party, 
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which selectively advocated botý boycotting and participating in elections to advisory 
boards, the N. R. C. and Natives Representation in Parliament. While the A. D. P. 's 
strategy was based upon a long term realignment in liberal forces within the structures 
of political representation in South Africa, the C. P. S. A. was able to exploit whatever 
were the prevailing local sympathies to representative structures. In Johannesburg 
the local party committee advised a boycott of advisory board elections in support of 
6ý 
the Pimvil le Sub Tenants Association )while in Orlando Communist candidates were 
put up, unsuccessfully, against the Sofasonke Party of Mpanza 
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-, and in Pretoria five 
candidates stood for ten seats in the advisory board elections. 
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Similarly in the 
Cape, C. P. candidates stood for advisory board elections where local figure. s like 
Johnson Ngwevela and W. Ndunyana continued to stand on the advisory board long 
after the party was banned in 1950, while in 1948 Sam Kahn defeated Douglas 
Buchanan in the election for Natives Representative for the Western Cape. 
68 
While 
Edwin Mofutsanyana defended this expediency on the grounds that "a total boycott can 
only be achieved when sufficient organisational work has been achieved in this country", 
69 
clearly the C. P. did score against the A. D. P. in its ability to appease the radical support 
for the boycott whilst at the same time using the election to the representative institutions 
to attack the "collaborationism" of the more conservative liberals. In the Western 
Cape elections, for instance, Sam Kahn's supporters were able to muster extensive support 
in a 53% pol I when the slogan "Votela Ngoluhlobo" was able to appeal against the 
somewhat ineffective campaign of Douglas Buchanan. Winning 3,780 votes against 
Buchanan's 754, Kahn declared that "a vote for a communist is a vote for freedom. 
That is what the Africans think today. " 
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In such circumstances, Basner by 1948 moved towards a more mainstream liberal 
position by coming out in favour of a liberal party led by Hofmeyr. Only such a 
party, he declared in the wake of the Nationalist election victory over the U. P. , 
"based on the needs of the industrialists of South Africa has a chance of finally defeating 
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the feudal agrarian ideology and policy of the Nationalist Party". The statement 
was indicative of the state of the liberal position as a whole in the South African body 
politic as independent political action to establish a power base amongst black political 
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organisation has so clearly failed. Though various further attempts were to be made by 
isolated liberal groups and individuals through the 1950s and early 1960s to repeat 
Basner's enterprise and seek some form of African following - most notably Patrick 
Duncan and the white student group the African Resistance Movement 
72 
_ it was 
clear that, by the time of the 1948 election, liberal political initiative would be based 
upon party political action through the narrowly based white electoral franchise. The 
attempt at democratising liberalism in a social democratic direction had for the most 
part been unsuccessful despite the period of war-time optimism, while in the period 
after the Nationalist election victory of 1948 a number of key liberals who had been 
hitherto involved in the governmental process itself via Natives Representation became 
released to become actively involved in leading political action in the direction of a 
political party. It was in circumstances such as these that the democratic challenge 
from left liberalism was met in the 1940s. As a consequence, as the next chapter 
shows, the. more conservative liberalism of the Institute of Race Relations became 
consolidated on a cold war basis that increasingly equated the left-liberal ism of Basner, 
Sachs and The Democrat with a monolithic "communism" stemming from Moscow. 
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Chapter Eleven 
The failure of reform 
The progressive isolation of the left-liberals in the post war period in South 
Africa was a reflection of growing political polarisation on both the internal and 
external political plane. Internally, as we have seen, the democratic liberalism 
of Basner became isolated as it was caught between a growing nationalism inside 
the African National Congress favourable to the boycotting of Natives Representation 
and the more conservative liberalism of the other Natives Representatives sheltering 
behind the Institute of Race Relations. Externally, it became caught up in the 
growing cold warpolitical climate engendered by the iron curtain spreading down 
through Europe and struggles between East and West for political influence inside the 
United Nations. These latter influences began to play an increasing role in 
defining political ideologies in South African politics as the move towards national 
independence in both Asia and Africa began to shape increasingly the complexion 
of Union policy in international affairs. 
In essence, the inter-war climate of "trusteeship" underpinned by the League 
of Nations and the operation of mandates in such areas as Tanganyika and South West 
Africa was now dead. National independence in countries Fike India in 1947 meant 
that it no longer became internationally acceptable for one country to be holding 
another country in "trust", and this applied as muph to South Africa's holding of South 
West Africa as anywhere else. Even if the Western powers covertly sought continued 
South African control over a region that was beginning to emerge as a vital source of 
minerals, 
1 
it no longer became possible to justify this internationally in terms of the 
old mandate conception. The growing attacks on South Africa in this respect from 
both emergent states I ike India and from the South African A. N. C. left the 6ountry 
isolated politically and unable any longer to appeal to the old colonial allegiances of 
the pre-war years. "What has be en evolving at Dumbarton Oaks, San Francisco 
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and here in London", wrote the Union High Commissioner in London, Heaton Nicholls, 
"has been a new world system, which is very- imperfectly understood in South Africa": 
We have surrendered our old sovereignty. No longer will we be 
able to determine our own external policies without let or hindrance 
from outside. ... South African politics are quite out of date in 
the modern world. The political parties will have to realise that 
they are part of a greater whole and they cannot do what they like 
in Trade, Economics or in Politics, and that they are linked up with 
the rest of Africa in a unity of common interests. It i's an interesting 
thought to realise that it is only the British Commonwealth and the 
support of the Western colonial powers which prevents the development 
of a movement initated by Russia and its satellites to regard South 
Africa as a kind of Franco Spain, and thus turn the whole force of the 
United Nations against us. 2 
This realisation of South Africa's isolation in terms of her "native policy" thus 
initiated a reappraisal within her administrative class of the working of segregationist 
legislation. While not necessarily concerned to move away from the basic assumptions 
of this policy, the administrators in charge of the old policy of "trusteeship" increasingly 
recognised the need to reformulate this in more internationally respectable terms. At 
the same time, the widening of political opposition to the policy after 1946 by the 
A. N. C. in alliance with the Indian Congress and the Coloured Peoples Organisation 
and the growing rad. ical influences from both the Congress Youth League and the 
Communists emphasised the urgency of the situation. 
Discussions on reform: 
Thus, soon after the adjournment of the Natives Representative Council in 
August 1946, there began to occur a debate within administrative and political circles 
on the methods that might be adopted to reconsolidate the original 1936 legislation on 
a new basis acceptable to the African political elite. The problem was, as the deputy 
Prime Minister Jan Hofmeyr pointed out to the Prime Minister Smuts, that "the hitherto 
moderate intellectuals of the Professor (Z. K. ) Matthews type are now committed to an 
extreme line against colour discrimination, and have carried the chiefs with them. We 
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can't afford to allow them to be swept into the extremist camp, but I don't see what 
we can do to satisfy them, which would be tolerated by European public opinion". 
3 
Hofmeyr put the dilemmas of political change in order to re-establish the structures 
of political co-optation over the African political elite with succinct brevity. For 
how far would it be possible to engineer political change without risking losing 
further support from the white electorate to D. F. Malan's Nationalists? 
In this respect, the question turned on using as far as possible the avenues 
of consultation established under the 1936 legislation as a means to win back the 
confidence of the "moderate intellectuals" on the Natives Representative Council 
and to use the liberals elected as Natives Representatives. As had been evidenced 
during the excursions of the Native Trust after 1936, the white parliamentary 
representatives had often proved useful as channels to the African chiefs in the tribal 
reserves. 
4 
Now the question turned on whether the Representatives could be 
employed in a similar fashion regarding the intelligentsia in both the Congress and the 
R. C. who had been swung behind the boycott motion. 
This strategy by the government was in many ways determined by the mutual 
consultation. of both government representatives and white liberals as both sought to 
exploit as far as possible a situation of relative flux in the immediate post-war period. 
For the government,, the exact method of administrative reform remained unclear given 
the somewhat shaky state of the Native Affairs Department that had been denuded of 
personnel for the duration of the war. The guiding influence of the Secretary of 
Native Affairs, Douglas Smit, ended in 1945 as he was appointed to the Trusteeship 
Committee of the United Nations -a post in which he remained until 1946 when he 
returned to the more advisory role as member of the Native Affairs Commission. But 
during the time away in San Francisco and later London, he had a chance to see,, like 
Heaton Nicholls as High Commissioner in London, the development of newer ideas in 
Native Administration in the British African colonies and to meet with Lord Hailey, 
a key exponent of developing African councils as administrative units at tlýe local 
5 level. 
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In addition, for the liberals, changes were occurring in the internal politics 
of the Institute of Race Relations by the end of the second world war as the long felt 
presence of Rheinnalt-Jones as director was clearly coming to an end. Having 
suffered considerable loss of faith with his election defeat in 1942, and intolerant 
of many of the younger members like Lynn Saffery with whom he had fallen gut during 
the war years, there was growing pressure within the Institute for his removal. The 
executive committee, therefore., decided in 1945 to begin relieving Rheinnalt-Jones 
of much administrative work and to place it in the hands of the somewhat more 
ineffectual Quintin Whyte, whose ideas revolved less around the interventionist 
approach that had been carved out by Rheinnalt-Jones since the Institute's inception 
in 1929 than as a research body with leanings towards the field of "industrial relations" 
and "race relations". 
6 In the period of transition before Whyte took over full control 
in 1947 when Rheinnalt-Jones accepted an offer to work as an adviser to Anglo American 
in the opening up of its Orange Free State gold mines, 
7 
the Institute was in somewhat of 
a state of flux and was very much open to the influences of the one liberal whom 
R he inna I t-Jones and Loram had cast as ide in the ear IyI 930s, Edgar Brookes. As a 
new member of the Native Affairs Commission as well as Native Representative in the 
Senate for Natal, Brookes by late 1945 was in a position of some influence to act as a 
mediator between the Institute, as it was being reshaped under the guiding hand of 
Quintin Whyte, and government discussions on the reform of native administration. 
For Brookes this was a golden opportunity not to be missed towards remodel I ing government 
native policy to involve the African intelligentsia and political elite at the local level as 
well as carving out a new role for the liberals around the Institute in the field of local 
level administration and in industrial relations. In one sense., indeed, the opportunity 
that was presented took up some of his earlier suggestions made on the Pact Government 
between 1924 and 1926. 
For the important point was that by the end of the second world war it was 
becoming clear that the old "welfare" approach of inter-war liberalism was no longer 
adequate and risked becoming increasingly irrelevant in the new political situation. 
Many of the Joint Councils were going into decline either through apathy or open 
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African hostility and it was by no means certain that any active policy would be able 
to revive them. Brookes was in favour of avoiding the personality cult that had 
surrounded Rheinnalt-Jones. and spreading out Institute representation onto various 
bodies and committees as well as seeking, if possible, to reconcile the old differences 
with William Ballinger and the "Friends of Africa" so as to focus upon trade unions and 
industrial relations. At the same time, through avoiding direct research itself 
except certain small-scale work, the Institute could act as the co-ordinator for many 
other types of research at the local level: 
The work for racial cooperation is vital. We should not have a 
unintelligent policy of keeping Joint Councils as such alive 
artificially. Where they have lapsed, local branches of the 
Institute may be better. 'I know our difficulties in that these 
bodies tend either to get apathetic or to be run by the Leftists. 
We can combat that by encouraging cons-tructive, work, especially 
on actual local situations, and also study. Visits from Head- 
quarters, with their stimulation and guidance, are very necessary. 
We shal I miss R. J. in this, but it may also be a good thing if this 
work is more spread out. Marquard could be used, so could 
Maurice Webb. Regional Organisers could be exchanged from 
time to time. I also want to suggest that one of the ways in 
which the Carnegie Corporation could help us would be the setting 
aside of funds for travelling lecturers. 8 
Brookes's ideas for a more activist approach to race relations backed up* by 
increasing local level research coincided with his hopes for a more coherent stake 
by the white liberals in the working of the government's native policy. The boycott 
resolution of the A. N. C. in 1946 indicated that in many respects the heartland of 
South African liberalism was for the first time under systematic attack. The con- 
solidation of the Joint Councils and the Bantu Men's Social Centre in the 1920S had 
tended only to overlay the fundamental liberal structure at the local level centred 
on the Cape, the African franchise, the Transkeian and Ciskeian General Councils 
and Fort Hare. These had been able to continue, even after the 1936 legislation 
ending the Cape common rol I. for as a substitute there had been the direct represent- 
ation of African representatives in Parliament and the election of such liberals as 
Donald Molteno and Margaret Ballinger. But by the early I 940s, it was becoming 
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clear that many of the traditional assumptions behind Cape liberalism at the local level 
were finally beginning to be eroded as the Government's Betterment Areas Scheme 
fook heavy tolls on the Eastern Cape African peasantry. The South African Native 
Farmers Congress complained that many of the BSC graduates in agriculture from Fort 
Cox and Fort Hare were becoming frustrated in their ambitions to put their training 
into practice through the government's failure to employ them as agricultural instructors, 
9 
while in many parts of the Eastern Cape areas of African land holding that had been 
consolidated under the 1894 Glen Grey Act were being contracted in size. Despite 
attempts by Margaret Ballinger in the early 1940s to defend as far as possible the claims 
of individual land-holders, the channels of communication through Native Commissioners 
to central decision making became increasingly blocked and the seeming effectiveness 
of Native Representation in advancing the interests of African land claims progressively 
diminished. "The effect and apparent intention of the present land policy of the 
Department of Native Affairs", Margaret Ballinger wrote despairingly to the Under 
Secretary of Native Affairs Gordan Mears in 1943, "is that a Native peasantry shal I 
not develop but that rather the African country man shaIl continue to be, and on an 
increasing scale, a town worker with a plot of land to subsidise his town earnings". 
Even this trend, though, became checked by the actual forfeiture of many African 
claims to rural holdings after migrating to town locations thus ensuring a complete 
proletarian isa tion of many former peasant land holders in the Eastern Cape. 
10 
This 
nullified the hopes of many of the Eastern Cape African political leaders, like 
D. D. T. Jabavu., who had originally considered that the instruments of Natives 
Representation established in 1936 could be used to extract large land settlements from 
the South African Native Trust. 
11 
As a consequence by 1943 the position of Jabavu 
inside his own political body the All African Convention was becoming progressively 
weaker and he looked to his friend and mentor Margaret Ballinger for political assistance 
to defend himself from an increasingly vocal Trotskyite left wing. 
12 
A similar 
phenomenon occurred too with the Reverend James Calata in the Cape African Congress 
as attacks on the liberally-inclined Secretary General mounted in the years after 1936 
from an assorted collection of Communist and Africanist orientated political groupings. 
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With Calata, however, the main source of political assistance came from Donald 
Molteno who, until the middle 1940s, provided his client with a considerable support 
in the form of attending African political meetings and acting as a covert lobbyer in 
13 Calata's favour against his more radical political critics. 
After the end of the war., however, and particularly following the passing 
of the boycott motion by the A. N. C. in September 1946, it became clear that this 
covert support-by the Cape Representatives to the liberals inside both the A. N. C. and 
the All African Convention was ceasing to work. The structures of Native Repres- 
entation had failed to rectify the overall workings of government segregation policy 
and it had not even been able to prevent the erosion of the remnants of the African 
franchise in the Cape which ensured the Representatives of their basic political 
support. By January of 1946 The Cape African Voters Association indicated that 
the effect of the government's limitation on African land-holding was the further 
narrowing of those eligible to the franchise: many applications for the vote under 
the old E50 property qualification, for instance, were refused because it was difficult 
for Africans to demonstrate that they were employed by a "known" employer, while 
in the case of the E75 property qualification it became difficult for many Africans to 
prove that property they held in the rural areas amounted to this figure unless they 
had a house built on it "in a European style". 
14 
This weakening of the economic basis of the old Cape liberalism at the local 
level by the mid 1940s thus left the Cape liberal representatives in an increasingly 
marginal political position. Though a part of the caucus of Natives Representatives 
in Parliament, Margaret Ballinger had not necessarily agreed to all the political views 
of her more conservative colleagues like Rheinnalt-Jones and Brookes from the Transvaal 
and Natal. Considering Brookes a "timid conservative", she had in the initial years 
after 1936 sought to develop her own specific channels of consultation on specific 
issues and had tended to avoid working in too close a harmony with the other Represent- 
atives, as Brookes in particular had at first hoped. 
15 
This strategy, however, left 
her po I itica IIy weak after August 1946 when the boycott issue cha II enged the who Ie 
system of Natives Representation and in particular shattered the belief that the old 
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structures of paternalist Cape liberalism could continue to be used to sustain the 
influence of the Cape Representatives. In December of 1946 the Cape African 
Voters Association followed the A. N. C. in urging a boycott of Natives Representation 
and the position of some of the white Cape liberals' closest African supporters like 
R. H. Godlo., chairman of the Advisory Boards Congress, Professor Z. K. Matthews and 
D. D. T. Jabavu became politically threatened. Jabavu declared that, despite 
opposing the boycott motion in both the A. A. C. and the Cape African Voters 
Association, he was "overwhelmed by the youthful majority who were strong in their 
views and who forced me to refrain from exerting any influence on the discussion by 
reason of my being chairman". 
16 
Similarly Godlo pointed out that "without the 
voice of the Council" the efforts of the Natives Representatives would lose in their 
effectiveness for they would lose a valuable means through which to disseminate 
their views to the African public. 
17 
In comparison, therefore,, to the northern liberals who were more closely 
associated with the Institute of Race Relations, there, was little that such Represent- 
atives as Donald Molteno and Margaret Ballinger could actively do in the critical 
period from the beginning of 1947 to the election in 1948. Having so closely based 
her political strategy on a parliamentary view of Natives Representation in the best 
whig tradition, Margaret Ballinger was clearly taken very much unawares by events. 
"We have a strong feeling that the African population are not yet ready for a complete 
18 
repudiation of the Council", she wrote to Godlo in September of 1946, and it was 
only in December, on returning from a trip to India, that she sought a meeting of the 
Natives Representatives in Cape Town to seek some form of co-ordinated strategy vis 
av is the boycott issue. 
19 
This parliamentary lobbying, however, was clearly a far less effective means 
of trying to influence government policy and though the Cape representatives acted as 
purveyors. in the course of 1947, for resolutions by the Cape African Congress, 
20 
the 
more effective method lay in direct contact with government decision makers on a 
personal basis and the formulation of clearýcut reformist proposals. And in this respect, 
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Edgar Brookes had the upper hand for he not only had the advantage of being a 
member of the Native Affairs Commission and close contact with his fellow member 
Douglas Smit, but also the role of being mediator between the Institute of Race Relations 
and government policy. Furthermore, for the period immediately after the boycott 
resolution in 1946, Brookes was not hampered by any strongly radical African political 
influence in Natal for the Youth League did not begin to expand into the Province 
until 1947 and Congress politics were still dominated by the amenab-le presence of 
Allison Champion, whom Brookes had secured as a supporter behind his senatorship in 
the late 1930s. 
21 
Thus, after securing the support of the four Natal members on the 
Natives Representative Council - including Champion - behind his policy of 
opposition to outright boycott in October of 1946,22 Brookes Legan a campaign of 
direct influence on Hofmeyr and central government decision making. In comparison 
to the Cape representatives, Brookes was far more concerned to create new and more 
direct platforms by which to coopt the disaffected "moderate" elements within African 
political leadership. Enclosing an article published in The Manchester Guardian in 
December 1946, Brookes suggested to Hofmeyr that a Commission of Enquiry on the 
N. R. C. be set upsoas to "hold thequestion insolution", while the N. R. C. at its 
next meeting could be asked to nominate a sub-committee to confer with this Commission. 
23 
While Hofmeyr doubted the wisdom of a full sca-le Commission which he felt would lead 
"to a crystallization of the issues and a deepening of the cleavage". undoubtedly 
Brookes's ideas for an administrative reform from the top downwards had some impact in 
the coming months and indicated the changing nature of the political pressures from the 
white liberals. 
24 
In essence, Brookes's differing approach to the "solution" of the boycott issue 
to that of the Cape liberals related not only to differences of temperament but also 
cultural and historical background. As a Na ta I ian . Brookes was heir to a more 
systematised pattern of native administration dating back to Shepstone and he had a far 
greater faith in the virtues of "administration" than the Cape liberals ever did. At 
the sam e time., in comparison to the more pragmatic approach of the Cape representatives, 
Brookes's ideas were shaped in part by t, he previous discussion in the Institute of Race 
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Relations and by Hoernle in the early 1940s on blueprints for the reform of "race 
relations" . The problem was, for Brookes, -to open up the avenues of native 
administration and prevent it from hardening into a closed and impermeable system. 
In a memorandum to the other members of the N. A. C. in September 1946, for instance, 
he warned of the dangers of allowing the boycott movement to extend itself: 
If ... the Government stands on its dignity and gives the more 
moderate members of the Council no way of saving their faces, 
they will be bound to repeat their resolutions and udiourn again 
indefinitely. If we consider what that means, it means a 
declaration of civil war -a bloodless war but war nevertheless 
between Government and accredited leaders of the Native people 
chosen by a system of election which the Government itself has 
dev ised. It means that men who have hitherto stood out as 
moderates AII by the logic of events., be forced to take their 
place with the extremists. If we pause to think what a nationally 
organised non co-operation movement among the natives would 
mean, especially if among those leading it were such men as 
Matthews, the Transkeian chiefs and Luthuli, who have won the 
confidence of large numbers of Europeans and who are regarded as 
moderates and responsible men, I do not see any end to such a 
strugg le . 25 
This meant, therefore, exerting pressure through such lobbies as the Native 
Affairs Commission and the Natives Representatives' caucus in Parliament for political 
reform that would widen the political influence of the N. R. C. as well as go someway 
toward meeting the hopes of African union leaders for the legal isation of African trade 
unions. In the debate that ensued on this, Brookes was partly supported by many of 
the Native Affairs Department administrators who, though not necessarily so beholden 
to liberal influences directly through such bodies as the Institute of Race Relations, 
were nevertheless aware that that bureaucratic conception of Natives Representation 
devised in 1936 was no longer operable. Douglas Smit had long privately felt that 
the N. R. C. was an iII -devised body that fai I ed to meet the demands of the African 
in te II igentsia, 
26 
while the new Secretary of Native Affairs, G. Mears, who had the 
responsibility of charing the Council's meetings, confessed to difficulties in coping 
with its political nature. The Council, he complained to the Native Affa, irs Commission, 
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was "a 'political body and does not fit into the administrative machine at all": 
When it was born the analogy'was taken of the Transkeian 
Council, that it had worked wel I and this would too, but 
actually it is a different body altogether. The Transkeian 
Council is an administrative machine but this is a political 
body which does not fit into the administration at all instead 
of being an advisory body as an adjunct to the departmental 
machine. For that reason I find it difficult to handle the 
situation and the whole thing is an embarrassment to me. 27 
Thus, in the course of 1947, following an in-itial instruction from Smuts the 
Prime Minister, the administrative apparatus of Native Affairs began to discuss 
strategies for reform based upon the idea of politicising in some way the existing 
body of the N. R. C. and widening its area of representation so that it could represenI 
more fully the emergent interests of an African petty bourgeoisie in the urban areas. 
At the same time., though, the basic constraint on any such reformist programme was 
that it was still to work within the basic structures of Stallardist urban segregation and 
merely to widen the linkages by which the urban intelligentsia maintained contact with 
its counterparts in the reserves. While much of the actual drafting of the proposals 
for the N. A. D. was done by the Secretary of Native Affairs Mears, it seems that the 
strongest influences came from his former boss Douglas Smit and the N. A. C. who 
sought the recategorisation of Africans into "Reserve Natives", 'Urban Natives" and 
"Farm Natives", with the latter having in particular an increased stake in the 
composition of the N. R. C. via a Union Advisory Boards Congress. 
28 
However , 
in contrast to the somewhat more radical proposals of Mears for the establishment of 
an almost completely separate system of devolved local African -dominated administration, 
Smit urged for only a partial reform that still ensured the continuation of white 
administrative officials from the N. A. D. "You cannot eliminate the local officials 
from responsibi I ity", he wrote to Mears in Apr iI of 1947 when opposing the S. N. A. 's 
ideas on local tribal councils conducting their own courts. For "at present they do 
the bulk of the work and their withdrawal'would deprive the Native Councils of the 
ne. cessary driving power and the close association with our adm inistration that. is 
necessary to ensure success". 
29 
Smit's desire to shield the existing area of 
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responsibility held by the Native Affairs officials indicated the limitations on the 
debate on reform, conducted as it was within the confines of an administrative 
hierarchy anxious to preserve its own sphere of influence. Smit certainly recognised 
the need to bring in as. far as possible the African intelligentsia into public admini- 
stration and the proposals that were drawn up by the N. A. D. entitled A Progressive 
Programme for Native Administration went some way towards achieving this by 
establishing a reconstituted 50 member Natives Representative Council that h. ad powers 
to impose personal taxes on Africans, to consider the expenditure of the General 
Councils and to allocate funds to them as well as having an executive committee to 
confer with the Secretary of Native Affairs. Furthermore, a separate "Native 
Treasury" was envisaged that would be responsible for revenue obtained by the N. R. C. 
and the system of local government that was envisaged to cover the whole of the Union 
and which would be centred around a series of General and Local Councils model led on 
30 
the Eastern Cape and Transkeian precedents. While being segregationist, the 
scheme was the most comprehensive plan for a delegation of powers to both a rural and 
urban African political elite yet evolved and recalled in some ways the promises made 
by General Hertzog to Sol Plaatie and African political representatives when he was 
Minister of Native Affairs in 1912. "it should be our policy to associate the Natives 
with us in their own affairs", Smith, the essential architect of the policy, wrote in some 
notes for Mears-, 
Unless we do this they will resent our presence more and more as the 
time goes on, as has been the case in India. The growing spirit 
of nationalism among them will be less bitter if we find more scope 
for members of the intelligentsia in the Public Service rather than 
in agitation ... Lord Hailey 
has rightly drawn attention to the fact 
that throughout Africa there is a growing middle class among the 
Natives who are antagonistic to our Government and these people 
are gradually creating a position that may well prove insoluble in 
the future unless some effort is made to give them an outlet for their 
aspirations. 31 
The essentially bureaucratic context in which this policy for reform was 
conducted, however/ indicated that the influences from the white liberals 
led by 
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Brookes and the Institute of Race Relations were ultimately blunted. The Native 
Affairs Commission by May of 1947 was relegated to a more peripheral role where it 
could do little more than urge a greater political tact by the government leaders 
when it next met the African political leadership, 
32 
while Brookes's pleas at one of 
its meetings for a complete overhaul of the Industrial Conciliation Act so as to ensure 
a more wide ranging measure than the proposed Natival Industrial Bill fell on stony 
groun . 
33 
Instead, it became clear after the 8th May, when Smuts in a meeting 
with a contingent from the N. R. C. promised to try to make the Council into a "real 
working institution, helpful to the good government of this country", 
34 
that the reformist 
p rogramme was becoming in, creasingly bound up with the rest of the reconsideration of 
the Union's native policy that was currently being considered by the Native Laws 
Commission under the chairmanship of H. A. Fagan. Though the N. A. D. proposals 
did not directly conflict with the ideas of the Fagan Commission, - the more 
detailed intricacies of the reform policy such as the establishment of a Union Advisory 
Boards Congress depended upon the final resolution of the Commission's deliberations. 
In August of 1947 Fagan therefore urged that def in ition of the new scope and powers of 
the Boards be shelved until after the Commission's report and, in effect, until after the 
next general election. 
35 
It was essentially for this reason that when the N. A. D. 
programme came up for renewed discussion on I September 1947 that Smuts decided 
that the final evolution of the policy should be delayed until after the election, which 
he confidently expected to win. 
36 Administrative slowness thus delayed an early 
response to the N. R. C. 's boycott decision of September 1946 and in the event the 
United Party suffered the election defeat by the Nationalists in May 1948 without any 
coherently evolved native policy. 
The African response: 
The dilatoriness and uncertainty pervading the government's native policy in 
the months after September 1946 if anything helped to exacerbate the resolve amongst 
African political leadership in the A. N. C. to step up the boycott campaign. Xuma 
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found the initial blueprint of the N. A. D. reform policy in May 1947 "vague and 
disappointing" since the failure to remove the essentials of colour bar legislation 
left even a revamped N. R. C. assisting the Africans "to administer their own domination, 
discrimination and oppression under the cloak of giving Africans responsibility and 
participation in the administration of their own affairs". 
37 
Meeting in the Johannes- 
burg Trades Hall in June, 600 delegates of the Transvaal African Congress went on to 
condemn the proposals, especially the Industrial Disputes Bill which C. S. Ramohanoe 
argued would increase state surveillance over African unions by the N. A. D. which he 
38 
described as an "Intelligence Service Department surpassing even Marshall Square". 
Furthermore, even the most liberal ly-inclined African leaders like Jordan Ngubane 
who had written a pam ph let in 1946 arguing for an increase in the powers of the N. R. C. , 
39 
could not find much to support in the Smuts proposals since the executive powers that 
would be given the Council would still be subject to a government veto and would thus 
nullify any attempts to escalate some of the existing land provisions under the Govern- 
ment's trusteeship policy: 
As things now stand, the Native Affairs Department needs millions 
of pounds to rehabilitate African reserves alone. Parliament is 
not willing to vote the required amounts. The Africans see no 
reason why Parliament would suddenly change its attitude merely 
because the demand for the money came from an elected, wholly 
African body. 40 
These arguments reflected in essence many of the pressures being exerted by 
Africans at the grass-roots against collaborating with the government's attempts to reform 
the machinery of administering native affairs. In the Eastern Cape and Transkei, for 
example, widespread opposition began to be expressed against the seeming ineffectiveness 
of both local African representative bodies such as the Ciskeian General Council and the 
Transkeian Bunga as well as the representation in Parliament to reverse the working of, 
t. he Government's Rehabilitation Policy. The promulgation of the scheme for'the 
Ciskei in the form of Douglas Smit's New Era of Reclamation in 1945 had occurred at 
the same time as a devastating drought which had led to considerable famine amongst 
the African peasantry, 
41 
and the complaint was expressed by vi I lagers that the South 
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African Native Trust had effectively taken over most of the administrative functions 
formerly conducted at the local level via the Glen Grey Councils. This burýau- 
cratisation particularly removed many of the powers by local headmen who had often 
been in many cases, as we saw in chapter one, one of the basic pillars behind the 
reconstituted Cape liberalism in the early years of the century. Now, however, 
in areas like the Healdtown Reserve, groups of local headmen began to protest in the 
course of 1947 at the erosion of their powers which, as one petition claimed, was 
drawing local African dignatories "into the policy of administration implied in the 
Native Administration Act of 1927 which gives discretionary powers to officials to 
act without consulting the people". 
42 
These protests against the workings of the rehabilitation policy also became 
linked to the boycott campaign and this became instanced in the Transkei with the 
formation of an "Anti Rehabilitation Government Scheme Committee" which argued 
in a manifesto of October 1947 that "the present boycott in the Transkei is strengthened 
by the dissatisfaction caused by the Government in the Transkeian Territories. We 
fully endorse that if the scheme could be stopped at present pending future consideration, 
the present state of mental perturbation among Africans resulting in the anti white spirit 
can be improved and bettered in the Native Reserves". 
43 
The manifesto warned, 
however, that much of this depended upon how far the Natives Representatives were 
prepared to fight the scheme in Parliament and it was becoming clear just how ineffective 
this was now becoming. William Ballinger, in a letter in reply to the manifesto writers, 
personified the state of the more radical white liberals by simply repeating many of the 
ideas on African peasant cooperatives in the reserves linked to an urban African working 
class in the towns that had been debated in the 1930s, with the additional hope that if 
the African peasant farmers could "get busy" and pass on their ideas to the Natives 
Representatives a "plan of campaign could be worked out" providing the conclusions 
were "theoretically sound" for "representatives cannot of themselves compel the 
authorities to put them into operation". 
44 
Ballinger's hopes, however, depended upon the boycott campaign being in 
406 
effect stifled and African consciousness at the grass roots being brought behind a 
more moderate leadership that was stil I prepared to work through the system of native 
re pre sen ta ti on. 
45 
Such a hope, however, seemed increasingly implausible in the 
course of 1947 as particularly in the Transkei support began to be mobilised behind 
boycotting the by-election for the Native Representative to replace Advocate Hemming 
who died that year. The executive committee of the Transkeian African Voters 
Association declared the whole system of Natives Representation "a farce and a 
mockery" since it meant that Africans were "expected to elect a European to perpetuate 
the illusion that we are represented ... Let the people know that we are voiceless", 
46 
while a campaign began to be organised by Govan Mbeki and the Transkeian Organised 
Bodies that gathered considerable momentum despite the shortage of funds. 
47 
With 
the only known candidate standing being the rather old fashioned Cape liberal Douglas 
Buchanan who was still keen to trust to parliamentary tactics as far as possible, 
48 
the 
campaign was a considerable success. Despite the fact that Buchanan was able to 
claim that only a small number of African voters - allegedly some 94 out of 200 
gathered at a meeting in Umtata in May - actually supported the boycott campaign, 
49 
the appeal of the boycotters to the large numbers of franchiseless African peasants and 
labour migrants undoubtedly acted as a considerable fillip to the general African feeling 
that Natives Representation in toto locked a basic political legitimacy. Alfred Xuma 
urged Mbeki to encourage African voters to press the ir own candidate or candidates 
forward in the election to succeed Hemming since there was "calamity awaiting the 
Tra. nskei about its representation" 
50 
and Anton Lembede of the Congress Youth League 
urged Buchanan to stand down. 
51 
Indeed, the movement of Congress organisation 
out into the reserves indicated the strength of the boycott appeal and Buchanan's 
eventual election in the Transkei in 1947 did nothing to nullify the growing African 
opposition to being represented in an al I white parliament by whites. By the time 
that General Smuts's proposals for reform of the Natives Representatives Council were 
finally revealed in September of 1947., it was clear that even some of the foremost 
Congress moderates like Selby Msimang were forced to concede that they would do 
little to ease the political deadlock. 
52 
Pressure from the grass rootes had in areas 
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such as the Transkei ensured that by the start of 1948 Natives Representation had 
become a political symbol of the structures that were seen to be preventing the 
development of mass African political consciousness and only those white radicals 
like the Communist Sam Kahn who stood outside the white liberal caucus of Native 
parliamentary representatives gained the support of the leading local African political 
organisations. Justifying the support of Kahn in the Western Cape election of 1948 
after Donald Molteno's decision to resign from Parliament, C. A. W. Sigila of the Cape 
African Voters Association indicated the degree to which the old paternal alliance 
with Cape liberalism had been eroded. "We Africans since 1936", he wrote to 
Margaret Ballinger, "learnt to have no particular attachment to any political party, 
except to individuals who promise to consistently and persistently present our case 
with courage and honesty" 
53 
and it appeared that now., even in the former heartland 
of the South Afr-ican liberal tradition, white liberals could no longer expect automatic 
support by organised African political opinion. 
The beginnings of a party base: 
In these pol ifical circumstances in 1947 and 1948 fol lowing the general 
inadequacy of the Smuts reform proposals, liberals began to look towards a more formal 
political organisation. The election defeat of the U. P. turned many liberal hopes 
towards a political party led by Hofmeyr; and this became more and more the obvious 
direction in which to go as the Nationalists policy of ethnicisation through the apartheid 
conception both cut the white liberals off from their African political base as well as 
rem, oving them from the institutions that could effect government policy at the centre. 
The attempts, for instance, by Brookes and his fellow Institute liberals to influence 
government decisions became dashed as the death of Hofmeyr at the end of 1948 removed 
the one figure to whom liberals could look to be included in a liberally-inclined 
cabinet. 
54 Furthermore., the general direction of the Nationalist apartheid policy 
began to become clear in the course of 1949 as both Brookes and Smit were put under 
pressure to resign by the Nationalist Minister of 
Native Affairs, E. G. Jansen, from 
the Native Affairs Commission. 
55 Now, the thrust of, pol icy was to continue some 
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aspects of the previous United Party government's reform programme by extending 
local and general native councils on a regional basis; but hopes of continuing the 
idea of extending urban African representation onto a revamped Natives Representative 
Council vanished as the Nationalists sought separate political outlets via the tribally 
dominated reserves. 
56 
For the new Secretary of Native Affairs, W. W. M. Eiselen, 
appointed over the head of Mears in September 1949, and his colleague M. D. C. de 
Wet Nei, chairman of the Native Affairs Commission, this became an extension of 
the neo-Fichtean conception of Afrikaner nationdlism as it became clear in the cqurse 
of 1949 and 1950 that the National ist Government could -expect I ittle or no support 
from the urban African intelligentsia beyond a small number of opportunists like 
S. N. Bennett Ncwana and the former Treasurer of the A. N. C. , the Alexandria 
business man Richard Baloyi. 
57 
By 1950, the entire thrust of government policy 
had swung round towards by-passing the urban African petty bourgeoisie and the 
existing institutions of Natives Representation via the N. R. C. and the white parl ia- 
mentary representatives and establishing instead new structures of control via Bantu 
Authorities in the reserves under the control of a regenerated tribal political elite. 
58 
With the appointment of the apartheid ideologist Dr. Verwoerd in 1950 as Jansen's 
successor as Minister of Native Affairs this policy received strong political support 
in the central echelons of the Nationalist controlled state apparatus. 
For the liberals, these new political trends necessitated a search for a new 
political strategy in order to cope with their weakened political base. Even before 
the U. P. election defeat in 1948 the government discussion on political reform had 
been s een in some quarters of the Institute of Race Relations as an opportunity to put 
into practice some of the previous ideological revision of liberalism propounded by 
Hoernle in the early 1940s. On the basis of a memorandum written by Brookes in 
January 1948 entitled "Segregation and its Alternatives", the executive committee of 
the Institute had kept closely in mind the three political possibilities offered by 
59 
Hoernle of total segregation, parallelism and assimilation. The proposals of the 
Smuts government for a widening of the powers of the N. R. C. together with an 
extension of local government for Africans received the committee's tentative support 
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for, as it argued "there is a certain incompatibility in the demands of the Natives 
Representative Council for increased powers for itself and for extension of the present 
system of African parliamentary representation". 
60 
The Institute executive tended 
to place most faith in the proposals to extend representation to the urban African petty 
bourgeoisie via a Union Native Advi sory Boards Congress for it was in this direction 
that it saw its own influence in terms of an industrial relations and race relations 
research mediator. Echoing the previous trend towards a plural conception of 
democratic theory, the committee concluded that "the application of democracy to 
a multi-racial society with peoples of different -levels of development may involve 
forms not hitherto found necessary". 
61 
But what was to be the avenue by which these political ideas could now be 
put across given the changed complexion of the South African state and the b-lack 
political opposition to it? By the middle of 1949 Margaret Bal I inger began to move 
round towards the idea of establishing a liberal political party, which was now being 
actively championed by diverse groups of liberals, including Leo and Hilda Kuper and 
Kenneth Kirkwood in Durban. 
62 1 am quite convinced", she wrote to C. A. W. Sigila 
of the Cape African Voters Association, "that it is a fruitless (? ) waste of energy for 
those of us who have applied ourselves to the task of Native representation to continue 
longer as idolated units. It simply means that for much of the time we are beating 
the air. " 
63 
Similarly, Donald Molteno wrote that with the death of Hofmeyr there 
- was an even greater need for the organisation of liberal leaders since "the need for 
inspiring leadership is perhaps greater in the case of I iberal ism than in that of any other 
political creed". 
64 The actual decision to organise such a party, though, was 
deferred until after the 1953 election., which many liberals hoped that the U. P. could 
still win from the Nationalists, despite the creation of six extra Nationalist seats 
through the incorporation of South West Africa into the Union. 
65 
This idea of direct entry into party politics was not necessarily shared by all 
sections of the liberal establishment in South Africa for in the Institute of Race Relations, 
particularly, there was still the view that liberals should keep to a bland and empirical 
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programme. But the African National Congress came under growing influence 
from the Communist-Youth League alliance in 1949 as Xuma and Calata were removed 
from the presidency and secretaryship respectively and replaced by J. M. Moroka and 
Walter Sisulu, so clearly new avenues had to be found to appeal to the 
radicalised African political elite. Though some influence remained through Natives 
Representation as Brookes held on to the senatorship for Natal in 1948 and William 
Ballinger easily won the Transvaal and Orange Free State the same year, 
67 
it was likely 
in some areas that continued liberal participation in the elections risked alignment with 
only the tiny faction of the African rural elite who continued to oppose the boycott. 
In the Transkei, for example, the main support for the nomination of Alexander Kerr 
as parliamentary representative on his retirement as Principal of Fort Hare came from 
the Bikitsha faction of Mfengu headmen who were linked in a political alliance with 
Kaiser Matanzima, chief of the emigrant Tembus. Though this group gained control 
of the old Transkeian African Voters Association in opposition to the pro-boycott 
Transkeian Organised Bodies, the partial nature of the support led even such a con- 
servative chief as Victor Poto of the Pondo to advise Kerr to stand down. 
68 In such 
circumstances, the avenues of political influence to African political leaders via such 
channels as Natives Representation became increasingly unreliable and needed to be 
supplemented by a new political organisation based on a party apparatus. 
69 
The formation of the Liberal Party after the defeat of the U. P. in the 1953 
election should, therefore., be seen within a somewhat wider context than the pluralist 
party politics model suggested by Janet Robertson in her Liberalism in South Africa, 
70 1948-63. While clearly the timing of the white liberals' decision to form the party 
was dictated by the fortunes of the U. P. in opposition to Malan's Nationalists, it is 
important to understand the structural context in which the party was formed. This 
was unlike western liberal democratic systems since, by 1950 at the latest, it was already 
beginning to be recognised that white liberals could not hope to reverse the general 
political direction that the South African political system was taking. As Edgar Brookes 
lamented in the Hoernle memorial lecture of the Institute of Race Relations that -year, 
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a new "golden image" of nationalism had come to dominate South African politics 
"and those of us who w il I not bow down to this golden image are threatened in our 
positions and our fields of service. We may never, if the worshippers of the image 
have their way, never, never, never hold public office in South Africa, never speak 
for our beloved country in the outside world, never be reckoned as one of the real 
family in our own country. As far as may be our freedom must be curtailed, our 
voices stilled, our pens struck from our hands". 
71 
In such circumstances, the move 
towards creating a Liberal Party took on more the mantle of defensive political despair, 
indicating less a continuation of the values of a Cape liberal tradition, as Robertson 
has argued, 
72 
than a simple desire to assert basic political values which no longer 
influenced political decision making at the centre of power. 
For in essence, the early 1950s found the mainstream white liberals trapped 
in a political limbo. They had fought off the earlier attempts in the 1 940s to swing 
liberalism in South Africa leftwards under the aegis of political bodies like the African 
Democratic Party; similarly the radicalisation of the A. N. C. and the boycott 
campaign had nullified their former control of the apparatus of Natives Representation. 
But with the capture of the state by the Nationalists, and the increasing prevarication 
of the U. P. in opposition as the more conservative elements in the party surfaced to 
neutral ise the efforts of many of the urban-based I iberals to reform the party from within, 
there was little else that could be done but to go into the political wilderness. And 
this, indeed, was substantially the legacy of the Liberal Party as it sought to extend its 
miniscule political influence in the years after 1953. Deeply suspicious of efforts by 
individuals such as Patrick Duncan to seek to swing its policy behind a campaign of 
passive resistance, 
73 
it remained wedded to constitutional means of effecting political 
change to the very end of its I ife in 1968. Though still anxious to seek some form of 
role as a "bridge builder" between white and black communities in South Africa, its 
essential function in South Africa could hardly be described as one of "an agent of social 
control" for it was too politically marginal to exert any such influence. 
74 
Basically, 
the party was the logical culmination of the earlier erosion of the white liberals' power 
.I 
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base within both African politics and the central echelons of the state and it was driven 
to assert a coherent political solidarity in the context of growing polarisation of 
political ideologies in the Cold War and the rise of MacCarthyism. By keeping too 
vague an alliance with the U. P. the more committed white liberals risked compromising 
themselves completely with the evolution of the Nationalists' apartheid policy. 
Iýqually, by aligning themselves with the "left" in South African politics, they risked 
increasingly being aligned with members of the Communist Party and their allies who 
had gone underground after the party's suppression in 1950. Some form of distinct 
political body therefore was essential to advance the interests of the I iberal establish- 
ment, even if it by no means received unanimous political support in elections as many 
white liberals, until the formation of the Progressive Party in 1959, continued to vote 
for the U. P. The Liberal Party at least had the virtue of acting as one form of 
political shield for the increasingly defensive political establishment in the 1950S and 
early 1960s; and it had the advantage, too, of articulating the values of conservative 
western I iberal ism that were formulated under American global hegemony in the West 
after the demise of Britain as a world power. 
75 This it continued to do until the 
erosion of the rule of law under an increasingly authoritarian garrison state in the post- 
Sharpeville 1960s made even this limited function politically impossible. But by 
then, to adopt a phrase of Matthew Arnold, it was clear that the earlier values of a 
more'optimistic age of South African liberalism had grown "cold and sad beneath that 
breathless, voiceless night". 
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Referen ces 
For the growth in this Western interest in the post-war years see Ruth First, 
South West Africa, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1963, which, though 
dated, is still one of the best general accounts. 
2. D. L. Smit Papers, 4/46 G. Heaton Nichol Is to D. L. Smit, 18 February 1946. 
3. Jean Van der Poel (ed), Selections from -the Smuts Papers, Cambridge 1973, 
Hofmeyr to Smuts 8 September 1946. 
See chapter nine, p. 350. 
5. D. L. Smit Papers, 165/45 D. L. Smit to Mears 9 August 1945 encl. Notes of 
Discussion with Colonial Office Officials, 31 July and I August 1945; 
169/45 Notes of Interview with Dr. Margaret Read, head of the Colonial Dept. 
of the Institute of London University, 8 August 1945; 175/45 D. L. Smit to 
Piet Van der Byl , noting British expenditure of El 20,000,000 over next ten 
years under Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. "What we 
want", Smit argued, "is an overall plan so that we may look ahead without 
fear of interruption half way"; Note Book No. 3, dined with Lord Hailey 
24 September 1945. 
6. Ar SAIRR BIV Q. Whyte to Bernard Pim 4 July 1945. 
7. Rheinnalt-Jones only took up this job after being advised by both Smuts and 
Hofmeyr to do so. Shepherd Papers, MS 14/713 (w) J. D. R-T to Shepherd 
March 8 1947. 
8. Ar SAIRR BIV E. Brookes to Q. Whyte 17 April 1947. 
9. M. Ba I I. Pap. A410/B2 D. D. T. Jabavu to M. Ba II inger 4 March 1942 enc. l. 
Memo of S. A. Native Farmers Congress. 
10. ibid. M. Ball to G. Mears 13 December 1943; to D. L. Smith 11 December 
1943; Notes entitled "Complaints from the Glen Grey District Re Allocation 
of Lands", November 1943; to B. B. Mdlele 16 December 1943. 
Select Report of the Natives Representative Council, UG 10-'38, motion by 
D. D. T. Jabavu . November 1938. 
12. M. Ba 11. Pop. D70/80 5(n) D. D. T. Jabavu to M. Ba 11. and D. Mol teno 
26 Nove 1943, asking M. Ballinger to appear at the triennial conference 
414 
of the A. A. C. atBI oemfonte in on the I 6th De cember; M. Ball. to D. D. T. 
Jabavu 4 December stating that she did not feel well enough qualified to 
advise Jabavu on his position: "I am always aI ittle bit nervous of interfering 
in purely African matters, unless I have some grasp of all the issues involved. " 
As an M. P. Margaret Ba II inger appears to have been cons isten tl y" hazy" of the 
nature of African political cleavages. 
13. Donald Molteno Papers; Calata to Cape Parliamentary Representatives 2 July 
1941; Calata to Molteho 4 October and 16 December 1941'. 7 January 1942, 
19 June 1946,14 June 1947. 
14. M. Ba 11. Pap. A41 O/C2 C. A. W. S ig i la to M. Ba II inger 26 J une 1943. 
15. ibid. I E. Brookes to D. Buchanan February 10 1943. 
16. ibid., D. D. T. Jabavu to M. Ba II inger 23 September 1947. 
17. ibid, R. H. Godlo to M. Ballinger 16 April 1947. 
18. ibid. , M. Ballinger to R. H. Godlo 3 September 1946; Memorandum on the Adjournment of the Natives Representative Council August 11 1946 advocating 
a do nothing policy by the Natives Representatives in the wake of the N. R. C. 
resolution condemning the government's native policy. 
19. ibid., M. Ballinger to C. H. Malcommess December 31 1946. 
20. ibid. I D. Molteno to Calata 29 April 1947 describing interview with the P. M. 
21. Champion Papers A922 Caroline Frost to A. Champion April 20 1936 indicating 
the first overtures from Brookes even before his election; Champion to Brookes 
10 August 1937 indicating messaged passed from Brookes to Champion via the 
Durban Bantu Men's Social Centre for a'meeting; BC 581 Al 128 E. Brookes 
to-Champion 16 August 1937 promising to keep in touch with Champion on the 
wage question; - Champion to The Editor The Natal Mercury II March 1940 
indicating his support for Brookes; Champion to Brookes 5 September 1941; 
Brookes to Champion October 2 and 15 1941; Champion to Brookes 18 November 
1941 , thanking Brookes 
for making it possible to attend a conference of Chiefs 
and leaders at Pietermaritzburg, and II June 1942. 
22. Jan Hofmeyr Papers Brookes to Hofmeyr 22 October 1946 describing meeting 
with the Natal members of the N. R. C. 
23. ibid. , Brookes to 
Hofmeyr 3 December 1946 encl. article "Racial Tension in 
ýou th Afr i ca "- 
415 
24. ibid. , Hofmeyr to Brookes 5 December 1946. 
25. D. L. Smit Pap. 29/46 E. Brookes to 0. L. Smit 2 September 1946 encl. Memo 
dated 2 September 1946. 
26. ibid. , GM 69/35/D 13.1/43 D. L. Smit to wife 13 May 1943 
lamenting that the 
N. R. C. was so dominated by "the urban element"; 16 May 1943; Note Book 
No. 4 entry dated 7 September 1946 noting that Hofmeyr felt that the events in 
the N. R. C. had occurred as he had foreseen at its inception in 1936. 
27. Notes of Discussion by Native Affairs Commission 27 September 1946, p. 6 
contained in ibid. 31/46. 
28. ibid. 5/47 SNA to the Prime Minister 15 February 1947 encl. draft memo 
A Progressive Programme for Native Administration; D. L. Smit to Mears 
8 March 1947; Memo on Native Councils. 
29.13/47 D. L. Smit Further Notes Re Native Representation 2 April 1947. 
30.55/47 A Progressive Programme for Native Administration, revised after corres- 
ponden ce between Mears and H. A. Fagan, 20-22 August 1947. 
31.10/37 Sm it to Mears 24 March 1947 en c 1. Notes on Further Deve I opmen t of 
Native Councils. 
32.22.1/47 Native Affairs Commission to S. N. A. 2 April 1947. 
33.21/47 Notes of Discussion of N. A. C. re Native Industry Bill, 3 May 1947. 
34.23/47 Notes of Interview between the Prime Minister and members of the N. R. C. 
8 May 1947, P. 4; Smit indicated the political constraints on the whole reform 
programme when he privately minuted on 25th March that he did not think that 
the General and Local Councils would accept the scheme "and the intelligentsia 
will object that they want much more than is visualised. But within the orbit 
of the present political outlook I cannot suggest a suitable alternative" 11.1147 
Notes Re Representation. 
35.45/47 H. A. Fagan to Mears 23 August 1947; Mears to Fagan 20 August re to 
conversation re same. 
36.57/47 Notes of Discussion with the Prime Minister, Union Buildings, Pretoria, 
1 September 1947; see also my article, "Liberalism and Ethnicity in South 
African Politics, 1921-1948", African Studies, 35,3-4,1976, p. 250. 
. 37. The Bantu World May 17 1947; The Democrat July 1947. 
416 
38. The Bantu World June 14 1947; The Guardian May 15 and 29 1947. 
39. Jordan Ngubane, Should the N. R. C. be Abolished?, Cape Town, 1946. 
The N. R. C. was envisaged as becoming merelyan administrative institution., 
responsible for the administration of Reserves and Locations and the appointment 
of Native Commissioners, while Ngubane sought a drastic overhauling of the 
1936 legislation to ensure the extension of the Cape franchise to the other 
provinces and the increase in the number of Senators representing Africans. 
"So far", he concluded, "the Council has been a fairly good school of political 
training; now it must be turned into a training centre for Africans in the art 
of administration" (pp. 27-28). An idea exactly opposite, in many respects, 
to the scheme of Mears and Smit who sought to pol iticise the N. R. C. as an outlet 
for the urban African petty bourgeoisie and to confine administrative matters in 
detail to local and general councils under the guiding influence of the N. A. D. 
40. The Forum June 21 1947. 
41. A New Era of Reclamation, Statement of Policy made by Mr. D. L. Smit, Secretary 
for Native Affairs at a Special Session of the Ciskeian General Council at 
Kingwilliamstown, the 8th January 1945, Pretoria. The Ciskeian famine the 
same year was to some extent a propaganda coup for The Guardian newspaper 
which organised a relief fund which was assisted by Dr. Bokwe. Donald 
Molteno Pap. BC 579 C4 148' M. Ballinger to Donald Monteno October 25th 1945. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45, 
46. 
M. Ball. Pap. Memorandum drawn up by C. A. W. Sigilia from Healdtown Farmers, 
24 May 1947; lmvO' June 18 1947. 
ibid. The Anti Rehabilitation Government Scheme Committee for the Transkeian 
Territories Manifesto" . East London , 
14 October 1947. 
ib id. W. G. Ba II inger to Messrs. Ham iI ton G. Kraa i, M. P. Ng I oshe and W. J. ingo, 
22 November 1947. 
W. G. Ba II inger Papers W. G. B. to Mal commess 2 December 1947. 
The Guardian July 3 1947. 
47. A. B. Xuma Pap. Govan Mbeki to Xuma 27 June 1947; Mbeki started the anti 
ft campaign initially through the Transkeian African Voters Association in the 
period following the adjournment of the N. R. C. in 1946 before establishing the 
rival T. 0. B. ABX 400411 G. Mbeki to Xuma II September 1946. There were 
charges though that the A. N. C. leadership did nothing to help the campaign in 
the Transkei during 1947, Inkululeko December 1947. See also Brian Bunting, 
Moses Kotane . London . 
1975 f p. 145. 
417 
48. M. Ball. Pap. D. Buchanan- I September and 13 November 1947. 
49. D. Molteno Pap. BC 579 C6 96 D. Buchanan, leaflet New Transkei By Election, 
15 July 1947. 
50. ABX 570604 A. B. Xuma to G. Mbeki 4 June 1947. 
51. Brian Bunting, op. cit. , p. 
146. 
52. ABX 470917c Selby Msimang to A. B. Xuma 17 September 1947. 
53. M. Ball. Pap. C. A. W. Sigila to M. Ball. 31 January 1949. 
54. Edgar Brookes, A South African Pilgrimage, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1977, 
pp. 89-99. "Gone with him were most of our facile political hopes. Par I iament 
was now an altogether different place. We could no longer go to Ministers' 
offices and hope for a friendly reception", p. 98. 
55. D. L. Smit Pap. 18-25/49 corr. re remova I of Brookes and Sm it from N. A. C. 
A South African Pilgrimage, p. 95. 
56. E. G. Jansen , Native Pol icy of the Union of South Africa, Pretoria, 1950, pp. 7-9. 
57. No Sizwe writes that only "half hearted and tentative overtures" were made to the 
Africanists in the A. N. C. "to probe the stability of the kinks between African 
nationalism and communism", and the Nationalists soon abandoned the idea of 
co-opting petty bourgeois African leadership, One Azania, One Nation, London, 
-Zed Publications, 1979, pp. 64-65. 
58. Jeffrey Butler, Robert 1. Rotberg and John Adams, The Black Homelands of South 
Africa, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977; Patrick Laurence, The 
Transkei: The Politics of Partition, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1976; for 
African resistance to Bantu Authorities see Goven Mbeki, South Africa. The 
Peasants Revolt., Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1964. 
59. S. A. 1. R. R. Memo R. R. 3/48 CT. 8.1.48 Memo entitled "Segregation and its 
Alternatives". 
60. S. A. I. R. R. R. R. 2/48 CT. 8.1.49 Marked "Private and Confidential" 
Considerations of Proposals Regarding Natives' Representative Council,. p. 2. 
61. ibid., p. 4. 
62. W. G. Ball. Pap. BC 347 G2 11 19 Kenneth Kirkwood to M. Ballinger 21 August 
1948. 
418 
63. M. Ball. Pap. A410/BL M. Ballinger to C. A. W. Sigila 21 June 1949. 
64. Donald Molteno, "The Situation after Hofmeyr", Trek, January 1949, p. I. 
65. M. Ball. Pap. A. Paton to M. Ballinger 22 September 1952 stat-ing that he 
felt a Liberal Party would be established after the 1953 e-lection. 
66. This was especially the view in the Institute of Race Relations under Quintin 
Whyte's influence. See Q. Whyte, Apartheid and Other Policies, S. A. I. R. R. 
1950. Whyte made a visit to the United States in 1950 and came under the 
influence of various techniques of race relations involving inter-group contact 
via holiday camps, social welfare via the National Urban' League. Drawing 
on the American parallel , 
he concluded that given the I imited funds of the 
Institute and its difficulties in specialization, the main approach should be an 
eclectic one: "American experience would appear to point to this line of 
approach - to seek lines of least resistance in whatever field, probing each 
to the limit where opposition might be severely provoked", Quintin Whyte, 
Report of Trip to Europe, Britain and the U. S. A. , 1950, p. 6. 
67. The Guardian, September 23 1948. 
68. A. Kerr Pap. B. B. B. Bikitsha to A. Kerr 18 April 1948; Victor Poto to A. Kerr 
27 Apri 1 1948; A. Kerr to V. Poto, 11 May 1948 declining nomination. 
69. Margaret Ballinger also confessed to confusion in knowing the exact policies of 
African leadership, M. Ball. Pap. A41 Q/B2 M. Ball. to J. Hlehani 10 February 195, ',, 
70. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1971. 
71. Edgar H. Brookes, We Come of Age, S. A. 1. R. R. , 1950, p. 20. 
72. Robertson , op. cit. , p. 
106. 
73. See Tom Lodge, "Patrick Duncan and Radical Liberalism", unpublished seminar 
paper, University of Cape Town, May 1977. 
74. Robertson. op. c it. , p. 115. 
75. For analyses of this American -dominated cold war liberalism see Richard W. Fox, 
"Reinhold Neihbuhr and the Emergence of the Liberal Realist Faith, 1930-1945", 
Review of Politics, Vol. XXXVIII, 1976, pp. 244-265; James A. Nuechterlein, 
77rtTur M. Sc'ý Teinger Jr and the Discontents of Post-War American Liberalism", 
Review of Politics, Vol. XXXIX, 1977, pp. 3-40. B-y 1953 the changed nature 
of the global context of western liberalism was coming to be appreciated 
by Edgar 
Brookes in his book, South Africa in a Chang, ing World, Cape Town, 0. U. P.,, 1953. 
419 
Conclusion 
0 
This study has sought to show the divided and uncertain nature of South 
African liberalism over the critical period of 1883 to 1948. Searching for much 
of this time for a coherent ideological perspective, liberals in South African politics 
can only be partially designated "agents of social control" in the reproduction of 
capitalist social relations. While the more conservative sections of what was 
increasingly becoming by the turn of the century a "liberal establishment" did see-k 
a political role for themselves in the centralising political processes that were accruing 
before and after Union in 191 Of the eclectic and haphazard nature of this prevented a 
full and complete inclusion in the governmental process. 
Instead/ as we saw from the beginning of this study, liberal political interests 
increasingly contented themselves with piecemeal and local level involvement in the 
governing structure of the emerging South African state. In one important respect, 
this tradition accrued from the early nineteenth century origins of South African 
liberalism with John Philip and the missionary paternalism of the London Missionary 
Society. Bringing an empirical and loose ideological conception of politics that 
avoided the question of the nature and degree of centralised power through the state, 
the liberalism of the Cape frontier addressed itself right from the beginning with only 
ad hoc questions involving the application of moral pressure on a governmental apparatus 
that was accepted ab initio. Believing, too, in the centrality of the market economy 
and the dominance of economics over politics, early South African liberalism eschewed 
as far as possible direct political involvement and sought to rely on the workings of 
mechanistic market processes in the resolution of political problems. 
This avoidance of a coherent theory of political action led South African 
liberals for the most part to bypass attempts to politicise liberalism in a more radical 
direction. While such a tradition can be seen to exist in a minor form in South 
African history from the time of James Read and the mechanic missionaries in the early 
nineteenth century, through the ideas of J. M. Orpen in the wake of the Basutoland 
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Gun War to the attempts to introduce social democratic ideas in the late I 920s and 
1930s, via the Ballingers and Friends of Africa, for the most part liberals in South 
Africa remained contented to use informal institutions to bring pressure to bear on 
government policy in some form of "liberal" direction. 
In the nineteenth century Cape, these institutions were the missions, linked 
as they were to the evangelical revival and anti slavery lobby in the English metro- 
politan heartland, together with such associated groups as the press, the economic 
interests I inked to the Eastern Cape African peasantry and spokesmen in the parliament 
in Cape Town. Buttressed by British imperial hegemony, these arms of the nascent 
"liberal establishment" needed rarely to stir themselves for protracted political 
involvement and the colonial "trusteeship" of Africans was ultimately reposed in the 
parliament at Westminster. Defined predominantly in whig parliamentary terms, 
this view of liberalism depended heavily on the idea of rep resentation through a single 
par I ia men t. Its chief political ally in this at the local level was the small African 
political elite, who had been mission -educated and had enough educational or property 
qualifications to wield the limited right to the common franchise. 
By the 1880s, this alliance began to come under strain as the beginnings of 
industrial isation based first upon the Kimberley diamond discoveries, and later the 
growth in gold mining on the Witwatersrand, indicated growing pressures for the 
segregationist exclusion of the African petty bourgeoisie from the South African polity. 
As a consequence, despite believing strongly in a Victorian idea of continuous moral 
and political progress, the white liberal establishment in the Cape put up little or no 
resistance to both restrictions on the African franchise in 1887 and 1892 and limitations 
on peasant land holding through the 1894 Glen Grey Act. Furthermore, when it 
came to the question of Union, Cape liberals for the most part failed to put up any 
protracted fight to the constitution which confined the common franchise to its native 
Cape and entrenched the Northern system of racial exclusivism in the Transvaal and 
the Orange Free State. Instead, liberals remained contented to work via local 
level politics, placing most faith in the operation of local councils established under 
the otherwise segregationist Glen Grey Act and the consolidation of African higher 
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education in response to African emigration to overseas college and universities through 
the Un iversi ty Col I ege of Fort Hare that was opened in 1915. 
Perhaps the longer political trajectory of liberalism in South Africa might have 
been slightly different if the Cape had remained independent longer than it did. 
Michael O'Dowd, for instance, has suggested recently that "the slight degree of class 
mobility which one had in England, or in Japan, ... might have occurred in South 
Africa had industrial isation been built on the foundation of the class system of the old 
Cape Colony", and there seems no real reason to accept the contention of some 
revisionist historians like Legassick that "segregation ism" was inherently endemic to 
South African capitalism. 
2 
The fact that capitalist industrial isation occurred on an 
increasingly segregationist basis in South African history, does not necessarily prove 
that the segregationist model that was evolved was the most rational conjucture of 
political and economic restraints open to the capitalists concerned. Such ex post 
hod ergo propter hoc reasoning overlooks the autonomous political factors that were 
critical to the segregationist tendencies in South African politics occurring in the way 
they did. Crucial to this, as we saw in chapters three and five, was the development 
of a distinct white petty bourgeois class interest on the Witwatersrand in the years before 
and after Union which led to the entrenchment of territorial segregation on both the 
land, via the 1913 Natives Land Act, and in the urban areas, via the 1923 Natives 
(Urban Areas) Act. 
What was the meaning, of this segregation? In some respects, it took many 
features of the previous debate on native policy in the Cape in the late nineteenth 
century to a more advanced level, beginning a systematisation of native policies at 
Union level. Much of the f lexibil ity of the earl ier Cape pol icy, however, was 
progressively removed as the African petty bourgeoisie was increasingly denied further 
access to tracts of land for purchase or residence and trading rights in the urban areas. 
lnstead, ý an increasingly "Prussian Path" of internal capital accumulation began to occur 
whereby white trading and manufacturing interests were weaned away from the earlier 
Cape model of allying themselves with a relatively prosperous African peasantry, and 
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instead brought under the umbrella of a segregationist state bent on ensuring the 
emergence of a class of large capitalist agricultural landlords on the Transvaal and 
Orange Free State model. This refeudalisation via the Native Administration Act 
of 1927, the Native Service Contract Act of 1932 and the Native Trust and Land 
Act of 1936 were linked to a policy of destroying the African petty bourgeoisie in 
the towns, shunting it back to the reserves and seeking to channel African political 
aspirations through reconstituted tribal authorities that sought to legitimise themselves 
by 'Paying obeisance to "traditional" African cultural norms and values. 
For the liberals, these developments were either a matter of regret or else 
something to be used as a possible- instrument to advance liberal ideas on an ad hoc 
basis. The development of Fort Hare under Alexander Kerr and the control of 
Lovedale by the Reverend James Henderson indicated even before the end of the first 
world war the association between liberals and the creation of a class of African 
master farmers. These tendencies developed in the inter-war period through the 
academic study of William MacMillan, the experiment with African cooperative 
agriculture by missionaries like Bernard Huss and the Friends of Africa, established by 
the Ballingers, and the favourable attitude shown by the 1932 Native Economic 
Commission Report on ties between the Native Affairs Department, anthropologists 
and liberal welfare agencies like the Joint Councils. Thus., despite continued lip 
service to African entrenched political rights via the commo n franchise in the Cape, 
many conservative liberals looked increasingly to working within the government's 
segregationist policy as a means both to extend their own sphere of influence and 
influence official policy in a "liberal" direction. This became clear after the 
failure of the liberal-backed Non Racial Franchise Association in the Cape in the 
1929 election and the establishment the same year of the South African Institute of 
Race Relations with the aid of American money. The influence of such liberal 
accommodation ists as C. T. Loram and J. D. Rheinnalf-Jones now indicated that an 
ostensibly "non political" strategy for the S. A. I. R. R. was really designed to neutralise 
the joint Councils, many of whom had become radicalised politically at the local 
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level, and work in accord with government "trusteeship" policy as it became evolved 
in the wake of the Native Economic Commission Report. A last ditch attempt at 
widening the sphere of liberal interest to incorporate the British Protectorates and 
link African cooperatives in the reserves with buying organisations in the townships 
was defeated by the Institute as William Ballinger and the Friends of Africa were 
isolated in the early 1930s and the 1936 legislation of the Hertzog-Smuts government 
ensured continued liberal participation as Rheinnalt-Jones, Brookes and Margaret 
Ballinger were all elected as Natives Representatives under the new segregationist 
legislation.. 
The onset of the second world war, however, and the speeding. up of South 
African industrial isation., indicated that this era of continued liberal collaborationism 
within basically a colonial and paternalistic structure Was now passing. Max 
Gordon's Federation of Non European Trade Unions indicated a renewed African trade 
union challenge to white liberal hegemony over African politics which had been the 
foundations for the continued success of the system. As long as the A. N. C. and 
its small African leadership had remained weak and divided white liberals had 
continued to exercise crucial domination over African political thinking and this had 
been reinforced by their control of both African higher education, newspapers like 
Umteteli wa Bantu and The Bantu World., cultural organisatibns like the Gamma Sigma 
Club and the Bantu Men's Social Centre and the Joint Councils. African attempts 
for a separate sphere of cultural and economic rejuvenation - which had first been 
expressed in the growth of Ethiopian church separatism in the 1890S - had been 
continuously defeated and had remained little more than futile hopes held by small 
groups of Garveyists inside the A. N. C. in the 1920s and early 1 930S as the main 
pillar of African hopes, the 1. C. U. became wracked by corruption, internal division 
amid manipulation by the Joint Councils. Now, however, a new generation was 
coming to the fore which was much better educated than previously and more able to 
maintain contact with its potential supporters among the permanently urbanised African 
townsmen who continued to swell in number despite the increasingly harsh attempts by 
the state to entrench urban segregation and influx control. 
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The political expression of these new African tendencies began to become 
manifold in the early 1940s. In the All African Convention, there emerged 
growing Trotskyite influences; in the African National Congress there grew up the 
African ist-orien tated Congress Youth League; while in 1941 the Council for Non 
European Trade Unions and the African Mine Workers Union were formed. All 
these tendencies, however, became focused by the end of the war with the 
1946 African Mine Strike and the adjournment of the Natives Representative Council. 
From now on the whole legitimacy of Government Trusteesýip policy and its under- 
pinnings of separate natives representation was thrown into question and, despite 
the lack of funds, organisation and resources, the A. N. C. together with the A. A. C. 
plunged into a programme of boycotting native representative elections. 
For the first time on a Union wide basis, South African liberalism was faced 
with a concerted challenge to its already somewhat tarnished legitimacy. The white 
liberals were ill-equipped to respond to the new democratic challenges which had 
been stimulated by the war, and the increasing militancy all over the colonial world 
of nationalist agitation, and South Africa's leading philosophical advocate Alfred 
Hoernle in a general sense expressed their nostalgia for a safer and more secure 
colonial era that was now passing from their grip. The "Heartbreak House" of South 
Africa resembled in many ways George Bernard Shaw's play of 1919 that looked back 
on the Victorian sunset and it seemed that liberalism was incapable of coming to grips 
with the stark political polarities that were coming to characterise the South African 
3 
scene. 
The result we have outlined in the last two chapters of this study, though the 
full response would take us far beyond our period and lead us to the developments of 
the 1950s and 1 960s. In essence, once the immediate democratic challenge to the 
paternal liberalism centred around bod ies like the Institute of Race Relations had been 
beaten off in the middle 1940s, South African liberals set down towards formulating a 
programme to accord with Hoernle's ideas of ethnic pluralism acting as the basis for a 
liberal model of political conflict resolution in South Africa's "multi-racial" society. 
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The power-base via parliamentary representation had, even in its severely truncated 
form via Natives Representation, seen its final demise in the boycott campaign of 
1946-47 and the last vestige of the old Cape liberalism that had secured representatives 
like Margaret Ballinger and Donald Molteno came to an end. Now the strategy 
became one of trying to work through the echelons of the government native admini- 
stration apparatus which, in the last year of the Smuts government., seemed at least 
willing to discuss revamping some aspects of the Natives Representation system and 
incorporate the African urban petty bourgeoisie into an enlarged Natives Representative 
Council. As we saw in chapter eleven, these hopes came to an end with the 
election victory of the Nationalists in 1948 and the emergence of the apartheid strategy 
after 1950 of Verwoerd and Eiselen in the Native Affairs Department. The political 
response from some of the liberals, therefore, was the decision finally to form a 
separate Libera I Party after the second U. P. election defeat in 1953 and seek at least 
some political change through the white parliamentary system. 
However, even this response was only a partial one. Despite the growing 
attacks on the South African Constitution in the early 1950s, the Defiance Campaign 
and the progressive escalation of the apartheid programme whereby African political 
energies were to be redirected through revamped Bantu Authorities in the reserves, 
many white liberals continued to look to the old methods of moral pressure and peaceful 
persuasion on the Nationalist government. The Institute of Race Relations' Director., 
Quintin Whyte, echoed C. T. Loram's strategy in the early 1920s of trying to work in 
conjunction with the Dutch Reformed Churches for., as he wrote to Dr. H. W. Shepherd 
of Lovedale "issues in South Africa are moral issues and having no constitution like the 
Amercians, we have to deal on this moral basis in this field of race relations". 
4 
On 
such issues, too, as the implementation of Betterment Areas schemes in the reserves in 
the 1950s on bases similar to the original Native Economic Commission Report of 1932, 
the Institute found itself in close agreement with government policy, disagreeing mainly 
on the pace and scale of its implementation. 
5 
The objective, therefore, seemed to 
be to try to modify the workings of government policy in order to ensure. the progressive 
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incorporation of African business and political interests in the urban areas, much on 
the same lines as had been tentatively pursued immediately prior to the 1948 election. 
This, in essence, has continued to be the basis of white liberal policy in 
contemporary South African politics and there has been over the last thirty years 
almost an unbroken tradition of continuous liberal hopes, echoed in press reports, 
of a "new deal for urban blacks" whereby an African business and professional 
bourgeoisie can be eventually created as a political buffer in South Africa's growing 
racial polarisation. 
6 The plural democratic models espoused by the Progressive 
Federal Party, and the discussion on a Swiss-style canton system for urban areas 
whereby separate political autonomy can be ensured for the aspirations of the urbanised 
African political elite, are more recent features of this otherwise unmodified tradition 
of liberal optimism. 
7 Whether, of course, such a political model could ever amount 
to a "solution" to the South African "racial problem" will remain a matter for political 
punditry; but the absence of a solid African political base lends credence to the 
belief that ultimately South Africa's white liberals can only remain on the perimeter 
of South African politics. Short of massive external intervention by the Western 
powers over the head of the South African government, ita ppears tha t the I ibera I mode I 
of ethnic pluralism that makes such massive concessions to the urban African petty 
bourgeoisie has little chance of immediate success. In the longer term, government 
escalation of the Homelands policy and the granting of "independence" to such proto 
states as Transkei and Bophutatswana might introduce a new dimension that has yet to 
be thoroug hl y ana I ysed. Here there appears at least the nucleus for a political 
machine that might buttress some of the more conservati ve liberals and their strategy 
for political and economic modernisation of the urban townships. In Kwazulu, 
especially, the Inkatha machinery of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, himself a former pupil 
at Fort Hare, acts as a potential African political extension of some liberal strategy. 
Over the years, therefore, a progressive Africanisation of South African or Azanian 
liberalism could well occur and thus introduce a new dimension to the trends we have 
been discussing in this study. But so far there are no clear signs that such a develop- 
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ment could ever lead to the internal transformation'of the South African political system 
in a demonstrably I iberal -democratic direction on the western style. 
I 
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